MEDAPA, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the judgment and decree in O. S. 21 of 1948 on the file of the District Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, dismissing the appellants' plaintiffs' suit for the refund of rs. 41,090 said to be the excess amount of rent paid by the plaintiffs to the respondents from 22-6-43 to 1-10-46 in respect of suit premises, No. 6, South Parade, Civil Station, Bangalore. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case leading up to this appeal briefly stated are as follows. The plaintiffs (Globe Theatres Ltd.) were exhibiting cinema shows in the suit premises which they had leased from one Kanmull since 15-7-37 on a rental of Rs. 950 per month. The defendants purchased the suit premises on 22-1-43 and the plaintiffs executed a lease deed (Exhibit I) in their favour on 12-4-43 for a period of 3 years agreeing to pay rent at Rs. 2,000 per month. They renewed the lease once again under a lease deed (Exhibit II) dated 26-3-46 for another period of 3 years agreeing to pay the same rent of rs. 2,000 per month. The plaintiffs applied on 2-7-46 to the House Bent Controller under Clauses 4 and 5 of the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore House Rent Control Order, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order, 1945) for the fixation of fair rent on the ground that the rent stipulated in the lease was excessive. The House Rent Controller found that no case had been made out under Clause 4 of the Control order, 1945, to hold that the rent fixed was excessive and that therefore there was no need to fix a fair rent under Clause 5 of the said order and dismissed the petition. Exhibit A is a copy of the order. The said order was taken in appeal before the hon'ble Resident and during the pendency of the appeal the Bangalore House Rent and Accommodation Control Law, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Law, 1946) came into force with effect from 1-10-46. There was no section in this law corresponding to Clause 4 of the Control Order, 1945 and under Section 5, the Controller was bound to fix the fair rent, if an application was made for that purpose by a tenant or landlord. There was no section in this law corresponding to Clause 4 of the Control Order, 1945 and under Section 5, the Controller was bound to fix the fair rent, if an application was made for that purpose by a tenant or landlord. The Hon'ble Resident therefore remanded the case to the Controller directing him to give a decision under section 5 of the Control Law, 1946. Exhibit B is a copy of his order. The Controller thereafter fixed Rs. 950 as fair rent and allowed an increase of Rs. 400 over the fair rent or a rent of Rs. 1,350 per mensem with effect from 1-10-46 as per the original of Exhibit C. There was an appeal against this order under Section 14 of the Control Law, 1946 and the Hon'ble resident confirmed the order of the Controller subject to the modification that an increase of Rs. 450 should be allowed over the fair rent of Rs. 950. Exhibit D is a copy of the order. ( 3 ) THE appellants had also contended before the Hon'ble Resident that the Controller should have ordered the refund or adjustment of excess rents paid by them to the respondents in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Clause 6 of the control Order, 1945 and Section 7 of the Control Law, 1946. The Hon'ble the Resident in his order observed that Clause 6 of the Control Order, 1945 and Section 7 of the Control Law, 1946 wore only declaratory and the Controller was therefore not competent to give the directions which the appellants required. He further observed that the appellants, if so advised, might move the civil courts for necessary reliefs. The suit filed by the appellants for obtaining the refund or adjustment in pursuance of the order of the Hon'ble the Resident was dismissed. Hence this appeal by the appellants (Plaintiffs ). ( 4 ) IT will be necessary and useful, before considering the respective contentions of the parties to refer in some detail to the various relevant provisions of different House Rent control Orders that came into force in the Civil Station. The civil and Military Station of Bangalore House Rent Control order, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order, 1941) came into force in the Civil and Military Station on 17-5-41. Under Clause 2 (2 ). The civil and Military Station of Bangalore House Rent Control order, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order, 1941) came into force in the Civil and Military Station on 17-5-41. Under Clause 2 (2 ). "house" has been defined as meaning "a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence and includes (a ). . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . " section 3 provides " When, on a written complaint or otherwise, the controller has reason to believe that the rent of any house within the Civil and Military Station, bangalore, is excessive, he shall hold a summary enquiry and record a finding". Section 4 reads" If, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, including any amount paid or to be paid by the tenant by way of premium or any other like sum in addition to the rent, the Controller finds that the rent of the house is excessive, he shall determine the fair rent to be charged for the house". Under Section 6 " When the Controller has determined the fair rent of a house (a) the landlord shall not charge any rent in excess of such fairrent (6) any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of such fair rent shall be null and void in respect of such excess and shall be construed as if it was an agreement for payment of the faid rent (c) any sum in excess of such fair rent paid, whether before or after the commencement of this Order in respect of residence after the commencement of this Order shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid, or at the option of such person, otherwise adjusted ". The Notification, dated 22-6-43. Cl. 2 (2) inserted the following amendment:" House means in the areas specified in the schedule' appended to this Order, any building or part of a building let separately or to be let separately, suitable for any purpose residential or non-residential, and elsewhere a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence and includes. . . . . . . . . " ( 5 ) THEN the Control Order, 1945 carne into force with effect from 19-9-45 in supersession of the Control Order, 1941. . . . . . . . . " ( 5 ) THEN the Control Order, 1945 carne into force with effect from 19-9-45 in supersession of the Control Order, 1941. Under Clause 2 (2) of this Order " ' House means a building or part of a building suitable for residential or non-residential purposes and includes (a ). . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . " clauses 3, 4 and 6 of this Order are identical with Clauses 3, 4 and 6 of the Control Order, 1941 with the addition of only the proviso to Section 3 which is immaterial for the purpose of this case. ( 6 ) THEN the Control Law, 1946, carne into force on 1-10-46. Clauses 3 and 4 found in the previous order were omitted in this Law. Under Section 5 (1) of this Control Law "the Controller may, in any case and shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a house, fix the fair rent for a house after holding such enquiry as the Controller thinks fit". Section 7 reads" When the Controller has determined the fair rent of a house (a) the landlord shall not claim or receive any premium or other like sum in addition to fair rent or any rent in excess of such fair rent, but the landlord may stipulate for, and receive as advance, an amount not exceeding one month's rent (b) any agreement for the payment of any sum in addition to rent or of rent in excess of such fair rent except in cases falling under section 6 of cl. (a) of this section shall be null and void in lespact of such addition or excess and shall be construed as if it were an agreement for payment of the fair rent (c) any sum paid in excess of the fair rent, whether before or after the commencement of this Law, in respect of the use of the building after the commencement of this Law shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of such person otherwise adjusted ". Under Section 19" All proceedings taken under the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore house Eent Control Order, 1945, or under any other Order under Rule 81 of the defence of India Rules as applied to the Station issued by any authority with respect to matters referred to in sections 3 and 4 of this Law, and pending at the commencement of this Law shall be continued as if they had been taken under the corresponding provisions of this Law ; and anything done under the aforesaid Orders shall be deemed to have been done under the corresponding provisions of this Law ". ( 7 ) THE contention for the appellants (Plaintiffs) is that the controller has fixed the fair rent for the suit premises at Es. 950 per mensem, that they have actually paid Rs. 2,000 per mensem and that therefore they are entitled to the refund of the excess from 22-6- 43 when the Control order 1941 was made applicable to non-residential buildings till 1-10-16 when the Control Law, 1946 came into force. On the other hand, the contention for the respondents is that under cl. 6 (c) of the Control Order, 1941, as well as Control Order, 1945, it is only the excess payment in respect of residential buildings that could be refunded and not in respect of non-residential buildings, as the one in the present case. ( 8 ) IT is urged that the word residence' in cl. 6 (c) means ' dwelling' and the benefit of this clause can be invoked only in respect of residential buildings. The learned District Judge has held that the House Eent Control Orders are not merely declaratory as found by the Hon'ble the Eesident and that he could have passed an order for the refund, if the claim was otherwise legally tenable. He however accepted the interpretation put for the respondent on the word ' residence and found that the expression in respect of residence ' used in cl. 6 (c) of the Control Orders of 1941 and 1945 does not apply to a place of business and dismissed the suit. He however accepted the interpretation put for the respondent on the word ' residence and found that the expression in respect of residence ' used in cl. 6 (c) of the Control Orders of 1941 and 1945 does not apply to a place of business and dismissed the suit. ( 9 ) THE learned District Judge after referring to definitions of the word residence ' in some dictionaries, referred to Stroud's judicial Dictionary in which it is stated residence' has a veriety of meanings according to the statute in which it is used and it is an ambiguous word and may receive a different meaning according to the position in which it is found. ( 10 ) IN Wharton's Law Lexicon the following note is found" Ordinary meaning the word ' residence' denotes the place where the individual eats, drinks, and sleeps, and where his family or his servants eat drink and sleep and for the meaning, extent or interpretation of the word in statutes, see particular statute. " ( 11 ) IN the Law Lexicon by Ramanatha Iyer it is noted that the word ' residence is " a word whose statutory meaning depends upon the context and the purpose of the statute, which may as used in one statute be fulfilled by mere business residence and in another require domicile in the strictest and most technical sense". " The word ' residence ' may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the courts believe the intention of the legislature to have been in framing particular provision in which the word is used ". ( 12 ) THE meaning to be attached to the word residence' thus depends upon the particular statute in which it is used. The question for consideration therefore is what the word residence means in the Control Orders of 1941 and 1945. It is contended for the respondents that the word is used in its ordinary sense of dwelling. It is urged that though by a notification dated 22-6-43 non-residential buildings were included in the definition of 'house' in Control Order, 1941, and both residential and nonresidential buildings were included in the definition, in the Control order 1945, so far as clause 6 (c) of both these Orders is concerned, that word is intended to refer only to residential buildings. ( 13 ) THE contention for the appellants, on the other hand, is that it is used in a broad sense so as to apply both to residential and nonresidential