JUDGMENT This is a first appeal by some of the principal defendants from the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Manipur passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1953 D/-11-2-1955, whereby the claim of the plaintiffs for possession of lands covered originally by pattas Nos. 12/1, 12/105, 12/3, 12/53, 12/72, 12/4, 12/78 and 12/97 situated as Yumnam Moibunglokpa Leikai, was decreed in their favour. 2 The lands were held by the predecessors of the plaintiffs, and in 1909 the Raja of Manipur took away the lands and gave them to his brother R.K. Chandrahas Singh, who built on them and lived there. After his death in 1913, his sons and other heirs have continued in possession and in 1940 the suit lands were divided amongst the heirs of R. K. Chandrahas Singh (Darbar Civil Suit No. 3 of 1940) and they began to pay land revenue for the lands. Before that the lands were held by R.K. Chandrahas Singh and after him by his heirs free of land revenue. In the second Great War, the houses in this locality were demolished and the residents left the locality in 1942. They returned after the war was over in 1945 and the defendants have been living in the suit lands thereafter, after re-building their houses. 3 This suit had a chequered career and it is useful to state at some length, as to how this litigation started, and the course it followed, as some of the legal objections are based on these facts. 4 The plaintiffs presented on 3-11-1945 a plaint or petition for these lands before the Chief Court of Manipur. The Chief Court after examining one of the petitioners forwarded the petition on 5-11-1945 to the President of the Manipur State Darbar for action for reasons which will appear from the order of the Chief Court reproduced below :- "The petitioners state that they have been out of possession of the lands for about 35 years and the lands now stand in the name of the State. The relief asked for by the petitioners may be granted by the State only. Forwarded to P.M.S.D. for favour of necessary action". 5 The President, Manipur State Darbar, ultimately sent it back to the Chief Court with the following remarks on 20-12-1946:- "So far as State Records show no acquisition has ever taken place. The relief asked for by the petitioners may be granted by the State only. Forwarded to P.M.S.D. for favour of necessary action". 5 The President, Manipur State Darbar, ultimately sent it back to the Chief Court with the following remarks on 20-12-1946:- "So far as State Records show no acquisition has ever taken place. The matter now be settled purely on merits as a civil case". 6 The Chief Court then directed that the petition be registered as a civil suit and the plaintiffs should pay court-fees, which was done, the suit being registered as Chief Court Civil suit No. 13 of 1946-47. The plaintiffs then applied for joining the Manipur State as a party and it was allowed by the Court (order dated 25-3-47). The plaintiffs had also in the meantime filed a suit for the same relief in the Cheirap Court on 23-4-1946, which was forwarded by that court to the Chief Court for disposal on the ground that the Manipur State being a party the Cheirap Court, according to the prevailing law had no jursdiction to try the suit. 7 It appears that no receipt of the summons the Manipur State Council passed a resolution "(No. 18 of 7-1-48) which is reproduced below and sent a copy of it to the Chief Court:- "18. To consider Home Ministers Memo No. 3475-GB/ Orgl., dated 18-12-47, forwarding R.C.C.s Memo No. 1434-CC/Case/II-I, dated 16-12-47, regarding Sjt. M.K.P.B. Singh , Chief Ministers attending Chief Court on 20-1-48, on behalf of the State for the disposal of Sjt. R.K. Chandrahass ingkhol. The case is purely an administrative affair over which the Chief Court has no jurisdiction. No Judicial Court should entertain appeals-preferred against the decision of the State Council. By order of H.H. in Council." 8 The Chief Court then passed the following order in the order sheet dated 20-1-1948, dismissing the suit :- "In view of Resolution No. 18 of 7-1-48 of the Manipur State Council, a copy of which is received by this court (and is on the file of this case) we have no option but to dismiss this case, as jurisdiction of the case has been declared by means of that resolution". 9 The plaintiffs then preferred an appeal to the Maharajah against this order, while this appeal was pending, the changes which resulted in the integration of the Manipur State with the Union of India took place and the appeal came up before the Chief Commissioner for Manipur for decision, presumably, by virtue of proviso to para 5 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949. 