Judgment :- 1. The legal representative of the decree-holder in O.S. No. 574 of 1108 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff of Meenachil, has brought this second appeal against the order the learned Temporary Additional District Judge of Kottayam passed on 21.3.1953 in A.S. No. 207 of 1953 dismissing the execution application (E.P. 65 of 1952) filed by the appellant as barred by time. The District Munsiff had allowed the execution to proceed over-ruling the judgment-debtor's objection that the execution was barred by limitation. The learned District Munsiff's view was that by reason of certain prior orders the judgment-debtor was precluded at the present stage of the execution proceeding from raising the plea of limitation. The appellate court differed from the execution court's view and dismissed the application. Hence this second appeal. 2. E.P. 65 of 1952 was the 4th execution petition filed in the case. The decree is one passed on 23.7.1115 and is a simple (unregistered) money decree. Admittedly the first execution petition, E.P. 17 of 1120 was made beyond 3 years from the date of the decree. E.P. 17 of 1120 was filed on 7.1.1120. It is common ground that the three subsequent petitions were each filed within three years of the filing of the one immediately preceding it. The second one, E.P. 148 of 1123, was filed on 1.3.1123, the third one, E.P. 501 of 1950, on 21.12.1950 and the fourth (E.P. 65 of 1952) on 3.3.1952. The objection raised by the judgment-debtor was that as the first execution petition was filed out of time and no effective order in execution was made on it or on the second or the third application, the present one should be held to be barred by time. The lower appellate court accepted this view. 3. Before us the learned counsel for the appellant urged two grounds in support of the second appeal. The first ground was that the decree was attached before judgment in a suit (O.S. 35 of 1110) filed before the Kottayam District Court and that as the attachment was lifted long after the first execution petition, the second and the subsequent applications have to be held to have been filed within time. Indeed this is the only ground specifically raised in the memorandum of second appeal. Indeed this is the only ground specifically raised in the memorandum of second appeal. However, it was another ground, namely, that by reason of certain prior orders in execution the judgment-debtor was precluded from raising the plea of limitation at the present stage of the proceeding, that was more elaborately argued before us. The respondent's counsel did not tell us in his argument that this ground was not properly taken in the memorandum of second appeal. It is rather surprising that while the lower appellate court's decision went against the appellant on this ground, no specific objection should have been taken against it in the second appeal memorandum. Having permitted the appellant to raise this ground, though unwittingly, we shall deal with this ground also on the merits. 4. The first ground that as the decree was the subject of an attachment before judgment the time during which the attachment subsisted should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for execution has concurrently been repelled by the two lower courts and it was rather a faint attempt that the learned counsel for the appellant made to attack the said finding. As pointed out by both the courts below the execution court allowed the first application to be proceeded with only subject to the attachment, a course permitted by the provision in 0.21, R.53(1)(b)(ii). Whatever doubts there might have been under the old Civil Procedure Code, the Code of 1908, (which was adopted in Travancore in 1925) expressly permitted the holder of an attached decree to execute it, subject, of course, to the limitation that the proceeds should go in liquidation of the claim or decree for which it was attached. Counsel, however, sought to make two distinctions with reference to the attachment in the present case. The first one was that here the attachment was not made under 0.21 R.53 in execution, but was one before judgment. Counsel, however, sought to make two distinctions with reference to the attachment in the present case. The first one was that here the attachment was not made under 0.21 R.53 in execution, but was one before judgment. This point was considered so long ago as 1894 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case reported as Beti Maharani v. The Collector of Etawah - (1895) ILR XVII Allahabad 198 - and it was held there that an attachment before judgment issued by a Court at the instance of a third party, prohibiting the creditor from recovering the debtor from paying the debt, was not an order falling within the purview of S.15 of the Indian Limitation Act (same as S.15 of the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100). Though the contrary view was taken in some cases before the Privy Council gave its decision and even afterwards without noticing it, it can now be taken to be settled law that when a decree is attached before judgment the holder thereof is not precluded from executing it. Munsur Ali v. Abhoya Charan Das (1917) XL Indian Cases 870 (Calcutta) and Rangaswami Chetti v. Thangavelu Chetti (1919) L Indian Cases 380 (Madras) have discussed the question. The distinction sought to be drawn is therefore of no avail to the decree-holder to get over the plea of limitation. 