SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : This is an appeal by the defendant and is direct­ed against the judgment and decree dated 28-1-1952 passed by Mr. D. N. Hazarika, Subordinate Judge, Lower Assam Districts. The plaintiff, who is the respondent to this appeal instituted a suit for re­covery of a sum of Rs. 10,500/- by way of damages on account of wrongful dismissal. The amount in­cludes a claim for salary and dearness allowance due to the plaintiff from the 3rd April, 1947 to the 30th June, 1948, deducting therefrom the pension payable to the plaintiff, in addition to certain other incidental expenses claimed by the plaintiff. (.2) The facts leading to the institution of the suit may be briefly summed up as follows: The plaintiff was appointed a Deputy Superin­tendent of Police in the year 1919 and was due to retire on full pension on the 30th June, 1948. He was placed under suspension with effect from the 3rd April 1947, and ordered to appear before a Commission of Enquiry set up by the Government of Assam under Act XXXVII of 1850. Mr. J. E. Reid, the then Deputy Inspector-General of Police was the President of the Commission, which con­sisted of two other members, who were both re­tired executive officers. The Commission submitt­ed a report on the 12th of September, 1947. The members of the Commission appear to have been agreed that some of the charges of corruption and illegal gratification had been proved, though there was a difference of opinion in regard to the other charges. In all, the charges consisted of as many as 23 counts relating mostly to allegations of acceptance of bribes and illegal gratifications (vide Exhibit 14). The report of this Commission was also con­sidered by the State Public Service Commission. The latter was of the view that the plaintiff should be asked to retire from the Police Service. While the report of the Commission and the opinion gi­ven by the Public Service Commission appeared to have been pending consideration with the Go­vernment, the plaintiff applied for leave prepara­tory to retirement with effect from 1-3-1948 or with immediate effect as the Government pleased, though he was normally due to retire on the 30th of June, 1948. He also prayed that he might be re­leased from suspension without loss of pay and ser­vice from the 3rd April. 1947. He also prayed that he might be re­leased from suspension without loss of pay and ser­vice from the 3rd April. 1947. This was by an ap­plication addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, dated the 20th February, 1948 (Exhibit 24) He received a reply from the Chief Secretary on the 12th March 1948 (Exhibit 25)., The Government in its reply stated that his prayers were inadmissible, inasmuch as he had been found guilty by the Commission of Enquiry; and the Assam Public Service Commission had re­commended that he should not be allowed to con­tinue in service and suggested compulsory retire­ment as an alternative to dismissal. The Govern­ment also suggested that since compulsory retire­ment was not a punishment prescribed by the Rules, the plaintiff might, in order to avoid dismissal, voluntarily elect to retire on proportionate pen­sion with effect from 3rd April, 1947. Time was accordingly given to him for a week to make his election in order to avoid dismissal. On the 17th of March, 1948, the plaintiff in res­ponse to the letter of the Government sent another letter (Ex. 26). In this letter he stated that he had enclosed a separate application praying volun­tarily for retirement on proportionate pension with retrospective effect from the 3rd April, 1947. He, however, pointed out in that letter that by the adoption of this procedure, he was likely to suffer pecuniary loss of Rs. 7,080/-, inasmuch as he was asked to retire 15 months before the due time. He also made allegations challenging the findings of the Commission of Enquiry and the Assam Public Service Commission and submitted that he might be given a further opportunity to vindicate his character in a Court of Law and committed for trial on the charges in respect of which he had been found guilty by the Commission. On receipt of his application praying for volun­tary retirement, the Government forwarded a copy of the formal application form for pension of gazetted officers and stated that final orders on the proceedings would be passed on receipt of the pen­sion form duly filled in. This was on the 7th Ap­ril, 1948 (Exhibit 27). The plaintiff then immedi­ately filled in the pension paper forwarded to him and submitted it to the Government on the 13th April, 1948 (Exhibit 28). This was on the 7th Ap­ril, 1948 (Exhibit 27). The plaintiff then immedi­ately filled in the pension paper forwarded to him and submitted it to the Government on the 13th April, 1948 (Exhibit 28). He, however, again reiter­ated in an application his complaint against the findings of the Enquiry Commission and his ob­jection to the opinion expressed by the Assam Pub­lic Service Commission, and wanted that he should be given a chance to appear personally before the latter and