JUDGMENT M.L. Chaturvedi, J. - This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. The Petitioner filed a suit u/s 202(b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act with the allegation that the Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were declared to be sub-tenants of the Petitioner u/s 27(3) of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, Act No. X of 1947. This declaration was made on the 30th September 1948 entitling the Respondents to remain in possession for a period of three years. That period expired and the Petitioner was entided to eject the Respondents as they had acquired the rights of asami and were liable to ejectment, one of the defences taken by the Respondents was that the Petitioner had not executed his order of reinstatement passed in his favour u/s 27(3) of the U.P. Act No. X of 1947. The first court dismissed the suit by its judgment dated 16th December 1952. An appeal was preferred by the Petitioner before the Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal by his order dated 13th January 1955. The Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 then went up in second appeal to the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue set aside the decree of the Additional Commissioner and restored that of the Trial Court dismissing the Petitioner's suit. This was the decision of one of the Members of the Board given on the 20th April 1955. He was of the opinion that the matter should be laid for concurrence before another Member. The case then went to another Member and the other Member came to the conclusion that no such concurrence was necessary as the case would not be governed by paragraphs Nos. 170 and 190 of the Revenue Court Manual, the case being one under the zamindari Abolition Act and not under the U.P. Tenancy Act or the Land Revenue Act. With the above remarks he returned the papers to the first Member. The first Member, it appears then declared the appeal allowed by his order dated 11th July 1955. In the present petition it is prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued fordoing justice to the Petitioner's case". 3. With the above remarks he returned the papers to the first Member. The first Member, it appears then declared the appeal allowed by his order dated 11th July 1955. In the present petition it is prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued fordoing justice to the Petitioner's case". 3. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the opinion of the Board of Revenue that it was necessary to execute the order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947 was erroneous and the Petitioner should be deemed to have acquired the rights of a tenant in spite of his commission to execute the order of reinstatement. The other point argued is that the appeal could not have been allowed by the Board of Revenue without the concurrence of two Members and the opinion of the second Member given on the 29th May 1955 was wrong in law. 4. As regards the first point the question depends upon the interpretation of Sub-section (3) of Section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, Act X of 1947. Section 27 directed the reinstatement of certain classes of tenants who had been ejected on or after the 1st day of January 1940 under the sections of the U.P. Tenancy Act specified in Section 27(1) of Act No. X of 1947. The ejected tenants could file an application for reinstatement within six months of the date of the commencement of this amending Act. Sub-section (3) says: On receipt of an application under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) the Court shall give notice to the landholder and to the tenant, if any, in possession of the whole or part of such holding. After making such enquiry as may be necessary if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was so ejected or dispossessed, it shall order that the applicant be reinstated in such holding or part thereof, as the case may be, and that any other person in possession of it be ejected therefrom. 5. After making such enquiry as may be necessary if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was so ejected or dispossessed, it shall order that the applicant be reinstated in such holding or part thereof, as the case may be, and that any other person in possession of it be ejected therefrom. 5. There is a proviso to this Sub-section which is to the effect that if the land had been let out, after ejectment of the applicant by the landholder to a person who was not a relation, dependant or servant of the landholder, the Court instead of ordering the ejectment of such person, shall notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force, declare him to be the subtenant of the applicant in respect of such holding or such part. The person so declared as a sub-tenant was not liable to ejectment until after the expiry of three years from the date of declaration. In the instant case the Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were declared to be sub-tenants but it appears that the Petitioner omitted to execute the order of reinstatement passed in his favour under Sub-section (3). The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that no execution of the order was necessary nor was it practicable because the Respondents had been declared to be sub-tenants and possession therefore could not be delivered to the Petitioner. He says, under the circumstances, the Petitioner could not have executed the order and, in any case, the omission to execute it is merely a formal defect which does not affect the Petitioner's right. I think that the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is not without force but the better view appears to be that token by the Board of Revenue, as it is in accordance with the language used in Section 27 of Act X, of 1947. Sub-section (3) directs the revenue court to order that the applicant u/s 27 be reinstated in such holding and any other person in possession of it be ejected. So that the order is both for reinstatement and for ejectment and it appears that reinstatement was necessary in order to put the petitioner in the position of a tenant qua the landholder and ejectment was necessary as against the person in actual possession of the land. So that the order is both for reinstatement and for ejectment and it appears that reinstatement was necessary in order to put the petitioner in the position of a tenant qua the landholder and ejectment was necessary as against the person in actual possession of the land. According to the proviso, if there was tenant already let in by the land lord, the Court was not to pass an order for his ejectment but to declare him as a sub-tenant with a right to continue in possession for three years. No order for ejectment in sue case was to be passed but an order was still to be passed for the reinstatement of the applicant u/s 27A reading of Sub-section (3) and the proviso shows that the legislature made a distinction between reinstatement and ejectment and, as already stated, reinstatement appears to have been for the purpose of restoring the position of the applicant as tenant qua the land holder and the ejectment appears to be against the person in actual possession. If this proviso applied, the person in actual possession was not to be ejected but the proviso nowhere says that in such a case reinstatement was also not to be ordered. It cannot be denied that there was an order for reinstatement in this case but the Petitioner omitted to execute that order. He was, therefore, not reinstated to the possession of a tenant qua the landholder. The right of the Petitioner as a tenant had been extinguished when he was ejected in execution of the decree, before Act X of 1947 came into force. This extinction of the rights was in accordance with the provisions of Section 45 Clause (b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act which says that the interest of a tenant shall be extinguished in land from which the tenant has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court. If such a decree or order was not executed, the mere passing of it would not result on the extinction of the right of the tenant. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the Petitioner could have acquired against the rights of tenant if he would have got formal possession over the premises and the mere existence of the decree does not confer any such right. 6. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the Petitioner could have acquired against the rights of tenant if he would have got formal possession over the premises and the mere existence of the decree does not confer any such right. 6. As regards the execution of an order of reinstatement, Section 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act says that every decree or order for ejectment shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the execution of decrees for delivery of immovable property. The order in this case cannot be said to be an order of ejectment and it was merely an order for reinstatement. So Section 181 does not apply to the case. Section 186 says that the provisions of Section 181 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of a decree for the reinstatement of a tenant in his holding. The difficulty with respect to this section is that it only speaks of a decree and not of an order for reinstatement. Sub-section (3) of Section 27 of Act X of 1947 says that the Court can pass an order for reinstatement. There is thus no clear procedure provided for the execution of this order of reinstatement but the order being there, it could be executed by a court on the analogy of the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 36 of the CPC and the provisions of Sections 181 and 186 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The order passed by the Court under Sub-section (3) merely says that the applicant be reinstated and it does not have the effect of reinstating the applicant by its own force. This reinstatement is to be subsequently done and, the order being there, the court passing the order can execute it in the manner it is possible to do so. It is well known that when actual possession is in a person the courts deliver only formal or symbolic possession. That could have been done in this case also and these orders of reinstatement should have been executed for the last eight or nine years. In the absence of the order being executed, the Petitioner has not been in fact reinstated to his previous position and this is due to his own fault in omitting to have the order executed. That could have been done in this case also and these orders of reinstatement should have been executed for the last eight or nine years. In the absence of the order being executed, the Petitioner has not been in fact reinstated to his previous position and this is due to his own fault in omitting to have the order executed. He did make an application for execution of the order but absented himself on the date fixed with the result that his application was dismissed in default. Sub-section (4) of Section 27 also points to the conclusion that, after the order directing the reinstatement has been made, something further has to be done to actually reinstate the applicant. It is said in Sub-section (4) that the applicant shall not be reinstated in such holding or in any part thereof, unless within such time as may be allowed by the Court, he pays to the landholder certain amounts specified therein. Before actual reinstatement time is to be granted to the applicant to make the payments if the conditions are satisfied and it is after these payments have been made that the applicant is to be actually reinstated. Before the payments are made, this section prohibits reinstatement. 7. The Board of Revenue has mentioned three cases, decided by it, in which a similar view has been taken. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has brought to my notice a case reported in Ram Das v. Shital Singh 1955 R.D. 371. But the facts of that case, to my mind, are different. The question in that case, before the Board of Revenue, was whether the pensions having been declared to be sub-tenants under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 27, acquired the status of subtenant simply because the order of declaration and the Board said they did. The other case brought to my notice by the learned Counsel is the case of Chhaju v. Sumer 1956 A.L.J. (Rev.) 24 The head note of the case appears to be entirely in favour of the Petitioner but the relevant portion of the judgment has not been reported in this number and I had not the benefit of reading it as it has not been reported yet and the learned Counsel has not been able to procure a copy of the judgment. 8. 8. In view of the wording of Sub-section (3) of Section 27, I am unable to hold that there is any manifest error in the judgment of the Board of Revenue on this point. But I think the observation that Section 141 CPC applied to execution proceedings appears to be incorrect. 9. The other point is whether the concurrence of the second member was necessary before the appeal could be allowed. This concurrence has been made necessary in the case of appeals by Rule 170 of the Revenue Court Manual in the case of revisions by Rule 190. The heading of the chapter however shows mat these rules were made for appeals filed under the U.P. Tenancy Act and U.P. Land Revenue Act. When these rules were framed, the Z.A. and L.R. Act had not come into force and the rules have not been made applicable to the appeals filed under the Z.A. and L.R. Act. Under the later Act, a number of rules have been framed but there appears to be no rules. Similar to Rule 170 or 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. The rules framed under the Z.A. Act do not say how many Members are to dispose of particular case. Under the circumstances, I think the provisions of Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act would apply to the case. The Board of Revenue has been constituted Under Sections 5 and 6 of the Land Revenue Act and Sub-section (1) of Section 7 says that, subject to such rules or orders as the State Government may prescribe or issue, the Board may distribute its business and make such territorial division of its Jurisdiction amongst it members and the Board may deem fit. Sub-section (2) then says that all orders made or decrees passed by a Member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders of decrees of the Board. No rules having been framed for the determination of the appeals by the Board under the U.P.Z.A. and Land Reforms Act, Section 7 authorises the Board to distribute its business and make territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members and Sub-section (2) says that all orders passed or decrees made by a Member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders or decrees of the Board. It thus appears that one Member of the Board is competent to pass the order and it may be an order allowing or disallowing the appeal or revision. This position will continue till rules to the contrary are made by the State Government, or the Board itself. 10. For the above reasons I think the petition should fail and it is dismissed with costs.