5. The second distinction which counsel sought to make was that the terms of the order of attachment in question (Ext. E) really operated as an injunction and that therefore even if normally attachment of a decree before judgment or in execution will not preclude the holder of the attached decree from executing it, the terms of the particular order did not permit the decree-holder to execute his decree. All that the order states is that until otherwise ordered by the court issuing the attachment the decree-holder shall not realise the debt or transfer it and that the judgment-debtor will not pay the debt to the decree-holder or anybody else. As far as we can see this is in terms of the normal type of orders attaching a decree and the concerned order in the Privy Council case cited was understood to be virtually in similar terms. As far as we can see this is in terms of the normal type of orders attaching a decree and the concerned order in the Privy Council case cited was understood to be virtually in similar terms. Counsel invited our attention to the decisions in K. Rajitagiripathy v. K. Bhavani Sankaran, AIR 1924 Madras 673 and to Lonan v. Venkitarama Ayyar (1936) XXVI Cochin Law Reports 126 - in support of his contention that the present order can be construed to serve the purpose of an injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing his decree. As pointed out in the latter case the Madras ruling gave the goby to the Privy Council decision and the judgment does not set out the terms of the attachment order. The Cochin decision contains a statement as to the terms of the attachment order in that case. Though the Privy Council decision and several other decisions bearing on the point have been referred to there, we are not prepared to say that the decision rendered is in conformity with the preponderance of judicial opinion on the point. However, the learned judges chose to construe the particular attachment order as a prohibition against the decree-holder from seeking to execute the decree. We are not now concerned with the question whether the construction is right or not. We cannot invoke the aid of the decision to construe the present order. Moreover, that decision was rendered when the old Cochin Civil Procedure Code (II of 1079) was in force. It is only in 1112 that the Cochin Code was amended on the lines of Civil Procedure Code Act, V of 1908. We regret we cannot accept the argument that Ext. E, the order of attachment in the case prohibited the decree-holder from executing his decree. 6. Our decision on the first point urged in the second appeal is therefore in conformity with that given by the courts below. On the second point the two lower courts have differed. The learned District Munsiff based his decision that the judgment-debtor was precluded from raising and the court from considering the question of limitation mainly for the reason that on 20.6.1952 the court had passed an order on the present execution petition permitting the decree-holder to proceed with the execution. The order made on that date reads "no objections, F.S." (meaning further steps). The order made on that date reads "no objections, F.S." (meaning further steps). The date 20.6.1952 was the date fixed for the judgment-debtor to show cause against execution. A notice under 0.21 R.22 (Travancore R.20), was issued to him fixing the above date as the date of the hearing. That notice was served by affixture at the respondent's residence alleging that the respondent refused to accept it. This was on 25.5.1952 and on the date fixed for hearing (20.6.1952) the Court passed the order quoted above. The judgment-debtor's objection to the execution on the ground of limitation among others came some time later on 28.8.1952 after a notice under 0.21 R.37 was issued to him to show cause against his arrest and detention in civil prison. The question is whether it was open to the Court to entertain the objection at that stage. If the alleged refusal to accept the notice under 0.21 R.22 is true and the service then effected is valid, the order the court made on 20.6.1952 must preclude the respondent from raising the question of limitation - see - Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Griga Kant Lahiri (1882) ILR VIII Calcutta 51 (PC), Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari (1884) ILR VI Allahabad 269 (PC) Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Thevar, AIR 1921 Privy Council 23, Venkitaranga Reddi v. Chinna Sithamma (1941) 1 MLJ 270, Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishna, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 65, Shanmugavelu v. Karupannaswami, AIR 1954 Madras 1070, Ushadevi v. Devidas, AIR 1955 Bombay 239 and Kameshwar Singh v. Krishnanand Singh AIR 1955 Patna 423. A question was raised whether when a prior order is passed in the same execution proceeding that could or would estop the party effected by it from challenging its correctness at a subsequent stage. The balance of judicial opinion as will be noticed from the cases in Ram Kripal v. Rup Kuari, Shanmugavelu v. Karupannaswami and Kameshwar Singh v. Krishnanand Singh is in favour of the view that it must estop from the point being registered at a later stage. 7. It is seen that no notice issued in the execution proceedings in the case has ever been accepted by the judgment-debtor or after his death by his legal representative. On the first application of 1120 notice of impleading the decree-holder's legal representative was affixed during the temporary absence of the judgment-debtor. 7. It is seen that no notice issued in the execution proceedings in the case has ever been accepted by the judgment-debtor or after his death by his legal representative. On the first application of 1120 notice of impleading the decree-holder's legal representative was affixed during the temporary absence of the judgment-debtor. A like notice issued pursuant to the application of 1123 was served by affixture as the party refused to accept it. The notice issued on the last application under 0.21, R.22 was also, as noticed earlier, served by affixture by reason of the alleged refusal of the respondent to accept it. Same is the case with other notices issued subsequently too. Curiously enough the judgment-debtor did not challenge the truth of any of these returns in his written objections to the execution petition. We cannot, however, allow the plea of constructive res judicata to prevail without it being examined whether the return made on the notice issued under 0.21, R.22 (for the hearing on 20.6.1952) is true or not. We would, therefore, set aside the orders of the courts below and direct the execution court to deal afresh with the question of limitation after considering whether the service of the notice under 0.21, R.22 is true and valid. Mr. Paikeday, the learned counsel for the respondent also raised an argument that even if the alleged refusal is true, the service cannot be held to