represent his case. In conclusion he requested that the pension paper and the other materials should be placed be­fore the Government for final orders. Eventually, the Assam Government under letter dated the 7th June, 1948, sent to the plaintiff by the Chief Secre­tary (Exhibit 29) held that after due considera­tion of the case, it found his other prayers inad­missible and decided that he should be permitted to retire voluntarily with proportionate pension with effect from 3-4-1947. He appeared to have then presented certain memorials to the Government in respect of his other prayers, which did not have any better re­sult: vide, for instance, the letter of the Chief Secretary dated the 26th July, 1948 (Exhibit 30). The matter thus ended there and would have pro­bably remained where it was, but for the decision of the Privy Council in The High Commr. for India v. I. M. Lall, AIR 1943 PC 121 (A) which attracted .the notice of the plaintiff. This provided him with a new impetus to move in the matter. He then presented a fresh applica­tion to the Chief Secretary to Government dated the 26th August, 1948 (Exhibit 21), wherein he specifically referred to this ruling and prayed that his case should be reopened and he might be given fresh opportunity to show cause in the matter. He further submitted that he was not willing to take the help of the Civil Court on the lines indicated in that judgment, inasmuch as that remedy would not be enough to vindicate his position. The Government's reply to this petition is dat­ed the 17th September, 1948 (Exhibit 23), in which it maintained that the decision in question had no application and that he had himself voluntarily elected to retire and was permitted to do so. Thus by permitting him to retire voluntarily no punish­ment was inflicted by the Government and it saw no reason to reopen the case. Thus by permitting him to retire voluntarily no punish­ment was inflicted by the Government and it saw no reason to reopen the case. (3) The above facts are beyond the pale of con­troversy. The contention of the plaintiff is that he had been compelled by the threat of dismissal to retire voluntarily from the 3rd of April, 1947. Ac­cording to him, retirement from service could ne­ver be optional with an officer of the Government and in the circumstances, he submits that his com­pulsory retirement amounted to dismissal and was-for all practical purposes a measure of punishment 'inflicted on him in disregard of the statutory pro­visions relating to dismissal. He also says that in view of the unwarranted and illegal action taken by the Government, he had suffered not only mental distress and loss of pre­stige, but also pecuniary damage, particulars of which he mentioned in the plaint. He also claim­ed that he had a valid cause of action against the-Government on account of the premature retire­ment, which was forced upon him. (4) The State of Assam contested the suit. It maintained that there were good grounds for mak­ing a formal and public enquiry into the truth of the numerous imputations of misbehaviour and malpractice on the part of the plaintiff and in pub­lic interest, it decided to appoint a Commission of Enquiry. The constitution of the Commission was perfectly valid and its personnel comprised of men discharging or who had at one time discharged, high and responsible public duties. They were all persons of high integrity without any bias of any kind against the plaintiff. The Commission of Enquiry after taking such evidence-in the case as appeared to it necessary, came to-certain findings against the plaintiff. Indeed the Commission was very fair to the plaintiff as it gave the benefit of doubt to the plaintiff on any point on which it thought that evidence was in­adequate. The Government of Assam also on re­ceipt of the Commission's report dealt with the plaintiff leniently and treated him with great con­sideration in giving him the option of voluntary retirement in which case the plaintiff was allowed to earn his proportionate pension. In view of the circumstances, the plaintiff him­self agreed to retire voluntarily and the Govern­ment permitted him to do so. Therefore, there-could be no threat or undue influence exercised on him in the matter. In view of the circumstances, the plaintiff him­self agreed to retire voluntarily and the Govern­ment permitted him to do so. Therefore, there-could be no threat or undue influence exercised on him in the matter. Any other course might have been seriously prejudicial to the plaintiff and. might have deprived him of his pension altogether, if he had been dismissed. It was, therefore, sub­mitted on behalf of the defendant that there was nothing illegal in the step taken against the plain­tiff and the plaintiff had therefore, no cause of action. It also pleaded that there was waiver and estoppel on the part of the plaintiff and no relief can be granted. (5) The learned Subordinate Judge at the trial raised various issues most of which, in my opinion, did not really arise for adjudication. The only re­levant issues were issues 3, 8 and 9, which dealt