10 The Chief Commissioner in view of the fact that the Resolution No. 18 dated 7-1-48 was in flat contradiction of the order of the President dated 20-12-1946 sending the case to the Chief Court for trial and that the plaintiffs had paid court fee took the view that justice had not been done to the plaintiffs and it was necessary that the suit be tried and disposed of according to law. He, therefore, referred the case by his order dated 7-5-1951 to the Judicial Commissioner with a request to make arrangements for the disposal of the suit by whatever civil court he considered appropriate. On receipt of this order, the suit was registered afresh in the court of the Judicial Commissioner as Civil Suit No. 1 of 1951. Thereafter, the plaintiffs were permitted to amend the plaint and they filed an amended plaint. The Court then by its order dated 30-1-1953. upheld the contention raised by some of the defendants that the suit was no more exclusively triable by the court of the Judicial Commissioner, as was the case previous, to integration on account of section 23(b) of the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947 read with Darbar Resolution No. 5 dated 11-5-1948 defining "Ningthoumanai cases" and ordered that the same be transferred to the District Judge, Manipur for disposal according to law. The District Judge, on receipt of the case registered it as Title Suit No. 1 of 1953 and proceeded to try it. It is from this judgment and decree of the District Judge that the present appeal has been preferred. 11 The case of the plaintiffs as stated in the amended plaint was :- That the suit lands were allowed to be occupied by the late R. K. Chandrahas Singh, predecessor of the principal defendants at the instance of the then Maharajah in the year, 1909 with an assurance for its reversion to the former patta-holders or their successors-in-interest on the death of R. K. Chandrahas Singh. On the death of R. K. Chandrahas Singh in 1913, his heirs were allowed to occupy the lands until they could move to other lands of their own and even as late as 1941 the same was permitted on the intervention of the Maharajah. The defendants instead of vacating the land got it partitioned amongst themselves as already stated in Darbar Civil Suit No. 3 of 1940. Thus the case of the plaintiffs was that R. K. Chandrahas Singh and his successors were in permissive possession or in other words they were their licensees. 12 Only defendants 1 to 6 and defendants 8 to 10 contested the suit and filed their written statements. The contesting defendants denied that R. K. Chandrahas Singh or his heirs were allowed to occupy the lands on the conditions alleged by the plaintiffs. According to them the suit lands were acquired by the then Manipur State in 1909 after giving other lands to the pattadars in lieu of suit lands, which were later auctioned as the pattadars made wilful default in payment of land revenue. An appeal was also preferred by the pattadars to the Chief Commissioner of Assam against this acquisition, but it was dismissed. The suit lands were granted to R. K. Chandrahas Singh as "Khorpos" (free of land revenue) lands and after his death his heirs are in possession and they got the lands partitioned in Darbar Civil Suit No. 3 of 1940 amongst themselves with full knowledge of the plaintiffs. 13 They also contended that the claim of the plaintiffs was barred by time and they had obtained a perfect title to the land by adverse possession for more than 12 years. Their further contention was that the suit was bad for want of notice under section 80 C.P.C. to Manipur State before it was joined as a party. It is not necessary to state certain other pleas which were rather vague and which were not pressed in this anneal. 14 The learned District Judge held proved that the lands were taken from the pattadars and given to R. K. Chandrahas Singh and on his death to his heirs on the conditions alleged by the plaintiffs. It is not necessary to state certain other pleas which were rather vague and which were not pressed in this anneal. 14 The learned District Judge held proved that the lands were taken from the pattadars and given to R. K. Chandrahas Singh and on his death to his heirs on the conditions alleged by the plaintiffs. The defendants were thus licensees of the plaintiffs, and the suit was not time barred He also held that it was customary in Manipur State that members of the Royal family could live anywhere they liked and a resident on the land could be turned out for that purpose, but subject to the condition that the land would revert to the pattadars on the death of that member of the Royal family. He negatived the defendants plea that the lands were acquired by the State alter giving other lands and the possession of R. K. Chandrahas Singh and the defendants was adverse. 