Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No.111 of 1120 of the District Court of Kottayam is the appellant before us. The properties belonging to his illom were partitioned among the members in 1105. The partition deed is Ext. A dated 10th Edavam 1105. 2. By that document item No.1 of the plaint schedule was allotted to defendants 3 to 5 and items 2 and 3 (item 3 is a building in item 2) to the 2nd defendant who was a minor at that time in lieu of certain amounts belonging to his mother and utilised by the family. The relevant recital in Ext. A regarding items 2 and 3 reads as follows: 3. Ext. Al is that portion of Ext. A which deals with certain specific stipulations regarding the items included in the C schedule to the document and which as already indicated are items 2 and 3 of the schedule to the plaint: Defendants 3 to 5 sold their rights in item No.1 of the plaint schedule to the 1st defendant (1st respondent) by Ext. B dated 30th Chingom 1119 for a consideration of Br. Rs. 600 and the 2nd defendant also sold his rights in items 2 and 3 of the plaint schedule to him by Ext. C dated 23rd Kanni 1119 for a consideration of Sirkar Rs. 2,000. The prayer in the plaint which is based on Ext. Al and which relates to both Exts. B and C is in the following terms: 4. Ext. Al refers only to items 2 and 3 of the plaint schedule which was sold under Ext. C by the 2nd defendant to the 1st and has nothing to do with item No.1 which was sold to him under Ext. B by defendants 3 to 5. In view of this though the memorandum of appeal does cover item No.1 as well, no arguments were advanced in respect of that item and the validity or otherwise of Ext. B does not arise for consideration in this appeal. 5. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's prayer and dismissed the suit. B by defendants 3 to 5. In view of this though the memorandum of appeal does cover item No.1 as well, no arguments were advanced in respect of that item and the validity or otherwise of Ext. B does not arise for consideration in this appeal. 5. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's prayer and dismissed the suit. Various arguments were advanced before us in support of the appeal but as we have come to the conclusion that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as found by the trial court only the questions relating to issue 8 - Is the suit barred by limitation?-arise for consideration and are dealt with in this judgment. 6. Ext. Al as we read it creates a right of pre-emption and the present suit which is no more than a suit to enforce that right should be governed by Art.7 of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100. The mortgage deed in controversy in Matura Subba Rao v. Surendra Nath Sahu, AIR 1928 Patna 637 provided that "if ever the mortgagor wished to sell or mortgage the mortgaged property, he should not be able to sell or mortgage it to any one except the mortgagee and that if the mortgagee was unwilling to purchase it or have it mortgaged in his favour, the mortgagor would be at liberty to transfer it elsewhere" and Fazl Ali, J., said: "I have no hesitation in holding that although the word'pre-emption' has not been used in the deed, the contracting parties meant nothing else than this that if the house was to be sold at all, the plaintiff was to have an option of purchase and that any transfer to a third person without offering it to the plaintiff was to be deemed invalid as against him. This is, in my opinion, nothing else than the giving of the right of pre-emption to the plaintiff". 7. That case also provides an answer to the respondents' contention that the contract is unenforceable as Ext. Al does not fix the price at which the property is to be sold. According to Fazl Ali, J., such an argument completely "overlooks the distinction between a contract which is out-and-out a contract for sale and one which merely creates aright of pre-emption" and: "If it is the former, then it is certainly incomplete if no price is fixed. Al does not fix the price at which the property is to be sold. According to Fazl Ali, J., such an argument completely "overlooks the distinction between a contract which is out-and-out a contract for sale and one which merely creates aright of pre-emption" and: "If it is the former, then it is certainly incomplete if no price is fixed. If it is the latter, then it is not at all, necessary that any price should be fixed beforehand because in such cases the price to be paid would be the price at which the property was actually sold to a third party". 8. Art.7 of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100, corresponds to Art.10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and provides: Table:#1 9. Para.7 of the plaint admits that physical possession of the whole of the property sold under Exts. B and C passed to the purchaser on their respective dates: and the fact was not challenged before us. The suit should hence have been brought within one year of the date of Ext. C, that is, within one year of 23rd Kanni 1119 and as the plaint was presented only on 14th Meenom 1120 it has to be rejected as barred under Art.7 of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100. According to the appellant the suit is governed by either Art.101 ("For specific performance of a contract") or Art.109 (residuary article) of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100, which correspond to Art.113 and 120 respectively of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. As the right created by Ext. Al as already stated is a right of pre-emption and Art.7 of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100, specifically deals with suits to enforce such rights we are unable to find any jurisdiction for the said contention. 10. The right of pre-emption with which we are concerned is a right which is founded not on custom or on statute but on contract. We do not understand why the fact that the parties are Hindus should preclude them from entering into such a contract as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Such arrangements are by no means uncommon at the time of partition in Hindu families and is certainly not opposed to Hindu law or usage. We do not understand why the fact that the parties are Hindus should preclude them from entering into such a contract as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Such arrangements are by no means uncommon at the time of partition in Hindu families and is certainly not opposed to Hindu law or usage. As pointed out by Kathalay in his Treatise on the law of Pre-emption (p. 196): "An important instance of contractual pre-emption is found in the case of members of a joint Hindu family wishing to separate from each other. The defect which exists in the system of Hindu law on account of its non-recognition of the right of pre-emption is sometimes sought to be remedied by an agreement, entered into amongst the members of the Joint Family at the time of the partition, reserving a right of pre-emption over the property which is the subject matter of the division, in case it is subsequently sold to a stranger". 11. In the light of what is stated above the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.