buildings. It cannot be disputed that the House Rent Controller could fix a fair rent for both residential and non-residential buildings and any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of such fair rent in respect of either residential or non-residential buildings is null and void. That being so, could it be the intention of the Legislature that refund of excess rent paid by the tenant is allowable only in respect of the residential buildings and not non-residential buildings ? That would be the result if the word residence ' is to apply to only residential buildings. It will not be quite correct to interpret the word residence ' in such a restricted sense for even a non-residential building, can in a contingency be used as a residence and vice versa. It cannot be said that such uses are impossible or inconceivable. It therefore follows that the word ' residence ' must be taken to have been used in a very comprehensive sense so as to apply not only to residential but also to nonresidential buildings. It is contended for the respondents that in the analogous provision, section 7 (c) of the Control Law, 1946, the word ' use' is used instead of residence' and that this change indicates that the word ' residence ' is not synonymous with ' use'. This contention cannot be accepted as correct for different words or expressions might be used in subsequent enactments not only when a change is intended but also to make the meaning that was not quite clear in the first enactment more clear in the subsequent enactment . It may be that because there was some scope for the argument that the word ' residence applied only to residential buildings the Legislature thought it fit to make its intention quite clear by the insertion of the word use ' instead of ' residence ' in Sec. 7 (c) of the Control Law, 1946. The appellants are a limited company and there can be no doubt that the appellants reside in the place where they carried ' on business. The appellants are a limited company and there can be no doubt that the appellants reside in the place where they carried ' on business. The word residence in the case of a company denotes the place where the company keeps house and does business (vide Law Lexicon by Ramanatha iyer ). In Taylor v. The Crowland Gas and Coke Co. , 11 Ex. 1 it was held that a corporation dwells ' at the place where its business is carried on. In Jones v. The Scottish Accident Insurance Co. , ltd. , (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 421 Pollock B. has observed " The first principle arrived at in the early decisions was that a corporation dwells in the place where it carries on its business ". ( 14 ) IN D. E. Bears Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, 1906 A. C. 455 it was contended that a company resides where it is registered but Lord loreburn L. C. in applying the conception of residence to a company observed " A company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep a house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps house and does business ". ( 15 ) IN Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol. 17 at para 776 it is stated that the test in determining whether or not a company is resident is not necessarily the place of registration but the place where the company does its real business. The appellants-company exhibited cinema shows and carried on their business in the suit premises. It must therefore be held that they ' resided ' in the suit premises. The classification of buildings as residential and non-residential can have no bearing or significance in interpreting or understanding the meaning of the word ' residence '. This position seems, to be implicit in the order of the Hon'ble Resident (who issued the several Bent Control orders) directing the appellants to seek redress in a civil court and receives further strength from the amendment to the Control order of 1941 so as to include non-residential buildings in the definition of the word ' house ' in the enactment. Sri N. P. Engineer, the learned Council for the appellants next contended that apart from the provisions of the House Rent control Orders, the plaintiffs are entitled to the refund of the excess rents paid by them, under the law of contracts. He relied upon Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act which reads : " A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it" ( 16 ) IT is argued that the plaintiffs paid the excess of rent by mistake of law and they are entitled to refund. The respondents' objections are : (a) that Section 72 of the Contract Act does not apply to mistake of law (b) that in the present case there has been no mistake of law at all: and (c) that they would be seriously prejudiced if such a new plea is allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal. ( 17 ) THE decisions were not uniform regarding the applicability of section 72 of the Contract Act to payments made under a mistake of law. The point however was set at rest by the decision of the privy Council reported in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra, A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 297 In this case the appellant was the owner of an estate known as Jharia Estate. In 1898 his predecessor granted a mining lease of a part of that estate to the predecessor of respondent 1. The lease provided that for the quantity of coal which the lessee would raise from the leasehold, he would pay royalty at the rate of As. 3 per ton for coals which would be despatched by the East indian Railway line. The lease further provided:" But in future if the Bengal-Nagpur line is constructed and the freight of coal becomes less by two annas at least or more than what is fixed at present per ton, I (i e. the lessee) shall pay royalty for those coals, which shall be despatched in the aforesaid manner at the specially reduced freight, at five annas person ". ( 18 ) THE contemplated Bengal-Nagpur line was subsequently constructed and freight for coal on both the lines was reduced by more than two annas. ( 18 ) THE contemplated Bengal-Nagpur line was subsequently constructed and freight for coal on both the lines was reduced by more than two annas. In the year 1910 the question whether the lessor was entitled to the enhanced rate of royalty provided in the lease fell for decision in a litigation which ended in an appeal to the Privy Council. Their Lordships of the Privy council by the judgment delivered on 8-3-1917 held that the enhanced rate of royalty was payable on coal despatched by rail over any of the two railways. After this judgment, royalty was regularly paid at the enhanced rate of five annas till 1923. ( 19 ) DURING 1923 payment of royalty fell into arrears and in January 1924 the lessee himself paid a sum of Rs. 57,069-3-0 to the lessor in full payment of royalty from 1st January to 30th September 1923. This payment was calculated at the enhanced rate. Meanwhile, the rate of freight for coal had been raised on 1st april 1921. The lessee's agent wrote to the lessor that since the freight for coals had been raised in 1921 he had been very much overpaid and no further payment on account of royalty would be made until the excess was wiped out. The lessor replied that the contingencies mentioned in the lease having happened he is entitled to claim the enhanced royalty for all time to come. The lessor then brought a suit for the subsequent royalties and the lessee pleaded that by virtue of the rate of freight having been raised in April 1921 he was liable to pay royalty only at a lesser rate according to the terms of the lease. Their Lordships held that the lessee was entitled to the benefit of section 72 of the contract Act. They observed that section 72 made no distinction between ' mistake of fact and ' mistake of law '. ( 20 ) THE contention for the respondents is that even if mistakes of law fall under Section 72 of the Contract Act there has been no mistake of law in the present case. It is contended that the appellants could never be said to have been ignorant of the provisions of the House Rent Control Orders or the effect thereof and there could never have been any mistake of law on their part. It is contended that the appellants could never be said to have been ignorant of the provisions of the House Rent Control Orders or the effect thereof and there could never have been any mistake of law on their part. It is urged that they voluntarily executed lease deeds, exhibits I and II dated 12-4-43 and 26-3-46 respectively, to pay rs. 2,000 per mensem by persuading the defendants to agree to the respective leases even when they (the defendents) wanted the building for their own use. They did not take action till 2-7-1946 not because they did not know their rights under the house Bent Control Orders but because they wanted the premises even at Rs. 2,000 rent. Even so, there has been a mistake of law. The fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller is the rent which the lessor, under law, can fix and receive for the building and any agreement between the lessor and lessee to receive or pay rent in excess of the fair rent is void. The parties were under a mistake in thinking that by an agreement between them, they can get over a prohibition rendered necessary in the interest of the public and in accordance with public policy which demand prevention of individuals from exploiting a national crisis to amass unconscionable profit or gain. ( 21 ) THE plaintiffs began exhibiting cinema shows as early as on 15-7-1937 on a rental of Rs. 950 per month. The defendants purchased the premises on 22-1-43 and demanded possession during the subsistence of the lease. The Second World War gave rise to a national crisis (more particularly after the entry of japan into the War) and the plaintiffs could not possibly secure any other suitable building to run their shows. They had therefore to continue in the suit premises agreeing to pay to the respondents, the new landlords, Rs. 2,000 per month, more than twice the rent they were paying before. They had therefore to execute Exhibit I, and later Exhibit II and pay the enhanced rents. It is exactly to prevent such exploitation that the House eent Control Orders were enacted. The House Rent Controller and the Hon'ble the Resident fixed Rs. 950 as the fair rent and that was the rent legally payable. The plaintiffs paid Es. They had therefore to execute Exhibit I, and later Exhibit II and pay the enhanced rents. It is exactly to prevent such exploitation that the House eent Control Orders were enacted. The House Rent Controller and the Hon'ble the Resident fixed Rs. 950 as the fair rent and that was the rent legally payable. The plaintiffs paid Es. 2,000 per month an amount not legally payable in the belief that they had to pay at that rate by virtue of the lease deeds, exhibits I and II they had executed. They certainly did not intend to make a gift of the excess to the respondents. It must therefore be deemed that the payment of excess amount is a payment made under a mistake. ( 22 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants relied on an English case Field v. Gover, (1944) 1 K. B. 200. In that case the defendant was the tenant of a house which became a controlled house for the first time on September 2, 1939, by virtue of the provisions of the Rent and mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939. One room in the house had been sub-let at the rent of 11s. 6d. a week till July 1939. On the termination of that sub-tenancy the room remained vacant until May 25, 1940, when it was sub-let by the defendant to the plaintiff at the rent of 10s. a week. On July 11, 1942, the county Court Judge, on the application of the plaintiff, declared the standard rent of the plaintiff's room to be 3 s. 8 d. a week. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the defendant to recover the difference between the aggregate of the amount of rent paid by him at the rate of 10s. a week and the aggregate of the apportioned standard rent, on the ground that under Section 1 of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, as amended by Section 3 Sub-section 1 and Schedule I to the Rent and Mortgage Intereet Restrictions Act, 1939, such rent would be irrecoverable by the landlord and was therefore recoverable by the tenant as rent overpaid. It was held that the condition precedent in the section to the recovery of rent overpaid was an increase, since the prescribed date, of the contractual rent above the standard rent, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It was held that the condition precedent in the section to the recovery of rent overpaid was an increase, since the prescribed date, of the contractual rent above the standard rent, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. ( 23 ) IT is urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the learned Judges were forced to give such a decision by virtue of some special enactments and have actually expressed that the result would work a great hardship to ignorant persons, but nevertheless they were bound to give effect to the enactments. It is therefore contended that under the ordinary law, repayments of rents paid in excess by tenants to landlords should not be allowed. If this contention is accepted, it follows that the House bent Control Orders which provide for refund of rents paid in excess by tenants are inequitable but that inequity should be relieved against only when overpayments in respect of residential buildings are claimed. Special enactments during the time they are in force are as much law as ordinary law and the attempted distinction between the two has no merit in it. The acceptance of this contention will defeat the object and purpose of the Rent Control Orders and the intentions of the Legislature. ( 24 ) IT has been pointed out earlier that the word ' residence ' can be taken to apply to both residential and non-residential building and that in the case of a company its residence is in the premises in which it carries on business. Section 65 of the Contract Act reads: " When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. " ( 25 ) THIS section deals with two matters: (a) an agreement which is discovered to be void, and (b) a contract which becomes void. It follows that if an advantage is received under a contract and that contract later becomes void, Section 65 does apply. In the present case, the advantage was received by the respondents under the contract (agreement enforceable at law) before it became unenforceable as a result of the fixation of fair rent by the House eent Controller. It follows that if an advantage is received under a contract and that contract later becomes void, Section 65 does apply. In the present case, the advantage was received by the respondents under the contract (agreement enforceable at law) before it became unenforceable as a result of the fixation of fair rent by the House eent Controller. Thus Section 65 also comes into play and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the excess of rents paid by them. ( 26 ) THE doctrine of unjust enrichment can also be invoked by the appellants. Nobody should be allowed to enrich himself at the cost of another unjustly. Aravindamma v. Bajasekhariah, 48 Mys: H. C. R. 534 is to the point. His Lordship Chief Justice Venkataramana Eao in the course of his judgment at page 541 observed :" The basis of the doctrine is that if a person has received some property or benefit from another it is just that he should make restitution as otherwise he would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other. It is on this principle of unjust enrichment several sections of the Indian contract Act particularly Sections 65, 68, 69, 70 and 72 of the Contract Act are based. " ( 27 ) IT is by the application of this principle an obligation is imposed in law in order to satisfy the requirements of justice. Lord Dunedin stated the true principles that should be applied in such cases thus : ' It is clear that all ideas of natural justice are against allowing A to keep the property of B, which has somehow got into 'a's possession without any intention on the part of B to make a gift of it to A '. It was urged for the respondents that in this case no fair rent has in fact been fixed. It is contended that the mention of rs. 950 as fair rent in the order is only intended as a step for the fixation of proper rent by the Kent Controller and that it cannot be taken that the Rent Controller had actually fixed a fair rent prior to 1-10-1946. It is contended that the mention of rs. 950 as fair rent in the order is only intended as a step for the fixation of proper rent by the Kent Controller and that it cannot be taken that the Rent Controller had actually fixed a fair rent prior to 1-10-1946. The order of the Hon'ble the Resident regarding this point is not as clear and specific as it might have been, but it must be noticed that the appellants applied to the house Kent Controller on 2-7-46 for the fixation of fair rent from the date of occupation. The House Bent Controller came to the conclusion that the rent was not excessive and as such under the control Order then in force, the question of fixing the fair rent did not arise for consideration. The matter was taken up in appeal before the Hon'ble the Resident and during the pendency of that appeal the Control Law of 1946 came into force. ( 28 ) SECTION 5 of that law provided for the fixation of fair rent irrespective of the question whether or not the rent was excessive. The Hon'ble the Resident ultimately remanded the case to the eent Controller for fixation of fair rent and the Bent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 950 per mensem and directed an increase of Rs. 400 with effect from 1-10-46. The Hon'ble Resident confirmed the order subject to the modification that the increase should be Rs. 450 instead of Rs. 400 as fixed by the Bent controller. It is therefore clear that what was confirmed by the hon'ble Resident is the operative part of the order of the House rent Controller fixing the fair rent at Bs. 950 per mensem prior to 1-10-46. It is thus clear that there has been a fixation of fair rent at the rate of Bs. 950 per mensem for the period prior to 1-10-46. ( 29 ) IT was next contended for the respondents that the plea that the plaintiffs are entitled to restitution under Section 72 (also section 65) of the Contract Act, is a new plea and the appellants must not be allowed to raise such a plea for the first time in appeal. It was urged that the principle of law enabling refund of money paid under a mistake is not absolute but is subject to limitations like estoppel. It was urged that the principle of law enabling refund of money paid under a mistake is not absolute but is subject to limitations like estoppel. It is contended that the respondents have had no opportunity to show that the appellants were estopped by their conduct from claiming any restitution. There is however no estoppel against a statute. The contention based on Sections 65 and 72 of the Contract Act are besides pure questions of law which can be raised at any time and in this case the appellants have given notice to the respondents of their intention to raise the said pleas.- the learned District Judge was therefore in error in refusing restitution to the appellants and in dismissing their suit. ( 30 ) I am sorry I have to differ from the judgment which the learned Chief Justice has just pronounced. The plaintiffs, a limited liability company described as having its registered office at No. 7 Lindsay Street, Calcutta, filed a suit (through its Managing Director) in the Court of the district Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, against the two defendants for the recovery of a sum of Es. 41,000. That suit having been dismissed by the District Judge, they have come up in regular appeal. ( 31 ) THE facts leading up to the suit are not seriously in dispute. The defendants purchased the premises in Mahatma Gandhi eoad, Civil Station, Bangalore, concerned in this suit on 22-1-1913. At that time the plaintiffs had taken the same on a lease from the defendants' vendors and were running a cinema theatre in it under a registered lease deed dated 15-7-1937 on a monthly rent of Es. 950. Immediately after the defendants became the owners, and therefore the landlords of the premises, they notified the plaintiffs to vacate them as they wanted the premises for their own use. The plaintiffs however replied that they could not vacate at such short notice and entered into a fresh lease with the defendants which is evidenced by a registred lease deed Ex. I dated 12-4-43. That leasa was to run for a period of three years from 1-4-1943 and the plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendants an enhanced rent at Es. 2000 per month with effect from 12-3-1943. On the expiry of that lease there was again some correspondence between the parties. I dated 12-4-43. That leasa was to run for a period of three years from 1-4-1943 and the plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendants an enhanced rent at Es. 2000 per month with effect from 12-3-1943. On the expiry of that lease there was again some correspondence between the parties. The defendants again asked the plaintiffs to vacate the premises as they wanted them for their own use and to run a cinema of their own in it but the plaintiffs wanted to continue in occupation. On' 26-3-46 the plaintiffs executed another lease deed Ex. II in favour of the defendants for another period of three years at the same rent. ( 32 ) THE rent at Rs. 2,000 per month was being paid regularly during all this time. Shortly after executing that lease deed, on 2-7-46, the plaintiffs applied to the House Bent Controller of the then civil and Military Station, Bangalore, to fix a fair rent for the premises complaining that the rent of Es. 2,000 per month was excessive. The Bent Controller then made an order on 28-7-1946 dismissing their application and holding that no case had been made out under Rule 4 of the then current Bangalore House rent Control Order to hold that the agreed rent was excessive. ( 33 ) THE plaintiff took up the matter in appeal before the British resident in Mysore and he passed an order on 19-12-1946 by which he remanded the case to the Controller for determination of the fair rent under Rule 5 of the H. R. C. Law of 1946 which by then had just come into force. The Bent Controller subsequently made an order on 3-1-1947 by which be fixed the fair rent of the premises. Not being satisfied with his order both the parties again took up the matter in appeal before the Resident and he passed the order Ex. D dated 15-3-47 mainly on the basis of which the present suit has been filed. Subsequently in May 1947 the defendants filed a petition for eviction on the ground that they wanted the premises for their own use and also that the plaintiffs had allowed some arrear of rent to fall due. The "latter was adjusted between the parties and the defendants subsequently secured an order of eviction from the District Judge, Civil Station which was confirmed in revision in this Court. The "latter was adjusted between the parties and the defendants subsequently secured an order of eviction from the District Judge, Civil Station which was confirmed in revision in this Court. ( 34 ) THE case of the plaintiffs is that the House Rent Controller has fixed the fair rent of these premises at Rs. 950 per month with effect from 26-3-43 upto 1-10-46 and thereafter at Rs. 1,350 that the Resident, while he confirmed that order, raised the latter figure to Rs. 1,400 and that the defendants are liable to refund to them the excess amount over the fair rent which they had collected from 26-6-43 when the House Rent Control Order was made applicable to non-residential premises upto 1-10-1946, after which date it is not disputed that they have been paying and the defendants have been receiving rent at Rs. 1,400 per mensem. The defendants have denied their liability to refund any such sum. ( 35 ) TO understand the contentions of the parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the various House Bent control Orders which were in force during the concerned time. The earliest Order called " The Civil and Military Station of bangalore House Rent Control Order, 1941", came into force on 7th May 1941. In that Order 'house' was defined as meaning a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence. Rule 3 provided that when on a written complaint or otherwise the Controller had reason to believe that the rent of any house was excessive he should hold a summary enquiry and record a finding Rule 4 provided that if, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, the Controller found that the rent of the house was excessive he should determine the fair rent to be charged for the house. Rule 6 provided as follows :"when the Controller has determined the fair rent of a house (a) the landlord shall not charge any rent in excess of such fair rent; (b) any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of