JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal. 2. The Plaintiff came to court on the allegation that he was a tenant of one Smt. Sughra Begum, that he had, after acquiring the tenancy, entered into a partnership agreement with one Prakash Chandra for carrying on the business of selling lemon drops in the said premises and that pursuant to the agreement the said Prakash Chandra had executed a partner shipdeed on 8-4-1952 and thereafter Prakash Chandra had dissolved the partnership in October, 1952 and had gone away to Lucknow and had given up possession of the shop wrongfully to the Defendants who were refusing to deliver possesion to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff claimed to recover possession. 3. The Defendants contested the suit and pleaded that they themselves were the sub-tenants of the Plaintiff under the partnership deed which had been executed in the name of Prakash Chandra benami. 4. The trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. 5. Upon appeal, the court below allowed the appeal with costs and decreed the suit for possession and for recovery of Rs. 150 with costs. 6. The court below came to the conclusion that the deed created a sub-lease in favour of Prakash Chandra but it was hit by the provisions of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act III) of 1947, that Prakash Chandra could, therefore, merely be considered to be a licensee and that the license was for a fixed period and it had terminated by efflux of time and that neither Prakash Chandra, nor the Defendants could maintain their possession over the shop in dispute. 7. Learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellant argues that the court below was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the sub-lease in favour of Prakash Chandra was hit by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. 8. 7. Learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellant argues that the court below was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the sub-lease in favour of Prakash Chandra was hit by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. 8. Admittedly, this sub lease (assuming that it was a sub-lease) was created without intimating to the District Magistrate, as required u/s 7 of the aforesaid Act, that accommodation in possession of the Plaintiff had fallen vacant and without giving an opportunity to the District Magistrate to make an order directing the Plaintiff to let the accommodation to a person specified by the District Magistrate Having regard to the definition of "Landlord" given in S. 2 (c) of the said Act and the language of S. 7 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time it is clear that there is a prohibition against the creation of a sub-tenancy without the District Magistrate Being informed and being given an opportunity of nominating the sub-tenant. Therefore, the court below was clearly right in holding that the sub-lease could not operate as a sub-lease and that, at best, the position of Prakash Chandra was that of a licensee and that when the partnership was dissolved, the license came to an end and no rights could be passed by Prakash Chandra to the Defendants. 9. There is, however, yet another aspect of the matter. Having regard to the terms of the partnership deed, dated 8-4-1952, it can-not be held that even a sub-lease came into existence in favour of Prakash Chandra. Even though it may be held that the deed dated 8-4-1952 did not create a partnership, because there was no provision for sharing the profits in the deed, none-the-less it was clear from the deed that even a sub-lease had not been created. Under the terms of the deed, Prakash Chandra was to give the keys of the premises every evening to the Plaintiff who was to be in occupation during night. Moreover, under the terms of the deed the Plaintiff was entitled to keep his things on the premises. Under S. 1(5) of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised. Under S. 1(5) of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised. Where the right of enjoyment is restricted in the manner that it is restricted under the present deed, namely that the Plaintiff would have the keys of the premises during the nights and would be entitled to keep his things on the premises, it cannot be said that an exclusive right to enjoy such property for a certain time has been granted. At best, this deed dated 8-4-1952 gives only a non-exclusive and interrupted right of enjoyment, the interruption and exclusion taking place every night when the keys were to be given over to the Plaintiff. In the The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. Vs. Phiroz Sorabji Contractor, AIR 1923 Bom 228 , it was indicated that it is essential to the creation of a tenancy of a corporeal hereditament that the tenant should have the right to the exclusive possession of the premises. It was also indicated that a grant, under which the grantee takes only the right to use the premises without exclusive possession, operates as a license and not as a lease. 10. Though the facts in the Bombay case referred to above were somewhat different, the principle of that case is clear and, I think, is applicable to this case also. Upon an interpretation of the deed dated 8-4-1952 I have come to the conclusion that it did not create a sub-lease in favour of Prakash Chandra but that, at best, it created a license in his favour. That license terminated with the efflux of time and Prakash Chandra had no right in any case to put the Defendants in possession of the premises. The position of the Defendants is, therefore, that of a trespasser. 11. It is to be noted that the Defendants themselves did not allege that they were sub-tenants of Prakash Chandra. On the other hand, they alleged that they were the sub-tenants of the Plaintiff himself. This has been negatived by the court below. The position of the Defendants is, therefore, that of a trespasser. 11. It is to be noted that the Defendants themselves did not allege that they were sub-tenants of Prakash Chandra. On the other hand, they alleged that they were the sub-tenants of the Plaintiff himself. This has been negatived by the court below. It was no body's case that the Defendants were the sub-tenants of Prakash Chandra and it is not open to Learned Counsel for the Appellant now to say that upon the deed dated 8-4-1952 it was established that Prakash Chandra was a sub-tenant of the Plaintiff and that Prakash Chandra had created a further sub-lease in favour of the Defendants. In ray view, the court below has come to a correct conclusion that the Defendants are trespassers and, therefore, in my view, the decree passed by the court below is correct. 12. Accordingly, I dismiss this appeal. The decree for possession, if it has not already been executed, will not be executable until a period of six months has expired from today's date. The rest of the decree will become immediately executable. Parties to this appeal will bear their own costs.