RAM LABHAYA J.: The District Judge, Lower Assam Districts-passed a decree nisi on 4th April 1955 dissolving the marriage of the petitioner with the respon­dent. The records have been submitted to this court for the confirmation of this decree. (2) The petitioner, Patric Donald Stracey sued Eileen Stracey, his wife, for the dissolution of their marriage. Harold Murray was made co-res­pondent in the case. (The crucial issue in the case was as follows: "Whether the respondent committed acts of adul­tery with the co-respondent on different occasions between 20th July 1952 and 10th April 1953 as alleged by the petitioner". In the course of the discussion of the evidence, His Lordships observ­ed:) (3) In 'Woolf v. Woolf, 1931 PD 134 (A), it was held that "where evidence is tendered in good faith, which under the usual circumstances clearly point­ed to1 adultery, it was the duty of the Court to act upon it". The; evidence was that the husband had passed two nights in a bedroom at a hotel with a woman. This evidence was considered enough for an in­ference of adultery. In - 'Earnest John white v. Mrs. Katheleen Olive White', AIR 1954 Pat 560 (B), it was held that "in a divorce case the charge of adultery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Public policy, namely the peculiar duty of the Court of protecting the sanctity of marriage relationship-requires this." 'Preston Jones v. Preston Jones', 1951 AC 391 (C). was relied on in ,- 'Mrs. Georgians G. Marks-Gideon v. Edward Nathnial Gideon', AIR 1955 All 8 (SB) (D). The observations of Lord Mac-Dermott in 1951 AC 391 (C), were reproduced. They were as follows: "The jurisdiction in divorce involves the sta­tus of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict inquiry. The terms of the: statute recognize this plainly, and I think it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold that the Court, might be satisfied, in respect of a ground for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond reasonable doubt." These decisions may be regarded as settling the standard of proof needed in a case for dis­solution of marriage. If adultery is alleged as the ground for dissolution its proof beyond reason­able doubt would be necessary. If adultery is alleged as the ground for dissolution its proof beyond reason­able doubt would be necessary. This propositionl does not conflict with anything laid down in the decision in 1931 PD 134 (A)'. There it was laid down that evidence tendered in good faith should; be accepted. The evidence when accepted was considered enough for an inference of adultery. In the present case evidence of intimate and exclusive association is abundant. The respondent and the co-respondent had numerous opportunities of being alone at their respective residences. They have been seen on no less than four occasions alone at night in one or the other of these two places. On 4-9-52 they were at IB, Palmgrove Road after 2-30 A. M. for about 5 to 10 minutes when lights were dimmed and then brightened. There is nothing improbable in this circumstance. Lights may appear to have been dimmed if one of the-two available lights is switched off. There are other simple devices by which similar effect may 'be produced. The witness was outside and could not say how this was done. If Peggy Phillips' testimony is not dependable as I have found, Kesava's statement remains unrebutted. According to him the two were inside only for 5 to 10 minutes. The period is stated on esti­mate but even if it is approximately correct, I am not impressed by the argument that adulterous in­tercourse was improbable during this short period. The same argument was put forward in regard to the incident of 24th October 1952. On this occa­sion the period was longer. When two persons are tempted irresistibly to illicit sexual intercourse, more often than not it is a hurried affair. The parties to it may not be able to shake off the fear of detection even when in the act. They have to take chances and therefore are in real need of drastically cutting short normal or usual proces­ses. (After further discussing evidence His Lord­ship concluded as follows:) The respondent is about 52 years old. The co-respondent is aged about 58. Notwithstanding their ages the evidence of the fondness and attach­ment amounting to infatuation afforded by their behaviour and of the circumstances in which they have been seen on five occasions discussed above, do point unmistakably to the conclusion that these or some of these opportunities were availed of for adulterous intercourse. The co-respondent is aged about 58. Notwithstanding their ages the evidence of the fondness and attach­ment amounting to infatuation afforded by their behaviour and of the circumstances in which they have been seen on five occasions discussed above, do point unmistakably to the conclusion that these or some of these opportunities were availed of for adulterous intercourse. A strong presumption of adultery arises from petitioner's evidence and this has not at all been rebutted. I think the learned District Judge had ample justification for holding that it was beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed adul­tery on more than one occasion with the co-res­pondent. (4) Adultery from its very nature is a secret I or a promiscuous act. Seclusion is necessary for I indulgence in it. Direct evidence of an act of [adultery is so extremely difficult to obtain that j Insistence on it by Courts may well amount to a denial of the legitimate protection of marital rights. Couples may not be caught in the act even if indulgence in adulterous intercourse continues for a long time. They take precautions against it. It was