such fair rent shall be null and void in respect of such excess and shall be construed as if it was an agreement for payment of the said fair rent (c) any sum in excess of such fair rent paid, whether before or after the commencement of this Order in respect of residence after the commencement of this order shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid, or at the option of such person, otherwise adjusted. " ( 36 ) BY a Political Department Notification dated 22-6-43 an amendment was made to this order by which 'house' was re-defined as meaning, in the areas specified in the schedule appended to that order, any building, or part of a building let separately or to be let separately, suitable for any purpose residental or non-residential and elsewhere a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence. This H. R. C. Order "was amended from time to time till on 19-9-1945 when a fresh order called 'the civil and Military Station of Bangalore House Rent Control Order, 1945 came into force in supersession of it. In that order Rules 3, 4, 5 and 6 continued to be in the same terms as those in the 1941 order. On 30-9-1946 the Bangalore House Rent and Accommodation control Law of 1946 replaced the earlier Order of 1945. ( 37 ) UNDER Rule 5 of that law the Controller was invested with power to fix fair rents in any case and was bound to do so on application by the tenant or landlord of the house after holding such enquiry as he thought fit. Rule 5 also provided that in fixing fair rent the Controller was to have due regard to the prevailing rates of rent for similar accommodation during 12 months prior to 1-9-1939 and to the rental value as entered in the Property Tax assessment Book of the Municipal Commission of the Station during that period. It further provided that in fixing the fair rents of non-residential building the Controller may allow an increase ranging from 37 to 50% on such rate or rental value. It further provided that in fixing the fair rents of non-residential building the Controller may allow an increase ranging from 37 to 50% on such rate or rental value. By Rule 7, clause (c) it was provided that when the Controller had determined the fair rent of a house any sum paid in excess of the fair rent whether before or after the commencement of that law in respect of the use of the building after the commencement of that law shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of such person otherwise adjusted. Glauses (a) and (b) of the rule continued to be substantially the same as clauses 6 (a) and (b) of the previous Order. This law was replaced in 1948 by the Mysore House Eent and Accommodation control Order of 1948 which came into force on 1-7-1948. ( 38 ) THE learned District Judge has held that under Rule 6 (c) of the House Rent Control Order of 1941 it was only any sum paid in excess of the fair rent in respect of residence after the commencement of that Order that was liable to be refunded or adjusted, that the plaintiff company could not be said to have resided in the premises and that it was only by virtue of Rule 7 cl. (c) which refers to the use of the building after the commencement of the law of 1-10-46 that it could be so refunded or adjusted. ( 39 ) THE meaning of the word 'residence' as found in various dictionaries has' been referred to in the judgment of the learned district Judge. In the Law Lexicon by Ramanatha Iyer at page 1118 Residence' is stated as signifying a man's abode or continuance in a place (Cowel) and the word Reside as "where there is nothing to show that it is used in a more extensive sense, (denoting) the place where an individual eats, drinks and sleeps, or where his family or his servants eat, drink and sleep (per bayley, J. R. v. North Curry 4 B and C 959)". At page 1119:" Residence is a word used in law to denote the fact that a person dwells in a given place or, in the case of a corporation, that the management is carried on there. At page 1119:" Residence is a word used in law to denote the fact that a person dwells in a given place or, in the case of a corporation, that the management is carried on there. It is a word capable of different meanings, including temporary residence or permanent domicile ; a word whose statutory meaning depends upon the content and the purpose of the statute, which may as used in one statute be fulfilled by mere business residence, and in another require domicile in the strictest and most technical sense. The abode, or dwelling place, as distinguished from a mere locality of existence ; the place of abode, a dwelling, a habitation, the act of abiding in a place for some continuance of time. " ( 40 ) AGAIN at page 1120: " The word residence may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the Court believes the intention of the legislature to have been in framing the particular provision in which the word is used. " ( 41 ) MR. Engineer has referred to The Swedish Central Railway company Ltd. , v. Thompson, 9 Tax cases 342. and Todd v. The Egyptian delta Land and Investment Co. , Ltd. , 14 Tax oases 119. where the domicile of a company for purposes of levying income-tax have been considered and it has been held that the place where the company is registered is not the sole criterion to ascertain such domicile but the place from which the company's affairs are managed and controlled or where it may carry on its business. I do not think that- that interpretation of the word "residence" or "domicile" would at all be relevant in this case. Under the Income-tax Act the question for determination would be where the company has been registered and where the company is carrying on business or is being controlled or where its profits are realised or collected ; see sanapath Iyengar's Income-tax Act, 1952 Edn. , Vol. 2, page 341. ( 42 ) THE object of the H. B C. Orders is to give protection to persons who are actually living or carrying on business in any particular preinises within any particular area to which the Orders are applied. The objects of the Income-tax Act and the H. E. C. Orders are entirely different If the wide meaning suggested by Mr. The objects of the Income-tax Act and the H. E. C. Orders are entirely different If the wide meaning suggested by Mr. Engineer is to be given to the word "residence" there was no reason at all for making any difference between residential and non-residential premises in any of the Orders or need to amend the earlier order in June 1943 and no significance to be attached to the deliberate change of the expression from "in respect of residence" to "in respect of use" in the 1941 Order and in 1946 Law respectively. According to that contention a person having a house wherein he resides and a separate shop in the same locality must be said to reside in both the places, and a firm carrying on business in a business locality must be said to reside there apart from the residence of its individual partners. ( 43 ) SUCH a position could never have been contemplated or intended when H. R. C. Orders were promulgated or could be inferred therefrom. Even in the amendment of 22-6-43 a house is defined as meaning a building suitable for residential or nonresidential purposes in certain specified areas and for occupation as residence in other areas which clearly shows that all along a distinction is being recognized between residential and non-residential preinises and the purposes for which they were used. ( 44 ) MR. Engineer has urged that when the H. R. C. Order was amended on 22-6-43 by describing " house " as any building suitable for any purpose, residential or non-residential, the use of the word house ' in Rule 6 would entail a liability to refund the excess rent paid even of non-residential premises and that there is no reason why such refund should be restricted only to the case of residential premises. That argument can be easily met. The word " house " is used there as meaning simply " premises " or buildings and the incidents connected with the two different classes of premises residential and non-residential cannot be assumed from the use of that general experession but must be sought in the other provisions of the Order. That argument can be easily met. The word " house " is used there as meaning simply " premises " or buildings and the incidents connected with the two different classes of premises residential and non-residential cannot be assumed from the use of that general experession but must be sought in the other provisions of the Order. In spite of the amendment in june 1943 of the definition of ' house the words " in respect of residence " were continued till 1947 and if the H. R. C. Order chose to make a difference it is not open to question. The circumstances under which the various H. R. G. Orders came to be enacted have also to be remembered in this connection. At the outset there was a great deal of hardship and difficulty experienced by tenants of residential premises by their landlords seeking to evict them or attempting to levy extortionate rents from them and to use the words of the House of Lords in Field v. Gover, (1944) 1 K. B. 200. these rules were framed in a hurry to meet an urgent situation. ( 45 ) THE businessman who was in occupation of non residential premises and was probably engaged in profitable business at that time just before and after the war was not apparently under any such distress and while it might have been considered desirable to regulate the fair rent in respect of non-residential premises and the eviction of tenants therefrom in June 1943, the authorities did not feel called upon to make an express provision for a refund of any excess sum paid till 1st October 1946 when on account of changed conditions such a provision might have been made in the law. ( 46 ) THE H. R. C. Orders allow enhancement of rents upto 150% in the case of non-residential premises and for a much smaller increase in the case of residential houses showing that different considerations were meant to apply to the two cases. The hardship on the landlord by asking him to refund the excess rent from any time previous to the application for fixation of fair rent was recognized in the 1948 Order and such period was fixed from the date of the application. If Mr. The hardship on the landlord by asking him to refund the excess rent from any time previous to the application for fixation of fair rent was recognized in the 1948 Order and such period was fixed from the date of the application. If Mr. Engineer's argument that there is no difference at all between " residence in a premises" and " use in a premises " is accepted there was no need at all for the amendment of June 1943, nor the use of the words residential and non-residential in any of the Orders or Law. Even in England the Act of 1920 was at first concerned only with dwelling houses. The conclusion of the learned District Judge based on the meaning of the words " residence " and " use " is therefore correct and if accepted the plaintiffs would have no case for asking for a refund of any excess rent paid before 1-10-1946. ( 47 ) IN this Court, Mr. Engineer, learned Counsel for the Appellants has urged another and new ground in support of his clients' claim, which has not been mentioned either in the pleadings or put forward in the lower Court or even in the appeal memo before this Court. He contends that apart from the provisions of the h. E. C. Order which provides under certain circumstances for refund or adjustment of any rent paid in excess of fair rent, his clients are entitled to recover such excess under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act even from the date of ex. I, and that they can do so even though a fresh lease has been entered into by them as per Ex. II on 1-4-1946. ( 48 ) HE represents that such payment amounts to a payment made under a mistake of law and therefore recoverable and that the Article of limitation applicable to such a suit is Art. 96 which prescribes a period of three years from when the mistake becomes known to the plaintiff. He has further urged that it is immaterial whether the mistake under which payment was made was one of law or of fact and that he can raise this fresh ground even in this Court as the same involves merely a question of law. Mr. He has further urged that it is immaterial whether the mistake under which payment was made was one of law or of fact and that he can raise this fresh ground even in this Court as the same involves merely a question of law. Mr. Haneef, the learned Counsel who appears for the respondent, contends that the point now raised is not a pure or simple question of law and that the appellants should not be allowed to raise the same now. He represents that if the point had been raised earlier his client could have let in evidence regarding the circumstances under which the rents were enhanced and were being paid and could have easily negatived the plea that the appellants could ever have acted under any mistake of any kind or that it took all these years to discover their alleged mistake. There is a great deal of force in this objection. ( 49 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Engineer has relied strongly on Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra, AIR (1949) P. C. 297. 