Chhuttilal v. Bagmal — 1956 DIGILAW 58 (MP)

JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. These three revisions have been referred to this Bench for the determination of a question with regard to the validity of the Indore Stamp Act, as adapted in the State by the Indore Stamp Act Adaptation Act (Act No. 5 of 1950) in its applicability to bills of exchange. The question arises thus. After the formation of Madhya Bharat various Stamp Acts which were in force in the covenanting States were continued tinder the Madhya Bharat Regulation of Government Act (Act No. 1 of 1948). In 1950 the Indore Stamp Act Adaptation Act was passed. It received the assent of the Rajpramukh on 24-11-1949. It was published in the Madhya Bharat Gazette on 14-1-1950. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that the Act would come into force fifteen days after the date of its publication in the gazette. Section 4 of the Act lays down that on the coming into force of the Act, the various Stamp Acts in force in the covenanting States shall stand repealed. All these revision petitions arise out of suits based on Hundis drawn after Act No. 5 of 1950 came into force. They were not duly stamped under the Act and in each of these revision petitions, the lower Court has held that the Hundi in question not being stamped in accordance with Art. 11 of Sch. 1 of the Indore Stamp Act as adapted in Madhya Bharat is inadmissible in evidence. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urge that the Act in so far as it imposes and levies stamp duties on bills of exchange was not within the legislative powers of the Madhya Bharat Legislature under the Constitution and that, therefore, the Act in its applicability to bills of exchange is ultra vires the State Legislature because of Art. 246. It is further argued that the stamp duty on bills of exchange levied by Act No. 5 of 1950 which came into force on 29-1-1950 not being a duty, which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was being lawfully levied by the States, is not saved under Art. 277. It is further argued that the stamp duty on bills of exchange levied by Act No. 5 of 1950 which came into force on 29-1-1950 not being a duty, which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was being lawfully levied by the States, is not saved under Art. 277. It is true that the impugned stamp duty falls under item No. 91 of the Union List and not within item No. 63 of the State List or item No. 44 of the concurrent List and that, therefore, the Madhya Bharat Legislature is not competent to pass a legislation after 26-1-1950 imposing and levying any stamp duty on bills of exchange. This was not contested by the learned Advocate-General. He, however, urged that Act No. 5 of 1950 was enacted before the Constitution came into force, though it became operative after 26-1-1950; that the Act was placed on the statute book on 24-11-1949 when it received the assent of the Rajpramukh and that it became effective fifteen days after its publication in the gazette dated. 14-1-1950; that the Act was, therefore, an existing law in force according to explanation 1 to Art. 372 and as such one saved and continued by that Article; that Art. 246 dealt with the legislative powers of Parliament and State Legislatures to make laws after 26-1-1950 and that it was not concerned with the operation of statutes already enacted. There is no answer to this argument of the learned Advocate-General and it must be accepted. It cannot be denied that Art. 246 deals with the power of Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws after 26-1-1950. It has nothing to do with the operation of laws already enacted. That is dealt with by Art. 372. Under that Article and the explanation 1 to it, it is plain that Act No. 5 of 1950 which received the assent of the Rajpramukh on 24-11-1949 but became operative from 29-1-1950 is a law continuing in force after the commencement of the Constitution. The challenge resting on Article 246 to the validity of Act No. 5 of 1950 in its applicability to bills of exchange is, therefore, without any foundation. 3. The continuance of Act No. 5 of 1950 under Art. 372 is, however, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution as is clear from the wording of Art. 372(1). The challenge resting on Article 246 to the validity of Act No. 5 of 1950 in its applicability to bills of exchange is, therefore, without any foundation. 3. The continuance of Act No. 5 of 1950 under Art. 372 is, however, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution as is clear from the wording of Art. 372(1). Now Art. 277 says : "Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of this State, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law." 4. This Article saves existing taxes, duties, cesses or fees levied by State or local authorities on subjects which are now included in the Union List and under that Article only those taxes, duties, cesses or fees have been saved which immediately before 26-1-1950 were being lawfully levied. The real question, therefore, that survives for consideration is whether the stamp duty under Act No. 5 of 1950 which was passed before the commencement of the Constitution but became operative thereafter is a duty "which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was being lawfully levied." If it is taken that as the Act came into force on 29-1-1950 the stamp duty on bills of exchange cannot be regarded as a duty which was actually being levied before the commencement of the Constitution, then it would not be saved under Art. 277. If on the other hand the mere enactment