therefore held in - 'Loveden v. Loveden', (1810) 2 Hag Con. 1: 161 ER 648 (E), that "it was a fundamental rule that it was not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery, for if it were otherwise, there is not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable; it is very rarely indeed that the parties are sur­prised in the direct act of adultery. In every case almost, the fact is inferred from circumstan­ces that lead to it by fair inference as a neces­sary conclusion and unless this was the case and this were so held, no protection whatever could be given to marital rights." In 'Allen v. Allen', 1894 P. 238 at p. 252 (F), Hopes L. J. held that "to lay down any general rule to attempt to define what circumstances would be sufficient upon which to infer the fact of adultery is impossible. Each case must depend on its own particular cir­cumstances." Adultery may be presumed when guilty attachment existed and there were opportunities for adulterous intercourse. In the circumstances of the present case as disclosed in evidence I find ample justification for inferring an adulterous con­nection and intercourse as a consequence of long illicit association. Each case must depend on its own particular cir­cumstances." Adultery may be presumed when guilty attachment existed and there were opportunities for adulterous intercourse. In the circumstances of the present case as disclosed in evidence I find ample justification for inferring an adulterous con­nection and intercourse as a consequence of long illicit association. (5) In view of the findings reached above the decree for dissolution of marriage passed by the learned District Judge should receive confirmation of this Court and is hereby confirmed. (6) The question of alimony could be consid­ered only on the decree being confirmed. This having happened, this question arises for conside­ration. This can be decided only after hearing the counsel for the parties who had no opportunity of addressing the Court on this point before. SARJOO PKOSAD C. J. : (7) It is with no small difference that I have agreed to the order proposed to be passed in this case by my brother colleagues. (8) The prayer for dissolution of marriage is based on allegations of adultery between the res­pondent and the co-respondent on various occa­sions as enumerated in paragraph 11 of the peti­tion. There is indeed plenty of evidence of deep friendship and even intimacy between the res­pondents. In fact a large part of it is admitted by the respondents themselves and their witnesses. But the question is whether this intimacy had ripened into criminal intimacy or adulterous in­tercourse between them. The evidence of general behaviour of the respondents towards each other may lead one to entertain somewhat strong sus­picion as to the illegal nature of their intimacy; but whether this suspicion enters the realm of proof and a well-founded conviction of the exis­tence of such relationship is a different matter. I have my own doubts about the credibility of the evidence adduced by the petitioner on the specific instances of adultery mentioned by him. (After discussing the evidence His Lordship pro­ceeded as follows.-) (9) I have directed my attention only to the glaring features of the evidence. I am invited on this state of the evidence to hold that the alle­gations of adultery on the dates alleged have been substantiated. I naturally hesitate to do so. (After discussing the evidence His Lordship pro­ceeded as follows.-) (9) I have directed my attention only to the glaring features of the evidence. I am invited on this state of the evidence to hold that the alle­gations of adultery on the dates alleged have been substantiated. I naturally hesitate to do so. But, throughout this evidence there is at least one feature of the case, which emerges clear; and that is the fact that the respondent and the correspondent seem to be fond of exclusively asso­ciating with each other and have at all odd hours of the day and night freely enjoyed and indulged in each other's company. It is probable that this factor weighed with the learned District Judge in condoning the lacuna in the evidence adduced by the petitioner and in passing the decree for dissolution of marriage. It is probably this consideration, which has also weighed, and quite naturally, with my brother col­leagues in proceeding to confirm that decree. On the whole, therefore, I am also disinclined to seek to interfere now with the decree passed by the learned District Judge and in view of the order which I propose to make, I consider it unprofit­able to dilate upon the questions raised any fur­ther. (10) We are, however, all agreed that it is a fit case in which an order for alimony should be made in favour of the respondent..................We, therefore, think that an adequate allowance payable by the petitioner for her maintenance should be granted. As to what the amount should be. we propose to determine after the Court has delivered judgment confirming the decree for dis­solution of marriage and heard the parties on the question of alimony payable. DEKA J. : (10-a) (His Lordship after discussing the cir­cumstances of the case expressed his concurrence with the view that the respondent and co-respon­dent had been leading an adulterous life.) ORDER. (11) We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the question of alimony. We think that the proper forum to determine the question would be the court of the District Judge, who pass­ed the decree nisi. In the circumstances, we would refer the matter for appropriate orders to the Dis­trict Judge. The record may be sent to the Dis­trict Judge as early as possible. D.S.P. Order accordingly.