ORDER :- Anant Ram and his brother, Jagdish, filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, first class, Bilaspur, wherein they sought a declaration that a sale-deed executed by Mathra, deceased husband of Mt. Janki, defendant 1, in favour of Lachhu and Daya Ram (defendants 2 and 3) was without legal necessity and consideration and, therefore, would not affect their reversionary rights after the death of Mt. Janki. On an objection preferred by Daya Ram, defendant 3, the trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that it was barred by the principles of res judicata, i.e. by reason of the dismissal of a previous suit No. 76 of 1997 (Ganga Ram and others versus Mathra and others), based on the same cause of action. 2. Anant Ram and Jagdish then went up in appeal to the learned District Judge, but were unsuccessful there. Thereupon, they filed a second appeal in this Court. For reasons stated in this Courts order of yesterdays date, however, it was held that no second appeal lies in this case. At the request of the learned counsel for the appellants, the memorandum of appeal was treated as a revision petition and admitted on the following point : "Whether the Courts below have erred in holding that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 11, Civil P. C." 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that, having found that the provisions of S. 11, Civil P. C., were not applicable, the lower appellate Court was bound to remand the case for decision on other issues. I have gone through the judgment of the learned District Judge. I am constrained to remark that it betrays some confusion of thought. All that the District Judge had to decide was whether the trial Court had erred in holding that the present suit was barred by reason of the dismissal of the previous suit No. 76 of 1997. In the course of his judgment, the learned District Judge remarks : "All the same, a new plea has been taken up in this suit by the plaintiffs and it is that the previous suit failed because defendant 4, their real brother, did not conduct it with the care it demanded and was negligent. This new plea has been covered by a new issue numbered 7 in the present case. This new plea has been covered by a new issue numbered 7 in the present case. This issue, as is obvious enough, was not an issue in the previous case between these parties and was never adjudicated upon. As such, it cannot be said by any stretch of arguments that the present suit, with the new issues involved does not lie and is barred by S. 11, Civil P. C." I am unable to follow the reasoning adopted by the District Judge. The plea of negligence could not, possibly, have been taken in the previous suit and there was no question, therefore, of there having been any adjudication upon that plea in the previous proceeding. As is obvious, the main point for determination in the previous suit was: whether the alienation of 23rd Jeth 1990, effected by Mathra in favour of Lachhu and Daya Ram was on account of legal necessity and for due consideration? It is the very same issue that mainly arises in the present suit also. That issue having been decided against the plaintiffs, they are debarred from seeking a fresh decision on it, in the present suit, under the provisions of S. 11, Civil P. C. - unless, of course, they can show that in the previous suit, their guardian-ad-litem, Ganga Ram, acted with gross negligence. Under these circumstances, I do not appreciate what the District Judge means when he says at one place that the present suit was not barred by S. 11, Civil P. C. If he meant to convey that it was open to the plaintiffs to avoid the previous decree only on the ground of negligence on the part of their former guardian-ad-litem, then I must say that the language used by the Court below was not only unhappy but clumsy, in the extreme. 4. I find, however, that the learned District Judge has gone into the question as to whether the evidence on the record makes out any case of negligence on the part of Ganga Ram. On this point, there are the statements of three witnesses, Jiwanu, Lachhu and Gulaba. Jiwanu (P. W. 1) merely states :- "Sukh Ram aur Ganga Ram ne koi parwi muqadma sabka nahin ki - har do mudian ke mafad ki koi parwah na ki gai." No further details have been given. On this point, there are the statements of three witnesses, Jiwanu, Lachhu and Gulaba. Jiwanu (P. W. 1) merely states :- "Sukh Ram aur Ganga Ram ne koi parwi muqadma sabka nahin ki - har do mudian ke mafad ki koi parwah na ki gai." No further details have been given. A bald assertion that Ganga Ram was negligent would not be sufficient to make out a case of negligence. Lachhman (P. W. 2) has stated :- "Ganga Ram ne dawa kiya tha na malum parwi karta tha yah nahin." In view of his frank admission that he was not aware whether Ganga Ram conducted the case or not his statement does not help the plaintiffs. Gulaba (P. W. 3), in his turn, deposed that :- "Sukh Ram aur Ganga Ram ne khud parwi nahin ki thi." None of these three witnesses has made any serious attempt to show how and in what respect, Ganga Ram had failed to conduct the case properly on behalf of Anant Ram and Jagdish, who were then minors and who were represented by him as their guardian-ad-litem. 5. On the other hand, the following circumstances are significant. The suit filed by Ganga Ram against Mathra and others was decreed by the Subordinate Judge on 10-9-1998 B., vide Ex. P.12. Daya Ram, defendant, went up in appeal and the Judicial Secretary set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge and non-suited the plaintiffs, vide judgment Ex. D.4 dated 13-4-1999 B. Ganga Ram then went to the extent of filing a second appeal to the Ijlas-i-alia, which was, however, rejected on 8-5-2002 B., vide Ex. D.5. I fail to see how, under these circumstances, it can be said with any show of reason that Ganga Ram was negligent. As was held by a Pull Bench of Lahore High Court in Iftkhar Hussain Khan v. Beant Singh, AIR 1946 Lah 233 (A) : "A minor can avoid a decree passed against him on the ground of gross negligence on the part of his guardian ad litem, even if he has not succeeded in proving fraud or collusion on the part of such guardian." This ruling, however, will not help the plaintiffs-petitioners in the absence of clear and cogent evidence to establish negligence on the part of Ganga Ram in the previous litigation. Learned counsel for the respondents cited Talumun Begum v. Marjam, AIR 1927 Oudh 354 (B), wherein Stuart, C.J. and Raza, J., indicated that : "A subsequent suit by a person must be considered to be barred by res judicata on account of a previous suit, wherein he was represented by a next friend unless the plaintiff is able to establish that his interests were so grossly neglected by his next friend, in the previous suit, as to render the decision of the question against him nugatory in the subsequent suit." Their Lordships then went on to observe that : "The circumstance that there was no evidence which the next friend might have produced and did not produce and circumstances that he did not himself go into the witness-box, do not establish gross negligence." 6. In view of all that has been said above, I concur with the view of the Courts below that negligence on the part of Ganga Ram in conducting the previous litigation was not, at all, satisfactorily made out. Consequently, the present suit was rightly held as barred by the provisions of S. 11, Civil P. C. 7. Consequently, this so-called second appeal, which was heard as a revision petition, is rejected with costs assessed at Rs. 30/-, payable to respondents Prabh Dayal and Lachhu. Other respondents will bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.