JUDGMENT Mehrotra, J. - This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order passed by the Kanpur Development Board and the Scheme Secretary, Zone No. 4 of the said Development Board, dated 21-12-1955 purporting to be u/s 186 of the Municipalities Act, and further praying that a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to demolish the construction made by the Petitioner on plot No. 37, Block E of Nachghar Scheme, in accordance with the final plan submitted by her on 25-6-1955. 2. The Petitioner owned house No. 58/95 in Nilwali Gali, Kanpur. After establishment of the Kanpur Development Board the site of the house and the adjoining house were acquired by the Municipal Board. The new plots were carved out and the site acquired by the Kanpur Development Board was renumbered as plot No. 37, Block E in Nachghar Scheme No. 24 and each plot was given to people on lease for building purposes. The Petitioner also desired to build a construction on this plot and in April, 1955, submitted a plan to the Kanpur Development Board in accordance with the provisions of Section 178 of the Municipalities Act, On 23-6-55 she received from the Scheme Secretary of the Kanpur Development Board certain objections to the plan submitted by her. Thereupon, she again filed a reply to the objections raised by the Board. Thereafter she received no reply from the Board and she waited for more than two months and then on 7-9-55 served on the Kanpur Development Board a notice u/s 180(3) of the Municipalities Act, calling upon the Board to remove its omissions and neglect in sanctioning the plan according to law, and also gave notice to the Board that if no objection will be received by her within the next 15 days, she will presume that the Board had been pleased to sanction the proposed plan. Annexure I to the petition is the copy of the notice that she gave u/s 180(3) of the Municipalities Act. The Petitioner then waited but no reply was received from the Board. Thereafter she started making constructions according to the plan. The Petitioner then received a letter from the Scheme Secretary purporting to be a notice u/s 186 of the Municipalities Act, to the effect that the constructions contravened the bye-laws of the Board. The Petitioner then waited but no reply was received from the Board. Thereafter she started making constructions according to the plan. The Petitioner then received a letter from the Scheme Secretary purporting to be a notice u/s 186 of the Municipalities Act, to the effect that the constructions contravened the bye-laws of the Board. On 20-10-1955 the Petitioner sent a reply to the notice of the Board and stated therein that after the expiry of the statutory period she had begun to make constructions and had completed part of the constructions, and the objections could not be raised. Thereafter on 21-12-1955 a notice was issued against the Petitioner u/s 186 of the Municipalities Act asking her to demolish within seven days of the receipt of the notice two rooms of the ground floor and two rooms of the first floor. It is the validity of this notice which has been challenged by means of this writ petition. 3. Three points have been raised by the Petitioner. Firstly, that the notice was illegal inasmuch as a notice u/s 186 of the Municipalities Act could have been issued only if the constructions made by the Petitioner were an offence u/s 185 of the Act, and as the sanction will be deemed to have been granted by virtue of Section 180(3) of the Municipalities Act after the expiry of the statutory period of notice, it cannot be said that the constructions amounted to any offence within the meaning of Section 185, Municipalities Act. Secondly, it was contended that the notice could only be issued by the Board. In the present case the notice has been issued by the Scheme Secretary. Lastly it was contended that even on the facts of the case there was no violation of any of the bye-laws of the Board, and as such the notice was invalid. 4. Section 186 of the Municipalities Act provides that the Board may at any time by written notice direct the owner or occupier of any land to stop the erection, re-erection or alteration of a building or part of a building or the construction or enlargement in any case where the Board considers that such erection, re-erection, alteration, construction or enlargement is an offence u/s 185 and may, in like manner, direct the alteration or demolition as it deems necessary of the building or part of the building. 5. 5. Section 185 provides that any person who begins, continues or completes the erection or re-erection of or any material alteration in, a building or part of a building, without giving the notice required by Section 178 or in contravention of the provisions of Section 180(5) or of an order of the Board refusing sanction or any written directions made by the Board u/s 180, or any bye-laws, shall be liable upon conviction to a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. 6. In this case it is admitted that an application had been made u/s 178 for be necessary sanction. It is also clear that the constructions had not been made in contravention of the provisions of Section 180(5) of the Municipalities Act, which provides that no person shall commence any work of which notice has been given u/s 178 until sanction has been given or deemed to have been given under this section. Admittedly the constructions were made in this case after the expiry of the period given in the notice by the Petitioner u/s 180(3) of the Municipalities Act. There was also no refusal to sanction on any grounds. There was also no direction made by the Board either u/s 180 or under the bye-laws which have been contravened in this case. There was, therefore, no offence committed by he Petitioner within the meaning of Section 185 of the Municipalities Act, and consequently no notice could be issued by the Board u/s 186 of the Act. 7. Reliance was placed by the Standing Counsel on Clause (4) of Section 180, Municipalities Act which provides that nothing in Sub-section (3) shall be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of this Act or bye-law. It has been strenuously argued by the Standing Counsel that as there has been a prohibition for a person to act in contravention of the bye-laws the constructions as they were in contravention of the bye-laws they were illegal, and it was not open to the Petitioner to contend that the sanction will be deemed to have been granted in this case. I do not think there is any substance in this contention. I do not think there is any substance in this contention. Section 180(4) of the Act only provides that even if it be, held that the sanction has been granted or that it may be deemed to have been granted, that by itself does not authorise the Petitioner to make constructions in contravention of the bye-laws. If the Petitioner makes constructions in contravention of the bye-laws she may be liable for prosecution for breach of the bye-laws, but Section 180(4) to my mind, does not render the sanction which is deemed to have been granted by virtue of Section 180(3) as cancelled. 