with the question of waiver and estoppel, the viol­ation, if any of S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the voluntary retirement of the plain­tiff. These crucial issues were all found by the learned Subordinate Judge against the defendant. He held that the plaintiff had been reduced in rank by reason of his suspension and since no opportunity for showing cause against the propos­ed action was given to him, there was breach of the statutory safeguards embodied in S. 240, clause (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. He found that compulsory retirement was in the nature of punishment inflicted on the plaintiff and amount­ed to a virtual, if not, legal dismissal and that the retirement was not voluntary, but made under the threat of dismissal. He also held that in the circumstances of the case in accepting voluntary retirement, there was no waiver or estoppel against the plaintiff and it was open to him to question the procedure adopt­ed in a Court of Law. He accordingly decreed the suit for a slightly modified claim with proportionate costs. (6) I need not detain myself to examine the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge below on the other questions raised, because as I have indi­cated, those questions strictly did not arise for deci­sion. He accordingly decreed the suit for a slightly modified claim with proportionate costs. (6) I need not detain myself to examine the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge below on the other questions raised, because as I have indi­cated, those questions strictly did not arise for deci­sion. It may be sufficient to observe that he held that there was some irregularity in the constitu­tion and report of the Enquiry Commission, though at the same time he found that the members arriv­ed at their findings with great caution and that the composition of the Commission was in no; way pre­judicial to a fair and impartial conduct of the pro­ceedings. It is against this decree that the defen­dant has preferred the appeal. (7) The learned Advocate-General in support of the appeal has challenged the findings of the Court below on those essential issues. The main questions, therefore, which arise for our considera­tion are: (1) whether the plaintiff was dismissed or reduced in rank within the meaning of S. 240, clause (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and if so, whether there was any violation of the provisions thereof; and (2) the plaintiff having agreed to retire voluntarily whether he is not es­topped from questioning the order accepting his voluntary retirement, and whether as' such he has not waived his right, if any, to enforce compliance with S. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. (8) It would appear from the facts which I have indicated earlier that the plaintiff was given the option under letter dated 12-3-1948 (Exhibit 25) to retire voluntarily as an alternative to dismissal and he elected to retire voluntarily. Section 240 of the Government of India Act has no relation to a case where a person voluntarily chooses to retire. Under clause (1) of this section, it is expressly pro­vided that every person, who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in India, holds' office during His Majesty's pleasure. But this is subject to the other clauses of the section and clause (3) says that no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed Or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. But this is subject to the other clauses of the section and clause (3) says that no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed Or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. I need not refer to the pro­visos to this clause, which are unnecessary for our (present discussion. Clause (3), therefore, clearly contemplates only two classes of cases; dismissal or reduction in rank. The instant case is not a case either of dismis­sal or reduction in rank. The Government's let­ter made it clear that compulsory retirement was not a punishment prescribed by the Rules and therefore, the plaintiff might in order to avoid •dismissal, voluntarily elect to retire on proportion­ate pension. Part XII of the Civil Services (Classi­fication, Control and Appeal) Rules relating to conduct and discipline of members of the Civil Services includes Rule 49. This Rule sets out vari­ous penalties to which a member of the services can be subjected for indiscipline and misconduct. These are seven in number and include cen­sure, suspension, reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal from service. The Government of India Act, 1935 appears to have taken note of only two of these possible pen­alties as serious enough to attract the operation of the statutory guarantees and safeguards provided In that section, namely in the contingency of reduc­tion in rank and dismissal from service. The pre­sent Constitution under Article 311, which corres­ponds to section 240 of the old Constitution Act has added a third contingency to the list, namely removal from service. The distinction between