This appeal arises out of a tills suit. Plaintiff prayed for declaration of title to and confirmation of possession or in the alter­native for delivery of Khas possession in case he was found out of possession. The property con­sists of Jote rights in land with some structures on it Plaintiff's claim is confined to one-sixth share in the Jote right and one-sixth share of maliki rights in the house and the latrine on the suit land. (2) Mofazzor All and Asaddar All were the ori­ginal owners of this land with the structures on it and they were in possession through Madhab. After Madhab's death his son Raghu succeeded. Plaintiff's case is that on 16th, June 1956 Rakesh, defendant No. 7 and defendants Nos. 8 to 11 got settlement of the suit land from the landlords and purchased the structures on it. The settlement was obtained in the name of defendant 7 who was the Karta It was in favour of all the members of the joint family. Rakesh, defendant 7, later brought an ejectment (T, S. No. 62/47) against Raghu. The suit was compromised and Raghu vacated the land. On 26th June, 1948 defendants Nos 2 to 6 got a registered Kataala executed in their fa­vour by defendant No. 7. He purported to convey 'Jote rights in the land and the ownership of the houses to the transferees. Out of the transferees defendants 4 to 6 sold their shares in the land and the houses to defendants 1 and 2. The property in suit thus passed to defendants 1 to 3. It is alleged that the defendants tried to get possession of the property. There was a scramble for it. This led to a proceeding under S. 145, Cri­minal P C. The property was attached in that proceeding. Plaintiff is therefore claiming de­claration of his title to his share in the property. The defence set up was that the defendants were bona fide purchasers for consideration without no­tice of plaintiff's title. Title of the plaintiff to the property was also disputed. (3) The learned Munsiff who tried the suit found both the issues in defendants' favour. His conclusion was that property belonged to Rakesn and in any case defendants were entitled to pro­tection under S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge on appeal by the plain­tiff reversed the decree of the trial Court. (3) The learned Munsiff who tried the suit found both the issues in defendants' favour. His conclusion was that property belonged to Rakesn and in any case defendants were entitled to pro­tection under S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge on appeal by the plain­tiff reversed the decree of the trial Court. He came to the conclusion that property belonged to the joint family of which plaintiff was a member. He was entitled to one share and the defendants who are transferees had failed to substantiate that they had made reasonable inquiries into the title of their vendor before entering into the transaction. They have by this appeal assailed the cor­rectness of the appellate decree. (4) The admitted facts are that defendant No. 7 who appears to be the eldest brother of plain­tiff and of defendants 8 to 11 is a Mukhtar. He is practising at Karimganj. He purchased the pro­perty in dispute in his own name for a sum of Rs. 600. Later on he instituted an ejectment suit against the defendant in occupation in his own name. He then transferred the property to defen­dants 2 to 6. In none of these transactions he dealt with the property as a Karta or as a representative of the family. He was purporting to deal with it as though he was the sole owner and nobody else had any interest in it. He purchased the property in 1946 and in 1948-2 years later-he transferred it to defendants. This suit was instituted in March, 1949. (5) Plaintiff's case is that he and defendants 7 to 11 are members of a Hindu joint family. This family had property and the purchase of the pro­perty by defendant No. 7 though in his own name alone was made by him as a Karta with his family funds. Where a plaintiff comes forward with a claim like this, the onus of establishing that there was a nucleus with the income of which the pro­perty could have been acquired would be on him. The law has been lucidly stated in Mulla's Hindu Law, 11th Edition on page 267: "There is no presumption that a family be­cause it is joint, possesses joint property or any property. The law has been lucidly stated in Mulla's Hindu Law, 11th Edition on page 267: "There is no presumption that a family be­cause it is joint, possesses joint property or any property. The jointness of family therefore would not lead to the conclusion that the disputed pro­perty standing in the name of a member of the joint family is necessarily joint or family pro­perty. To render the property joint the plaintiff must prove that the family was possessed of some property with the income of which the property could have been acquired or from which the pre­sumption could be drawn that all property possess­ed with joint family funds, such as the" proceeds of sale of ancestral property or by joint labour. None of these alternatives is a matter of legal pre­sumption. It can only be brought to the cognizance of a Court in the same way as any other fact, name­ly, by evidence." (6) Their Lordships had to consider the ques­tion of onus arising in such a case in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango, SIR 1954 SC 379 (A). The propositions of law there were stated as follows: "Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint", and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of pro­perty was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the pro­perty in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family pro­perty." In this case no partition or disruption of the joint family is at all alleged. It may therefore be taken for granted that there was a joint family in existence at the time the property in suit was ac­quired. But according to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court this would not give rise to any presumption that the property acquired by defendant No. 7 in his own name is joint family property. The plaintiff who is claim­ing the joint family property has to establish that the family possessed joint property at the time from the income of which this property could have been acquired. The plaintiff who is claim­ing the joint family property has to establish that the family possessed joint property at the time from the income of which this property could have been acquired. The nature and the relative value of the property are relevant considerations. Their Lordships explained their meaning further in the following passage: "The important thing to consider is the income which the nucleus yields. A building in the occu­pation of the members of a family and yielding no income could not be a nucleus out of which acqui­sitions could be made, even though it might be of considerable value. On the other hand, a run­ning business in which