15 In this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants pressed the following points before me:- (1) That the orders reviving the suit after it had been dismissed by the Chief Court by its order dated 20-1-1948 was without jurisdiction and therefore all the proceedings after that including the judgment and decree of the District Judge were without jurisdiction and thus null and void. (2) That the suit was bad as no notice under section 80 C.P.C. was given to the Manipur State before it was joined as a defendant. (3) That the evidence failed to prove that the lands were taken on conditions as alleged by the plaintiffs. (4) The claim of the plaintiffs was time barred, and (5) The custom found by the learned District Judge as proved was not pleaded by the plaintiffs and therefore the learned District Judge was not entitled to take it into consideration and should not have allowed the plaintiffs to lead evidence on that point. In any case evidence fell short of proving the alleged custom. In any case evidence fell short of proving the alleged custom. 16 The first point about jurisdiction is based on the reasoning that under the law then in force no appeal lay against the order of Chief Court dated 20-1-1948 dismissing the suit and therefore the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 7-5-1951 sending the case to the Judicial Commissioner and Judicial Commissioners proceeding with the suit and then transferring it to the District Judge were all without jurisdiction and therefore null and void, with the result that the decree passed by the District Judge would also be a nullity. 17 It is necessary for the purpose of appreciating the questions involved in this objection to know the history of the development of courts and their powers in the old and new Manipur State. 18 In the beginning the matter was governed by the "Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur" and Rule 5 made under "Administration of Justice. Rules 1 and 2 of the said "Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur" ran thus:- "5. Appeals. Rural Panchayet. Appeals lie to the Cheirap Court. Sentences of fine of Rs. 5/-/- or less and decrees of Rs. 10/-or less are unappealable. All appeals must be filed within 2 weeks of the date of communication of the order. Sardar Panchayet. Appeals lie to the Cheirao Court. Sentences of fine of Rs. 10/- or less and decrees of Rs. 20/-or less are unappealable. All appeals must be filed within 2 weeks of the date of communication of the order. Cheirap. Appeals lie to the Darbar. Sentences of one months imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20/- or less and decrees of Rs. 30/- and less are unappealable. All appeals must he filed within two weeks of the date of communication of the order. Darbar. Appeals or applications for revision lie to His Highness the Raja only and must be filed in the Judicial Office (State Office) within one month of the communication of the order. 19 The Rule thus shows the grades of courts and the right of appeal and revision. In 1944, a Chief Court was established for Manipur State with effect from 1-2-1944, later to be replaced by the Court of Judicial Commissioner under the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950. 19 The Rule thus shows the grades of courts and the right of appeal and revision. In 1944, a Chief Court was established for Manipur State with effect from 1-2-1944, later to be replaced by the Court of Judicial Commissioner under the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950. The functions assigned to the Chief Court were the judicial functions which were then performed by the Judicial Member and the Judicial Darbar. The duties of the Judicial Member were as laid down in rule 3 under the chapter "Administration of Justice" of the Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur. The rule is re-produced below:- "3. The Judicial Member will supervise the working of all the courts and inspect them from time to time. He will receive all appeals from the orders of the Cheirap Court and lay them before the Darbar. He will also receive all petitions relating to the Administration of Justice". 20 It will be thus clear that the Chief Court came to be substituted in place of the Daroar in Rule 5 referred to above. That would mean that appeals or applications for revision lay to the Raja from the decisions of the Chief Court. 21 This appears to have been the law till the introduction of the Manipur State Courts Act 1947, which came into force from 10-8-1947. By section 22 of that Act, the following classes of Civil Courts were established in Manipur State :- "22. In the Manipur State there may be the following classes of Civil Courts, namely :- (a) The Chief Court. (b) The Court of a District Judge. (c) The Court of a Sub-Judge. (d) The Court of a Munsitt. (e) The Court of the Village Panchayet". and by section 23(a) it was declared that the Chief Court shall be the highest civil court having original and appellate jurisdiction in all matters of a civil nature. and a provision was made by the following sections of the Act for first and second appeals and revisions to the Chief Court. 22 Then comes section 31 which bars any further appeal or revision from the decision of the Chief Court. It runs thus :- "31. No appeal or revision shall lie from an original or appellate decision of the Chief Court". 