of Act No. 5 of 1950 is held sufficient to make the duty one being lawfully levied by the State before the Constitution, then no objection can be taken to the levy of the duty by the State notwithstanding the fact that the stamp duty in question is included in the Union list. The question turns upon the true construction of the expression "were being lawfully levied" and in particular of the word "levy" as used in Art. 277. The question turns upon the true construction of the expression "were being lawfully levied" and in particular of the word "levy" as used in Art. 277. Counsel for the petitioners contended that "levy" under Art. 277 means "collect" and that the words "were being lawfully levied" as used in that article referred do only those taxes, duties, cesses or fees which were being actually collected and not to those which under an Act enacted prior to 26-1-1950 could be collected only after the Act becoming operative after the commencement of the Constitution. Learned Advocate-General while not saying that the contention advanced on behalf of the applicants was of unsubstantial character, asked us to consider whether in the context in which the word "levy" has been used it means "impose." According to the learned Advocate-General if "levied" means "imposed", then the stamp duty on bills of exchange under Act No. 5 of 1950 would be one imposed before the commencement of the Constitution and would be saved under Art. 277. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel and the learned Advocate-General, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are three stages in the taxation. First there is a declaration of law by an Act which lays down the circumstances in which persons or things are liable. This is a legislative act. Then comes the stage of assessment and collection of the tax and this is followed lastly by the stage of recovery if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay. The assessment, collection and recovery of a tax are executive processes. The words "impose", "levy" and "recovery" connote these three stages in the subject of legal taxation. These main divisions have been emphasized in an Australian case, namely,- 'British Imperial Oil Co. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation', (1926) 38 Com-W LR 153 (A). In that case Issacs, J., observed at page 187 : "'Levying' taxation, that is, collection, is an executive act, and it cannot be supported by the law of the prerogative. The 'grant' that is, the imposition of the tax by Parliament, is essential. The 'period' is necessarily part of the grant. The 'manner' that is, the machinery, such as the assessment, andc. must be prescribed by Parliament. The 'grant' that is, the imposition of the tax by Parliament, is essential. The 'period' is necessarily part of the grant. The 'manner' that is, the machinery, such as the assessment, andc. must be prescribed by Parliament. In these days, the divisions so marked out are spoken of as 'imposition' or 'imposing' and 'assessment and collection'.- 'Bowles v. Bank of England', (1913) 1 Ch 57 (B), is a most convenient place to find all these phrases of the parliamentary and executive processes of obtaining taxes from the subject mentioned and differentiated. Almost every page from p. 70 to p. 82, and the judgment of Parker J., passim, will attest this. It will there be seen that the words 'imposition' and 'imposing' mean the same thing, and that both mean the grant; further, that both are distinct from the management, assessment, collection and control of the tax". The observation of Isaacs, J., only lends support to what I said in the case of- 'Ramprasad v. War Profits Tax Officer', 1953 Madh-B 20 (AIR V 40) (C). In that case I said : "It must be remembered that there is a distinction between 'imposition' and 'the levy', i.e. 'assessment and collection' of a tax. The imposition of a tax is by an Act of the competent Legislature and is purely a legislative act. The levy and the collection of a tax is a process subsequent to the imposition of the tax by the statute. A tax cannot be levied or collected before it is actually imposed by an Act of the competent Legislature. This is clear from Art. 265. The levy, that is to say, the assessment of a tax, and the collection of the tax are executive processes regulated by provisions made in that behalf." There is thus in the subject of legal taxation a real distinction between the imposition of a tax and the levy or collection thereof. The imposition of a tax which is by an Act of the competent Legislature is an act which is done once for all and is not an act which like the levy is done continuously or periodically. 6. Now it is undoubtedly true that in English language the word "levy" is frequently used in more than one sense. The imposition of a tax which is by an Act of the competent Legislature is an act which is done once for all and is not an act which like the levy is done continuously or periodically. 