the capital invested is com­paratively small might conceivably produce sub­stantial income., which may well form the founda­tion of the subsequent acquisitions. There are not abstract questions of law, but questions of fact to be determined on the evidence in the case. Where the finding of the Courts is that the in­come from the ancestral lands was not sufficient even for the maintenance of the members and the houses in dispute are substantial burden is on the plaintiff who alleges the houses to have been ac­quired out of joint family funds, to establish it." (7) The issue between the parties then boils down to the simple question whether at the time of the acquisition of the property in suit by de­fendant No. 7 there was such nucleus the income from which might have been utilised for purchas­ing this plot; The learned Additional District Judge when considering this question found that these brothers had some lands in their village. They had a paternal homestead in the name of de­fendant No. 7. They also had joint business in the town of Karimganj where defendant No. 7 was practising. They all lived in the same house and had joint mess. The house they lived in also was in the name of defendant No. 7. Having found these facts he observed that "in the absence of proof, I would regard that even if he acquired the properties with his own funds, he had thrown the same into the common stock.'' (8) In regard to the existence of some joint land we have got no documentary evidence. Even the oral evidence does not bring out the area of the land or its value or its approximate produce. Even the oral evidence does not bring out the area of the land or its value or its approximate produce. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the income from the lands would be about Rs., 50 per mensem, and the joint family consisted of no less than 17 mem­bers. If this is all that the family had, it would not have been possible to purchase any property from the income of land. Rs. 50 per mensem would hardly suffice for the maintenance of a large family. In regard to the joint business all that has been proved by the plaintiff is that they have a watch repair shop and he himself works at that shop. Now whether it is joint family shop or not in this case is immaterial since it is admitted by the plaintiff himself that this watch repair shop was not in existence at the time the defendant No. 7 purchased the property. This therefore could not be regarded as part of the available nucleus. There is a homesiead. That also stands in the name of defendant 7. The homestead was described by one witness of the plaintiff as paternal. But this home­stead yields no income. There is evidence that an annual tax of Rs. 5 is payable., But there is no statement by anyone that there is any income ac­cruing to the family from this property. The plain­tiff also claims that they had a truck which was being utilised as a public carrier and the family was making some income from it. But it is not shown when the truck was pur­chased and since when it is being plied. There is no evidence that it was purchased with the funds of the family. In any case there is no evidence on which it may be said that this truck was in existence at the relevant time when defendant No. 7 purchased the property. The learned Judge re­ferred to the existence of the homestead and the land but did not consider the question whether from its nature or its value the property was capa­ble of yielding any income which may render it possible for the family to acquire property. He has not considered this aspect of the mat­ter at all. He did not even notice that the alleged joint business was started admittedly after the purchase of the property in suit. He has not considered this aspect of the mat­ter at all. He did not even notice that the alleged joint business was started admittedly after the purchase of the property in suit. The evidence bearing on the question thus has not been fully or properly considered. His finding, on the point therefore is not binding. The conclusion cne is driven to by an examination of the evidence is that plaintiff has failed to establish that at the time this property was purchased there was the existence of such nucleus from which the family was in a position to purchase the property. (9) The conduct of the plaintiff and his bro­thers excepting defendant No. 7 has also got some bearing on the nature of the property. It is said that they lived in the same house and they are joint. Plaintiff led evidence on that point. He stated that he did not know whether the sum of Rs. 4000/- received by defendant No. 7 came to the family funds or not. The family is not maintain­ing accounts though there are six brothers ad­mittedly engaged in different undertakings. De­fendant' No. 7 himself is a practitioner who is said to be having lucrative practice. It would not be difficult for him to purchase this property with his own money. His income I constitutes gains of science and is self-acquired I property unless he himself throws it into the joint1 stock. It is not claimed that his professional in­come was thrown into the joint stock. It could not be treated as joint family income unless it was alleged and proved that the income was aug­menting the family funds. There is no evidence on this point. But the fact that the plaintiff has not even made sure whether the sum of Rs. 40007/- has been credited to the family funds or not raises another question. Plaintiff's suit may possibly be a speculative one. The suit is instituted after some years of the transfer, only one brother is suing, five other brothers are merely pro forma defendants. They have not even appealed in the case and have not claimed any share. 40007/- has been credited to the family funds or not raises another question. Plaintiff's suit may possibly be a speculative one. The suit is instituted after some years of the transfer, only one brother is suing, five other brothers are merely pro forma defendants. They have not even appealed in the case and have not claimed any share. In view of these circum­stances I find it difficult to hold that in this case evidence justifies the view that the property was purchased by defendant No. 7 for and on behalf of the family and with joint family funds or that there was such nucleus from the income of which it could possibly have been purchased. The pro­perty in these circumstances could not be held to be joint family property. Plaintiff would have no share in it and his suit should fail on this ground alone. In view of the conclusion reached, it is not necessary to consider the question whether the defendants were bona fide purchasers for value. This appeal succeeds. The appellate decree is reversed and that of the trial Court restored. The plaintiff's suit stands dismissed with costs throughout. (10) Leave for a Letters Patent appeal is ask­ed for and is refused Appeal allowed.