dis­missal and removal from service is apparent in R. 49 itself. Removal, according to the Rule, does not disqualify a person from future employment, where­as dismissal from service does. It follows, therefore, that section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, has no application to any other case, except cases of dismissal or re­duction in rank and neither of these contingencies have arisen in the present case. A case of volun­tary retirement is covered by R. 56 of the Funda­mental and Subsidiary Rules. As such, the case has nothing to do with any of the penalties speci­fied in Rule 49 of the Rules discussed earlier. A case of volun­tary retirement is covered by R. 56 of the Funda­mental and Subsidiary Rules. As such, the case has nothing to do with any of the penalties speci­fied in Rule 49 of the Rules discussed earlier. The above principles are clearly borne out by the deci­sion of the Supreme Court in Satish Chandra v. The Union of India AIR 1953 SC 250 (B). The plaintiff, therefore, in a case of this nature could not claim the protection of S. 240 at all, the section having no application to his case. I am, therefore, unable to see how he could invoke the principles laid down in the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1948 PC 121 (A). That was clearly a case of dismissal of a civil servant of the Crown and therefore, the safeguards laid down in S. 240 were applied. Besides on the question whether an action can lie against the Crown for damages for premature termination of service, this case has not been follow­ed by the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid AIR 1954 SC 245 (C), though in other respects its authority cannot be questioned. (9) It is then contended for the plaintiff that his retirement was compelled under threat of dis­missal and therefore, it must be assumed to be a case of dismissal. The plaintiff was forced to retire by way of penalty in view of the report of the En­quiry Commission and the recommendations of the Public Service Commission. In my opinion, these arguments are fallacious. The point is not what actuated the Government to take that action, taut the point is what was the action actually taken against him. In other words, the answer to the question depends on whether the nature and inci­dents of an action, which results in dismissal or removal from service are found to exist in an ac­tion for compulsory retirement. Whatever the position may be in regard to dis­missal or removal from service; and indeed in some cases of removal from service, some amount of per­sona,! imputation or charge against the officer may well be involved. In other words, his dismissal or removal may he attributed to some blameworthy conduct on his part, showing that he was deficient: in some respects, or that he had been guilty of misconduct or was lacking in integrity and ability or honesty of purpose. imputation or charge against the officer may well be involved. In other words, his dismissal or removal may he attributed to some blameworthy conduct on his part, showing that he was deficient: in some respects, or that he had been guilty of misconduct or was lacking in integrity and ability or honesty of purpose. There is, however, no such element or charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. The plaintiff may have been asked to accept voluntary retirement, because the authorities thought that the proceedings for dismissal against him might be a long drawn out affair and it might be more in public interest to choose the former alternative. Even assuming that the real reason for taking this step were the charges of misconduct against the plaintiff, which the authorities may have been unable to substantiate, it is quite clear that an im­putation or charge is not in terms a condition for the exercise of the power. The step could be taker-even without any such charge. In other words, a compulsory retirement by itself has no stigma or implication of misbehaviour or incapacity. The en­quiry in the present case conducted by the En­quiry Commission was only to enable the Govern merit to make up its mind as to whether it was in public interest to dispense with his services. Even the recommendation of the Public Service Commis­sion could not be taken to go beyond that. It follows, therefore, that the principal test which (determines whether a termination of service amounts to dismissal or removal is absent in the case of compulsory retirement. I have already pointed out that Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Clas­sification, Control and Appeal) Rules does not spe­cify compulsory retirement as one of the penalties to be inflicted on an officer for his misconduct or indiscipline. Here the officer earns his proportion­ate pension, which he otherwise would not have, if he had been dismissed or removed from service. It does not deprive him of the benefit accrued. (10) The learned Advocate-General in the context' of his submissions has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 369 (D). In that case the appellant was appointed by the Secretary