6. Now it is undoubtedly true that in English language the word "levy" is frequently used in more than one sense. The Oxford English Dictionary and the Webster Dictionary both give different meanings of the term according to the context in which it is used or the subject-matter in which it is applied. It means "collecting of assessment, tax, andc". It also means 'imposing a tax." The meaning of the word has thus to be determined by resort to the context in which it is used. In the- 'Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. Zorastrian Building Society Ltd., Bombay, 1955 Bom 273 (AIR V 42) (D), Chagla C.J., while considering the meaning of the expression "levy" in One third proviso to S. 9(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 observed that the word "levy" is used in the sense of "impose" as well as "collection" and that the question whether it means "collect" or it means "impose" depends upon the context in which the expression is used. 7. Now it appears that in the context of Article 277 the word "levy" can only mean "collection". It will be observed that Art. 277 is grouped with the provisions which deal with the allocation between the Union and the States of the proceeds of taxes and duties which can only be imposed by the Government of India. All taxes and duties mentioned in the Union List are imposed by the authority of enactments passed by the Parliament. But the produce or yield of these taxes and duties does not enure to the benefit of the Central Exchequer. This is clear from Arts. 268 to 273. These articles deal with (a) the appropriation by the States of certain duties imposed by the Union but collected by the States; (b) the appropriation by the States of the proceeds of certain duties and taxes imposed and collected by the Government of India; (c) the distribution between the Union and the States of the yield of certain taxes and duties imposed and collected by the Union Government; (d) the appropriation by the Union Government of surcharge on certain duties and taxes. Article 277 is concerned with the application and collection of taxes, duties, cesses or fees of those taxes now included in the Union List, which before the commencement of the Constitution could be validly imposed by any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body and were so imposed. Article 277 is not a provision inserted in the Constitution for the continuation, after the commencement of the Constitution, of laws imposing taxation which were in force before 26-1-1950. It is Art. 372 which provides for the continuation of existing law including the laws imposing Taxation. A law imposing taxation in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution would have continued in force by virtue of Art. 372 even if Art. 277 had not been included in the Constitution. The object of Art. 277 must then be taken to be something different from that of Art. 372, otherwise it would become a mere surplusage. When Art. 277 says that the taxes, duties, cesses or fees mentioned earlier therein shall "continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes" it emphasizes the question of collection and application of the proceeds of such taxes and duties and not on their imposition or of the continuation of laws imposing them. Now the question of application of the proceeds of a tax cannot arise unless there is first collection; and the imposition of a tax is not a continuous or a periodical act. It is an act which has to be done once for all. In the expression "continue to be levied and to be applied" the word 'levy' cannot, therefore, mean anything else than 'collection'. If 'levy' is used in the sense of "collection" in the later part of Art. 277, then according to the most ordinary rules of construction, it cannot be given a different meaning, when it is used for the first time in the Article in the expression "were being lawfully levied." The word "continue" in the expression "continue to be levied and to be applied" itself shows that if the word 'levy' in this expression means collection, then it must have the same meaning when it is used earlier in the provision. For, there can be no question of the continuation, after the commencement of the Constitution, of collection and application of any tax if before the commencement of the Constitution there has never been any collection or application. You cannot say that a thing or an act or a state of affairs is continued unless it has been in existence before. Therefore it seems to me that the only natural and proper construction that can be placed on the expression "which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were being lawfully levied" is which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were being actually collected under some law sanctioning the collection. A similar view was taken by me in 1953 Madh-B 20 (AIR V 40) (C). The question as to the meaning of 'levy' in Art. 277 is not covered by any other authority. 8. Learned Advocate-General referred us to- 'D.R. Madhavakrishnaiah v. Income-tax Officer, Bangalore', 1954 SC 163 (AIR V 41) (E) and- 'Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. v. Union of India', 1953 Raj 145 (AIR V 40) (FB) (F). But in none of these cases the question of the meaning of the term 'levy' in Art. 277 was considered. The Supreme Court case dealt with the point whether income tax and super tax, which was being lawfully levied by the Mysore Government under the Mysore Income-tax Act prior to the commencement of the Constitution, could be assessed and collected on income accruing prior to 1-4-1950 through the agency of authorities appointed in the State under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for assessments subsequent to 1-4-1050. It was held that "while Art. 277 undoubtedly authorises the continued levy of taxes lawfully levied by the Government, of the State before the commencement of the Constitution and their application to the same purposes as before, even after the Constitution came into force, there is nothing in the Article to warrant any implication that such taxes should continue to be levied, assessed and collected by the State authorities as before the Constitution." These observations made in relation to the question of the agency for the levy, assessment and