52 Bom L. E. 17 in that case, after referring to Sections 21 and 22 of the Contract Act, their lordships observe :" Payment' by mistake' in section 72 must refer to a payment which was not legally due and which could not have been enforced : the ' mistake' is thinking that the money paid was due when in fact it was not due There is nothing inconsistent in enacting on the one hand that if parties enter into a contract under mistake in law, that contract must stand and is enforceable, bat on the other hand that if one party acting under mistake of law pays to another party money which is not due by contract or otherwise, that money must be repaid "in that case, the appellant was the owner of an estate in Bengal. ( 50 ) IN 1898 his predecessor had granted a mining lease of a part of that estate. The lease provided that for the quantity of coal which the lessee would raise from the leasehold he would pay royalty at the rate of As. 3 per ton of coal which would be be despatched by the East India Eailway line. The lease further provided 'that if the Bengal Nagpur Railway line was constructed and the freight of coal became less by As. 3 per ton of coal which would be be despatched by the East India Eailway line. The lease further provided 'that if the Bengal Nagpur Railway line was constructed and the freight of coal became less by As. 2 or more the lessee would pay royalty at As. 5 per ton and at a- different but less higher rate if the freight was lowered by less than As. 2. The interpretation of the clause relating to the royalty payable by the lessee fell for decision before Courts and the litigation ended in an appeal to the Privy council. Their Lordships by their judgment in March 1917 held that as a consequence of the changed conditions a readjustment was made in the freight on coal and that royalty was payable to the lessor at enhanced rate on coal despatched by rail over any of the two Railways. After the judgment of the Privy Council royalty was regularly paid at the enhanced rate till 1923. During 1923 payment of royalty fell into arrears and in January 1924 the lessee himself paid a sum of Rs. 57,000 and odd to the lessor in full payment of the extra royalty from 1st January to 30th September 1923. " This payment was calculated at the enhanced rates. Subsequently the lessee wrote to the lessor stating that as the rate of freight for coal had been raised on 1 4-1921 he had been very much overpaid and that he would make no further payment on account of royalty until the excess was wiped out. This was not admitted by the lessor who claimed that the contingencies mentioned in the lease having happened, the lessor was entitled to claim the higher rate of royalty for all time to come. When the lessor brought a suit for the subsequent royalties the lessee pleaded that by reason of the rate of freight rising again to or beyond what it was when the lease was executed he was liable to pay royalty at a lesser rate according to the terms of the lease and that an account should be taken on that basis giving credit to the amounts which had been overpaid by mistake. The Courts in India held that during the period in question royalty was only payable at the lower rates but that the lessee was not entitled to set off against such royalty the amount of his earlier overpayments. The lessor appealed to the Privy Council and the respondent filed cross-objections. Their Lordships agreed with the courts below that royalty was recoverable only at a lower rate during the concerned time. They held that the lessees were entitled to the benefit of Section 72 of the Contract Act and to set off the amount of the overpayment against the royalties which subsequently became due by him. They referred with approval to the decision of Sen J. in Pannalal v. Produce Exchange Go. Ltd. , A. I R. 1946 Cal 245. and observed that in the case before them there was not sufficient evidence to show why the lessee and his agents made the overpayments. They may have acted on inadequate information, they may have taken a wrong view of their legal rights or they may have continued paying at the old rates without giving any thought to the matter. But it is clear that there was no intention to make a present to the lessor of money which was not due. The money was paid under the belief that it was legally due. This belief was mistaken. " ( 51 ) IN their Lordships' view that was sufficient to bring the case within Section 72 and therefore the cross appeal must succeed. They, however, added in their judgment:" It may be well to add that their Lordships' judgment does not imply that every sum paid under mistake is recoverable no matter what the circumstances may be. There may in a particular case be circumstances which disentitle a plaintiff by esteppel or otherwise. " ( 52 ) IN Pannalal v. Produce Exchange Co. Ltd. , A. I. R. 1946 Cal. 245. to which their lordships of the Privy Council have referred with approval, the plaintiff firm had entered into a contract with the defendant company for the purchase of a waggon of maize starch at the rate of Es. 77 per cwt. f. o. r: Jagadhri. The maxium price then fixed by the government of India, under the Defence of India Act, was Es. 78 per cwt. The goods were railed on 27-12-1943 by the company. 77 per cwt. f. o. r: Jagadhri. The maxium price then fixed by the government of India, under the Defence of India Act, was Es. 78 per cwt. The goods were railed on 27-12-1943 by the company. In the railway receipt the company was shown as the consignee. On 3-1-41 the railway receipt was endorsed over to the plaintiff firm who paid the balance of the price for the goods on that date. ( 53 ) IN the meantime, on 16-12-1943, a new order was passed by the government of India making Es. 48 per cwt. the maximum price and this order was applicable to all contracts in which delivery was to be given on or after 1st January 1944. The plaintiff firm filed a suit to recover the difference between the contract price of rs. 77 per cwt. and the maximum price of 48 per cwt. as fixed by the Government Order and relied upon Sections 56, 65 and 72, contract Acb, in support of their claim. Sen J. held that the subsequent order of the Government fixing Es. 48 per cwt. as the price affected the contract, that the contract as it stood could not be performed without infringing the law and hence under Section 56 it became void on 16th December 1943, i. e. , the date on which the second Government Order was promulgated and that the plaintiff firm could not recover the amount under Section 72 because it could not be said that the difference between the contract price and the price fixed by the second Government Order represented a payment made by the plaintiff firm under a mistake. At page 249 he observes:" The question remains whether in this case the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum claimed. Can it be said that the difference between the contract price and the maximum price fixed by the Government Order represents a payment made by the plaintiff by mistake ? In my opinion it cannot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 54 ) I think the decision of the Privy Council proceeds largely, if not entirely, on its facts. there was an earlier judgement of the board interpreting the clause of the lease in a particular way the lessee had made some payments overlooking the terms of the original contract. . . . . . . . . . " ( 54 ) I think the decision of the Privy Council proceeds largely, if not entirely, on its facts. there was an earlier judgement of the board interpreting the clause of the lease in a particular way the lessee had made some payments overlooking the terms of the original contract. The relationship of lessor and lessee continued between the parties and in a subsequent action by the lessor to recover arrears of royalty it is difficult to see how he could have resisted a plea by the lessee that he had made some payments which had the effect of wiping out the arrears on a proper constrauction of the terms of the lease. The mere circumstance that the earlier payments purported to be in settlement of some previous dues on a wrong basis could not disentitle the lessee from Baying that he had made those overpayments under a mistake as to the exact amount payable which depended as much on the facts as on the basis or the data on which rates had to be calculated. Such adjustments are governed by the express provisions and different principles of the different H. R. C. Orders and Law, and its incidents different. ( 55 ) IN Joint Family business of Ramachandera Srinivas v shahdamnpur Light Railway, A. I. R. 1953 Hyd. 274. , Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish chandra, A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 297. has been referred to as follows : " Their Lordships of the Privy Council have held that if payment is made under a mistake as to the rates it is not a mistake of law but it is a mistake of fact". ( 56 ) WITHOUT fully agreeing with this interpretation of the judgement of the Privy" Council it can be stated that the Privy Council decision does not lay down that all payments made under any circumstances in ignorance of one's legal rights can be sought to be refunded. ( 57 ) I do not think that in the present case there is any question of payment under a mistake so as to attract the provisions of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act at all. ( 57 ) I do not think that in the present case there is any question of payment under a mistake so as to attract the provisions of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act at all. Under the provisions of the various House Bent Control Orders with which we are concerned in this case the Controller was called upon to fax the fair rent of a premises on an application by the tenant. the h. B. C. law of 1946 provided for a similar applicationby a landlord also. When the Controller had determined the fair rent of a house it was provided that the landlord shall not charge any rent in excess of such fair rent and that any agreement for payment of rent in excess of such fair rent shall be null and void in respect of such excess and should be construed as if it was an agreement for the payment of such fair rent and any sum in excess of such fair rent paid in respect of the residence after the commencement of the Order was to be refunded to the person by whom it was paid or adjusted. The first provision could only apply as regards the future rents payable after the determination the second was designed to give effect to the Order by declaring that the original agreement could no longer be enforced with regard to the stipulated rate of rent; and the third expressly provided that on the happening of the contingency, viz. , the determination of the fair rent of a house the tenant could claim a refund in respect of residence. By Section 7 (c) of the 1946 law the words '' in respect of residence " were replaced by the words in respect of the use of the premises. I have referred earlier to this change and how thereby the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any refund in respect of the use of non-residential premises before 1-10-46. Thus it was necessary for the tenant to approach the house Rent Controller to fix the fair rent. It was optional on his part and he was not bound to do so. Till he applied to the house Eent Controller the payments made by him were not under any mistake of any existing disability on the part of the landlord to receive the agreed rent. It was optional on his part and he was not bound to do so. Till he applied to the house Eent Controller the payments made by him were not under any mistake of any existing disability on the part of the landlord to receive the agreed rent. ( 58 ) LAKSHMANA Prasada and Sons v. Achutan