ORDER : Petitioner Radhabai is the objector in execution proceedings. Kadar Ali, the opponent, was a decree-holder who obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1945-46 from the Munsiffs court, Barwani, against Kundanlal who is the son of Radhabai, the petitioner. In execution of this decree Kadar Ali had attached four houses in Barwani. Radhabai in her objections, under Order 21 Rule 58 Civil Procedure Code, to the attachment of the four houses, stated that she had adopted Kundanlal when he was only a boy aged 12 years, and that on 14-2-1933 prior to the ceremonies of adoption, there was an agreement between Radhabai and Motilal, natural father of Kundanlal, whereby the latter was given certain cash, ginning factory, shop business, with one residential house. The rest of the property consisting of several houses, land, moveable properties and ornaments was to remain with Radhabai as her absolute property. On this basis, the petitioner claimed the houses as her own and not liable to attachment in a decree against her adopted son. The objection was dismissed. Therefore, Radhabai filed a declaratory suit under O. 21, R. 63 Civil P. C. The District Judge, Barwani, decreed this suit. Kadar Ali, the decree-holder, did not file any appeal against that decision which became final. 2. Two other decree-holders Raoji Bhai and Balmukund obtained decrees in Civil Suit No. 32 of 1945-46 and Civil Suit No. 16 of 1945-46 against Kundanmal and got the same houses attached. Radhabai also filed objections which were dismissed and hence Radhabai filed a declaratory suit under O. 21 R. 63 against both the decree-holders, Balmukund and Raoj Bhai. The District Judge decreed the suit. The decree-holders went in appeal to the High Court where a Division Bench of this Court held the anti-adoption agreement to be invalid, and came to the conclusion that the whole property belonged to Kundanmal, the judgment-debtor. In effect, it reversed the decree of the District Judge, Barwani, and held that the four houses which had been attached in the decree were rightly attached. 3. On this decision Kadar Ali also applied for attachment and the same houses were again attached in his decree. Radhabai again filed objections against the attachment of the four houses contending that the houses having been held not liable to attachment in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1949, could not be attached again. 3. On this decision Kadar Ali also applied for attachment and the same houses were again attached in his decree. Radhabai again filed objections against the attachment of the four houses contending that the houses having been held not liable to attachment in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1949, could not be attached again. The learned Civil Judge rejected this objection on 17-11-1953. The applicant erroneously filed an appeal to the District Judge, Mandleshwar, Barwani, but the District Judge rejected the appeal as being incompetent. The applicant, therefore, comes in revision to this Court against the order of the Civil Judge, First Class, Barwani. 4. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel on the point, I have no doubt that the learned Civil Judge, Barwani, has fallen into an error regarding the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Balmukund v. Radhabai First Appeal No. 45 of 1948 (MB) (A) as a judgment in rem. The judgment in the decree of Balmukund and Raoji Bhai was only a judgment inter partes and not a judgment in rem. That judgment was not a judgment in a suit between the parties to the present case and, clearly, cannot be regarded as res judicata; nor can it be considered to be a judgment binding upon the whole world. S. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is exhaustive as to judgments in rem. The whole question of judgments in rem in India was exhaustively discussed in Yarakolamma v. Anakala Naramma 2 Mad HCR 276 (B), Kanhya Loll v. Radha Churn 7 Suth WR 338 (FB) (C) and Jogendra Deb Roy v. Funindro Dev Roy 14 Moo IA 367 at p. 374 (PC) (D). In these rulings, it was clearly specified what were judgments in rem in our country and what were not and the result had been embodied in S. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. In these rulings, it was clearly specified what were judgments in rem in our country and what were not and the result had been embodied in S. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. In 7 Suth WR 338 at p. 344 (C) Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J. observed : "If a judgment in a suit between A and B that certain property for which suit was brought belonged to A the adopted son of C were a judgment in rem and conclusive against strangers as to the fact and validity of the adoption, the greatest injustice might be caused." These observations were quoted and fully approved by the Privy Council in Appa Trimbak v. Waman Govind AIR 1941 PC 85 (E) and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held in this case that a judgment in a suit between A and B that the suit property did not belong to A as the adopted son of C as the adoption was invalid is not a judgment in rem and is not conclusive against the strangers as to fact and validity of adoption. Following this in Arjun v. Mathura Nath AIR 1928 All 395 (F) it was held that no judgment except that passed by a Court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty, or insolvency jurisdiction, upon any matters indicated in S. 41 can have the effect of a judgment in rem and, therefore, a judgment holding that A is not adopted son of B is not conclusive against the whole world. 5. According to S. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act a final judgment, order, or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction will alone be judgments in rem provided they confer or take away from any person any legal character, or they declare any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person, but absolutely. 6. In Punjab National Bank v. Balikram AIR 1940 Cal 225 (G) it was observed that the legal word "character" in S. 41 of the Evidence Act means status; it is something more than a mere right. The declaration of a persons right operates as against a particular person or group of persons against whom the right is claimed. 6. In Punjab National Bank v. Balikram AIR 1940 Cal 225 (G) it was observed that the legal word "character" in S. 41 of the Evidence Act means status; it is something more than a mere right. The declaration of a persons right operates as against a particular person or group of persons against whom the right is claimed. Whereas a mans status is something which defines his position not in relation to any particular person or group of persons but in relation to the rest of the world; his status distinguishes him from the rest of the world. It was then observed that to say that a person is not a partner of a firm is not to declare his status or legal character; it is merely to declare his position with respect to the particular firm. Hence it was held that an order of an insolvency Court refusing to adjudicate a person insolvent on the ground that he was not a member of a firm which had been declared insolvent is not a final order which conferred upon or took away from him any legal character within the meaning of S. 41, and hence such a judgment is not a judgment in rem. 7. Similarly in Radhakishin v. Mt. Gangabai AIR 1928 Sind 121 (H) it was observed that the legal characters that can be conferred or taken away in the exercise of the jurisdiction mentioned in S. 41 do not include the state of being a partner. 8. It would follow that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil First Appeal No. 45 of 1945 (MB) (A) (Balmukund and Raojibhai v. Radhabai and Kundanmal) regarding validity of the anti-adoption agreement dated 14-2-1933 between Radhabai and Motilal, natural father of Kundanmal, will not come in the category of a judgment in rem so as to be binding against the whole world. 9. So far as the objections in execution application are concerned, the whole case-law has been reviewed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Narasimhachariar v. Raghava Padayachi, AIR 1945 Mad 333 (I) and it has been held that an order on a claim petition filed under O. 21, R. 58, C. P. C., or a decree in a suit filed under R. 63 does not extend beyond the execution of the decree which has given rise to those proceedings. I respectfully concur in this view. 10. The result is that the revision will be allowed with costs and the order of the learned Civil Judge, 1st Class, Barwani, will be set aside.