JUDGMENT Desai, J. - This is a Defendants' appeal from a decree passed against them by the Civil Judge of Etawah declaring that the Respondents are entitled to remain in possession over the property in dispute as mortgagees; 2. The Appellants are father and four sons. They jointly executed a usufructuary mortgage on 9-1-1930 in favour of the Respondents Badri Prasad and Ram Charan for Rs. 17145/ - in respect of the property in dispute which is zamindari property situated in village Turkpur of Etawah district. On 3-3-1936 the Appellants is filed an application u/s 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, case No. 8 of 1986. In the application they did not mention the mortgage debt due to the Respondents or he fact that they were their creditors. The application was forwarded in due course to the Special Judge who u/s 8 of the Encumbered Estates Act called upon the Appellants to submit a written statement containing so far as was practicable, full particulars respecting private debts to which they were subject or with which their immoveable property was encumbered, the nature and extent of their proprietary-rights in land, the nature and extent of their property which was liable to attachment and sale u/s 60 of the CPC and names and addresses of their creditors so far as they were known to them or could be ascertained by them. The written statement was required under the law to be verified in the manner prescribed by law for the verification of a plaint. The Appellants in compliance with the notice filed before the Special Judge a written statement but they concealed at facts relating to the mortgage debt due to the Respondents. They were living in Jalaun district where they had some zamindari property; this property was mentioned by them in the written statement. They also mentioned some small debts that they owed to various persons. They owned the property in dispute, a grove and a house in village Turkpur, district Etawah but did not mention any of these three properties in the written statement. The mortgage debt was still due from them but they mentioned neither it nor the names of the creditors-Respondents. They also mentioned some small debts that they owed to various persons. They owned the property in dispute, a grove and a house in village Turkpur, district Etawah but did not mention any of these three properties in the written statement. The mortgage debt was still due from them but they mentioned neither it nor the names of the creditors-Respondents. After the written statement was filed the Special Judge published in the official gazette a notice as required by Section 9(1) calling upon all persons having Claims in respect of private debts against the persons or the property of the Appellants within a certain time. u/s 9(2) he was also required to cause copies of the notice to be exhibited at the office of each Collector within whose district any part of the property of the Appellants was situated and to send a copy of the notice together with a copy of the written statement to each of the creditors whose names and addresses were mentioned in the written statement. Accordingly he should have caused a copy of the notice to be exhibited at the office of the Collector Etawah and sent copies of it and the written statement to the Respondents; but this was not done simply because the Appellants did not mention their Etawah property, the mortgage debt and the names of the Respondents in the written statement. The Respondents did not file any claim within the time mentioned in the notice. The Special Judge was required u/s 11 to publish a notice in the manner specified in Section 9 specifying the property mentioned by the Appellants in their written statement; this notice also (sic) not exhibited at this office of the Collector Etawah because the Etawah property was not mentioned in the written statement. Among the creditors mentioned by the Appellants was one Ram Charan, who its different from the Plaintiff Ram Charan On 13-10-1936 he filed his claim and applied to the Special Judge, in response to the notice issued u/s 11, that the Appellants had given a totally wrong and false (sic) of their properties and had concealed their Etawah property. In the application and the written statement he mentioned the property in dispute, the house and the grove, On 15-1-1938 the Appellants applied for an amendment of their application, and written statement B(sic)adding the Etawah property in it. In the application and the written statement he mentioned the property in dispute, the house and the grove, On 15-1-1938 the Appellants applied for an amendment of their application, and written statement B(sic)adding the Etawah property in it. It was stated in the application that it had been left out by mistake from these documents. They, however did not apply for adding the mortgage debt due to the Respondents and their names and addresses in the written statement. They did not also explain what mistake had been submitted by them. The Special Judge at first allowed the amendment, but on 30-9-1939 he passed an order that the Etawah property added under the amendment would not be taken into consideration when deciding which property of the Appellants was liable to attachment, sale etc, Though the Etawah property was added in the written statement and a copy of the notice issued u/s 9 should have been caused by the Special Judge to be exhibited at the office of the Collector Etawah in compliance with the provisions of Section 