Nair, A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 779which was also relied upon for the Appellants was a case where a motor car had been purchased by a customer for a price in excess of the controlled price and who later on sued for return of the excess amount. While holding that the case was one which directly came under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, the learned judge observed that the simple fact in the case was that the money had been paid in excess of the controlled price under a mistake"of fact; and therefore in such circumstances money that had been paid in excess of the actual price under a mistake of fact, as to the actual price which had been fixed earlier by the provincial Government, must be recoverable by the party who had parted with it. That could not be said to be money that had been paid under "a mistake of law. For his conclusion, the learned Judge relied on the reasoning in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra, A. I. R. 1919 P. C. 297and referred to Sowdra Bai v. Saraswathi, i. L. R. 1942 Mad. 669 audinarayana Naidu v. Panchayat Board of Mangapaka, A. I. R. 1940 Mad. 660 and Jaqadish Prasad Pannalal v. Produce Exchange Corporation, A. I. R. 1946 Cal. 245 wherein he said no question of mistake at all had arisen. ( 59 ) HE found in that case that it was only after the purchase had been made and the respondent had taken delivery of the vehicle that the respondent came to know that the controlled price was much lower than what was actually paid by him. It may also be added that it was an offence to sell a car for the price higher than the controlled price. ( 60 ) THERE is also no question of the tenant having been or likely to be under any mistake about his right under the H. R. C. Order. Every tenant was bound to know the law and was at liberty to apply for relief. ( 60 ) THERE is also no question of the tenant having been or likely to be under any mistake about his right under the H. R. C. Order. Every tenant was bound to know the law and was at liberty to apply for relief. The contract might be said to be in the nature of a contract voidable under certain conditions and if the tenant did not choose'to avoid it he could not complain and if and when he chose to avoid it, he could avoid it only to the extent permitted by the Order or Law which gave him that right. Under the provisions of the H. R. C. Orders of 1941 and 1945 no tenant of non-residential premises could ask for refund of the rents he had paid. Under the Law of 1946 a special right was conferred on him. Such right is in the nature of an inroad against the recognized rights to property and must be constructed strictly in accordance with the rules which permit it. ( 61 ) IN this connection Mr. Engineer referred to Field v. Gover, (1941) 1 K. B. 200 in that case the defendant was the tenant of a house which became a controlled house for the first time in September 1939 by virtue of Section 12 (2) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest restrictions Act, 1939. In May 1940 the defendant sub-let a portion of the premises to the plaintiff at 10 sh. a week in July 1942 on the latter's application the County Court Judge fixed the standard rent of that portion at 3 sh. 8 d. a week. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the defendant to recover the difference between the aggregate amount he had paid at the contracted rate and the aggregate of the apportioned standard rent. Under Section 1 of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage interest (Eestrictions) Act, 1920, as amended by Section 3, Sub-Section (1) of the Increase of Eent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1939, the higher rent would be irrecoverable by the landlord and therefore recoverable by the tenant as rent overpaid. A refund of the difference as claimed by the plaintiff was, therefore, decreed. A refund of the difference as claimed by the plaintiff was, therefore, decreed. This was according to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act and not under any general law and it was within the extent permitted under Section 14 of the Act of 1920 as amended by Section 3 of the Act of 1939, i. e. , from the commencement of the Act of 1939. Even in that case at page 212 of the report it is pointed out how the decision imposed a great and unmerited hardship on the defendant and how the defendant a woman whose good faith was in no way assailed was suddenly called upon to repay something like two-thirds of the rent which she had been receiving from her lodger over a period of two years at least and was moreover obliged to keep him at the reduced rent which she probably would never have agreed to accept. Goddard l. J. , has further observed: " I cannot think that Parliament ever contemplated such a state of affairs, but, if this be the result of the legislation, the courts cannot refuse to give effect to it. " ( 62 ) MOREOVER the scheme of the English Act appears to be quite different from the scheme of the H. E. C. Orders. By the English Acts of 1920 and 1939 control was automatically imposed on certain classes of houses whose rateable value on a specified date did not exceed certain sums in certain areas. If either the standard rent or the rateable value was below those figures, the premises unless they fell within certain clauses of exceptions, were deemed, to be controlled See Vol. 32 (1939) of Halsbury's Statutes of England page 971 (preliminary note ). Also Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd Edn.) Vol. 20 para 369, page 312. In the later H. E. C Order of 1948 it has now been expressly provided that such a refund can only be ordered as from the date of the application for fixation of fair rent. Surely it cannot be argued that even now after the 1948 order the excess sum paid for any earlier or larger period can be recovered not under that Order but as payments made under a mistake. Surely it cannot be argued that even now after the 1948 order the excess sum paid for any earlier or larger period can be recovered not under that Order but as payments made under a mistake. I do not, therefore, think that the contention that the provision in Rule 6 (b) of the H. E. C. Order of 1941 or the corresponding sub-rule in the later Law that the lease must be construed as if it was an agreement for payment of fair rent would make payments already made by the tenant in excess as payment made under a mistake and hence refundable irrespective of the other provisions of the H. E. C. Orders themselves in that matter is correct. ( 63 ) MOREOVER the circumstances in this case clearly do not wariant any such meaning being placed on the tenants' conduct. The tenants are a limited liability company carrying on business of a most modern kind. Their management and directorate must be of seasoned businessman and it cannot be pretended that they had no Legal Advisers. The existence of the H. E. C. Law was a matter of public knowledge and its aid was being freely sought by tenants. On 1-4-1943 the plaintiffs voluntarily chose to enter into a lease deed for three years at the enhanced rent of es. 2,000. It was even then open to them, in view of the amendment of the 1941 Order on 22-6-1943 to have asked for fixing the fair rent of the premises. On the expiry of the first lease again on 1-4-1946 they executed a fresh lease deed for three years agreeing to pay the same rent of Rs. 2,000 per month and to continue the deposit of Es. 8,000 and to insure the building for rs, 50,000. At least then they could have claimed the protection of the H. E. C. Order and asked for fixation of fair rent. If they had refused to execute a lease on 1-4-1946 the defendants might have sought the aid of the House Eent Controller to evict them as they were apparently anxious throughout to secure the premises for their own use. If they had refused to execute a lease on 1-4-1946 the defendants might have sought the aid of the House Eent Controller to evict them as they were apparently anxious throughout to secure the premises for their own use. Whether they would have succeeded or not is not relevant, and the less chance there was of their succeeding in getting the plaintiffs evicted at that time the greater was the chance of the plaintiffs to secure the aid of the H. R. C. Orders. After executing the lease deed on 1-4-1946 after some correspondence referred to in para 4 of the plaint, they applied on 2-7-1946 to the House Rent Controller and during all that period from 1-4-1943 to 2-7-46 they paid rents at Rs. 2,000 per month as agreed. When they applied to the House Eent controller for fixing the fair rent in 1947 that officer had no power to do so unless he found that the rent fixed was excessive and by his order, Ex. A dated 27-8-1946 he held that he was not satisfied that the rent was excessive and refused to fix the fair rent. Only subsequently the H. R. C. Law came into force on 1-10-1946 and the Resident remanded the case making express reference to the latter order directing the Rent Controller to fix the fair rent. After the remand the House Rent Controller did not find that the rent originally fixed was excessive, but applying certain legal standards which were, prescribed under the H. R. C. Law itself he fixed the fair rent. No doubt against this order both the parties went up in appeal to the Resident "and he has confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. ( 64 ) IT was urged by Mr. Haneef, learned Counsel for the respondents, that the fair rent so fixed was really the rent payable after 1-10-1946 and not earlier and that he may have described the earlier rate which was really basic rent as fair rent only for the purpose of determining the increase allowable to the landlord under the H. R. C. Law. Considerable amount of argument was advanced on both sides with regard to this matter. Considerable amount of argument was advanced on both sides with regard to this matter. The orders themselves are not very clear and it is rather difficult to accept the contention that the same House Rent Controller chose to fix the fair rent for the period prior to 1946 for purposes of effective enforcement between the parties without finding that the rent stipulated was excessive, a stand which he had taken definitely in his earlier detailed and considered order and it is also a point for consideration and it is very doubtful if there was power in the house Bent Controller to fix the fair rent for any period earlier than 1-10-46 in the absence of the necessary ground on which jurisdiction would be based, viz. , that the rent was excessive, that he could fix any fair rent at all Vide Gururajachar v. Rangiah, 52 Mys. H. C. R. 455 52 Mys. H. C. R. 456 where it has been held that the House rent Controller is a special tribunal created by the statute for a specific purpose, that it can only act within the limits of the powers conferred by the statute and that if the said limits are exceeded or are not conformed to, the decision of the tribunal is liable to be challenged by an action in a Civil Court. See also halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, page 532, para 1178, where the rule is stated as follows :"where by reason of any limitation imposed by statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a court is without jurisdiction to enteitain any particular action or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled". and The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the income tax, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 313 (319 ). It is also doubtful whether" merely because the Resident chose to confirm the order of the House Kent Controller the parties are so bound by it that they cannot question the legality or want of jurisdiction of that portion of those orders in a Civil Court. It is also doubtful whether" merely because the Resident chose to confirm the order of the House Kent Controller the parties are so bound by it that they cannot question the legality or want of jurisdiction of that portion of those orders in a Civil Court. However, that question apart, it has to be noted that even the Resident did not direct any refund or adjustment as expressly claimed by the tenants and left it for determination by a Civil Court if the tenants chose to take the matter there. ( 65 ) IT is to be observed that neither the House Rent Controller nor the Resident has directed refund or adjustment, much less with effect from 1943 as now claimed but left it for determination by the Civil Court. It was open to the resident