of State for India-in-Council to the Indian Service of Engineers on the 20th October, 1923. (10) The learned Advocate-General in the context' of his submissions has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 369 (D). In that case the appellant was appointed by the Secretary of State for India-in-Council to the Indian Service of Engineers on the 20th October, 1923. After the attainment of independence, a fresh agreement was entered into by and between the appellant, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and the Governor-Ge­neral of India, confirming his terms of appoint­ment. He earned promotions and was recommend­ed even for appointment as the Chief Engineer. But, later he was asked to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired under the pro­visions of Article 465A of the Civil Service Regula­tions, as it appeared that he had been making systematic and gross overpayments to contractors and that he had spent large amounts of public money for his own personal convenience, and had taken recourse to dubious and unscrupulous me­thods. The appellant submitted his explanations, which were placed for consideration before the Un­ion Public Service Commission and the Commission came to the conclusion that some of the allega­tions against the appellant had been proved and submitted its report accordingly. On receipt of this report, the President, after considering the case and the recommendations of the Commission decided that the appellant should retire forthwith from service under Note No. 1, Article 465A of the Civil Service Regulations. This order was challenged before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as in violation of Article 311 thereof. The High. Court rejected the appellant's contentions and the mat­ter then was taken up in appeal to the Supreme Court, which also held against the appellant. The decision in that case to a large extent supports the contentions of the learned Advocate-General. Mr. Ghose, however, has sought to distinguish the case on the plea, that the decision rested on an ap­plication of Article 465A of the Civil Service Regu­lations, which did not affect the case of the ap­pellant. It is pointed out that the Article in Question read with Article 349A of the Regulations, pari pessu, had no application to the plaintiff, who was appointed on the 21-7-1919. It is pointed out that the Article in Question read with Article 349A of the Regulations, pari pessu, had no application to the plaintiff, who was appointed on the 21-7-1919. Article 349A says that the Rules in Art. 465-A applied to officers, who join­ed their appointments after the 29th August, 1919; but clause (b) of Article 349A provides that Article 465A would also apply to persons, who were in ser­vice on 29th August, 1919, but had definitely elect­ed in writing with the permission of Government to come under them. There has been no clear in­vestigation on the point, as to whether the plain­tiff had elected in writing to claim the benefit of the Article, though reasonably it is conceivable that the plaintiff may have so elected. Be that as it may, even assuming that Article 465A of the Civil (June) 1957 Assam D.P./6 Service Regulations did not in terms apply to his case, the principles which distinguish a case of compulsory retirement from a case of dismissal or removal from service remain the same; and I see no reason to hold that in the present case, compulsory retirement was tantamount to dismissal. (11) There is force in the contention of Mr. Lahiri that even if no such Rules existed the plain­tiff could still be asked to retire compulsorily by virtue of the provisions of clause (1) of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which pro­vides that every person, who is a member of the Civil service or holds any office under the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure. There was, therefore, nothing to prevent the Government in asking the plaintiff to retire on proportionate pension, if it thought that in pub­lic interest it was not desirable for him to con­tinue in service any longer. The evolution of the law on the point has been elaborately traced by the Supreme Court with reference to the Indian Constitution in S. A. Vencataraman v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 375 at p. 378, para 10 (E). Here, there is the added factor that the plain­tiff himself voluntarily agreed to the retirement. He filled in the pension papers, which were sent to him and asked for necessary orders to be passed by the Government and then Government agreed to his offer to retire on proportionate pension. Here, there is the added factor that the plain­tiff himself voluntarily agreed to the retirement. He filled in the pension papers, which were sent to him and asked for necessary orders to be passed by the Government and then Government agreed to his offer to retire on proportionate pension. (12) This fact of his agreement to the proce­dure adopted by the Government has also an im­portant bearing on the question of waiver and es­toppel. I have referred to the various