Judgment :- 1. This revision is by the plaintiff and arises out of the interlocutory injunction proceedings in the case. 2. The suit was for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant tenant from using plaint item 1 room which had been let to him by the plaintiff as a kitchen and causing nuisance thereby to the tenants of adjoining rooms and further restrain him from using item 2 the verandaha and courtyard which had not been let at all, for stacking firewood or other things and for other reliefs. Pending suit the plaintiff moved for temporary injunction in aid of the permanent injunction relief and after hearing both parties and considering the evidence adduced for the purpose, the Court granted the temporary injunction limited only against the defendant's use of the verandaha and courtyard for storing firewood or other articles. The defendant was at the same time directed to see that no annoyance was caused to the neighbouring tenants from the smoke arising from his use of item 1 as kitchen. This order was passed on 19.1.1956. 3. Subsequently in or about May 1956, the plaintiff removed the door of item 1 leading to the verandaha and blocked up the passage with masonary structure apparently on the ground that the defendant misused the verandaha. Plaintiff also removed certain smoke tiles which defendant had installed on the roof for the better escape of smoke from the kitchen, this again on the ground that the defendant had no right to make alterations in the building. The defendant thereupon on 19.5.1956 applied to the Court to compel the plaintiff to remove the block up and replace the door as well as put back the smoke tiles on the roof. The plaintiff objected that he was well within his power in doing the things complained against and that the court had no jurisdiction to issue any mandatory injunction in the matter as prayed for. The court below however took the matter seriously as constituting an unauthorised interference within the even tenor of its interlocutory injunction order and in the result directed the plaintiff to restore the status quo within a week, otherwise the defendants could do the same, the expenses incurred by the defendant being left to be dealt with at the stage of judgment. It is against this order that the plaintiff has brought this Revision Petition. 4. It is against this order that the plaintiff has brought this Revision Petition. 4. The main argument addressed by learned counsel is that the court below had no jurisdiction to pass an interlocutory mandatory injunction in the manner adopted and that at the instance of a defendant in a case. According to Mr. K.T. Ninan learned counsel for the plaintiff Revision petitioner an injunction can be granted in favour of a defendant only in a case coming under 0.39, R.1 and that was not the case here and that a mandatory injunction in interlocutory proceedings is an exceptional remedy that could be granted under the inherent powers of court only to the plaintiff in a suit contemplated by 0.39 R.2. The court below got over the difficulty by saying that if inherent powers of the court could be exercised in exceptional circumstances on behalf of the plaintiff there was no reason not to extend the same jurisdiction in similar circumstances on behalf of the defendant and it went on to find that the circumstances here were sufficiently exceptional as to require its intervention. I entirely agree with this reasoning. It is observed in Mulla's C.P.C. 12th Edition p. 1160 "The courts in England have the power to grant mandatory injunction on interlocutory applications. And so have chartered High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary original jurisdiction. The same power is possessed by Courts in the moffussil". The case of Collison v. Warrent (1901) 1 Ch. 812 cited in the English Annual Practice is also very instructive in this connection. Buckly, J. posed with this question at the initial stage as to whether the defendant can move for an injunction against the plaintiff without filing a counter claim or issuing a writ in a cross action and answered the same in the light of earlier authorities by saying that in some cases and only in some cases he can, viz., where his claim to relief arose out of the plaintiff's cause of action or was incidental to it. In that case the plaintiff depended on a contract under which he affirmed that he was entitled to be employed as manager of a hotel. The defendant's cause of action was likewise that contract, only from the opposite point of view. In that case the plaintiff depended on a contract under which he affirmed that he was entitled to be employed as manager of a hotel. The defendant's cause of action was likewise that contract, only from the opposite point of view. He negatived the plaintiff's claim to be employed and claimed to prevent him from interfering with the management and it was held' accordingly that he was entitled to move for injunction in the plaintiffs action, even though it was to restrain the remaining of the plaintiff in the hotel i.e., it was equivalent to a mandatory order upon the plaintiff to go out. There can be no doubt therefore that in particular circumstances the court is entitled to grant injunction involving the positive doing of a thing by the person subjected to the order. In this case it was clear that the plaintiff's interference with the door passage and the smoke tiles in the roof, tended to discredit the temporary injunction order passed by the court. If the plaintiff felt aggrieved that the order had not gone far enough he must have taken the matter in appeal at least by approaching the court once again for redress. It was not for him to take the law into his own hands and change the scope of the earlier order in the case. If the court below did not go further and vindicate its dignity by contempt process the plaintiff has to feel thankful therefor. The order of the court below cannot in the circumstance be complained against and I affirm it. The plaintiff will however have one week's more time from to-day to comply with the direction made in the order. The Revision Petition fails and is dismissed with costs.