to direct such refund if he really thought that the circumstances of the case or the provisions of the House Rent Control Law permitted it. ( 66 ) EVEN Shibaprasad Singh v. Srish Chandra, A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 297on which mr. Engineer so strongly relies recognises the exceptions to the rule that payments made even under a mistake of law may be recoverable. They take care to observe as referred to earlier that every sum paid under mistake was not recoverable no matter what the circumstances may be and that there may be circumstances which disentitle a plaintiff by estoppel or otherwise from doing so. The circumstances in this case clearly fall within the saving words of their Lordships' decision. In any case they are not entitled to the benefit of Section 72 of the Contract Act. ( 67 ) THE tenants are clearly estopped from raising that plea by reason of their executing the several lease deeds in the manner they have done and by their inaction and dilatoriness in not applying to the house Rent Controller earlier thereby inducing the landlord not to insist on their vacating the premises and applying for eviction to the House Kent Controller. The House Rent Controller who was the Collector of the Civil Station on a consideration of all the circumstances and the correspondence between the parties found that the defendants had two cinema plants of their own lying idle, that they wanted to run a cinema of their own in the premises which they considered advantageous to themselves and had purchased the premises for a large sum and had paid and were liable to pay further heavy sums as part of the purchase money. He has held that they purchased the building more with the idea of running their business utilising the cinema machines that had been lying in Sialkot. He has also referred to the admission by the tenants that it was to their advantage to have continued the cinema business in the premises and to the huge profits such business was bringing in at the time, and the action of Government while requisitioning another cinema premises in the station at the time paying even compensation in addition to only rent thereby recognizing these attendant circumstances. ( 68 ) THE Appellants are therefore precluded from contending in this court for the first time that they have made payments under a mistake of law which apparently it was left for their Legal advisers to discover for them now in December 1954. The claim of the Appellants runs counter to the principles of sacredness of contract and good faith to be observed in business relations. In my opinion persons circumstanced as the appellants, who are not shown to have been either helpless or ignorant cannot be allowed, unless we are compelled to do so by general law or by special statute like the H. R. C. Orders and within the provisions of the same to be strictly construed to obtain benefits by going back on their solemn undertakings in repeated formal registered documents of lease of 1943 and 1946. It would entail great hardship and operate unfairly on the landlord if several years after the original lease of 1943, and in spits of their entering into a second lease in 1946 the Appellants should be allowed to claim, with effect from the very beginning a refund of large sums of rents which they had paid month after month voluntarily and without protest. If they had chosen to file their application for fixing fair rent a few months later in 1948, they could have claimed refund only from the the date of their application. ( 69 ) THIS shows that even the Legislature does not consider it either fair or reasonable to compel the landlord to refund from the date when the lessee has first entered into possession, it' may be years ago, as in this case. In the result, the judgment of the learned District Judge must be confirmed. This appeal therefore fails and must be dismissed with costs. ( 70 ) ORDER of Reference to the Full Bench on 3rd February 1955 there are differences between me and my learned brother regarding the interpretation and application of the several Rent control Orders from 1941 to 1946 and also regarding the interpretation and the application of Sections 65 and 72 of the Contract act to the facts of this case. The matter will therefore be referred to a Full Bench for disposal. ( 71 ) THIS is an appeal from the decision of the learned District judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, by which the suit filed by the appellant for refund of part uf the amounts paid to respondents as rents with respect to a building used as a cinema theatre was dismissed. It has been referred to a Full Bench by the Division bench which heard it for disposal owing to difference of opinion about the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court. ( 72 ) THE facts relevant for considration are not in dispute. The plaintiff is described in the cause title to the plaint as a company with limited liability having its registered office in Calcutta and represented by its managing director. The plaintiff became the lessee of a building situated in Civil fetation at first in 1937 for exhibiting cinematograph shows. The defendants purchased the building on 22-1-1943 and the plaintiff continued to be in occupation of the property on terms embodied in a lease deed dated 12-4-1943 executed in their favour. At the expiration of the period prescribed therein the lease was renewed for a further term of three years by means of a document dated 26-3-1946. On 2-7-1946 the plaintiff applied to the House Rent Controller, Civil station, for determination of fair rent. At the expiration of the period prescribed therein the lease was renewed for a further term of three years by means of a document dated 26-3-1946. On 2-7-1946 the plaintiff applied to the House Rent Controller, Civil station, for determination of fair rent. The application was dismissed, remanded in appeal, subsequently resulted in fair rent being fixed at Rs. 950 and increase of this by Rs. 450 being allowed from 1-10-1946. The final order to this effect was passed on 15-3-1947. On the strength of this tbe plaintiff sent notices for adjustment of the amounts paid in excess of the fair rent towards future rent or return of the same. Defendants insisted on the stipulated rent of Rs. 2,000 being paid and instituted proceedings for eviction. Finally the plaintiff filed the suit from which this appeal arises for recovery of Rs. 41,090 as representing the total overpayment after deducting from payments made for the period 26-6-1943 to 1-10-1946 at the agreed rate of kb. 2,000 per month the amount payable at Rs. 950 per month as fixed by Rent Controller. ( 73 ) THE principle question for determination is whether the fixation of fair rent in the Rent Control proceedings entitles the plaintiff to the refund claimed by him and this is covered by issues 2 and 3 framed in the case. In the lower Court the parties seem to have sought consideration of only the provisions of the House Rent Control Order in force from time to time for disposal of the case and it was held that these do not justify the claim. Mr. Engineer, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the construction of these by the learned Judge as being not helpful to sustain the claim is wrong and referred to the orders and notifications issued from the beginning so as to facilitate the understanding of the changes made from time to time, the meaning to be attached to these and the purpose thereof. ( 74 ) TILL 1-7-1948 when the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control Order became applicable to the Civil Station it was governed by orders and notifications issued specially for this area. The first of these was brought to force on 7-5-1941. ( 74 ) TILL 1-7-1948 when the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control Order became applicable to the Civil Station it was governed by orders and notifications issued specially for this area. The first of these was brought to force on 7-5-1941. Of the eight clauses contained in this, clause 2 (2) defines " House " as meaning a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence and includes (a) garden. . . . . . . . . appurtenant to such building. (b) any furniture supplied by landlord for use in such building ; clause 3 provides for the Controller recording a finding that the rent of any house is excessive with or without a written complaint, clause 4 for his determining the fair rent and clause 5 for matters to be taken into account. Clause 6 states : when the Controller has determined the fair rent of a house" (a) the landlord shall not charge any rent in excess of such fair rent (b) any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of such fair rent shall be null and void in respect of such excess and shall be construed as if it was an agreement for payment of the said fair rent; (c) any sum in excess of such fair rent paid, whether before or after the commencement of the order in respect of such residence atter the commencement of this order shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of such person otherwise adjusted. " ( 75 ) BY a notification dated 22-6-1948 it was declared that ' House " means (in the area specified in the schedule appended to this order) any building or part of a building. . . . . . (let separately or to be let separately) suitable for any purpose residential or non-residential (and elsewhere a building or part of a building suitable for occupation as a residence and includes. . . . . . In the next Order dated 19th September 1945 there ib nothing new and of importance to he mentioned. The last one to which attention was drawn is the Order dated 26th September 1946 which came to force on 1-10-1946. . . . . . In the next Order dated 19th September 1945 there ib nothing new and of importance to he mentioned. The last one to which attention was drawn is the Order dated 26th September 1946 which came to force on 1-10-1946. In this the definition of " House " given in the previous Order is repeated but the words in Clause 7 (c) are different from those of clause 6 (c) of the earlier Order. Sub-clause (c) reads thus:" When the Controller has determined the fair rent of a house. (c) any sum paid in excess of the fair rent whether before or after the commencement of this law in respect of the use of the building after the commencement of this law shall be refunded to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of that person otherwise adjusted. " ( 76 ) THE House Rent Control Order was passed in exercise of powers under the Defence of India Rules and essentially a war measure intended to minimise the hardship due to inadequacy of accommodation and tendency of owners of buildings to exploit the situation. As in the case of prices of commodities and dealings in articles, rents of buildings were subjected to control by government under special orders and grant of relief under specified circumstances was made possible. To the extent this was done or could be done there was interference with contractual rights and obligations. The conditions and limits of interference and its effects were laid down in the orders which underwent modifications to meet exigencies arising from time to time the control provided for in the first Order of 1941 related only to houses " as ordinarily understood, that is buildings in which persons lived. The meaning of the term was extended in 1943 so as to include buildings other than those in which persons lived, perhaps because of the need to afford relief to all occupants of buildings irrespective of the manner these were used. This, by itself, does not justify the inference that in all respects the nature and degree of control capable of being exercised over "houses" residential and non-residential were the same and no difference was intended to be made in regard to the directions which may be issued about both. This, by itself, does not justify the inference that in all respects the nature and degree of control capable of being exercised over "houses" residential and non-residential were the same and no difference was intended to be made in regard to the directions which may be issued about both. The notification of 1943 implies that but for it, non-residential houses were exempt from control as otherwise it was superfluous. The effect of enlarging the meaning of "house'' was to extend the application of the provisions in the order of 1941 concerning houses to non-residential buildings. That order enabled the Controller to find out under Clause 