Exhibits on the point, it is true that from time to time the plaintiff asked the Government to reconsider his case and requested the Government to be allowed a chance either to represent his case before the Public Service Commission or to vindicate his character in a Court of Law. But, at no stage did he seek to withdraw the application which he had filed for grant of pro­portionate pension. In fact, it is admitted that he has been drawing his pension at the rate san­ctioned by the Government, which was in accor­dance with the application form filled up by him. It was, therefore, clearly a case where the plain­tiff was estopped from impugning the order of the Government to which he had himself agreed. If at that earliest stage he had protested ag­ainst the suggestion contained in the Government's letter (Exhibit 25) dated 12-3-1948, it would have been open to the Government to take whatever steps it liked for his dismissal. But, the plaintiff advisedly avoided the alternative contingency and thereby prevented the Government from taking any further action against him. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot take a different position now and challenge the very order of the Government under which he has been drawing his pension ever since. It is not a case of any estoppel against the statute as the learned Judge below has erroneously assumed. The provisions of S. 240(3), which are undoub­tedly mandatory even if applicable, were meant for his benefit; and it was surely open to him to waive his right, if any, to the observance of the formalities required by that section. On this point of waiver, I may usefully refer to a relevant pas­sage from Maxwell: "On the Interpretation of Statutes". The provisions of S. 240(3), which are undoub­tedly mandatory even if applicable, were meant for his benefit; and it was surely open to him to waive his right, if any, to the observance of the formalities required by that section. On this point of waiver, I may usefully refer to a relevant pas­sage from Maxwell: "On the Interpretation of Statutes". The eminent Jurist says: "Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed With without infringing any pubic right or public policy". We have a similar dictum of the Privy Council In Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197 (F), where Ford Simonds in connection with the importance of a notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, observed thus: "There is no inconsistency between the proposi­tions that the provisions of the section are man­datory and must be enforced by the Court and that they may be waived by the authority for whose benefit they are provided". He has taken full advantage of the order of the Gov­ernment granting him the pension for which he ap­plied and it would be quite unfair and inequitable now to allow him to repudiate the order. He can­not be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The principles of waiver and estoppel clearly apply to the circumstances of this case. (13) Even if the entire argument of the plain­tiff could be accepted, the position would be to re­legate the plaintiff to the situation which obtained at the date of the order of the Government embo­died in Exhibit 25 and the Government would be entitled to take any action which it would have otherwise taken against the plaintiff in accordance with law, but for his acceptance of the proposal for voluntary retirement. In any case, therefore, the plaintiff is not en­titled to the reliefs which he claims at present, namely that he should recover money by way of damages from the Government. I am unable to see anything in the contention that his consent to the submission of pension papers was not a volun­tary act. In any case, therefore, the plaintiff is not en­titled to the reliefs which he claims at present, namely that he should recover money by way of damages from the Government. I am unable to see anything in the contention that his consent to the submission of pension papers was not a volun­tary act. It was for him to decide whether he should have accepted this alternative or he should have faced a proceeding for dismissal and the risks involved thereon. He chose the former. There is no substance in the contention that the plaintiff was forced against his will to undergo and accept compulsory retire­ment, which he could not but accept. There was no compulsion on the plaintiff to enter into the contract he did. He was absolutely free under the law just as any other person to accept or reject the offer and to seek the remedies available to him in case of any wrongful step taken by the Government. It cannot be, therefore, argued that his con­sent to voluntary retirement was forced or obtain­ed under coercion or undue influence. It was a deliberate and perhaps a shrewd act on his part to accept the suggestion for compulsory retire­ment and the matter would not have come to a Court of Law until the plaintiff supnosedly felt encouraged by the decision of the Privy Council in Lall's case (ibid). (14) It was argued before the learned Subordinate Judge, as it