9(2) it was not done. The Special Judge then completed proceedings in his court and passed decrees u/s 14(7) in respect of the claims made before him. Since the Respondents did not appear before him at all and did not lodge any claim no decree was passed in their favour. u/s 19(2) The Special Judge was required to send to the Collect or a list of the property of the Appellants mentioned in the notice u/s 11 and found by him to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of their debts. Though the Etawah property was added under the amendment order in the application and the written statement, no fresh notice in respect of it was published as required u/s 11. Moreover, the Special Judge had directed that the Etawah property would not be taken into consideration in deciding which property of the Appellants was liable to attachment, sale etc. Consequently the property in dispute was not included by the. Special judge in the list prepared u/s 19(2). He transmitted the, decrees to the Collector for liquidation and the sub-divisional officer concerned proceeded to liquidate them. Consequently the property in dispute was not included by the. Special judge in the list prepared u/s 19(2). He transmitted the, decrees to the Collector for liquidation and the sub-divisional officer concerned proceeded to liquidate them. The Appellants filed an application before the sub-divisional officer for being put in possession over the property in dispute; the application purported to have been made u/s 35 of the Act which lays down that if at any time after the decrees granted by the Special Judge have been sent to the Collector "any person entitled to possession of any property under the provisions of this Act applies to the Collector to be put in possession of such property, the collector shall deliver possession of such property to him." The sub-divisional officer issued a notice of this application to the Respondents. Then the Respondents appeared before the Special Judge on 3-1-1944 with an application complaining that they had received no information about the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings until they got the notice from the sub-divisional officer, that their debt had been concealed from him by the Appellants, and that they had not even been made parties to the proceedings and requesting that the proceedings be re-opened and they be permitted to the their claim. The application was dismissed by the Special Judge. on 14-10-1944 on the ground that it was barred by the provisions of Section 11 which lays down that no claim to any property mentioned in the notice issued under the section can be entertained after the expiry of the prescribed period if certain proceedings had been taken by the Collector in liquidation proceedings. Section 11 has nothing to do with the application made by the Respondents for being allowed to file a claim u/s 9; but we are not concerned with that matter now. On 26-4-1944 the sub-divisional officer ordered possession over the property in dispute to be delivered to the Appellants in spite of opposition by the Respondents. He was of the view that Section 35 applied even though the property was not mentioned in the application u/s 4 and was not included in the list prepared by the Special Judge u/s 19(2) of the Appellants' property liable to attachment, sale etc. He repelled the contention of the Respondents that the Appellants had practised fraud upon them on the ground that the question was irrelevant. He repelled the contention of the Respondents that the Appellants had practised fraud upon them on the ground that the question was irrelevant. He held that he could order possession over the property u/s 35 even though it was not included in the list prepared u/s 19(2) The Respondents filed an appeal against the order but it was dismissed. Symbolical possession over the property was given to the Appellants on 23-12-1944. Hence the suit by the Respondents. 3. The main grievance of the Respondents is that the Appellants practised fraud in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act on account of which they remained in complete ignorance of the proceedings and could not file a claim on the foot of the mortgage. So they wanted a declaration that they were entitled to remain in possession of the property as mortgagees. 4. The suit was contested by the Appellants, who denied the allegation of fraud. They admitted that they did not mention the Etawah property including the property in dispute in their application and written statement but pleaded that the omission was not fraudulent but bona fide and accidental. They alleged that the Respondents had knowledge of the proceedings under the Act but willfully refrained from lodging any claim u/s 9 because they knew that the mortgage debt had been fully satisfied out of the usufruct of the property. They also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable under Sections. 13, 18 and 45(5) of the Encumbered Estates Act and Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. The Respondents examined Ram Charan Plaintiff while the Appellants examined Prakash Chand Appellant and Jang Bahadur. Ram Charan deposed that he had absolutely no knowledge of the proceedings, in the court of the Special Judge and that the mortgage debt was not satisfied out of the usufruct. Prakash Chand deposed that he got the application u/s 4 of the Act drafted by a petition writer without the advice of a legal practitioner and did not mention the property in dispute bona fide. He further disposed that the Respondents had knowledge of the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act but did not file any claim because they knew that no debt was outstanding in their favour and they did not want to lose possession over the property by making a claim on the foot of the mortgage. 