22 Then comes section 31 which bars any further appeal or revision from the decision of the Chief Court. It runs thus :- "31. No appeal or revision shall lie from an original or appellate decision of the Chief Court". 23 Section 37 reproduced below preserved the existing law and practice as far as they were not modified by the Act :- "37. The existing law and practice as far as they are not modified by this Act shall continue to be in force in regard to both Civil and Criminal Courts". 24It was, therefore, pointed out that the combined effect of sections 22, 23 (a), 31 and 37 of the Act of 1947 was that the forum of the Raja (later Maharaja) as an appellate or revisional court was abolished and the vested right of appeal that the plaintiffs had under rule 5 framed under the Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur and reproduced above (on account of the litigation having been commenced in 1945) was taken away from them. No appeal could, therefore, be entertained by the Maharajah against the order of the Chief Court dismissing the suit by its order dated 20-1-1948. In my opinion this contention is based on sound grounds and must prevail. 25It is well established that the right of appeal is a vested right and cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment (Vide Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 S.C. 221 (A) ). The vested right also perishes if the court to which an appeal lies is altogether abolished without any form being substituted in its place for the disposal of pending matters or for the lodgment of appeals (see Daji Saheb v. Shankar Rao, (S) AIR 1956 S. C. 29 (B) ). 26 In the present case the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947 had already come into force (from 10-8-1947) when the order of the Chief Court dated 20-1-1948 dismissing the plaintiffs suit was passed. It has, therefore to be examined how far the right of appeal which the plaintiffs had was, if at all, affected or taken away by the provisions of that Act. There can be no doubt that the effect of sections 22, 23(a) and 31. It has, therefore to be examined how far the right of appeal which the plaintiffs had was, if at all, affected or taken away by the provisions of that Act. There can be no doubt that the effect of sections 22, 23(a) and 31. was to abolish the Court of Maharajah as a Civil Court of appeal, and no other forum was substituted in its place by the Act. The right of appeal of the plaintiffs was thus necessarily lost by this abolition. S. 37 however preserved the existing law as far as it was not modified by the Act. If therefore, there was any such modification in respect of the rights °f appeal then the effect of section 37 would be that the right of appeal was taken away expressly or by necessary intendment. As already seen the old law was modified as far as appeals to the Maharajah were concerned. They were abolished as a result of the provisions of section 31. Therefore under section 37, the right of appeal which may have existed before the Act came into force were lost. It must therefore be found that the plaintiffs had no right of anneal from the order of the Chief Court dated 20-1-48 dismissing the suit. 27Even the power that the Maharajah was given by section 36 reproduced below was taker away by the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950. which came into effect on 20-1-1950 :- "36. Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to limit or bar the full and unqualified exercise of His Highnesss pleasure in calling for the records of any civil or criminal case decided by any of the State Courts whenever in His Highnesss opinion there has been a breach of law or custom or usage having the force of law and advising the court to take such action as he may deem suitable". 28 Therefore even if it were presumed that the appeal which the plaintiffs had preferred to the Maharajah against the order of the Chief Court dated 20-1-1948 was nothing but an application to exercise his powers under section 36. then also the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 7-5-1951 does not help the plaintiffs as it was passed after the Dowers vested by section 36 had already been withdrawn. That proceeding therefore lapsed on 20-1-1950 and no order could be passed on 7-5-1951. then also the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 7-5-1951 does not help the plaintiffs as it was passed after the Dowers vested by section 36 had already been withdrawn. That proceeding therefore lapsed on 20-1-1950 and no order could be passed on 7-5-1951. 29 It will be thus seen that the appeal preferred against the Chief Courts order dated 20-1-1948 was not competent and the Chief Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the order dated 7-5-1951. That order was, therefore, a nullity and if follows that the proceedings taken by the Judicial Commissioners Court and the Court of the District Judge would also be mere nullities. 