JUDGMENT This is an application for leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India, read with Ss. 109, 110 and O. 45, Rr. 2 and 3; Civil P.C. against the decree of this court in first civil appeal No. 43 of 1955, dated 19-9-1955. 2. It appears that the petitioner brought, suit No. 6 of 1952 on 24-9-1951 in the court of the-Sub-Judge, Manipur for adjudging the sale deed., dated 14-9-1946 executed by him in favour of Moirangthem Mani Singh, respondent No. 2, vide Ext. A/2 as void and for recovery of Rs. 17,700/- as mesne profits on the allegation that he and defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were members of the Manipur Drivers Union Co-operative Association Ltd. and the plaintiff took a loan of Rs. 2,500/- on 14-9-1946, from the Manipur Drivers Union, through the defendant No. 2, after pledging his lorry No. 427-A. S. M. but he executed the deed Ext. A/1 in the form of a sale deed, when in reality, it was a mortgage by conditional sale. It was further alleged that the plaintiff had-satisfied the loan within the prescribed time, limit by giving his Jeep to the defendant No. 2 and then the receipt dated 15-10-1946, Ext. P/A was obtained by him. The lorry was kept in the custody of the defendant No. 2 on the understanding that the plaintiff would get the net hire dues from this defendant, but the latter transferred the lorry to the defendant No. 3 without giving any information to the plaintiff and the defendant No. 3 took away the lorry, with the result that Criminal Case No. 247 of 1950 was started against the plaintiff while Criminal Case No. 66 of 1947 was started by the plaintiff against the defendant No. 3 and ultimately on 16-7-1951 it was held that the petitioner should approach the proper civil court for redress. The petitioner then brought suit No. 6 of 1952 in the court of the Sub-Judge in forma pauperis. 3. The suit was contested on the ground, that the transaction between the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff was that of all out and out sale and the sale deed Ext. A/1 was duly executed by the plaintiff after receiving its full consideration money of Rs. 2,500/-. The transaction regarding the jeep car was totally denied. 4. 3. The suit was contested on the ground, that the transaction between the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff was that of all out and out sale and the sale deed Ext. A/1 was duly executed by the plaintiff after receiving its full consideration money of Rs. 2,500/-. The transaction regarding the jeep car was totally denied. 4. It was held by the learned Sub-Judge that the deed Ex. A/1 was an out and out sale, deed and not a mortgage deed by conditional sale and the plaintiff was not entitled to redeem the lorry No. 427-ASM. It was further held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any mesne profits and so the suit was dismissed. In First Appeal No. 43 of 1955, this court agreed with the findings of the learned Sub-Judge and so the petitioners appeal was also dismissed. The petitioner now prays for leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court. 5. Article 133 of the Constitution of India, runs as follows : (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law, (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or (c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law....... The petitioner ought to have shown that there is a substantial question of law involved in this case. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has urged that there is a question of construction of the document, Ext. A/1 involved in this case. It has further been urged that there is a question of jurisdiction also involved in this case as the document Ext. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has urged that there is a question of construction of the document, Ext. A/1 involved in this case. It has further been urged that there is a question of jurisdiction also involved in this case as the document Ext. A/1 required registration under the Manipur State Registration Rules and when it was not registered, no court could have taken cognizance of it. Lastly, it was urged that as the opposite parties did not produce the Account Books summoned from them by the petitioner, the presumption should have been raised against them. It has now to be seen whether these points can be deemed to be substantial questions of law and whether this is a fit case for appeal within the meaning of clause (c) of the Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. 6. I shall take up the second ground first. The argument is that as the deed, Ext. A/1 was for more than Re. 15/- it required registration, under the old Manipur State Registration Rules. The petitioner came to court as plaintiff for declaration that the deed, Ext. A/1 was a mortgage deed and later on he prayed for amendment and urged that this deed was void for want of registration. The opposite parties as defendant relied on this deed, which was unregistered at that time but which has now been registered in accordance with the judgment of suit No. 50 of 1952, in order to substantiate their defence. The document, Ext. A/1 was stated to operate as a mortgage by the petitioner himself even though it was unregistered and its contents clearly disclosed that it was an out and out sale deed. This question cannot be deemed to be a difficult or substantial question as the terms of the deed are quite clear and there is the concurrent finding of both the courts on this point. In - State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies, 1955 Nag 287 ((S), AIR V 42) (A), it was held that any question of law affecting the rights of parties would not by itself be a substantial question of law. In - State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies, 1955 Nag 287 ((S), AIR V 42) (A), it was held that any question of law affecting the rights of parties would not by itself be a substantial question of law. An important or difficult question would of course, be a substantial question; but even if a question is not important or difficult, if there is room for reasonable doubt or difference of opinion on the question, then it would be a substantial question of law within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. The document Ext. A/1 is quite clear and as such it cannot be said that the question of its interpretation involves any difficult or substantial question of law. 7. In - Ganga Ram v. Mt. Saradhu, 1955 Him Pra 62 (AIR V 42) (B), it has been held that a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, would not be granted unless a substantial question of law of great public or private importance was involved. A case is not made out for grant of a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c) even if the court has erred in not relying on the plaintiffs admission. Similarly, in - Rattan Singh v. Ningthou-khonjam Ongbi Bimolia Devi, reported in 1955 NUC (Manipur) 4552 (AIR V 42) (C), this court has held that where there are concurrent findings of facts, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court can be allowed only if some substantial question of law of great public importance arises, vide also -Kaikhushrao Pirojsha v. C.P. Syndicate Ltd., 1949 Bom 134 (AIR V 36) (D) and - Annamalai Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, 1936 Mad 311 (AIR V 23) (E). In view of these rulings, I am of opinion that this question cannot be deemed to be any substantial question of law, within the meaning of Art. 133(1) of the Constitution of India. 8. Regarding the first contention of the petitioner, that the question of construction of a document is involved and so leave to appeal should be allowed. In view of these rulings, I am of opinion that this question cannot be deemed to be any substantial question of law, within the meaning of Art. 133(1) of the Constitution of India. 8. Regarding the first contention of the petitioner, that the question of construction of a document is involved and so leave to appeal should be allowed. The question of interpretation of a document no doubt is a question of law, but any question of law affecting the rights of parties, substantially would not by itself be a substantial question of law, vide - Subba Rao v. Veerju, 1951 Mad 969 (AIR V 38) (P) and - Bishen Singh v. Kishno, 1952 Punj 191 (AIR V 39) (G), in which it was laid down that where the principles of law on a point are well settled, the application of those principles to a particular set of facts cannot be said to be a substantial question, of law within the meaning of S. 110. Questions, of law, which have been definitely settled by the Privy Council, or the High Courts in India are not substantial questions of law within clause (3) of S. 110 or Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, even though, there is some application of those principles no substantial question of law within S. 110 arises. In my opinion, the question of construction of the document, Ext. A/1 therefore, does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. 9. The argument regarding drawing of adverse inference against the opposite parties on account of not producing account books involves the question of fact whether any account books helping the plaintiffs case had ever been in existence and the finding of the Sub-Judge, as well as of this court on this question is that such documents were not proved to have existed at all. In - Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SC 177 (AIR V 38) (H), it was held that the Supreme Court would not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying departure from this normal practice. In the present case, no such circumstance has been established and so this question also cannot be deemed to involve any substantial question of law. In the present case, no such circumstance has been established and so this question also cannot be deemed to involve any substantial question of law. The result is, the present petition fails and it is hereby rejected with costs to the opposite parties. Petition dismissed.