is also argued here, that the order of suspension amounted to reduction in rank and therefore, the procedure contemplated by S. 240, clause (3) was necessary. Assistance for this con­tention has been sought from a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Provincial Government, Cen­tral Provinces arid Berar v. Shamsul Hussain, AIR 1949 Nag 118 (G), where it was held that when a man is suspended, he is reduced in rank within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 240 and" therefore, such a person must be afforded a reason­able opportunity of showing cause. With great res­pect, I am unable to subscribe to that view. Suspension merely means that it only temporarily pre­cludes a person from doing certain duties attached to his office and receiving the enrolments thereof. With great res­pect, I am unable to subscribe to that view. Suspension merely means that it only temporarily pre­cludes a person from doing certain duties attached to his office and receiving the enrolments thereof. This is only a temporary measure and in certain cases, it may be imperative as demanded by the emergencies of the situation and very much in pub­lic interest to suspend an officer forthwith without the formalities of giving notice, etc., as contemplat­ed by the section. In a case of reduction in rank, the officer is definitely demoted to a lesser position or a position of lower category or class to that of the post which he was holding; he is not prevented from doing his duties attached to the post to which he is de­moted, as it is in the case of suspension. There is thus a fundamental distinction between the two1 and I can not help thinking with due deference that "suspension"' can never be regarded as "reduction in rank" unless we unduly stretch the language. This view is supported by a number of decisions on the point all of which are unanimous that "sus­pension" is not a "reduction in rank" at all: See for instance. Y. Venkateswarlu v. State of Madras AIR 1954 Mad 587 (H), Kali Prosanna Roy Chow-dhury v. StP.te of West Bengal 56CalWN 492: ( AIR 1953 Cal 343 (I), Shiva Nandan Sinha v. State of West Bengal 58 Cal WN 18: ( AIR 1954 Cal 60 ) (J) which is a Division Bench judgment, and Gurudeva Narayan Srivastava v State of Bihar (S) AIR 1955 Pat 131 (K). In this case the question becomes somewhat academic in view of the fact that it is no longer the suspension order which is sought to be challeng­ed, but it is the order of compulsory retirement, which is challenged as ultra vires owing to non-compliance with the provisions of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. (15) I have already given my reasons for hop­ing that the plaintiff's claim on the facts stated above is quite unfounded. (15) I have already given my reasons for hop­ing that the plaintiff's claim on the facts stated above is quite unfounded. In the view which we have taken of the matter, we refuse to go into the subsidiary questions raised, namely, whether or not the constitution of the Enquiry Commission was proper, whether the Enquiry Commission acted with any irregularity in taking evidence or hear­ing the parties, whether the Commission was in the nature of a Tribunal or whether its conclu­sions were justified and correct. All these questions, in our opinion, are quite irrelevant for the purpose of decision of the ca-e. I need only add that it is apparent from section 22 of Act XXXVII of 1850 that the Commission was in the nature of an advisory body and not a Court or Tribunal in the strict sense of the term and its report was not binding on the parties or even on the Government. It was open to the .Government to direct the Commission to take further evidence or to ask for further explanation. It was more or less in the nature of an advisory body and the report of the Commission was intended for the Government to make up its mind as to the action which it proposed to take. It was for the Government to pass final orders on the report such as appeared to it just and pro­per. No useful purpose will be therefore, served in going into the findings of the Commission and en­quire whether those findings were correct or not. For the reasons which I have stated above the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge must be reversed and the suit dismissed with costs. (16) There is also a cross objection by the plaintiff which is accordingly dismissed. RAM LABHAYA J.: (17) I agree. I am adding a few words. The respondent, a Deputy Superintendent of Police was suspended with effect from the third of April 1947 and ordered to appear before a Commission of Enquiry set up by the Government of Assam. He appeared. The Commission after an enquiry submitted a report on 12th Sep­tember, 1947. The members of the Commission were agreed that some at least of the charges for corruption and illegal gratification had been pro­ved. This report was considered by the Public Ser­vice Commission of the State. He appeared. The Commission after an enquiry submitted a report on 12th Sep­tember, 1947. The members of the Commission were agreed that some at least of