The plaintiff instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises, to enforce an agreement, dated 22-9-1948. On the terms of the agreement, he has sought to enforce two alterna­tive reliefs. The first is a claim for recovery of Rs. 2000/- from the defendant. In the alternative, he prayed for a mandatory injunction against the defendant compelling the latter to construct a hospital in terms of the agreement in question. (2) It is admitted that on the date of the said agreement, the defendant had purchased from the plaintiff an area of IB. 2K. 17 Lechas of land covered by dag No. 946 of Tezpur village, together with houses standing thereon, for a con­sideration of Rs. 7000/-. The terms of the sale in question are embodied in a registered document. On the same date, it appears, this agree­ment, which is the foundation of the suit, was arrived at between the parties. According to the agreement, it appears that the defendant was to construct a hospital on a certain portion of the land; otherwise he was liable to pay compensa­tion of Rs. 2000/-. The document refers to the purchase of the lands by the defendant from the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the two documents have to be read together, and that the sum of Rs. 2000/- was payable, on the contingency of the defendant not building a hospital over the vended land, as part of the consideration amount. The suit was resisted by the defendant who pleaded that the consideration amount was Rs. 7000/- and that the agreement in question, which sought to vary the terms of the sale deed or to affect the right of enjoyment of the property by the defen­dant, could not be enforced. It was also pleaded, inter alia, that there was some encroachment proceeding pending against the vendor in respect of the lands in question, about which no information was given to the de­fendant and that there was also an encroachment case (No. 169/48-49) pending against the defen­dant at the instance of the Forest Department with respect to the land in suit. The first Court decreed the suit but the lower appellate Court dismissed it, holding that the agreement on which the suit was based, was not admissible in evidence, as it purported to vary the ternis of the sale in question in regard to the consideration amount. The first Court decreed the suit but the lower appellate Court dismissed it, holding that the agreement on which the suit was based, was not admissible in evidence, as it purported to vary the ternis of the sale in question in regard to the consideration amount. (3) It cannot be gainsaid that the actual amount of consideration mentioned in the sale-deed is Rs. 7000/-, and so is the case in the agree­ment also. But the learned counsel for the appellant argues that this document should toe treated as part and parcel of the transaction of sale; and, so read, it must be held that this sum of Rs. 2000/- was a part of the consideration, on the failure of the contingency mentioned in the agreement. Even if we assume that this argument is cor­rect, it is obvious that the document being un­registered, it could not be admissible in evidence under S. 49 of the Registration Act. The do­cument clearly purports to limit the right of enjoyment of the property by the vendee. It com­pels him, according to the claim of the plaintiff, to erect a hospital on a portion of the land, failing which he is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 2000/- to the plaintiff. The document, therefore, had to be registered, because, it not only purported, to vary the terms of the sale-deed, but also to affect the 'right of en­joyment of the property by the vendee. The Court, therefore, in my opinion, was justified in not en­forcing a document of this character. Much argu­ment has been advanced before me that this docu­ment was not hit by S. 92 of the Evidence Act and was admissible in evidence as such. It appears to me that the document purports to vary an important term of the sale-deed in question, namely, that whereas in the sale-deed the consideration mentioned was Rs. 7000/-, by virtue of this document, it is argued that the actual con­sideration for sale was Rs. 9000/-. The prepon­derance of authorities on that point is in favour of the view that such a document would not be admissible under S. 9a of the Evidence _Act, and no evidence aliunde could be given on the point, which purports to vary an important term of the document. See e.g., 'Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer', AIR 1915 Mad 868 (A); - 'Krishnayya v. Mo­hamad Galeb Sahib'. See e.g., 'Adityam Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer', AIR 1915 Mad 868 (A); - 'Krishnayya v. Mo­hamad Galeb Sahib'. AIR 1930 Mad 659 (B); - Mohammad Taki Khan v. Jang Singh', AIR 1935 All 529 (FB) (C). Mr. Ghose on behalf of the appellant has, however, relied upon certain deci­sions: -- 'Nabin Chandra Chakravarti v. Sm. Shina Mala Ghose', 35 Cal WN 279 : (AIR 1932 Cal 25') (D): - 'Irpan Ali Laskar v. Jogendra Chandra Das', 36 Cal WN 451: (AIR 1932 Cal 708) (E), which do not really support his contention. These cases have only bearing on the ques­tion of manner of payment of the amount of consideration, whether the consideration was actually paid in cash or it was paid in some other manner. Payment of consideration is a question of fact which could be proved by evidence aliunde in spite of the recital in the document. But none of these cases go to the length of snowing that evidence aliunde can be given to vary the amount of consideration, namely that, although the con­sideration mentioned in the document was Rs. 7000/-, the parties had agreed to a larger amount of Rs. 9000/-. It appears to me, however, that the decision in the English case - Turner v. Forwood', 1951-1 All ER 746 (F), does to a large extent support the argument of Mr. Ghose. There also, however, I may respectfully point out, the question was of nominal consideration; and their Lordships ob­served that where, on the face of a document, the consideration mentioned in it appears to be nomi­nal, evidence could be given, apart from the reci­tals of the document, to show that the considera­tion was something beyond the amount ex facie mentioned therein. I am inclined to the view that the amount of consideration, which is one of the important terms I of the document, could not be varied by evidence aliunde except under circumstances falling; under proviso 1 to S. 92 of the Evidence Act, or some of the other provisos. In these circumstances, I hold that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge is correct. (4) He has also rightly pointed out that there were eviction proceedings, admittedly against the defendant, as also against the plaintiff. There is no period given in the document within which the hospital had to 'be constructed. In these circumstances, I hold that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge is correct. (4) He has also rightly pointed out that there were eviction proceedings, admittedly against the defendant, as also against the plaintiff. There is no period given in the document within which the hospital had to 'be constructed. In my opi­nion, having read the document, it appears to me that the terms are quite vague and no claim was made at any stage by the plaintiff that the hos­pital had to be erected within a certain period, failing which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover Rs, 2000/- from the defendant. (5) I, therefore, think that the suit was right­ly dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. The decree of the learned Additional Dis­trict Judge is affirmed and the appeal dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order for costs. V.B.B. Appeal dismissed.