8. Reliance was placed by the Standing Counsel on certain observations in three cases of this Court. The first case relied upon by him was Narain Das v. Municipal Board, Gorakhpur 1936 A.W.R. (H.C.) 31. That was a second appeal from the judgment of the subordinate court in a suit for malicious prosecution. The Appellant in that case had been prosecuted for making certain constructions without the sanction of the Board and he was acquitted on the finding that in view of the provisions of Section 180(3) the sanction will be deemed to have been granted to him. The Petitioner then made another construction and he was further prosecuted u/s 307, U.P. Municipalities Act and was again acquitted. The suit was one for recovery of Rs. 2900/ - as damages for malicious prosecution. One of the arguments which was addressed in that case was that on the finding of the court below that the Plaintiff had contravened bye. law No. 23 by making the constructions in view of the provisions of Section 180(4) the Petitioner could not be deemed to have been given sanction for the constructions in dispute, and it was contended by the Standing Counsel that this contention was accepted by this Court. I have gone through the judgment. I do not think in this case the contention raised by the counsel on this point was accepted. Ultimately the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the finding of the court below was one of fact which could not be interfered within the second appeal. This case is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition contended for by the Standing Counsel- 9. The next case referred to by him is Nasiruddin v. Emperor 1942 A.W.R. (H.C.) 392. Ultimately the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the finding of the court below was one of fact which could not be interfered within the second appeal. This case is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition contended for by the Standing Counsel- 9. The next case referred to by him is Nasiruddin v. Emperor 1942 A.W.R. (H.C.) 392. The facts of that case, to my mind, were quite different. There since an application u/s 178 was made, the Petitioner after certain lapse of time made constructions and then gave a notice u/s 180(3) and contended that the sanction will be deemed to have been granted, and consequently they could not be regarded, as illegal. It was in that connection held by this Court that it is not open to a person to take advantage of his own fraud. Having committed an offence it is not open to him to give notice and then legalise his action by taking help of the provisions of Section 180(3). The combined effect of Section 180(3) and (5) is that it is not open to the applicant to start constructions without giving a notice u/s 180(3) and before the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice. 10. The last case which was relied upon was Matwal Chand v. District Magistrate, Budaun 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 431. In that case sanction had been granted by the Executive Officer, which was subsequently revoked by the Municipal Committee. The revocation was justified because the officer had sanctioned the plan without applying his mind and the plan was not in accordance with the bye-laws and then the Petitioner had in that case, obtained sanction by fraud. That contention of the Municipal Board was challenged by means of a writ petition here on the ground that the Municipal Board had no power to revoke a previous sanction granted to the Petitioner. It was in this connection held by this Court that if a sanction was granted on misrepresentation of facts and in violation of the bye-laws such a sanction will be considered as non-existent in the eye of law. This case to my mind, does not lay down that if a construction has been made in contravention of the bye-laws by virtue of Section 180(4). Municipalities Act the sanction which is deemed to have been granted will stand cancelled. 11. This case to my mind, does not lay down that if a construction has been made in contravention of the bye-laws by virtue of Section 180(4). Municipalities Act the sanction which is deemed to have been granted will stand cancelled. 11. In my opinion, therefore, the notice issued against the Petitioner on 21-12-1955 is liable to be quashed. In view of my decision on this point it is not necessary to decide the case on the other points raised by the Petitioner. It was also contended by the Standing Counsel that instead of approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner had another alternative available to him. I do not think that any appeal is provided for against this order. The contention was that if and when steps are taken to demolish the constructions or the Petitioner is prosecuted he could raise this objection, but this Court should not interfere with the notice at this stage. Even if it be assumed that it was open to the Petitioner to challenge the notice if and when an order demolishing the construction was passed or a prosecution was launched against the Petitioner, it cannot be said that such a remedy would be equally adequate and efficacious in the circumstances of the case. 12. I, therefore, allow this petition and quash the notice dated 21-12-1955 issued against the Petitioner but I make no order as to costs.