30 Piru Pramanik v. Dhanabhanrlar Co., Ltd. AIR 1937 427 (C) was a case in which the facts were similar. No appeal lay to the District Judge, still he entertained the appeals and remanded the case for re-hearing to the trial court. Parties did not raise any objection before the District Judge that no appeal was provided for by law. The Calcutta High Court set aside the remand order of the District Judge and the decree passed by the trial court after remand and restored the original order of the trial court. The observations in that case were:- "It is a proposition too well established that if a Court is not invested with jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter, this usurpation of authority for which there is no warrant in law would make all decrees and orders mere nullities which could be set aside or declared void as the circumstances might require : vide Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyani Dasee, ILR 38 Cal 639 (D). It is also well settled that the authority or jurisdiction of an appellate court to review or revise a decision of the court below must be given by a statute or an equivalent authority. The Jucicial Committee laid that down clearly in Meenakshi Naidu v. Sub-ramaniya, 14 Ind App. 160 (PC) (E) and this was repeated in Rangoon Botatong Co. v. Collector of Rangoon, ILR 40 Cal. 21 (PC) (F) where the observation of Lord Bramwell in Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Rly. Co., (1877) 3 Q B D 1 (G) was quoted that: An appeal does not exist in the nature of things. A right of appeal from any decision of any Tribunal must be given by an express enactment. 21 (PC) (F) where the observation of Lord Bramwell in Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Rly. Co., (1877) 3 Q B D 1 (G) was quoted that: An appeal does not exist in the nature of things. A right of appeal from any decision of any Tribunal must be given by an express enactment. Where there is no appeal provided for by law a consent or waiver on the part of the respondent could not invest the appellate court with the jurisdiction it did not possess : see the observation of the Judicial Committee in the case reported in 14 Ind App. 160 (PC) (E)". "It is true that every court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case and when its jurisdiction is challenged it is its duty to determine the actual existence of things on which alone it can assume jurisdiction. If it decides that it has jurisdiction then that decision would be binding, as a court has always the jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly, and it would not do to say that the conclusion was wrong. This principle has been applied in many cases of which the cases in Rashmoni Dasi v. Gunada Sundari Dasi, 20 Cal LJ 213: (AIR 1915 Cal 49) (H): Girwar Narayan v. Kamla Prasad, ILR 12 Pat 177: (AIR 1933 Pat. 104) (I) and Birajmchini v. Sarala Devi. 41 Cal wn 396: (AIR 1937 Cal 88) (J) may be taken as types. If the appellate Court had decided that the appeals were competent when they first came up for hearing, then that decision, unless set aside by any higher Tribunal, could not be attacked at a subsequent stage of the proceeding, even if the decision was wrong. But when, as here, there was no decision by the appellate court on this point, I am unable to hold that mere inaction or want of objection on the part of the respondents would prove the existence of things, the existence of which alone would make the appeals competent under S. 153, Ben. Ten. Act". 31That exactly is the position in the present case and whatever was done after the order of the Chief Court dated 20-1-1948 must be regarded as a nullity. In ILR 11 Mad. Ten. Act". 31That exactly is the position in the present case and whatever was done after the order of the Chief Court dated 20-1-1948 must be regarded as a nullity. In ILR 11 Mad. 26 (PC) (E) a case in which the Madras High Court had entertained an appeal from an adjudication from which no appeal was provided by any enactment, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the decree of the High Court was a nullity and further remarked that in that case there was an inherent incompetency in the High Court to deal with the question brought before it and no consent could have conferred upon the High Court that jurisdiction which it never possessed. Thus where there is want of inherent jurisdiction, waiver or consent by parties will not give the court jurisdiction, and there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that the defendants not having raised an objection to jurisdiction before the Lower Court must be deemed to have waived it. 32It was also urged by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that the objection to jurisdiction not having been taken in the trial court, the appellants could not be permitted to take it here. It is true that ordinarily an appellant, will not be allowed to set up in appeal a plea not taken by him in the lower court, but if the objection is one which goes to the very root of the case, it may be taken for the first time even in second appeal, and an object on to jurisdiction may be taken for the first time in second appeal, if it is patent on the face of the record: Kuppa Gurukal v. Dorasami Gurukkal, ILR 6 Mad. 76 (K), and Daulatia v. Har Govind ILR 43 All 18 (AIR 1921 All 290 (2)) (L). In the present case, it is quite clear that the objection not only goes to the root of the case, but is patent on the face of the record. I, therefore find that it is permissible for the appellants to raise this objection about jurisdiction in this appeal. 