collection of the tax after the coming into force of the Constitution, cannot afford any ground to the meaning of the word 'levy' in Art. 277. On the other hand the observation that the levy of the tax need not be by the State authorities after the Constitution shows that in the observations quoted above, 'levy' has not been used in the sense of 'impose' so as to hold that after the coming into force of the Constitution the imposition of the tax saved under Art. 277 need not be under the authority of the State enactment. In the Rajasthan case the question decided was of the right of the Union Government to appropriate the arrears of cotton excise duties for the period after the commencement of the Constitution and upto 31-3-1950. Cotton excise duties were being levied in Rajasthan under a local law immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and were continued to be levied by the State of Rajasthan by virtue of Art. 277 till 31-3-1950 when Parliament made a provision to the contrary. It was held that those arrears were for purposes of the State of Rajasthan, even after the commencement of the Constitution and upto 31-3-1950 and could not, therefore, be taken over by the Union Government. The Rajasthan case is thus of no assistance in the determination of the question of the meaning of the term 'levy' as used in Art. 277. 9. If the construction I have put on the word 'levy' is the right one, then clearly the stamp duty on bills of exchange under Act No. 5 of 1950 which became operative on 29-1-1950 not being one "which was being levied before the commencement of the Constitution" is not saved under Art. 277. The stamp duties on bills of exchange, that were being levied immediately before the commencement of the Constitution in different parts of Madhya Bharat, were those under the various stamp laws of the covenanting States. These are duties which can be continued to be levied and applied under Art. 277 after the commencement of the Constitution until a provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law. The Stamp Laws of the various covenanting States no doubt stand repealed after the coming into operation on 29-1-1950 of Act No. 5 of 1950. These are duties which can be continued to be levied and applied under Art. 277 after the commencement of the Constitution until a provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law. The Stamp Laws of the various covenanting States no doubt stand repealed after the coming into operation on 29-1-1950 of Act No. 5 of 1950. But the effect of the words "until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law" in Art. 277, is, in my opinion, to keep alive those laws so far as the levy and application of such duties as are mentioned in the Union List is concerned till such time as Parliament provides to the contrary. The Hundis in the suits out of which these petitions arise were all drawn in that part of Madhya Bharat which was formerly the territory of the Gwalior State. Now in the territory of the former Gwalior State no duty on Hundis was being levied immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, as the Gwalior Stamp Act which was in force in that territory did not prescribe any. That being so, these Hundis were not required to be stamped in accordance with Act No. 5 of 1950 even though they were drawn after the Act came into force. Therefore, the order of the lower Court in each of these cases that the Hundi in suit not being stamped in accordance with Art. 11 of Sch. I of the Indore Stamp Act as adapted in Madhya Bharat is inadmissible in evidence, cannot be upheld. 10. In Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 127 and 128 of 1955 Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta raised the further objection that on the date the Hundis in question were drawn, impressed or adhesive stamps were not available and that on account of this non-availability, it was impossible to comply with the provisions of Ss. 9 to 13 of the Indore Stamp Act and that, therefore, the Hundis should have been admitted in evidence though they were not stamped in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Act. On this point I need not add anything to conclude what I said in the order of reference, as learned counsel was unable to satisfy us that no impressed stamp of any kind was available on the date the Hundis in question were drawn. 11. NEVASKAR, J :- . On this point I need not add anything to conclude what I said in the order of reference, as learned counsel was unable to satisfy us that no impressed stamp of any kind was available on the date the Hundis in question were drawn. 11. NEVASKAR, J :- . In all these three revision petitions the question involved is as regards the validity of the Indore Stamp Act as adapted in the State by the Indore Stamp Act (Adaptation Act No. 5 of 1950) with reference to its provisions regarding on bills of exchange. 12. Before the formation of Madhya Bharat various stamp provisions were in force in the covenanting States. After integration of these States they were continued in their respective territories by the Madhya Bharat Regulation of Government Act No. 1 of 1948. A uniform stamp provision was decided to be introduced in the entire State. With that object in view a legislation was passed by the Madhya Bharat Legislature. This was Act No. 5 of 1950. It received the assent of Rajpramukh on 24-11-1949. Later it was published in the Madhya Bharat Gazette on 14-11-50. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that the Act would come into force fifteen days after its publication. This date was 29-1-1950. Section 4 of the Act laid down that on coining into force of the Act, the various Stamp Acts in force in the covenanting States would stand repealed. Thus the appointed day under Act No. 5 of 1950 for the appeal of the Stamp provisions was 29-1-1950. Till then they would continue but would stand repealed on that day. 13. However on 26-1-1950 the Constitution of India came into force. Article 277 of the Constitution provided as follows : "Any taxes, cesses or fees which immediately before the commencement of this constitution were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purpose of this State, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purpose until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law". 14. 14. According to this Article the taxes, dues, cesses or fees which were being lawfully levied by the various authorities mentioned in it shall be continued to be levied and applied by them notwithstanding that these taxes, duties, cesses or fees pertain to the Union List. 15. In all these suits, out of which these three revision petitions arose, the documents sued upon are hundis (bills of exchange) which were executed after Act No. 5 came into force and it is not disputed that if that Act is held valid with reference to its provisions as to duties on bills of exchange they are not duly stamped. It is also not disputed that these bills of exchange or hundis had been drawn in territories which were comprised in former Gwalior State and would be considered as duly stamped in case Gwalior State provisions as to duties on bills of exchange are held applicable. The reason is that no duty was payable under those provisions for bills of exchange. It is also admitted that there was no law made by Parliament till the filing of these suits pertaining to bills of exchange executed in Part B State. 16. The material question, therefore, for consideration is whether the law applicable is Act No. 5 of 1950 or the provisions regarding duties on bills of exchange in the former Gwalior State. 17. Contention advanced by the learned Advocate General is that by reason of Art. 372 read with Explanation Act No. 5 of 1950 is a law in force although it had not come into operation at the time of commencement of the Constitution and being the law in force is continued by Art. 372 of the Constitution. For this reason, it is contended, it is Act No. 5 of 1950 which would, govern the question of what duty the document in question should bear. 18. It is also argued by the learned Advocate General that the word levied in Art. 277 means 'imposed' and that Act No. 5 which imposed stamp duties on bills of exchange even when executed in the territories of former Gwalior State is applicable. 19. 18. It is also argued by the learned Advocate General that the word levied in Art. 277 means 'imposed' and that Act No. 5 which imposed stamp duties on bills of exchange even when executed in the territories of former Gwalior State is applicable. 19. In my opinion the solution to the question depends not so much upon whether the word 'levy' means 'collect' or it means 'impose' but upon consideration as to what duty was being lawfully imposed and collected immediately before the commencement of the Constitution at the places where the documents came into force. 20. Article 372 of the Constitution is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. Therefore it is subject to Art. 277. Article 277 provides for continuation of taxes, duties, cesses and fees which were being lawfully levied immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore if levy means 'collection', the appropriate duty which was being collected would be material. Even if levy means 'impose' that Article would indicate that it is the duty which was being imposed immediately before the commencement of the Constitution which would govern the matter. Now under Act No. 5 Gwalior Stamp provisions would continue up to 29-1-1950, because the preexisting provisions as regards stamps in force in the territories of covenanting States would stand repealed when Act No. 5 of 1950 would come into force i.e., on 29-1-1950. 21. Therefore at the end at 25-1-1950 the Gwalior provisions would be applicable and it is under that provision that the stamp duties were being lawfully imposed or collected within the territories of former Gwalior State. 22. Article 277 of the Constitution provided for their continuance until provision to tine contrary is made by the Parliament. 23. In the absence of Art. 277 of the Constitution Act No. 5 which came into force on 29-1-1950 would have held the field and the provisions of that Act would have governed the matter by reason of Art. 372(1) of the Constitution. But Art. 372(1) is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, therefore, it is Art. 277 which would govern the matter under consideration. 24. It therefore follows that although Act No. 5 of 1950 was continued as existing law by Art. 372. still provisions therein which came in conflict with Art. 277 are rendered invalid. 25. But Art. 372(1) is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, therefore, it is Art. 277 which would govern the matter under consideration. 24. It therefore follows that although Act No. 5 of 1950 was continued as existing law by Art. 372. still provisions therein which came in conflict with Art. 277 are rendered invalid. 25. Therefore so as far as Hundis in question are concerned it is the Gwalior provisions which apply and Act No. 5 to that extent is invalid. Under the Gwalior laws Hundis required no stamp-duty even though they were drawn after Act No. 5 of 1950 came into force. 