JUDGMENT Desai, J. - This application is against a decree passed by the courts below for damages for the cutting of trees standing on the boundary of a plot of which the applicants are tenants. The opposite party is the land-holder. The suit was filed in the court of a Munsif and was contested by the applicants on the ground that they were the owners of the trees and not the opposite party. The learned Munsif held that the opposite party was the owner and decreed the suit, the appellate court has maintained the decree. 2. It was contended before me that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because of the provisions of S. 81 (2) U. P. Tenancy Act. What is laid down in S. 81 (2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act is simply this:- If any question arises between a land holder and a tenant regarding the ownership of trees it shall, on the application of either party, be decided by the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division." According to it, it is open to the applicants' when used by the opposite party, to apply to the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division for deciding the question of ownership of the trees; but it does not follow that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. Which court has jurisdiction depends upon the provisions of S. 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, according to which a revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction only in respect of suits mentioned in the fourth Schedule. An application u/s 81 (2) is mentioned in the fourth Schedule, and, therefore, a civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a declaration about ownership of trees. The suit in question was for damages for the cutting of trees and not for a declaration of ownership of them. Had the apposite party sued only for a declaration of his ownership of the trees, Section 242 would have applied to bar the jurisdiction of a civil court. A suit for damages for the wrongful act of cutting the trees is not a suit of that nature An Assistant Collector in charge of the subdivision can only give the relief of declaration; he cannot give a decree for damages. A suit for damages for the wrongful act of cutting the trees is not a suit of that nature An Assistant Collector in charge of the subdivision can only give the relief of declaration; he cannot give a decree for damages. The cause of action in the present case was not only the opposite party's ownership of the trees being questioned but also the wrongful act of the applicants in cutting them; the wrongful act of the applicants in cutting them is not a part of the cause of action on which an application could be filed u/s 8l (2) in the court of the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division. Therefore, he could not grant any relief on the cause of action in respect of which the opposite party has Sled the suit and the jurisdiction of a civil court over it has not been removed by anything contained in Sections 242 and 81 (2). 3. The matter may be tested in another way. The question of jurisdiction has to be determined on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint; it cannot remain in suspense to depend upon pleas taken in the written statement. If according to the pleadings in the plaint a civil court has jurisdiction, it does not lose it on account of any place taken in the written statement. A question of ownership of trees may not arise unless the Plaintiff's ownership is asserted in the plaint and denied in the written statement. It cannot be assumed that the ownership asserted in the plaint will be disputed by the Defendant and that consequently a question of ownership will arise in the suit. When a Plaintiff sues for damages for the wrongful act of cutting his trees, he is entitled to assume that his ownership of the trees will not be disputed and that there will arise no occasion for applying the provisions of S. 81 (2) and to sue in a civil court. Once he rightly sues in a civil court, he is entitled to obtain a decree from it regardless of any questions raised by the Defendant S. 288 under which a certain issue is to be referred by a civil court to a revenue court, has no application because a question of ownership of a tree is quite different from a question of tenant right. No question of tenant right is raised in the suit, it being admitted that the applicants are tenants of the plot on the boundary of which the trees stood. 4. It was contended that the words in S. 288 are 'tenant right' and not 'tenancy right' and that 'tenant right' includes any of the rights that are claimed by a tenant. Assuming, but without deciding, that tenant right includes a right claimed by a tenant on trees as standing on his holding, there are two reasons on account of which the learned Munsif was not bound to refer an issue to a revenue court for its finding. One is that S. 288 applies only when a suit relating to agricultural land is instituted in a civil court; the suit instituted by the opposite party was not a suit relating to agricultural land, it being a suit relating only to the cutting of trees owned by it. It is immaterial that the trees stood on agricultural land, even if they stood on agricultural land the suit did not become one relating to agricultural land. The other reason is that the question that arose in this suit between the parties was not a question of tenant right even according to the extended meaning sought to be given to it. The dispute between the parties was not whether the applicants were owners of the trees if they stood on their holding; it was whether the trees stood on the holding or on the boundary. If they stood on the holding it was not claimed by the opposite party that it was still their owner. If, on the other hand, they stood on the boundary it was not claimed by the applicants that they were still owners of them. Therefore, the real dispute between the parties was not of ownership of the trees but whether they stood on the holding or on the boundary; this was not a question of tenant right at all. If, on the other hand, they stood on the boundary it was not claimed by the applicants that they were still owners of them. Therefore, the real dispute between the parties was not of ownership of the trees but whether they stood on the holding or on the boundary; this was not a question of tenant right at all. It may be that if the dispute arose between the parties whether the trees stood on the holding or on the boundary S 81 (2) would apply because it is a question regarding the ownership of trees and an Assistant Collector in charge of the sub division would have the sole jurisdiction to decide it, but it would not make the provisions of S. 288 (1) applicable because tenant right is not the same thing as a right of ownership of trees. The trees have been found in the present case to have been standing on the boundary and, therefore, the applicants had admittedly no right over them. The learned Munsif, therefore, did not act without jurisdiction in deciding that the trees stood on the boundary; after he decided this there was no dispute between the parties about the ownership at all and no question of tenant right arose which might have been required to be referred u/s 288 (1) to a revenue court for its finding. The only case referred to me was Angan Chaube v. Keaar Nath 1947 ALJ 671, but the questions raised before me were not raised in that case and were not decided there. The facts of that case were quite different and what I have stated above does not militate against anything laid down there. 5. There is no substance in tins application and it is dismissed with costs.