33The objection about notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. was pressed only half-heartedly. I, therefore find that it is permissible for the appellants to raise this objection about jurisdiction in this appeal. 33The objection about notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. was pressed only half-heartedly. Civil Procedure Code did not apply to Manipur State when the suit was filed or the Manipur State was joined as a party and therefore section 80 of the C.P.C., had no applicability to the case. No other provision of law requiring such a notice to be given was shown to me. It was admitted on all sides that while the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to the State it was followed by the courts in Manipur State in spirit. That is however quite different from the Act being applicable and strict adherence can be demanded only if the Act applies; otherwise non-compliance with the provisions of the Act cannot have any adverse effect. There is thus no substance in this ground of the appellants. 34 Coming now to the point whether the lands were taken from the then pattadars on the conditions alleged by the plaintiffs, it is nobodys case that the transaction was reduced to writing, and the evidence of plaintiff No. 2 Ayekpam Pratap Singh (P.W. 31 goes to show that the pattadars were turned out by the State and a notice was served ordering them to leave the plots. 35 The evidence admitted in the Lower Court on the point consisted of the following :- (i) Registered statements of some witnesses made in 1947, and 1949 before the Registrar, who are dead. (ii) Oral and documentary evidence. (iii) Written opinion of the Legal Remembrancer (Ext P/H) which he gave to the Government in connection with this case proposing that the case might be compromised, if plaintiffs were willing to abide by certain conditions. 36It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that evidence under heads (i) and (iii) above was inadmissible in evidence and the learned District Judge erred in admitting that evidence. In my opinion that contention must be upheld. The learned District Judge relied on section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act as regards the registered statements and the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents pointed out that those statements would be admissible under subsections (4) and (7) of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In my opinion that contention must be upheld. The learned District Judge relied on section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act as regards the registered statements and the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents pointed out that those statements would be admissible under subsections (4) and (7) of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may be mentioned here that these statements were also relied on for proving the alleged custom. Sub-Section (4) obviously does not apply because these statements were made after the dispute had arisen, that is after the suit had already been filed in 1945. They are also not contained in documents of the nature mentioned in Sub-Section (7). They were thus clearly inadmissible in evidence and must be left out of consideration. 37Similarly, the opinion of the Legal Remembrancer given to the Government would be inadmissible in evidence. Nor can it constitute proof of the facts stated therein. No provision of law was also shown under which this opinion could be admitted and relied upon by the lower Court. The determination of the issues must therefore depend only on the other evidence available. 