SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in which the petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari quashing an order dated 8th December, 19(54 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. The petitioner is the proprietor of a cinema house called the "Bajrang Talkies" at Khowang, in the district of Lakhimpur. In 1953 he was granted a temporary license by the Deputy Commissioner for exhibiting films in that house. He thereafter constructed a permanent cinema hall for the purpose of exhibiting films in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Cinema Rules. The building was named as "Bajrang Tal­kies Hall". The petitioner claims that the hall in question was duly certified by the Executive Engineer, Lakhimpur to be a fit one for exhibition of films to the public. In any case, it appears that on the 19th Sep­tember, 1954 the petitioner was granted a License by the Additional Deputy Com-missioner of Lakhimpur under S. 3 of the Cinematograph Act 1918 (Act II of 1918) for public exhibition of films in the aforesaid hall. (2) According to the case of the petitioner and the license granted to him, it appears that the license was valid till the 19th December, 1954, though the original office copy which has been pro­duced before us shows that the license was valid till 15th December 1954. It must be observed that there is some interpolation in the original office copy. Apparently, the original date was 19th, taut it appears to have been altered to 15th and then within brackets "Fifteen Dec. 754" has been men­tioned; and a further sentence appears to have been added at the end in writing which runs thus; "In the meantime the party is directed to remove the objections raised by E. E. P. W." the sentence in writing does not find place in the copy of the cer­tificate which was handed over to the petitioner. There only the date 19th December 1954, as the last date to which extent the license was valid, has been mentioned and there is no mention what­soever of the other condition. On the authority of this certificate granted to the petitioner he has been showing films in that hall when, suddenly on the 8th December 1954 he received an order from the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur, Memo No. 21675-G, directing him to stop further exhibi­tion of films in that hall. On the authority of this certificate granted to the petitioner he has been showing films in that hall when, suddenly on the 8th December 1954 he received an order from the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur, Memo No. 21675-G, directing him to stop further exhibi­tion of films in that hall. The order merely says: "You are hereby direct­ed to stop forthwith further exhibition at Bajrang Talkies Hall", and is signed by the Deputy Com­missioner. No explanation has been given as to why the Deputy Commissioner wanted to stop ex­hibition of films in that hall. The petitioner sub­mits that the order is without jurisdiction and not contemplated by any of the provisions either of the Cinematograph or the Assam Cinemas Regu­lation Act (Act XIV of 1953) which repeals the •Cinematograph Act in relation to this State. The petitioner contends that the license hav­ing been granted to him, it was not open to the authorities to compel him to stop exhibition of films by an order of this nature, when there was nothing to indicate that the petitioner has incurred any of those liabilities which would have justified the authorities in invoking the aid of S. 8 of the Act to revoke his license. (3) In our opinion there seems to be ample justification for the contention of the petitioner. It is undoubted that he had been granted a license for showing cinema films in that hall, which license, at any rate, was valid till the 19th December, 1954; and even according to the copy produced before us on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner till 15th December, 1954. There was, therefore, no reason why in spite of this license the petitioner should have been preven­ted by the Deputy Commissioner from exhibiting films in that hall. The Deputy Commissioner in his counter affidavit has suggested that he made the order, because the license issued to the peti­tioner was of a temporary nature and was subject to his removal of some of the defects as pointed out by the Sub-Divisional Officer of the Public Works Department. The Deputy Commissioner in his counter affidavit has suggested that he made the order, because the license issued to the peti­tioner was of a temporary nature and was subject to his removal of some of the defects as pointed out by the Sub-Divisional Officer of the Public Works Department. The counter affidavit does not indicate what those defects were which the petitioner had failed to remove; and it is quite apparent that, without indicating either to the petitioner or hearing him »n the point, the officer passed the order impugned simply on the assumption, as he says, that he was satisfied on reliable information of the breach of the aforesaid conditions. As I have said, the counter affidavit does not indicate what those conditions were, of which breach was complained; nor has the officer given any indi­cation as to how he was satisfied that breach had been committed. In my opinion, the counter-affi­davit is absolutely vague on the point, and does not advance the cause of justice. It was the duty of the Deputy Commissioner to place the materials fully and carefully before us when his order on the face of it was quite a vague order and not justified prima facie under any provision of law. We also regret to have to point out that whereas in the certificate issued to the petitioner no such condition had been men­tioned that it was subject to the removal of certain defects as pointed out by the Executive Engineer; yet that condition in ink and writing appears to have been inserted in the body of the license pro­duced on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner. Whoever may have been responsible for that insertion, the Deputy Commissioner cannot escape the responsibility for it; and we should have been fully satisfied on the point that this was not a subsequent interpolation made by somebody to sup­port the case now made that the grant of the license was subject to this condition. It was natural to expect that if the condition was in the license from the very beginning, it should have found place in the license issued to the petitioner and produced on his behalf. It is not suggested by anybody that there was any era­sure of the sentence from the license given to the petitioner, and we have no doubt having exa­mined it ourselves that there could not be any erasure at all. It is not suggested by anybody that there was any era­sure of the sentence from the license given to the petitioner, and we have no doubt having exa­mined it ourselves that there could not be any erasure at all. The license is an original one which was issued to him and bears the signature of the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur. (4) The petitioner in his affidavit in reply has asserted that all the conditions or defects which were pointed out by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Public Works Department, Dibrugarh, had long been removed before any film was exhibited to the public in the Cinema Hall in question; and he has given the details of the defects which were pointed out and which were removed by him. In the affidavit, he however admitted that in the general remark column there was mention of a thatched hut which had to be removed and which was owned and held by a third party & for the purpose of which negotiations had been carried out by the petitioner. But before the purchase could be effected and the thatch removed, sudden­ly the order in question was clamped upon him. The petitioner gave an understanding to purchase the thatched house and to remove the same in case the license was renewed in his favour. In view of this condition, we found it at first some­what difficult to interfere with the order impugn­ed and we wanted to satisfy ourselves whether this thatch had been removed. We now find from a telegram sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Junior Government Advocate who appears on his behalf that all the defects have been removed. It Is thus admitted that even if the conditions were there subject to which the license had been issued, all those condi­tions had been satisfied, and ordinarily the peti­tioner would be entitled to a renewal of his license subject to the payment of the usual fees. But at this stage we are not concerned with the renewal or non-renewal of his license. The only point which we have to consider is whether the order moved against was a valid order accord­ing to law, or it was 9n order passed without iuris-diction interfering with his rights. But at this stage we are not concerned with the renewal or non-renewal of his license. The only point which we have to consider is whether the order moved against was a valid order accord­ing to law, or it was 9n order passed without iuris-diction interfering with his rights. The petitioner submits that if the order in question is allowed to stand, it may interfere with his right of renewal o£ the license in question and has caused him day to day loss. It is therefore, very necessary that this illegal order should be set aside. He had appealed against the order in question under S. 9 of the Act, to the State Government, but without any success. We have already found that this order was not only without jurisdiction and passed without any au­thority of the law, even during the continuance of the license in favour of the petitioner, but that it was passed without even hearing him and without giving him an opportunity to satisfy the authori­ties that there was nothing in the conditions which he had not duly fulfilled. He is justified in contending that after having invested a good deal of money in the construction of the house and its appointments and furnishings, it was quite unjust on the part of the Deputy Com­missioner to issue an order of this nature without even giving him an opportunity of being heard. For all these reasons, we are satisfied that the order is entirely without jurisdiction and illegal, and is directed to be quashed. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner is entitled to his costs; the hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-. The costs should be paid by the op­posite pasty within three months from the date of this order. (5) DEKA J. : I agree. H.G.P. Rule made absolute.