Judgment These two appeals arise out of two suits, O.S. No. 3 of 1949 instituted by the plaintiff-appellant, in Second Appeal No. 2373 of 1952, against the Municipal Council, Coimbatore, the other suit being O.S. No. 537 of 1948 instituted by the Municipal Council, Coimbatore, against the appellant. Thus in the two Second Appeals, the appellant is the same individual. The appellant’s suit was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1524-12-0 being the amount paid in respect of an auction of the lease of palmyrah and cocoanut trees which he bid for at an auction held on the 8th of February, 1946. The suit of the municipality was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 672-4-0 being the loss on re-sale, after adjusting the deposit paid in respect of the auction relating to the trees and also in respect of the auction of a sheep slaughter-house. The Courts below in a common judgment decreed the suit of the municipality and dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The appellant was declared to be the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 2,099 per year and the appellant wrote to the municipality under Exhibit A-3, dated 14th February, 1946, praying that he may be permitted to deposit one fourth of the amount of Rs. 2,099 amounting to Rs. 524-12-0 and offering to pay the balance in eleven monthly instalments and the one-fourth amount paid might be held as deposit. The Commissioner placed the matter before the Council at its meeting on the 21st of February, 1946, the subjects that were placed for decision of the Council being the highest bid of the appellant of Rs. 2,099 per year for three years, and the Commissioner recommending the lease for three years at the same rate, on the basis of the letter, Exhibit A-3 of the appellant requesting for permission to pay the balance of the three-fourth amount in monthly instalments. The recommendation of the Commissioner on that was that the appellant may be allowed to pay at the rate of Rs. 500 per mensem from 1st April, 1946. The Council approved the recommendation of the Commissioner. The recommendation of the Commissioner on that was that the appellant may be allowed to pay at the rate of Rs. 500 per mensem from 1st April, 1946. The Council approved the recommendation of the Commissioner. But thereafter from the subsequent correspondence it will be seen that the appellant had been trying to go behind the agreement, mainly on the ground that some of the cocoanut trees which were expected to belong to the municipality, were in fact, claimed by third parties and that he was under the impression that a larger number of trees was being auctioned, and also on the ground that permission to tap toddy was not granted. In the circumstances the municipality was obliged to have a re-auction and it is in respect of the loss caused on the re-auction that the other suit, O.S. No. 537 of 1948 has been filed by the municipality. The agreement is sought to be avoided on the ground of mistake, but as found by the Courts below, this objection as regards the number of trees was not raised till at a late stage and it looked as if the appellant was trying to go behind the whole transaction on some pretext or other, and, in the circumstances, the view taken by the lower Courts that the breach of agreement was on the part of the appellant has to be accepted. The appellant refused to execute the lease deed and he has also stated that he did not take possession of the trees. Whatever may be the conduct of the appellant, it is clear that he did not wish to stand by the bargain of taking the lease of the trees on an annual rent of Rs. 2,099, for a period of three years. The natural consequence of such a refusal to perform his obligations will be that he will be liable for damages for breach of contract. Such damages the municipality has claimed and the lower Courts have found the municipality is entitled to it. With that finding I am unable to find any ground for interference. Mr. Veeraraghavan, the learned counsel has raised a contention which was not raised in the Courts below but of which he has given notice to the other side and which he contends is a pure question of law. With that finding I am unable to find any ground for interference. Mr. Veeraraghavan, the learned counsel has raised a contention which was not raised in the Courts below but of which he has given notice to the other side and which he contends is a pure question of law. His argument is that under section 68, clause (2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, “In respect of a contract whereof the value or amount exceeds one thousand rupees, the sanction of the council for the making thereof should be obtained before the same is made.” And, under section 69(1) “Every contract made by, or on behalf of, a council whereof the value or amount exceeds one hundred rupees shall be in writing and, except in the case of contracts made under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 68, shall be signed by two municipal councillors.” Sub-section (2) enacts “A contract executed or made otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section, of section 68, and of the rules referred to in section 68-A shall not be binding on the Municipal Council.” That there is no such contract as required by section 69 of the Act is evident, but it cannot be contended that in respect of the lease in question the sand ion of the municipal council has not been obtained. Exhibit A-4 is evidence of such sanction and the fact remains that in respect of a counter offer made by the appellant as to the mode of payment of the rent, the council accepted that offer and the appellant stood by it and acted under it by paying two instalments of Rs. 100 as desired by him which could be seen from his letter Exhibit B-7, dated 12th November, 1946, to the municipality. The only other question therefore is as to whether by reason of the absence of a contract not executed in the manner provided for under section 69 of the Act, the suit claim by the municipality becomes unsustainable. 100 as desired by him which could be seen from his letter Exhibit B-7, dated 12th November, 1946, to the municipality. The only other question therefore is as to whether by reason of the absence of a contract not executed in the manner provided for under section 69 of the Act, the suit claim by the municipality becomes unsustainable. For this the learned counsel relied on a recent Full Bench decision of our High Court in Corporation of Madras v. Kothandapani Naidu1, where it was held that a contract which is not in conformity with the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2), of sections 68 and 69 of the Madras District Municipalities Act (V of 1920), does not bind, and is unenforceable by, either the municipality or the party contracting with the municipality. The suit by the municipality is not to enforce a contract entered into with the municipality but is a suit for damages for breach of an agreement to take on lease certain properties of the municipality. Such a suit is not covered by the decision of the Full Bench referred to. The suit being only for damages, the absence of a contract as required under section 69 of the Act is no bar for the claim of the municipality for damages. The result is the appeals fail and are dismisse costs of the Second Appeals. No leave. P.R.N. ----- Appeals dismissed.