Judgment :- 1. The 14th defendant is the appellant herein and the matter arises in execution of a final decree for partition. 2. The preliminary decree in the case had been passed on 28.12.1124 setting aside a Dhananischayam deed executed by the Karnavan of the plaintiffs 1 to 10 and the defendants 1 to 11 in favour of the defendants 14 to 19 and allowing the 1st plaintiff to recover on behalf of the plaintiffs and the 10th defendant the 12/21 share belonging to them with mesne profits at particular rate until the properties were delivered over after final decree and further providing for issue of commission for dividing the properties by metes and bounds. Subsequently and in due course a commission was issued and the commissioner submitted report and plan dividing the properties between the co-sharers. But instead of allowing the court to proceed on the basis of the plan and report and pass decree accordingly, the parties compromised the matter among themselves by accepting the report and plan and taking the properties allotted to each respectively thereunder. They also got the compromise recorded and made decree of court dated 4.9.1955 as the final decree for partition in the case. The only matter that really remained to be carried out was the recovery on behalf of the plaintiffs 1 to 10 and defendant 10, of 231/2 cents in item 1 and the building item 2 within it from the 14th defendant who had remained exparte throughout and had not also joined in the compromise. The compromise decree provided that the plaintiffs will work out their rights as against the 14th defendant through court and recover the property with mesne profits. It is in this connection, that the present question has arisen. 3. On application for execution filed by the plaintiffs as against the 14th defendant, for recovery of item 1 portion and item 2, she raised objection that the compromise decree could not be executed against her because she was not a party to it. The court below felt inclined to agree with this contention, but it thought that the preliminary decree was still capable of execution and all parties except the 14th defendant had concurred in the compromise so as to enable the plaintiffs to attain their object by putting that decree in execution and accordingly allowed execution to proceed. The court below felt inclined to agree with this contention, but it thought that the preliminary decree was still capable of execution and all parties except the 14th defendant had concurred in the compromise so as to enable the plaintiffs to attain their object by putting that decree in execution and accordingly allowed execution to proceed. The court below was led to believe that all persons except the 14th defendant were parties to the compromise. In this however there was some mistake for the compromise decree itself mentioned that the 3rd plaintiff and 10th defendant who belonged to the plaintiffs' group were not available and therefore had not joined in the compromise. It was also mentioned that the 2nd defendant did not join but the 5th defendant who belonged to the 2nd defendant's group was available for taking the share of that group. The 14th defendant has therefore come up to this court saying that there is no decree capable of execution so far as herself and the property in her possession were concerned and the order of the court below was unsupportable. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant attacks the reasoning of the court below on the ground that the preliminary decree in the case was not really capable of execution because it had not ascertained any particular property as falling to the share of the plaintiffs and 10th defendant or as available for recovery in execution from particular defendant. The preliminary decree had not also fixed the mesne profits but left it for the final decree. The contention so raised is well founded and indeed learned counsel for the respondent was unable to support the order of the lower court on its reasoning. He however submits that there was no question of jurisdiction involved and the order is still supportable on other grounds viz., that the compromise decree in the case cannot be said to be a nullity even though some of the parties co-sharers had not joined therein and so far as the 14th defendant was concerned there was no need to join him for with the passing of the preliminary decree he had ceased to have any interest in the property in his possession. 5. 5. The question is whether the final decree in the case by way of compromise is capable of execution notwithstanding (1) certain of the co-sharers 3rd plaintiff, 10th defendant and 2nd defendant had not joined in it and (2) the 14th defendant was not party to it. It is no doubt true as regards 3rd plaintiff and 10th defendant that as members of the plaintiff's group their shares also were being worked out on their behalf. But it should be remembered that the preliminary decree itself provided that the 1st plaintiff may by herself recover the 12/21 share on behalf of the entire group of the plaintiffs 1 to 10 and 10th defendant. If there was any objection so far as the 3rd plaintiff and 10th defendant were concerned it was a matter for them and the 14th defendant could not certainly act on their behalf. So far as the 2nd defendant was concerned the 5th defendant co-sharer had taken the common share belonging to both and if there could be any complaint it was for the 2nd defendant to raise. The 14th defendant was not concerned here also. In Saraswathi Ammal v. Avida Ammal,19 TLJ 1273 defendants 1 and 2 who were the karnavan and senior member of the tarwad stood exparte in the beginning. Subsequently the 1st defendant entered into a compromise with the plaintiff charging the tarwad properties and the question arose on objection in execution raised by the 2nd defendant as to whether the decree was a nullity because the 2nd defendant was not a party to the compromise and the properties of the tarwad could not be proceeded against. Repelling the objection of the 2nd defendant the learned judges said that the decree in the case might have been passed without reference to the 2nd defendant in improper exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the court but it was no case of non-existence of jurisdiction and in such circumstances the decree though it might have been passed irregularly could not be said to be a nullity. In Shankar Bharati v. Narasimha Bharati,1927 PC 57 the 1st defendant who had transferred all interests in favour of the 2nd defendant was not struck out of the party array. The question was whether the 1st defendant could object to a compromise entered into between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. In Shankar Bharati v. Narasimha Bharati,1927 PC 57 the 1st defendant who had transferred all interests in favour of the 2nd defendant was not struck out of the party array. The question was whether the 1st defendant could object to a compromise entered into between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. The Privy Council overruled the objection because the 1st defendant was no more interested in the suit. To the same effect is Pritam Singh v. Sunda Singh, 1934 Lahore 34. And we may finally refer to Sheo Behari Lal v. Makrand Singh (F.B.) 1935 Oudh 358 where the court passed a final decree on foot of a compromise even against exparte defendants and it was said that the exercise of jurisdiction in such circumstances was not a fatal irregularity. Learned counsel for the 14th defendant referred to Sankaravadivammal v. Kumarasamya, ILR 8 Madras 474, Gobind Chandra Sardar v. Bhagabat Sardar, 1915 Cal. 473 & (Firm) Danmal v. (Firm) Babu Ram, 1936 Allahabad 1. No doubt there are general observations in these cases saying that a decree on compromise by some only of the parties will not bind the others but the case in Sankaravadivammal v. Kumarasamya, ILR 8 Madras 474 and Gobind Chandra Sardar v. Bhagabat Sardar, 1915 Cal. 473 were cases of co-sharers in possession of particular property who had not been made parties to the compromise and it was held quite correctly in our opinion that those co-sharer party defendants could treat the compromise decree in the case to which they were not parties as mere nullities. In this case however the 14th defendant is not a co-sharer at all and that makes all the difference. His objection under the preliminary decree is only to be given up. The (Firm) Danmal v. (Firm) Babu Ram, 1936 Allahabad 1 case does not touch the question herein because that was a case of representative suit where the parties plaintiffs and defendants represented two rival communities and some few only of the plaintiffs and defendants posing themselves as leaders wanted to compromise the entire matter and the question arose at early stage as to whether it was lawful and could be recorded. The court refused to exercise its jurisdiction under 0.23 R.3 C.P.C. and record compromise. 6. The court refused to exercise its jurisdiction under 0.23 R.3 C.P.C. and record compromise. 6. There is one point however in respect of which learned counsel for the 14th defendant says reservation would have to be made viz., a second building in item 1 other than item 2 regarding which the 14th defendant claims independent title to. This suit and the compromise decree did not concern this second building and the question has nowhere been raised or settled as to whom the building belongs or whether the 14th defendant should not be entitled to remove it if he is directed to be vacated from item 1. This question is left open. Subject to this reservation we dismiss the appeal with costs.