26. As regards the other questions raised in Civil Revisions Nos. 127 and 128 of 1955 by Mr. Bhagwandas regarding non-availability of appropriate stamps at the material time, the learned counsel could not satisfy us on the point that no impressed stamps were then available. 27. Thus my conclusion accord with those arrived at by my learned brother Dixit, J. 28. I should however like to record my view on the point dealt with in his judgment regarding the meaning of the word 'levied' used in Article 277 of the Constitution which according to him means collected and does not mean imposed. According to the reasoning adopted by him reference in Art. 277 is to execute processes of collection and application and not to legislative process of imposition. I regret I am unable to concur in this view. 29. In my opinion word levied in this Article means imposed and not collected. 30. Article 277 appears in Part XII Chapter I of the Constitution which deals with subject of Finance. 31. Article 285 is the first Article in this chapter which uses the expression 'levied'. The word in this Article is used along with the word 'collect' in order to connote meaning and difference from the latter expression. This Article is as follows : "Taxes not to be imposed except by authority of law. No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." Both the marginal note as well as the body of the Article indicate that the word levied here is intended to mean imposed. This also follows as the Article is directed towards the legislative purpose. 32. Next Article in this chapter which deals with these expressions is Art. 268. 33. This also follows as the Article is directed towards the legislative purpose. 32. Next Article in this chapter which deals with these expressions is Art. 268. 33. This Article provides for levying of certain duties such as duties of stamp in certain cases and duties of Excise on medical and toilet preparations on the ground of their falling in the Union last. 34. It further provides for collection of duties thus levied within the limits of State territories by the State in the cases of Part A and Part B States and in the Part C States by the Union Government. 35. Clause 2 of the Article provides that such duties as are referred to in clause I in any financial year which are leviable within any State shall be assigned to that State. The marginal note to this Article is as follows : "Duties levied by the Union but collected and appropriated by the States". Although the marginal note does not fully express the meaning conveyed by the Article it certainly emphasises the distinction between levying and collection. This distinction is clearly discernible in the body of the Article. According to this Art. 8 Levy' means 'Imposition.' 36. Next Article i.e. Art. 269 deals with the case where taxes and duties are both levied and collected by the Union but assigned to the States. 37. This also clearly brings out the distinction between the meaning of the expressions 'levy' and 'collect'. 38. Next Article i.e., Art. 270 deals with the cases where taxes on income other than agricultural income are both levied and collected by the Union but are distributed between the Union and the States. 39. Article 272 which is the next Article, which uses these expressions provides that the Union duties on Excise as are mentioned in the Union List other than those dealt with by Art. 268 may be levied and collected by the Union but are limits to distribution between the States, within the limits of which the same are collected and the Union in accordance with law made by Parliament. 40. Next Article dealing with the expression in question is Art. 277. This article uses two expressions Levied and Applied. 41. 40. Next Article dealing with the expression in question is Art. 277. This article uses two expressions Levied and Applied. 41. Thus on review of all these provisions contained in this Chapter which deals with the subject of Finance the word levy is used in the sense of imposition of lawful process and clearly connote a meaning different from the word collect. 42. I agree with Dixit, J., that the dictionary meaning of the word levy is both imposing a tax and collection and assessment of tax, and what particular meaning it bears has got to be found with reference to its context. 43. In the context in which the expression 'Levied' is used in this Chapter at least up to Art. 277 it means, in my opinion, 'Imposed' and does not mean 'Collected'. In Art. 277 it cannot therefore be taken to carry any different meaning. 44. However as I held above this distinction between levied and collected is not material, as in my opinion the duties which were being lawfully imposed and collected immediately before the Constitution for Hundis were those which were in force in former Gwalior State immediately before the State merged into Madhya Bharat as the new law had not till then repealed those provisions. 45. The effect of this on the provisions as to stamp is that on 29-1-1950 the Act. No. 5 of 1950 became applicable in Madhya Bharat except such of its provisions which were referable to subjects in the Union List. In the latter case the preexisting stamp provisions continued. The reasons for this anomalous position is that Art. 372(1) is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. 46. For the reasons given above, I agree with the conclusion arrived at by Dixit J., that the Hundis in question need not be stamped in accordance with Act No. 5 of 1950. 47. I agree with the orders proposed to be passed by him allowing these revision petitions and setting aside the decision of the lower court. Petitions allowed.