JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. The plaintiff-appellants brought an action to recover Rs. 4171 together with interest thereon lent by them to the defendant-respondent. Before the defendant could be served with a summons to appear and answer the claim, the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am presented an application on their behalf saying that the claim had been settled between the parties; that the plaintiffs had received their full amount from the defendant and that, therefore, the suit be dismissed. Thereupon the learned Civil Judge First Class Shivpuri made an order dismissing the plaintiffs suit in the following terms : The plaintiffs have now filed this appeal against this order of dismissal. The appeal is purported to be one under O. 43, R. 1 (m). The appellants contend that the person who made an application to the Court for the dismissal of the suit was not their Mukhtar-Am and that on the material date his authority had been cancelled. 2. We have heard Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta learned counsel for the appellants. In our opinion this appeal must be dismissed on the short ground that the order passed by the learned Judge dismissing the plaintiffs suit is not an order recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction and does not fall within O. 23, R. 3. The order under appeal is pure and simple one dismissing the suit for want of prosecution. The Mukhtar-Am who represented the plaintiffs and appeared on their behalf in the suit made an application for the dismissal of the suit even before the defendant had been served with a summons to appear and answer the claim. In his application the Mukhtar-Am stated that : In this application the terms of the settlemen were not stated and the Court was not asked to record any agreement or compromise and to pass a decree according to the terms of the compromise. That application in substance was an application for the dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution and not one for disposing of the suit by a decree in accordance with the terms of compromise. The lower Court in fact did not record any compromise. All that it did was to verify the fact that the application for the dismissal of the suit was made by the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am and having satisfied itself that it was so made, dismissed the suit. The lower Court in fact did not record any compromise. All that it did was to verify the fact that the application for the dismissal of the suit was made by the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am and having satisfied itself that it was so made, dismissed the suit. In the above circumstances, the application made by the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am for the dismissal of the suit cannot be regarded as one under O. 23, R. 8 and the order passed by the lower Court dismissing the suit also cannot be regarded as an order recording any compromise. A similar view has been taken by us in Pannalal v. Motilal, First Appeal No. 32 of 1951 (A). If the appellants contend that the person who made the application for the dismissal of the suit was not in fact their Mukhtar-Am or on the date on which he made the application for the dismissal of the suit, his authority had been cancelled, and was not, therefore, competent to ask the Court to dismiss the suit, the appellants only remedy is to file regular appeal against the decree framed in the suit dismissing the plaintiffs claim. The present appeal is clearly incompetent and must be and is dismissed. A. H. KHAN, J. :- 3. This appeal is purported to be under Order 43, Rule 1 (m), Civil Procedure, Code, but to me it appears to be a device to avoid paying court-fees on a regular appeal. In substance the contention of the appellant is that the Mukhtar-Am not only deceived him by collusion with the defendant, but that he also perpetrated fraud upon the Court and that in the circumstances, a decree dismissing his claim has been wrongly passed. Order 43, R. 1 (m) of the Code says that an appeal lies from an order under R. 3, O. 23, Civil P. C., recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. 4. The facts out of which this appeal arises are that the plaintiff appellant filed a suit for the recovery of a certain sum of money. But before the summons were issued to the defendant the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am filed an application that the suit may be dismissed because the defendant has paid the amount. The Court, in consequence, dismissed the suit and framed a decree. But before the summons were issued to the defendant the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am filed an application that the suit may be dismissed because the defendant has paid the amount. The Court, in consequence, dismissed the suit and framed a decree. Can it, in the circumstances, be said that the application amounted to a request to the Court to record a compromise or adjustment or satisfaction? To me it seems that the application was moved for the withdrawal of the suit on the ground that the money in dispute had been paid. And an order passed on an application of withdrawal is not appealable. The application was not for recording any compromise, which is not a unilateral Act. A compromise is always bilateral and means a mutual adjustment. In this case the question of any compromise cannot be said to arise because no summons was even issued to the defendant. According to New Standard Dictionary, a compromise means agreement or adjustment for the settlement of a controversy by mutual concessions, often involving partial surrender. The application of the plaintiffs Mukhtar-Am lacks the element of mutuality and I am afraid that it cannot be said to be an application for compromise for which O. 23, R. 8 primarily exists. In Mohammad Ali Khan v. Shujat Ali Khan, AIR 1917 Nag 1 (B) it is said that where a suit was adjusted out of Court and the parties (in the instant case it is only the plaintiff who has filed an application) requested the Court to dismiss the suit, whereupon the Court dismissed the suit, then the plaintiff was deemed to have withdrawn the suit. 5. With these observations, I agree with my learned brother that the present appeal not lie and must be dismissed. .