JUDGMENT Desai, J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of our brother M.L. Chaturvedi rejecting the Appellant's petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash orders made by the Distt. Magistrate on July 8 and 9, 1955 writs of mandamus requiring him to remove the Respondent Nizamuddin from certain premises. Formerly the premises contained a shoe factory which was worked by the owner of the premises. The owner then made a waqf of the premises along with the business. The waqf committee let out the premises along with the business to the East India Leather Company for a term of three years which expired on 22-5-1955. The East India Leather Company worked the factory for about a year and then stopped working it but continued in possession of the premises and the machinery kept in them. In the middle of July, 1955 the waqf committee thought of letting out the premises and selling the machinery. The Petitioner applied to it for a lease of the premises, it decided to lease them out to him and he deposited one year's rent in advance. He applied to the District Magistrate for allotment of the premises to him u/s 7 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Nizamuddin Respondent also applied to the District Magistrate for an allotment order in his favour in respect of the premises; his application was supported by a member of the Legislative Assembly and the District Magistrate on 8-7-1955 directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot the premises to Nizamuddin and the Rent Control and Eviction officer on 9-7-1955 issued an order allotting them to him. Subsequently the District Magistrate issued a notice to the waqf committee requiring it to put Nizamuddin in possession of the premises and Nizamuddin was put in possession of the premises and continues to be in possession. 2. Subsequently the District Magistrate issued a notice to the waqf committee requiring it to put Nizamuddin in possession of the premises and Nizamuddin was put in possession of the premises and continues to be in possession. 2. The Petitioner claimed before our learned brother that the premises did not amount to "accommodation" within the meaning of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act because the premises along with the business carried on in them were let out to him by the waqf committee, that consequently the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction over the premises and could not pass any order of allotment and could not put Nizamuddin in possession of the premises and that consequently the orders passed by him on July 8 and 9, 1955 should be quashed. There was also a prayer for the quashing of the order made by him u/s 7A(2) of the Act but Sri S.N. Misra conceded before us that that order has been rendered infructuous and does not require to be quashed. A prayer also was made for a mandamus requiring the District Magistrate etc. to evict Nizamuddin from the premises and place the Petitioner in possession. 3. Our learned brother dismissed the petition. He held that the premises amounted to "accommodation" because what the waqf committee had decided to let out to the Petitioner was only the premises and not the premises along with the business carried on in them. He also took into consideration the fact that the East India Leather Company had stopped the business in the last two years of its term of lease. Since he held that the premises were governed by the Act he refused the prayers for the issue of a certiorari and writs of mandamus. 4. The question is whether the premises amounted to accommodation when they fell vacant in the middle of 1955. Since he held that the premises were governed by the Act he refused the prayers for the issue of a certiorari and writs of mandamus. 4. The question is whether the premises amounted to accommodation when they fell vacant in the middle of 1955. The lease in favour of the East India Leather Company was in respect of the premises along with the business as admitted by Nizamuddin in his counter affidavit; consequently what was let out to the East India Leather Company was not an "accommodation" within the meaning of the Act and what fell vacant or was contemplated to be let out in the middle of 1955 was something other than "accommodation." Undoubtedly there was no accommodation" with in the meaning of the Act on the date of the lease in favour of the East India Leather Company; if it be a fact that in the last two years the Company stopped working the factory, even then there was no "accommodation" within the meaning of the Act so long as the lease was in force. It cannot be contended that the premises became "accommodation" as soon as the East India Leather Company stopped working the factory because its act of stopping to work the factory did not affect its rights under the lease. When the term of the lease expired and the waqf committee decided to let out the premises to some person, what had fallen vacant was not an accommodation and the waqf committee was not; required to intimate to the District Magistrate that the lease in favour of the East India Leather Company had expired and the premises had fallen vacant and that it wanted to let them out to the Petitioner or anybody else and the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct it to let them to any person or not to let them to any person. The question whether the premises are "accommodation" or not within the meaning of the Act has to be determined on the basis of the state of facts existing when they fall vacant and not on the basis of state of facts that may come into existence at the time they are let out or subsequently. It must be "accommodation" at the time of falling vacant and not at the time of being let out. It must be "accommodation" at the time of falling vacant and not at the time of being let out. A District Magistrate can pass an allotment order only in respect of accommodation that has fallen vacant; if what has fallen vacant is not accommodation, he has no jurisdiction to pass any order. The fact that the waqf committee let out only the premises without the machinery or the business to the Petitioner was of no relevancy. It may be that as the business was not let out to the Petitioner the premises became accommodation within the meaning of the Act, but they became so only after the letting out to the Petitioner. Previous to the letting out they could not be governed by the Act because they did not amount to accommodation. After they became "accommodation" they did not fall vacant. The waqf committee was, therefore, fully competent to let out the premises to the Petitioner and the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere with it, or to prevent the Petitioner from taking the lease or from obtaining possession or to direct the waqf committee to let them out to Nizamuddin or anybody else or to put Nizamuddin or anybody else in possession. All the proceedings held by the District Magistrate were without jurisdiction and null and void. 5. When it comes to granting the Petitioner the reliefs asked for we find that he has an alternative adequate remedy open to him. He could ignore the orders passed by 'the District Magistrate which were null and void and take possession of the premises as if they did not exist, but before he could acquire actual possession Nizamuddin seems to have been put in possession by the waqf committee under the orders of the District Magistrate. The Petitioner's remedy is to file a suit for possession against the committee and Nizamuddin treating the latter as a trespasser.. When this remedy by way of a regular suit is open to him he cannot come to this Court with a request for writ of certiorari. If the orders passed by the District Magistrate are without jurisdiction as claimed by himself there is nothing to be quashed by this Court because even without being quashed they are of no effect. When this remedy by way of a regular suit is open to him he cannot come to this Court with a request for writ of certiorari. If the orders passed by the District Magistrate are without jurisdiction as claimed by himself there is nothing to be quashed by this Court because even without being quashed they are of no effect. As regards the writs of mandamus if the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction over the premises he cannot be ordered by us through a mandamus either to dispossess Nizamuddin or to place the Petitioner in possession; issue of a mandamus requiring him to take certain action under the Act would be wholly inconsistent with our finding that he has no jurisdiction under it. No mandamus can be issued against Nizamuddin because he is not required to do any act under the law; he may be wrongfully in possession of the premises as a trespasser but the Petitioner's remedy is to sue for his dispossession. Similarly no mandamus can be issued to the waqf Committee. We, therefore, hold that the Petitioner's petition was rightly dismissed by our learned brother though for reasons with which we do not agree. 6. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.