Judgment :- 1. The short point for determination in this second appeal is whether the two courts below went wrong in refusing to admit the appellant to the benefits conferred by the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as successively amended by Acts I of 1951, VII of 1952, IV of 1953, I of 1954, V of 1955, XIX of 1955 and IV of 1956. By the last mentioned Amendment Act the benefits conferred by the original enactment stand extended for a period of six years and six months from the date of its commencement, namely 25th day of March, 1950. That is to say, as the law stands now the Act is to remain in force until the 25th day of September, 1956. The facts giving rise to this second appeal are these: In 1104 the respondents to this second appeal, Sree Narayana Dharma Sanghom, Varkala, granted a lease in respect of 1 acre and 67 cents of land in Perumbavoor in favour of one Raman Unni. In 1118 the lessor Sanghom brought a suit in O.S. No. 766 of 1118 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Perumbavoor to recover the property with arrears of rent. Raman Unni, the lessee, having died before that his wife and children were made defendants to the action, the wife being made defendants 8 and the children defendants 1 to 7 and 9. That suit was compromised and a decree in terms of the compromise petition was passed by the court. Prior to the filing of the compromise petition the defendants surrendered one acre out of the lease-hold to the lessor Sanghom and by the compromise the remaining 67 cents of land and the buildings thereon constructed by the lessee and his heirs were to remain in the possession of the latter for a period of 6 years. The value of the said buildings was fixed at Rs. 5,000 and the arrears of rent accrued due till then at Rs. 500. After the expiration of the period of 6 years the lessor Sanghom was to recover possession of the 67 cents left with the defendants together with the buildings thereon on payment of Rs. 4,500. The value of the said buildings was fixed at Rs. 5,000 and the arrears of rent accrued due till then at Rs. 500. After the expiration of the period of 6 years the lessor Sanghom was to recover possession of the 67 cents left with the defendants together with the buildings thereon on payment of Rs. 4,500. During the said period of 6 years no rent was payable by the defendants to the lessor Sanghom, but the defendants were to pay the Municipal Tax on the buildings. While they were not allowed to make further improvements they were given the liberty to take the income from the land and to remain the exclusive possession thereof and the buildings. At the time of the compromise, defendants 6 and 7 were minors and their mother acted as their guardian for the purpose of the compromise. After the expiration of the 6 years' period prescribed by the compromise petition the decree-holder Sanghom paid the amount of Rs. 4,500 into court and sought to recover possession of the land together with the buildings thereon. Defendant 6 who had then become a major raised objections to the execution petition contending inter alia that the Act stood in the way of the decree-holder to recover possession of the property. Another objection he raised before both the courts was that the compromise decree was not binding on him. The lower courts repelled the objections and permitted the decree-holder to recover possession. Hence this second appeal. 2. Before us in second appeal the only ground urged was that the lower courts went wrong in refusing to extend the protection under the Act to the appellant. Both the courts only examined the terms of the compromise arrangement to decide whether the appellant was entitled to the benefits of the Act. They did not look into the terms of S.4, which in fact is the real operative section in the whole enactment. The District Munsiff held that the arrangement brought into existence with reference to the 67 cents and the buildings thereon left in the possession of the defendants did not bring into being a "Holding" as that term is defined in S.2 of the Act. The learned District Judge without expressing any opinion as to whether the arrangement created a "Holding" would appear to have had in mind Cl. The learned District Judge without expressing any opinion as to whether the arrangement created a "Holding" would appear to have had in mind Cl. (c) of S.3 while deciding the question of the applicability of the Act to the case. Cl. (c) of S.3 states that the Act shall not apply to buildings rented out including houses, shops or warehouses and the sites thereof together with the gardens or lands appurtenant thereto. To us it would, however, appear that the courts should have examined the terms of S.4 to determine the question of the applicability of the Act to the case before them. That section as amended by the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Amendment Act, 1956 (Act IV of 1956) reads: "Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, proceedings in execution of a decree in a suit for the recovery of possession of a holding shall, so far as they relate to the delivery of possession of the holding, be stayed for a period of six years and six months from the date of the commencement of this Act." 3. It cannot for a moment be contended and indeed it was not contended that O.S. No. 766 of 1118 was not a suit falling within the purview of the section, that is, a suit for recovery of possession of a holding. To our minds it is equally impossible to contend that the compromise decree for delivery of the possession of 67 cents of land comprised in the lease-hold together with the buildings thereon is not a decree for delivery of possession of the holding. The application to obtain delivery of the said land and buildings therefore clearly fell within the mischief of the section. Mr. T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that as the decree related to the delivery of possession of only a part of the holding and not the holding as comprised in the lease of 1104 the Act had no application to the case. A whole is made up of parts and the prohibition as to delivery which applies to the whole must apply to the part or parts as well. A whole is made up of parts and the prohibition as to delivery which applies to the whole must apply to the part or parts as well. If before or after a suit in eviction is brought with respect to a leasehold the lessee loses possession of a portion of it through eviction by title paramount, it will not to our minds bear argument that the suit or the decree, as the case may be, with respect to the portion still in the possession of the lessee will not attract the application of S.4. The words "in a suit for the recovery of possession of a holding shall, so far as they relate to the delivery of possession of the holding" must apply not only to suits or decrees for the recovery of the whole, but also to a suit with reference to a part (where it is permissible) and to a decree for a part. We are therefore definitely of the view that the lower courts acted wrongly in refusing to extend the protection of the Act to the appellant. The second appeal is accordingly allowed and the orders of the lower courts allowing delivery of possession are set aside. The execution petition filed by the decree-holders will stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their respective costs in all the three courts.