the charges for corruption and illegal gratification had been pro­ved. This report was considered by the Public Ser­vice Commission of the State. The Public Service Commission proposed that plaintiff respondent be asked to retire from the Police Service. He was not given leave preparatory to retirement; nor was the order of suspension cancelled by reason of the findings of the Commission against him. The Go­vernment offered to allow him to retire compulsorily since compulsory retirement was not a puni­shment prescribed by the rules. This was one of the two alternatives proposed to him. The other alternative was dismissal on the basis of the adverse findings arrived at by the Com­mission of Enquiry. On 17th March, 1948 the plain­tiff-respondent offered to retire on proportionate pension with effect from 3rd April 1947. (18) Compulsory retirement is not one of the prescribed punishments. It does not amount to dis­missal or reduction. It is also distinguishable from removal within the: meaning of the expression which it carries in Article 311 of the Constitution. If com­pulsory retirement is ordered without enquiry and without any imputation of character or any lapse mental or moral in the discharge of duties, it would not have any indicia of punishment. It may be ordered purely in public interest, when a Government servant (other than a mini­sterial servant) attains the age of 55. In fact the requirements of rule 56 the applicability of which is not disputed, is that retention in service should be with the sanction of the State Government on public grounds. A retirement under this rule car­ries no stigma or disqualification. The public ser­vant gets his pension which he has earned. (19) Compulsory retirement may be ordered without previous notice. No enquiry is necessary for determining whether it should be ordered or not. It is a unilateral act. The Government has to take a decision and if it is ordered without notice or any enquiry into the conduct of the public ser­vant, no provision of the statute or of the rules is violated. No enquiry is necessary for determining whether it should be ordered or not. It is a unilateral act. The Government has to take a decision and if it is ordered without notice or any enquiry into the conduct of the public ser­vant, no provision of the statute or of the rules is violated. (20) Compulsory retirement may in a particular case be induced by the result of an enquiry which though for some reasons not attracting serious pen­alties like dismissal, removal or reduction, reveals the unfitness of the public .servant concerned for continuing in service. Even in such a case he may be compulsorily re­tired. The mere fact that it is decided upon by discreditable disclosures in the enquiry, does not convert it into any kind of punishment referred to in section 240 of the Government of India Act or Article 311 of the Constitution Act. It may carry a stigma and in that sense it may involve censure but the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution Acts would not apply as mere censure would not amount to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, particularly in view of the fact that compulsory retirement brings full earned pension. (21) Compulsory retirement may be ordered only under the rules. If any rule is violated, the order may be illegal and may be reversed. As he'd in AIR 1954 SC 245 (C) whenever there is a breach of restrictions imposed by the statute, the Govern­ment or the Crown, the matter is justiciable and the party aggrieved is entitled to suitable relief at the hands of the Court. Restrictions on the po­wers of the State imposed by rules which have the force of law bind both the State and the public servant. In this case the order of the Govern­ment has not been challenged on the ground that the order involves a contravention of any rule hav­ing the force of law. (22) The option given to plaintiff-respondent may have been a choice of evils. He preferred to retire on pension and by so doing obviously elected the lesser of the two evils. He did so with eyes open and in full view of the consequences. He ap­plied for pension. He has been receiving it too. This conduct weakens his case still further. It would have disentitled him to relief even if he had been otherwise entitled to it. He did so with eyes open and in full view of the consequences. He ap­plied for pension. He has been receiving it too. This conduct weakens his case still further. It would have disentitled him to relief even if he had been otherwise entitled to it. His consent was not obtained by any kind of fraud, misrepresentation or coercion. He has not put forward any such case. It was not induced by any mistake of fact or law! It was free consent. He could have rejected both the alternatives and insisted on a disposal of his case on the merits. He did not do so. After his assent to take advantage of the rule authorising compulsory retirement, there was no 'room for any further enquiry or prosecution. In the result I entertain no doubt that his suit is liable to dismissal. D.S.P. Appeal allowed.