JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, J. - The Appellants filed a suit in a civil court for a declaration that the contents of certain paragraphs in the plaint of suit No. 387/47 instituted by them along with others had been written fraudulently and were not binding upon them and that the compromise decree - passed in the suit was null and void as against them. They claimed to be tenants of certain plots in dispute. In suit No. 387 they arrived at a compromise by which they surrendered their claim over tenancy rights over some of them. Now they want that tenancy rights over them should remain intact and that the compromise decree be held not binding upon them. The suit was decreed by the Munsif, who declared that the Appellants were tenants over the plots in dispute and that they were not bound by the contents of the paragraphs of the plaint in the suit No. 387/47 and the compromise arrived at in it. An appeal was preferred against the decree and the lower appellate court held that the suit was barred by S. 242 UP Tenancy Act because the Appellants were entitled to a relief from a revenue court on the cause of action on which they sued in the civil court. But it also went into the merits and held that Appellants were not entitled to any decree. Consequently it allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 2. In this appeal it was contended on behalf of the Appellants that when the lower appellate court held that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction, it should have ordered the plaint to be returned to them for presentation to a proper court. I see no substance in this contention and am satisfied that the lower appellate court rightly dismissed the suit on the ground that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to try it. 3. The Appellants sought the relief of getting rid of the effect of the compromise decree in the earlier suit No. 387 on the ground that it was obtained by fraud; this relief could not be granted to them by a revenue court. Consequently the suit as filed by them could not be filed before a revenue court and if they went to it with the plaint it would have at once returned it for presentation to a civil court. 4. Consequently the suit as filed by them could not be filed before a revenue court and if they went to it with the plaint it would have at once returned it for presentation to a civil court. 4. U/S. 242, UP Tenancy Act the jurisdiction of a civil court over a suit specified in the fourth Schedule or over a suit "based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means any such suit," was barred. The clear meaning of this provision is that the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred in respect of not only a suit of the nature specified in the fourth Schedule but also in respect of a suit based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any suit specified in the fourth Schedule. It is, therefore, not open to a Plaintiff to go to a civil court by concealing his real cause of action. Forum of the court for his suit depends upon the real cause of action and not upon what he alleges in the plaint. If according to his cause of action he can get relief by means of a suit mentioned in the fourth Schedule, he is bound to go to a revenue court and it is not open to him to go to a civil court by changing his cause of action or concealing a part of it The jurisdiction of a court undoubtedly depends upon the allegations made in the plaint, but S. 242 does not permit a Plaintiff to draft his plaint in such a manner as to conceal the real cause of action. The real cause of action that accrued to the Appellants in the present case was the cloud cast upon their tenancy rights over the plots in dispute by the compromise decree arrived at in the earlier suit. They claimed to be in possession of the plots as tenants but thought that on account of the compromise by which they gave up the tenancy rights over them it might be thought that they had no tenancy rights over them. So they felt the necessity of obtaining a declaration that they continued to be tenants. They claimed to be in possession of the plots as tenants but thought that on account of the compromise by which they gave up the tenancy rights over them it might be thought that they had no tenancy rights over them. So they felt the necessity of obtaining a declaration that they continued to be tenants. On this cause of action they could obtain relief by means of a suit U/S. 59 UP Tenancy Act which is one of the sections specified in the fourth Schedule. S. 242 expressly barred the jurisdiction of a civil court over the suit brought by them. They could not confer jurisdiction upon the civil court by refusing to ask for the relief of a declaration of the tenancy rights and by seeking the relief of only a declaration that a certain decree was not binding upon them. The position, therefore, is that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred, as found by the lower appellate court. 5. The position that emerges from these findings is that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction over the suit, that the suit filed through the plaint could not have been entertained by a revenue court also and that the only alternative before the lower appellate court was to dismiss it. It could order the plaint to be returned for presentation only if there was a proper court to which the plaint could be presented. But the plaint in the present case could not be presented to a revenue court also because, as explained earlier, it was based on a cause of action not within the jurisdiction of a revenue court. The Appellants are to blame themselves for the position in which they find themselves. They concealed the real cause of action and preferred to go to a civil court. They ought to have known that they should go to a revenue court through a plaint disclosing the real cause of action. Had the plaint disclosed a cause of action which could be taken cognizance of by a revenue court, the lower appellate court would have been bound to return it for presentation to a revenue court but that is not the case here. Had the plaint disclosed a cause of action which could be taken cognizance of by a revenue court, the lower appellate court would have been bound to return it for presentation to a revenue court but that is not the case here. The plaint would have to be materially altered before it could be received by a revenue court, whereas the provision in Order 7 R. 10, which deals with return of plaints for presentation to proper courts, deals with a plaint which can be presented in the existing form to the proper court. If a plaint has to be altered materially before being presented to a proper court, it is not a case at all of returning a plaint for presentation to a proper court because it is always open to the Plaintiff to present another plaint containing different allegations before the proper court. The lower appellate court knowing that the plaint as it stands could not be entertained by a revenue court could not with any justification direct it to be returned for presentation. Sri K. C. Saxena referred to a number of cases, for Pohap Singh and Others Vs. Mohan Singh and Another, AIR 1922 All 424 Brij Kumar Lal Sahu Vs. Jagdamba Prasad and Others, AIR 1929 All 671 , Khushnud Husain Vs. Janki Prasad and Another , Babu Ram Vs. Ram Narain and Others, AIR 1931 All 33 , and Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh AIR 1947 All 92 In most of these cases it was assumed that the plaint in the existing form could be presented before a revenue court and the question whether a plaint which in its existing form cannot be entertained by a revenue court must still be returned by the civil court for presentation to a revenue court, was not discussed. They dealt with suits which should have been filed in a revenue court but were filed in a civil court; apparently the plaints in those suits were such as should have been presented before a revenue court and not before a civil court. The plaint in the present case could not be presented before a revenue court; it could be presented before a civil court but the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred by S. 242 UP Tenancy Act. Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh(5), really is against the Appellants. The plaint in the present case could not be presented before a revenue court; it could be presented before a civil court but the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred by S. 242 UP Tenancy Act. Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh(5), really is against the Appellants. It was stated in it that if the essence of the relief claimed by the Plaintiff was really a declaration of her tenancy rights, she should file the suit in a revenue court. The essence of the relief claimed by the Appellants was a declaration of the tenancy rights; the obstacle in their way was the compromise decree in the earlier suit and they wanted to overcome it on the allegation of fraud. Just as in the case of Mst. Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh AIR 1947 All 92, it was held that she should have filed the suit not in a civil court but in a revenue court so also the Appellant ought to have filed the suit in a revenue court and not in a civil court. The question in which circumstances a court should order a plaint to be returned for presentation to a proper court did not arise, and was not discussed, in that case. In the case of Khushnud Husain Vs. Janki Prasad and Another , it was observed by Sulaiman J. at p. 664 that: Once the plaint was entertained the Plaintiffs had to be pinned down to the allegations in their plaint and if those allegations were not proved the suit would have to be dismissed. 6. It follows that whether the plaint should be returned for presentation or not should also be determined on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint, though the question whether the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred by S. 242 UP Tenancy Act or not depends not on the allegations made in the plaint but on the real cause of action accruing to the Plaintiff. 7. I hold that the lower appellate court was not required by any law to direct the plaint to be returned for presentation to a proper court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed u/O. 41, R. ll CPC. 8. Leave to Special Appeal is refused.