be proper as there was non-compliance by the execution court with the provision of 0.5 R.19. Azagappa v. Ramanathan, AIR 1933 Madras 466 - was cited as authority for the position. The execution court will examine this aspect as well. 8. The learned District Munsiff was inclined to think that an order dated 17.2.1120 on the first execution application for production of succession certificate after notice of impleading was served by affixture during the temporary absence of the judgment-debtor and the order for impleading passed on the second application on 27.4.1123 after the judgment-debtor refused to accept the notice, would also operate to preclude the respondent for raising the plea of limitation afterwards. Service of the notice on the first application was improper and after impleading was allowed on the second application, an order was passed to issue notice under 0.21 R.20 (present R.22) to show cause against execution. No notice pursuant to that order was issued on that application. Service of the notice on the first application was improper and after impleading was allowed on the second application, an order was passed to issue notice under 0.21 R.20 (present R.22) to show cause against execution. No notice pursuant to that order was issued on that application. In the circumstances no order on E.P. 17 of 1120 or any order on E.P. 148 of 1123 stands in the way of the judgment-debtor from raising the plea of limitation now. The lower court need therefore only concern itself with the order dated 20.6.1952 on the last execution petition. 9. The lower appellate court differed from the execution court's view that the principle of constructive res judicata debarred the judgment-debtor from raising the plea of limitation at the stage it was raised on the authority of a decision of the Travancore High Court reported as Padmanabha Pillai v. Nallathampi Nadar (1117) XVI TLT 582. That decision held inter alia that the notice to the judgment-debtor must be sufficiently specific to give information as to the nature of the reliefs applied for and that a general notice under 0.21, R.20 (now R.22) without specifying the reliefs sought for in the execution application would not be sufficient to estop the judgment-debtor from raising any specific plea. We are afraid this decision and some of the decisions followed there such as Chandapilla v. Kuncheria (1113) XII TLT 853 and Lekshmi Amma v. Ahmed (1933) XXIII TLJ 36 - over-looked the fact that the requirement as to the notice of the specific relief asked for is necessary only when the execution application went beyond the terms of the decree and asked for something not granted by the decree. When the application is not for the execution of something which has been directed to be done in the decree so as ipso facto to carry information as to what the claim made and the reliefs prayed for are, notice to the judgment-debtor without inserting the specific prayers will not render the order made upon such application res judicata. When the application is not for the execution of something which has been directed to be done in the decree so as ipso facto to carry information as to what the claim made and the reliefs prayed for are, notice to the judgment-debtor without inserting the specific prayers will not render the order made upon such application res judicata. This distinction was well brought out by the earliest decision of the Travancore High Court bearing on the question of res judicata in execution proceedings, namely Raman v. Chennan, XXXII TLR 6, where Raman Menon, C.J. and Cheriyan, J. made copious extracts in their judgment from the decisions in Shiek Budan v. Ramachandra Bhunjgaya (1887) ILR XI Bombay 537, Narayana Pattar v. Gopalakrishna Pattar (1905) ILR XXVIII Madras 355 and Ramasami Naik v. Ramasami Chetti (1907) ILR XXX Madras 255 to support the view that when the execution application asked for reliefs not granted by the decree, to render an order made on such an application res judicata the judgment-debtor must have had specific notice of the relief. The decisions in Ouseph v. Kavu (1933) XXIII TLJ 1242 and Damodara Kurup v. Govinda Kurup (1934) XXIV TLJ 770 have maintained this distinction, but not the three cases noted earlier. We are afraid the confusion has been caused by seeking to apply the qualification Raman v. Chennan enunciated to the rule of constructive res judicata in execution proceedings without reference to the question whether the order dealt with a relief granted by the decree or not. In the cases relied upon in that decision the concerned execution applications asked for reliefs not granted by the decree. That the qualification has been unduly extended by subsequent decisions of Travancore High Court was realised by the learned judges who decided Padmanabha Pillai v. Nallathampi Nadar who opened their judgment by stating: "This special appeal raises a question of, limitation which has been the subject of many rulings in this and other High Courts. I have no doubt that the decision in the present case should follow the rulings of this court alone." 10. The notice issued to the judgment-debtor in the case in hand is a normal notice under 0.21, R.22, to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him. I have no doubt that the decision in the present case should follow the rulings of this court alone." 10. The notice issued to the judgment-debtor in the case in hand is a normal notice under 0.21, R.22, to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him. When all that the execution application asked for is the enforcement of the reliefs granted by the decree we are unable to agree that the court should embody the reliefs asked for in the notice. R.22 does not insist upon any such thing and the decree-holder or the court cannot be blamed for not doing what the law does not require them to do. 11. In the result the second appeal is allowed and the execution case remitted back to the court of the District Munsiff for fresh enquiry and disposal in the light of this judgment. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their costs both here and before the lower appellate court. Costs before the execution court will be provided for in its revised order.