6. He further disposed that the Respondents had knowledge of the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act but did not file any claim because they knew that no debt was outstanding in their favour and they did not want to lose possession over the property by making a claim on the foot of the mortgage. 6. The learned Civil Judge held that the Appellants were guilty of fraud in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, that the suit was note barred and that the Respondents were entitled to the declaration asked for. 7. The first question that is raised before us on behalf of the Appellants is whether fraud was proved against the We are satisfied that it was. 8. The Appellants omitted to mention the Etawah property and the mortgage debt in their application. It was stated by Prakash Chand that he himself got the application drafted by a scribe and did not know all the law. We find it difficult to believe that he, who was only 19 years old then, could have gone to get the. application, drafted when his father was alive. All other particulars required to be mentioned in the application under the Act are there and there is nothing whatsoever to indicate that he did not know what was required to be mentioned in the application. The law as to the contents, of an application u/s 4 and of a written statement u/s 8 is very clear; it contains no ambiguous words which one may find difficult to understand. Prakash Chand Knew very well that there was a mortgage debt owing to the Respondents; he also knew their names and addresses. He was, therefore, bound to mention the mortgage property the mortgage debt and the Respondents' names in his written statement. He has not given any convincing explanation for his failure to do so. He has given vague and conflicting explanations on different occasions which suggests that the real explanation, namely, the desire to keep the Respondents in ignorance of the proceedings under the Act, has not come out. The Appellants could not be expected to admit that they designedly omitted to mention the mortgage debt etc. in the written statement since there was no other explanation they were obliged to give confusing and contradictory explanations on different occasions. The omission could not possibly be both accidental and deliberate or intentional. The Appellants could not be expected to admit that they designedly omitted to mention the mortgage debt etc. in the written statement since there was no other explanation they were obliged to give confusing and contradictory explanations on different occasions. The omission could not possibly be both accidental and deliberate or intentional. At one time it was suggested that the mortgage debt was not mentioned because it had been satisfied out of the usufruct. But there is absolutely no evidence to prove that it was. It was a usufruct mortgage; it was mentioned in the deed that the profits from the property would go only towards the interest; no part of the profits was to go towards the principal. No rate of interest was mentioned nor was the amount of profits mentioned in deed. No interest was to be paid by the Appellants to the Respondents. All these facts mean that the mortgage debt was not to be satisfied at all from the profits. Then there is no reliable and admissible evidence about the actual profits. The patwari has not been examined and whatever Prakash Chand stated was only on the basis of what he heard from him. Finally it was admitted by Prakash Chand himself that he was to by his father that the mortgage debt stood discharged from the usufruct after he had made the application u/s 4 Ram charan stated that the profits from the property amounted to Rs. 360/ - per annum which, after the payment of the land revenue would hardly be sufficient to pay interest. even at the rate of one per cent per annum One of the reasons given by 'the Appellants in the written statement for not mentioning the Etawah property is that since the proceedings were instituted within the jurisdiction of the Special Judge Jhansi, "inadvertently under a wrong notion" they did not mention the Respondents names. There is absolutely no connection between the forum of the proceedings and the contents of the written statement. Even when they mentioned the Etawah property by way of amendment, they did not mention the debt They also did not get notice under Sections 9 and 11 exhibited at the office of the Collector Etawah, The notices had to be exhibited at the office of the Collector regardless of where the proceedings under the Encumbered. Estates Act were to be held. Estates Act were to be held. We are satisfied that the Appellants had no judication whatsoever for not mentioning the mortgage debt and the mortgage property in the written statement and that the omission was deliberate and fraudulent and not bonafide or accidental They obviously intended to prevent the Respondents from filing a claim on the basis of the mortgage The claim would have been of a large amount. u/s 13 every claim against a, landlord, if not made within the time and in the manner prescribed' by Section 9 of the Act, is to be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions to have been duly discharged. The Appellants contemplated that if the Respondents did not file a Claim within the time allowed it would be deemed to have been duly discharged and they would be entitled to take possession of the mortgage property without having to pay a single shell. We are not at all impressed with their evidence that the Respondents knew about the proceedings in the court of the special Judge; the evidence is worthless. The mortgage debt is not proved to have been satisfied and the Respondents would not have deliberately refrained from filing a claim if they knew of the proceedings. There can be no direct evidence about fraud; it has in most cases to be inferred from the circumstances. The omission to mention the mortgage debt etc. in the proceedings is not explained except on the ground of fraud. That they knew the law very well is clear from the fact that they. applied to be put in possession of the mortgage property u/s 35; they knew the presumption contained in Section 13 etc. and were anxious to take advantage of it. They did not mention other, property of Etawah because otherwise a copy of the notice issued u/s 9 would have been sent by the Special judge to the office of the Collector, Etawah, for being exhibited, there and they apprehended that the Respondents might come to know about the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings if that were done, When Ram Charan pointed out the omission they felt compelled to apply for amendment of their application and written statement but they applied for the same with great delay and refrained from applying for publication of the notice in the office of the Collector Etawah. Undoubtedly they acted deliberately and with the intention of defrauding the Respondents. 9. The Appellants were not entitled to be put in possession u/s 35 that section comes into application only if a debtor applicant is entitle to possession of any property "under the provisions of is Act" The Appellants rely upon Section 13 but all that it lay down is that a claim not made within the time allowed is deemed to be duly discharged. It is quite a different thing to say that the debtor applicant becomes entitled to be put in possession of the mortgage, property On account of the effect of Section 13 the claim of the Respondents on the foot of the mortgage might be deemed, to be duly discharged and they might not be able to sue on the foot of the mortgage but it is quite a different thing to say that the Appellants became, entitled to be restored to possession of the mortgage property. Section 13 says nothing whatsoever about the debtor applicant's being entitled to possession of any property. Section 35 will not apply unless there is a provision laying down that a person is entitled to possession of a property in certain circumstances. Then Section 18 was retied upon. It simply mentions what the effect of a decree passed by a Special Judge u/s 14(7) is. The effect is to extinguish the previously existing rights, if any, of the claimant together with all rights if any, of mortgage or lien by which the same are secured and where a simple money decree is given, to substitute for those rights, a right to recover the amount of the decree in a particular manner, Section 18 comes into application only when a person makes a claim and the Special Judge passes a decree either for money in his favour, or for costs against him; if no claim is made and consequent no decree can be, and is, passed u/s 14(7), there is no question of any effect of a decree and Section 18 will not come up for consideration at all. If Section 18 had applied in the present case it could be argued that the mortgagee rights of the Respondents were, substituted, by a right to execute the decree passed in their favour in the manner and to the extent provided in the Subsequent sections of the Act and that consequently the Appellants were entitled to possession of the mortgage property. But in the absence of any claim by the Respondents Section 18 becomes absolutely irrelevant and the Appellants could not claim that they were entitled to be put in possession of the mortgage property under its provision There is no other section, dealing with the matter, and the sub-divisional officer acted without jurisdiction in delivering possession to the Appellants. It was argued before us that the order passed by him, confirmed on appeal by the Board of Revenue, has become final vide Section 47 read with Section 45. Section 47, however, deeds with, only "proceedings ... under this Apt". The delivery of possession by the sub-divisional officer to the Appellants not being covered by Section 35 or any other provision of the Act, could not be said to be a proceeding, under. the Act and was not privileged, It was for the trial court to decide whether it was a proceeding under the Act; if it found that it was, it would have no jurisdiction to question it but if it found that it was not, it would, have jurisdiction to go into its merits. 10. We agree which the trial court that the proceedings before the Special Judge were all vitiated by the fraud practised by the Appellants and were null and void. We also find, that the sub-divisional officer had no jurisdiction to deliver possession over the property to the Appellants and that the, Respondents' mortgage rights are not at all affected by the proceedings, in Case No; of 1936 in the Special Judge's Court. The suit. was rightly decreed and we dismiss the appeal with costs.