JUDGMENT Mehrotra, J. - This is an appeal by the State of U.P. against the order of the Sessions Judge of Mathura acquitting the opposite party, Shyamsingh, of the charge u/s 8(2) of the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1937. The opposite party along with four others were prosecuted u/s 8(2) of the said Act on a complaint filed by the Entertainment Tax Officer before the Magistrate. The opposite party was convicted by the Magistrate and the others were acquitted by him. On appeal the Sessions Judge acquitted Shyamsingh and the present appeal has been filed on behalf of the State against the judgment of the Sessions Judge. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on the 1st December 1950 at about 8 in the night Sri R.D. Thapar, Entertainment Tax Officer, accompanied by Sri Kunj Behari Lal, Entertainment Tax Inspector, visited the Garrison Cinema to check and to inspect in order to find out if civilians were also allowed to see pictures without paying Entertainment Tax. Garrison Cinema is established for the purpose of showing pictures to the military persons only and is exempted from certain provisions of the Cinematograph Act and the Entertainment Tax Act on conditions that the civilians are not allowed to witness the show. The Entertainment Tax authorities came to know that civilians were allowed to witness, cinema. A day before the incident, the Entertainment Tax Inspector having come to know that civilians had also gone to the cinema informed the Entertainment Tax Officer, Sri Thapar and both of them went to the cinema shall in order to inspect it on the 1st of December 1950 at 8 p.m. Mr. Thapar has stated that when he reached there saw nobody at the gate. He sent for the Manager, Sri Shyam singh the opposite party. When the Manager came Sri Thapar told him that they would check the hall. The Manager then asked him to wait outside and said that he was going to call the proprietor who was inside the hall. When the Manager left, the Entertainment Tax Officer was told by the Entertainment Inspector that the Manager was getting out the civilians from the other gate of the hall. The Entertainment Tax Inspector then went to the other side and he has deposed that he actually saw civilians being pushed out of the hall from the back door. 3. When the Manager left, the Entertainment Tax Officer was told by the Entertainment Inspector that the Manager was getting out the civilians from the other gate of the hall. The Entertainment Tax Inspector then went to the other side and he has deposed that he actually saw civilians being pushed out of the hall from the back door. 3. After some time the Manager came with two Garrison Military, personnels who (sic) there to watch that no civilians were allowed to enter the hall. The Manager informed the Entertainment Tax Officer that the proprietor had left for his house and then the Entertainment Tax Officer asked him to bring some military officers from inside. He was then informed by the Manager that there was no military officer inside available. 4. In cross examination Mr. Thapar has stated that Garrison men also refused to let him in and they demanded the identity card from him. On that these two persons left and a report was lodged. 5. The Sessions Judge has held that although the Entertainment Tax Officer and the Entertainment Tax Inspector were the persons who could have visited the cinema hall but there was no proper delegation of duties by the State Government to Sri Thapar and consequently they had no right to demand admittance to the cinema for the purpose of checking up. He has held that the authority of inspection as contained in Section 8 of the Act, even if delegated to the District Magistrate could make a further delegation of his. authority to a Magistrate subordinate to him in his turn. To appreciate the point raised by the learned Counsel, it will be necessary to refer certain provisions of the Entertainment Tax Act. Section 10 of the Act provides: Government may, by notification, delegate all or any of its powers under this chapter, except those conferred upon it by Section 9 and by this section, to any person or to any authority subordinate to Government. 6. One of the powers possessed by the State Government is to be found in Section 8 of the Act. 6. One of the powers possessed by the State Government is to be found in Section 8 of the Act. Section 8(1) provides: Any officer authorised by Government for the purpose may enter any place of entertainment while the entertainment is proceeding, and any place ordinarily used as a place of entertainment, at any reasonable times, with a view to seeing whether the provisions of this chapter or any rules made thereunder are being complied with. 7. Section 8(1) clearly gives powers to the State Government to authorise any officer to enter any place of entertainment for the purpose of inspecting it and such a power can be delegated by virtue of the provisions of Section 10 to any officer by the State Government. 8. By a notification dated October 27, 1937, the State Government authorised the District Magistrate to exercise the powers which were vested in the State Government. By virtue of this notification, therefore, the State Government authorised the District Magistrate to exercise the power to authorise another officer to inspect the cinema possessed by the State Government u/s 8 and as a consequence of this authority conferred on the District Magistrate by virtue of the said notification he allocated the work of inspecting the cinema to the Entertainment Tax Officer. Therefore it cannot be said that when the District Magistrate authorised the Entertainment Tax Officer to go and check the cinemas he further delegated the powers which were delegated to him by the State Government. He exercised the powers which could have been exercised by the State Government and it is not a case of further delegation of his delegated powers. 9. The next point urged by the State counsel is that the act of the Manager amounted to obstruction within the meaning of Section 8(2) of the Act Section 8(2) of the Act provides: If any person prevents or obstructs the entry of any officer so authorised, he shall, in addition to any other punishment" to which he is liable under any law for the time being in force, be liable on conviction before a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding two hundred rupees. 10. Before the opposite-party could, therefore, be convicted u/s 8(2) of the Act, it is necessary to prove that the act of the opposite-party amounted to prevention or obstruction within the meaning of the said clause. 11. In the present case Mr. 10. Before the opposite-party could, therefore, be convicted u/s 8(2) of the Act, it is necessary to prove that the act of the opposite-party amounted to prevention or obstruction within the meaning of the said clause. 11. In the present case Mr. Thapar has clearly stated that at the first instance when the Manager was called by him he told him to remain outside and. he went to bring the proprietor. He was asked to wait outside till the proprietor came and permitted him to enter the cinema hall. This, in our opinion, does not amount to prevention or obstruction in the discharge of his duties even though it may be admitted that the Manager knew that he was the Entertainment Tax Officer. After the Manager had gone he came out with the two military men Mr. Thapar himself admitted in cross-examination that he was being prevented by the military personnel not to enter the premises and they demanded identity card from him. The conduct which amounted to obstruction was the conduct of the garrison military men and not of the Manager. He cannot be said to have obstructed the Entertainment Tax Officer or prevented him from entering because it were the military men who did not permit him to enter unless he produced his identity card. 12. In our opinion, therefore, on the evidence led by the prosecution the Sessions Judge was right in holding that the conduct of the Manager could not be regarded as amounting to obstruction or prevention within the meaning of Section 8(2) of the Act and in that view of the matter the opposite party could not be convicted u/s 8(2). 13. There is, therefore, no force. In this appeal and it is rejected.