SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: This appeal arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of certain lands comprised in dags 407 and 808 of patta No. 63 of Hailakandi. The area of the disputed lands is 2 K. 15 Ch. The plaintiffs, who are the appellants here, claim title to the disputed land by virtue of a deed of exchange dated 27-4-48, corresponding to 14th Byjakh, 1355 B. S., from one Badrinarayan who, according to the plaintiffs, was the rightful owner of the land in question. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that Ramjatan Kahar, the father of Badrinarayan, got these lands by way of gift from Musst. Parbati, who was the original owner of these lands. The plaintiffs alleged that in August, 1948, the defendants dispossessed them from the lands in suit by erecting some sheds thereon and, therefore, they instituted the suit, to which this appeal relates, in December, 1948, for the reliefs claimed. Chanda Singh (defendant No. 1), who contested the suit, claims to have purchased the disputed lands from one Ramkumari. mother of Ramjatan Kahar, and grandmother of Badrinarain. There was thus a con­flict of title between the parties based on the ques­tion whether Badrinarain was entitled to the pro­perty or it was Chanda Singh, who purchased from Rnm Kumari, had a good title to the property in dispute. (2) The first Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove possession within twelve years of the date of the suit. It also found that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by res judicata. On appeal, the Court below did not accept the finding of the trial Court on the point of limitation. It held that the plaintiffs had been able to show possession within twelve years of the date of the suit; but affirmed the finding of res judicata at which the first Court had arrived; and, in the result, affirmed the decree of that Court. (3) On appeal, it is contended by Mr. Lahiri for the appellants that the decision on the point of res judicata is illegal and it should have been held that the question of plaintiffs' title to the lands, as derived from Badrinarain, was still at large and res integra. The point of res judicata arose on the following facts. (3) On appeal, it is contended by Mr. Lahiri for the appellants that the decision on the point of res judicata is illegal and it should have been held that the question of plaintiffs' title to the lands, as derived from Badrinarain, was still at large and res integra. The point of res judicata arose on the following facts. It appears that one Ganesh Prasad Kanu had a money decree against Badri­narain, and, in execution of the decree, he attached the disputed lands. Chanda Singh (defendant No. 1 in the present action) then filed a claim in the ex­ecution case, in which he asserted that the land did not belong to the judgment-debtor and that he was the owner of the land in question. The claim was allowed by the executing Court. The decree-holder, Ganesh Prasad Kanu, who is defendant No. 3 in the present action, then filed a suit under Or. 21, R. 63, C. P. Code, for declaration that the property in question belonged to his judg­ment-debtor Badrinarain, and not to the claimant Chanda Singh, and that the order in the claim pro­ceeding should be accordingly set aside. In that suit, Badriuarain was added as a defendant. He was then a minor represented by his maternal uncle. Ram Kumari, from whom the plaintiff Chanda Singh claimed to have purchased the land m ques­tion, was also impleaded as a defendant in the action. The suit was dismissed on the finding that the order in the claim case was correct and that the property in question belonged to Chanda Singh, and, on appeal, the decision was affirmed. The ap­pellate judgment is dated 23-8-37. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the defendants that the deci­sion in the suit in question, which was Title Suit No. 45 of 1936, is res judicata between the parties. Badrinarain, Chanda Singh and Ram Kumari were all defendants in the action, and in the presence of all these defendants it was held that the land in suit did not belong to Badrinarain, and that Chanda Singh had a good title to the land as a purchaser from Ram Kumari. The Courts below have concurrently held, as already stated, that the decision in question was res judicata between the parties. The Courts below have concurrently held, as already stated, that the decision in question was res judicata between the parties. For the purpose of deciding the claim of the plaintiff in the Title Suit in question, it was necessary to decide whether Badrinarain had a good title to the land. In other words, the question whether Ram Kumari had a good title to convey to the defendant Chanda Singh, or Badrinarain the judgment-debtor in that case, had title to the land, was a question which directly fell to be decided in order to decide the claim of the plaintiffs in that action; and this was decided by the Court. It is true that as against Badrinarain, there was no relief directly sought and he was made a pro forma defendant in the iction, but, in the eye of law. there is nothing like a pro forma defendant. Who­ever is impleaded is a defendant, is either a neces­sary or a proper party to the suit; otherwise he need not be on the record at all, and his presence would be just nominal. It could not be said that in that case, Badrinarain was only nominally a party to the suit. The suit, in order to succeed, could succeed only on the basis that the judgment-debtor of the plaintiffs is that action namly Badrinarain had a good title to the land; otherwise the plaintiff would tail if, on the contrary, it was held-as it was actual­ly held in that case-that the defendant Chanda Singh had a good title, as derived by his purchase from Ram Kumari. We thus find that there was a conflict of in­terest inter se between the defendants concerned, that it was necessary to decide this conflict of in­terest in order to give relief to the plaintiff in that action, and that Badrinarain was a proper party to the suit and was actually impleaded as such. We also find that the matter was finally decided bet­ween them and thus all the requirements of res judicata between co-defendants had been futilled. (4) The conditions for applying the principle of res judicata in cases of co-defendants have been clearly laid down in various decisions of the Privy Council and it is too late now to question those conditions. See Mt. (4) The conditions for applying the principle of res judicata in cases of co-defendants have been clearly laid down in various decisions of the Privy Council and it is too late now to question those conditions. See Mt. Munni Bibi