38 The oral evidence on the point adduced by the plaintiffs consists of the testimony of three witnesses, two of whom are plaintiffs and thus, interested in supporting their own case. Plaintiff Ayekpam Pratap Singhs (P. W. 3) statement shows that they approached the Judicial Member and President, M. S. D. for cancellation of the notice ordering the pattadars to vacate the land. They were then called by the Maharajah and it was explained that they would get back the land on the death of Chandrahas Singh according to custom. This witnesss age is given as 59 when he was examined in 1953. He was thus about 15 years old in 1909 when the land was taken away by the Maharajah and his father was then alive and was the recorded pattadar. It thus appears very improbable that this witness would have gone to the Maharajah for the purpose. An examination of the petition or plaint filed On 3-11-45 before the Chief Court would also make it clear that the story of the agreements that the lands would be returned to the pattadars on the death of Chandrahas Singh and his heirs were further allowed to continue in possession till they could move to other lands is nothing but an afterthought. In para 9 of that petition they quoted two instances and stated that the plaintiffs similarly hoped that their lands would be returned to them after the death of Chandrahas Singh They further stated in that para that the plaintiffs did not submit any representation to the State lest they might be asked to pay compensation for the valuable buildings standing thereon. That statement falsifies the story now put forward that on the death of Chandrahas Singh, they permitted the heirs to continue, in possession till they could move to other lands, on the intervention of the Maharajah. Again, if the agreement was as alleged by them, namely, that they will get back their land on the death of Chandrahas Singh, there was no question of any compensation being paid for the building. 39 In the plaint presented before the Cheirap Court in 1946, what was alleged was that the State usurped the land. In that plaint also it was stated that the plaintiffs hoped that the lands would be returned to them after the death of Chandrahas Singh but that was not done. A careful reading of that plaint discloses that the plaintiffs based their claim on the grounds that they had not been paid any compensation, when they were turned out in 1909, the buildings had been pulled down during the war and therefore there was no reason why the plaintiffs should not be allowed to resettle on the land. Thus nothing could be further away from their mind when they filed these two plaints than the story that Chandrahas Singh and his heirs were permitted by their predecessors to settle on the lands. 40 It is also most improbable that the Maharajah who was all powerful in those days would send for these people and request for their permission and if there was a custom as tried to be proved by the plaintiffs, the more reason that there was no need to consult the pattadars. 41 Ext. P/E is a copy of the chitha in respect of the suit lands and was filed by the plaintiffs and the entries in the remarks column against the names of the original pattadars show that the pattas were cancelled vide sale cases (numbers of which are given) of the year, 1909-10. The name of Sri Chandrahas Singh also finds place as patta-holder under the column "Measurement in chain Zarip". The name of Sri Chandrahas Singh also finds place as patta-holder under the column "Measurement in chain Zarip". No evidence has been led about these sale cases and it is not possible to say what happened actually in those cases, but the entry gives an indication that the acquisition was most probably through these cases. If so that would also support the view that there was no such agreement as has been set up by the plaintiffs. 42 It is, therefore, not possible to believe the oral evidence led by the plaintiffs. It is also highly improbable that Aribam Amuba Sarma (P.W. 5) who was then about 21 years old and was not interested in the land would have been present when the alleged talk with the Maharajah took place in 1909. There is thus no reliable evidence to prove the two alleged agreements and they must be found in the negative. 43 The custom tried to be proved at the evidence stage was not pleaded in the amended plaint and was also not put in the issues framed by the learned District Judge. It is also significant that the issues suggested on behalf of the plaintiffs, a draft of which was filed in this court on 24-5-52, did not contain any issue about this custom. He should not have therefore gone into that point. In any case, the evidence led on the point by the plaintiffs falls short of proof of the alleged custom. 44 Plaintiff Ayekpam Pratap Singh (P. W. 3) has no personal knowledge about it and puts it in the mouth of the Maharajah by stating that he said that we would get back the land according to the customary law after the death of Chandrahas Singh. He gives two instances of which he has no personal knowledge. I have already shown that it was hardly probable that he was present in the alleged talk of 1909.Plaintiff Keisam Gopal Singh (P. W. 4) also stated that the Maharajah told them that the land would be returned according to the long standing practice and custom on the death of Chandrahas Singh. He does not, however, say that there has been any such custom or customary law though he is aged 75, and is expected to know about it. He does not, however, say that there has been