3 if the rent stipulated for a house was excessive and if it was so, to fix the fair rent under Clause 4 in accordance with the terms of Clause 5. The result of the determination of fair rent is stated in clause 6 to be threefold; there is no limitation of applicability so far as prohibition of landlord to charge rent in excess of fair rent or the agreement relating to the payment of amount above the fair rent being ineffective. As regards the liability for refund of what has been received in excess of 'fair Rent the obligation is attached to payments "in respect of residence" and not house. If the notification was intended to make all the clauses in the order of 1941 as operative to non-residential houses as to residential houses the word "residence" would or should have been replaced by the word "house" in Clause 6 (c) The continuance of the same word after the notification cannot be ignored or treated as inconsequential for the purpose of refund. Even so, the contention on behalf of the appellant is that the word residence" in Clause 6 has to be liberally construed and that the benefit of refund should not be denied to tenants who are not dwellers. The plaintiff admittedly was not a lessee who lived in the premises but was in occupation of these for the purpose of exhibiting cinema shows as a business. Whether this is tantamount to or synonymous with residence was a point on which there is disagreement in the Division Bench. ( 77 ) THE word "reside", "resident" or "residence " is found in several enactments such as the Income Tax Act, Divorce Act, eepresentation of the People Act, Civil Procedure Code. Whether this is tantamount to or synonymous with residence was a point on which there is disagreement in the Division Bench. ( 77 ) THE word "reside", "resident" or "residence " is found in several enactments such as the Income Tax Act, Divorce Act, eepresentation of the People Act, Civil Procedure Code. This court in Ranga Iyengar v. llama Rao, 50 Mys. H. C. R. 147 which pertained to an election under the Municipal Act held that a person who ordinarily lived at a particular place and was obliged to leave it under pressure of an order of Government did not cease to be a resident of that place. This view may be useful for interpreting the term when it affects the qualification of a voter or candidate for election under that Act but cannot be of help to ascertain its exact meaning in all cases. Indeed no such meaning can be attached to the word. In Ramanath Iyer's Law Lexicon after quoting from some cases that" Residence ' has a variety of meanings according to the statute (or document) in which it is used. . . . . . . . . . . . It is an ambiguous' word and may receive a different meanning according to the position in which it is found," the author adds that "it is a word capable of different meanings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a word whose statutory meaning depends on the contest and purpose of the statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (It) may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the Court believes the intention of the legislature to have been in framing the particular provision in which the word is used". It is true there are cases in which it has been held that the residence of a corporation or company is the place where it is registered or where it carries on business. This must be understood as having reference only to the construction of the term for the application of the particular laws in which it is found. It is true there are cases in which it has been held that the residence of a corporation or company is the place where it is registered or where it carries on business. This must be understood as having reference only to the construction of the term for the application of the particular laws in which it is found. When a company is registered in one country and carries on business in another the question as to where it must be deemed to have residence has arisen in some cases to determine liability for income-tax. The decision in Egyptian Delta Land and investment Co, v. Todd, 1929 A. C. 1clearly states that for income-tax purposes it is the place where business is carried on. While considering the import of the expression "person resident in the united Kingdom" in the Income-Tax Act, 1918, Viscount Sumner at page 12 said" I do not think that residence is ever determined for a natural person simply by the law. Accordingly under the decisions as well as in principle resident is a term exceedingly unsuited to describe a statutory 'person' which can never be non-resident because by the law o its being it is a fixture". ( 78 ) LORD Buokmaster observed at page 35:"the difficulty which this question presents is due to the fact that residence is essentially a condition applicable to men and the tests for its determination such as living and sleeping can have no proper counterpart in an abstract entity such as an incorporated company which can neither live nor sleep. It must however be assumed that the company has a residence. "with reference to a provision in the Be presentation of the people Act, Lord Coleridge C. J. expressed in Barlow v. Smith, 9. T. L. R. 57 DC. "the Act distinguishes between occupation and residence and requires that the person who occupies must reside in the borough. . . . . . . . . . . The party may occupy and not reside there. . . . . . . . . Residence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under the enactment is different from occupation and means where the man lives and where he has his home. It has always been held that a man resides where he lives and has his home. . . . . . . . . Residence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under the enactment is different from occupation and means where the man lives and where he has his home. It has always been held that a man resides where he lives and has his home. " ( 79 ) I think, residence in clause 6 (c) has to be construed in the manner expressed by these words. If "residence" was meant to include use or occupation of the building, it may have been so denned either in the Order of 1941 itself or in the notification of 1943 as was done in regard to the word "house". The absence of this and replacing it by the word "use" in the Order of 1946 are significant and imply recognition of the necessary change of words to permit refund of amounts paid towards rent of non-residential buildings. The order passed by the Resident fixes the fair rent but does not decide the liability for refund. ( 80 ) IT would be a strained construction of the term "residence" having regard to all this, to apply it to the use of a building as a cinema theatre. Field v. Gover, (1944) 1 KB. 200. cited for the appellant is distinguishable from the present case. No doubt the sub-tenant in that case who had paid rents in excess of what was due on the basis of the standard Rent succeeded in enforcing his claim for refund of the excess but this was rendered possible by a definite statutory provision as is pointed out at page 209 by the statement "the plaintiff's claim to recover the alleged over payment is based on Section 14 of the Act of 1920 as amended by. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 81 ) THE language in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 6 indicates the result at present and in future and sub-clause (c) expresses the result concerning acts of the past. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 81 ) THE language in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause 6 indicates the result at present and in future and sub-clause (c) expresses the result concerning acts of the past. It may be that there is a lacuna in the provision perhaps because of the Order being passed in the hurry that it was with a very large number of other Acts when war was imminent" and having over-looked some aspects or because the handicap or hardship alleged by appellant was not contemplated by the authorities but the Court cannot improve upon it to afford relief. I do not find any good reason on the whole to disagree with 'the view of the lower Court that the provisions of the Rent Control Order do not justify the claim. ( 82 ) THE plaintiff no doubt may have cause to complain that this involves discrimination between residential and non-residential tenants. At the very outset the existence of the distinction between the two is noticed and only two years later the non-residential class was placed within its range. Even after this the two were not on a par in all respects as limits imposed for enhancement of rents are not the same for both. The reasonableness or propriety of the distinction is not a matter relevant for the decision and even if the object was to treat them alike it is not so much the supposed as the expressed object which is material for the decision. The disadvantages or difficulties entailed on the plaintiff are due to the provisions not being such as may be availed of by him to support the claim and that being so the appeal has to fail. ( 83 ) MR. Engineer argued that if relief cannot be had under the bent Control Order, the appellant can seek it on the ground of mistake and unjust enrichment. The ground is a new one not raised in pleadings or in issues but is alleged to be one apparent and vital to require consideration without need for any evidence. In support of this the decision in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srisk Chandra, A. I. R 1949 P. C. 297 was strongly relied upon. The ground is a new one not raised in pleadings or in issues but is alleged to be one apparent and vital to require consideration without need for any evidence. In support of this the decision in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srisk Chandra, A. I. R 1949 P. C. 297 was strongly relied upon. The resemblance between that case and this is that the dispute is between lessor and lessee, that refund of the overpayment is claimed by the lessee. Here, the terms of the contract are clear and the obligation of the lessee is not in controversy. ( 84 ) WHAT is urged is a statutory right and the existence of this is contested. In the Privy Council case, difference between the parties related to the construction of the terms embodied in the written agreement and the question whether there was an overpayment at all had to be determined on the interpretation of the conditions. It was found that more was paid than what was due under the agreement and the recipient was not entitled to retain it. On the facts of the present case the appellant cannot reasonably plead that payments were made by mistake unless it be a mistake to pay what one has voluntarily agreed to but what is held by another to be more. The correspondence between the parties and the earlier order of the Rent Controller show that the property was leased to appellant in compliance with its wish to have the advantage of continuing the business in the premises and that the respondents were more anxious to secure it for their own use than to let it out on any terms. The finding of the Controller at first was that the rent stipulated for was not excessive and payment at the agreed rate was made without demur for more than three years. The present litigation would not have arisen but for the Order issued in 1946 during the pendency of the proceedings under the prior Order and the Resident as the appellate authority not having disposed of the application finally under the prior Order or later one and but for his leaving the claim for refund open. The present litigation would not have arisen but for the Order issued in 1946 during the pendency of the proceedings under the prior Order and the Resident as the appellate authority not having disposed of the application finally under the prior Order or later one and but for his leaving the claim for refund open. ( 85 ) PARTIES voluntarily entering into a contract are ordinarily bound by it and when they have unreservedly acted up to it for a fairly long time they must be content with the result beneficial or otherwise. No case in which the doctrine of unjust enrichment has been applied for recovery of unconditional voluntary payment under no mistake of fact has been cited. ( 86 ) THE claim is permissible if at all under the provisions of the rent Control Order and since this has been found to be not possible, the decision of the lower court has to be upheld. The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs. PADMANABHIAH J. I agree. NITTOOR SREENIVASA RAU J. I also agree. --- *** --- .