v. Tirloki Nath, 35 Cal WN 661: 58 Ind App 158 : (AIR 1931 PC 114) (A), Maung Sein Done v. Ma Pan Nyun, 59 Ind Arjp 247: (AIR 1932 PC 161) (B) and Kedar Nath Goenka v. Ram Narain Lai, 62 Ind App 224: (AIR 1935 PC 139) (C). The learned Subordinate judge has referred to a single Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Monjur Mondal v. Ahammad Mondal, AIR 1953 Cal 155 (D), where the learned Judge has in an elaborate and com­prehensive review of the matter, followed the above decisions of the Privy Council, and a decision of the same High Court in Hafiz Mohammad Fateh Nasib v. Sir Swamp Chand Hukum Chand Firm, AIR 1942 Cal 1 (E), where the facts were almost similar to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge in the above Calcutta deci­sion has further given reasons for not adopting the principles laid down in some of the other earlier cases in which a contrary opinion had been express­ed. It seems to us that it is too late now to re­open that question, which has been repeatedly set at rest by the above pronouncements of the Judicial Committee. Mr. Lahiri, however, contends that the matter should not be deemed to have been finally decided in the present instance, because in the earlier case, it was to the interest of Badrinarain not to contest the claim of the plaintiff, and, as such, it should be held that (here was really no contest between Badrinarain on the one side and Chanda Singh on the other, who claimed, under a different title, the land in question. It is further argued that Badrinarain was merely a pro forma defendant and, as such, it was not necessary for him to contest the claim. I can understand cases where a defendant is merely nominally a party to a suit and in which, on the facts of a particular case no relief is definitely claimed against him; and the question whether there is a conflict of interest between such a defen­dant and another defendant in the action, does not necessarily arise for adjudication. I can understand cases where a defendant is merely nominally a party to a suit and in which, on the facts of a particular case no relief is definitely claimed against him; and the question whether there is a conflict of interest between such a defen­dant and another defendant in the action, does not necessarily arise for adjudication. But a decision would operate as res judicata even as against a pro forma defendant in a previous suit, when it is clear that his interest was in conflict with that of the other set of defendants and the plaintiff could not get relief without a decision of that conflict by the Court. In the Privy Council case of Munni Bibi, it was pointed that where a person is a proper party, though not a necessary party to a suit, he has a right to be heard, if he so desired, and if, in spite of being inapleaded, he chose to stand by, it would not affect the legal position and the decision given, if operating against his interest, would be res judicata in any subsequent suit between him and the other defendant. Therefore, when there is a conflict of interest between the defendants inter se as actually it was in that case-because the Court had to decide whether Badrinarain had a right to the property or Chanda Singh had the right,-the decision is bound to operate as res judicata bet­ween Badri, or for the matter of that, the plaintiff who claimed to derive interest from Badri, and Chanda Singh in the present litigation. In my opinion, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that because there was no definite -relief claimed against Badrinarain, and he was interested at that time in not opposing the plaintiff? claim, it did not really create any conflict of interest bet­ween the two sets of defendants, cannot be entertained. (5) Let us, for instance, assume a case where the dispute covered two sets of properties under the same claim of title. It. claim, it did not really create any conflict of interest bet­ween the two sets of defendants, cannot be entertained. (5) Let us, for instance, assume a case where the dispute covered two sets of properties under the same claim of title. It. may be that in re­gard to one property, which was the subject of attachment, the judgment-debtor may have been interested in not opposing the claim; but in regard to the other, it would still be to his interest to op­pose the claim, and, therefore, any decision given in the case would be final between the defendants inter se unless the judgment-debtor chose to ap­peal against that decision or appealed and lost. Therefore, whether in a particular suit, the defen­dant found it expedient not to oppose the, claim of the co-defendant, is not material to the applica­tion of the principle of res judicata. The real question is, whether, in substance, there was a conflict of interest between them, which conflict had to be resolved by the Court in order to finally decide the dispute between them. In this case, it must be held that there was, in substance, a conflict of interest between Chanda Singh on the one hand and Badrinarain on the oilier, and that conflict was decided against Badrivrain; therefore, the decision given in the earlier suit is res judicata in the present action. The Courts below, therefore, have correctly decided the mat­ter, and they were right in holding that the deci­sion in the previous suit created a bar of res judicata. (6) Mr. Lahiri then contends that in any case, it should be further considered whether or not Badri­narain, in spite of the decision in that action, con­tinued to remain in occupation of the land, and. by virtue of over twelve years' occupation, acquir­ed an indefeasible title to it. In the first place, this was a question of fact which should have been raised in the Courts below, but was not raised. The matter cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal, where the decision depends upon a consideration of evidence. In the second place. it is to be noticed that the appellate judgment in that case was passed on 23-8-37, whereas the date of exchange was 27-4-48. The matter cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal, where the decision depends upon a consideration of evidence. In the second place. it is to be noticed that the appellate judgment in that case was passed on 23-8-37, whereas the date of exchange was 27-4-48. Obviously the time has is not enough to give an indefeasible title to Badri­narain even if there had been such a case made out in the plaint. But, as I said, the point need not be decided because the question was not specifically raised in the pleadings and no evidence was led on the point. (7) For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. (8) H. DEKA J. : I agree. K.S.B. Appeal dismissed.