any such custom or customary law though he is aged 75, and is expected to know about it. Aribam Amuba Sarma (P. W. 5) while supporting P. W. 3 in this that the Maharajah said that he was making the proposal according to long standing practice and custom of Manipur, does not venture to assert that there was in fact such a custom. It is difficult to rely on such evidence and to hold the custom proved. It is easy to get such self-serving evidence. The two instances given by P. W. 3 also mean nothing. They only show that the land was given back to the pattadars on the death of the two ladies (relations of the Maharajah). This alone does not establish a custom or customary law. Again, there is no evidence to show, when this happened. It is also not difficult to see that custom could not be the only cause for giving back the land. It will be hardly disputed that such vague evidence cannot be accepted as proof of the alleged custom. A custom should always be specifically and definitely alleged and proved by clear and cogent evidence. find that the alleged custom has not been proved. 45 No proof was given by the defendant-appellants in support of their plea that these lands were acquired in 1909 after giving other lands in exchange nor to show that an appeal was preferred against that acquisition to the chief Commissioner, Assam, with the result that it was dismissed. 46 It must therefore be found in view of the findings reached by me that the Maharajah turned out the pattadars and gave the land to his brother Chandrahas Singh. Indeed that was the original complaint of the plaintiffs, as already seen. In other words the pattadars were dispossessed by or discontinued possession on the orders of the Maharajah. That would attract Art. 142 of Sch. I, of the Indian Limitation Act and not Art. 144 which could apply only if it were found that the possession of Chandrahas Singh and his heirs was with the licensee of the pattadars. The plaintiffs should have therefore brought their suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession which occurred in 1909 and not having done so this suit of theirs was clearly time-barred when filed for the first time in 1945. The plaintiffs should have therefore brought their suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession which occurred in 1909 and not having done so this suit of theirs was clearly time-barred when filed for the first time in 1945. Nothing turns on the question in whose names the lands were recorded, and the real dispute here is between the plaintiffs and the heirs of Chandrahas Singh, who took it from the Maharajah and in the circumstances found in this case the possession of Chandrahas Singh and after him of his heirs was clearly adverse to the plaintiffs. 47 It was urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that this appeal was time-barred and ought to be dismissed as such. He pointed out that when this appeal was filed it was not sufficiently stamped and the court allowed the deficiency to be made up when the time for the filing of the appeal had expired. Reference is to the order in the order sheet dated 24-8-1955 by which this court allowed the deficiency to be made up within a month. The deficit court fee was accordingly paid on 21-9-55 that is within the time allowed by this court. The learned counsel urged that the order was bad as no application under S. 149 C P. C. was filed, and the opposite party was not heard before passing the order. Civil Procedure Code has not been applied to Manipur State, but it is well-known and admitted that Civil courts in this State have been following the Civil Procedure Code in spirit. The principles laid down in S. 149 of the C. P. C. would thus apply to the case. 48That section gives the court power to allow deficiency in the court fees to be made up at any time with the result that on such payment the defective document is retrospectively validated, that is, the question of limitation does not arise. Section 149 does not require that an application must be filed for the purpose, nor that such an order can be passed only after hearing the opposite party. In fact when this question arose, the respondents were not before the Court, and there could be no question of hearing them. No law was also shown in support of the contention raised op behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. I find that the appeal is not time-barred. In fact when this question arose, the respondents were not before the Court, and there could be no question of hearing them. No law was also shown in support of the contention raised op behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. I find that the appeal is not time-barred. 49 The result of my findings is that the decree of the learned District Judge cannot be allowed to stand. I set aside the judgment and decree of the Lower Court and dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs with costs throughout Appeal allowed