Wanchoo, C. J.—These are two connected civil references by the Board of Revenue under sec. 57 of the Stamp act as adapted to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act (No. VII of 1952) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rajasthan Act). As the point raised in the two references is exactly the same, we propose to decided it by one judgment. 2. We set out briefly the facts which have led to these references. Two suits were pending before the Civil Judge, Gangapur on two Hundis. In both cases the Hundis are said to bear sufficient stamps but of improper description. Therefore, the plaintiffs of the two suits applied to the Collector for a certificate under sec. 37 of the Stamp Act. The Collector refused to give the certificate holding that he could not issue a certificate under that section till rules were framed by the State Government as provided therein. He was of the view that the Jaipur Stamp Rules which were in force could not be said to have continued after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Act. Thereupon, the two plaintiffs brought the matter to the notice of the Board of Revenue under sec. 56(1) of the Stamp Act and the Board has made these references under sec. 57 of the Stamp Act as it is of the opinion that the Jaipur Stamp Rules continued in force after the Rajasthan Act came into force by virtue of this first proviso to sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Act. The Board has prayed that necessary direction be issued in this matter by this Court after declaring the law. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of Bhagwan Sahai, the opposite party, that the Board has no jurisdiction to make a reference to this Court under sec. 57 of the Stamp Act, and the argument is that the Collector having decided the matter, there is nothing pending before him, and the Board has no jurisdiction to interfere under sec. 56 and therefore cannot make a reference under sec. 57. In support of this argument reliance is placed on a number of cases relating to sec. 40 sub-sec. (2) of the Stamp Act. 4. Sec. 57 gives power to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, namely, the Board of Revenue, to state any case to this Court, which may have been referred to it under sec. 57. In support of this argument reliance is placed on a number of cases relating to sec. 40 sub-sec. (2) of the Stamp Act. 4. Sec. 57 gives power to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, namely, the Board of Revenue, to state any case to this Court, which may have been referred to it under sec. 56(2) or which might have otherwise comes to its notice. The present is not a case referred to the Board under sec. 56(2). It is a case which came to its notice otherwise. The power of the Board to make a reference to this Court under sec. 57 is in very wide term, and it can refer any case to this Court which comes otherwise to its notice. All that is necessary to make a reference competent is that there should be a case pending before any revenue authority in order to enable it under sec. 59(2) of the Stamp Act to dispose of the case conformably to the judgment of the High Court, which is to be forwarded to the Revenue Authority. 5. This raises the question whether a case can be said to be pending before the Board of Revenue Authority that has made the reference. In order to decide this, we have to consider what are the powers of the Board of Revenue as the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under sec. 56(1) of the Act. That section reads as follows— "The power exercisable by a Collector under Chapter IV and V, and under cl. (a) of the first proviso to sec. 56 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority." The present is a case under sec. 37 which falls in Chapter IV. Therefore, the powers exercisable by a Collector under sec. 37 are subject to the control of the Board of Revenue. It has, however, been contended on behalf of Bhagwan Sahai that under sec. 56(1) the Board of Revenue can only pass orders while the case is pending before the Collector and that after the Collector has decided a case under chapter IV or Chapter V, or under clause (a) of the first proviso to sec. 26, the Board of Revenue has no power to revise it. 56(1) the Board of Revenue can only pass orders while the case is pending before the Collector and that after the Collector has decided a case under chapter IV or Chapter V, or under clause (a) of the first proviso to sec. 26, the Board of Revenue has no power to revise it. Stress in this connection is laid on the words "powers exercisable by a Collector", and it is urged that these words mean that the Collector should not have exercised the powers, and that if he has exercised them, the Board of Revenue cannot pass any orders under sec. 56(1). We are of opinion that such a restricted meaning cannot by given to these words. What sec. 56(1), in our opinion, lays down is that the powers, which the Collector can exercise under Chapter IV and Chapter V, and under clause (a) of the first proviso to sec. 26, are subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. That Authority can, in our opinion, interfere with the orders of the Collector under these provisions even after they have been made provided there is no other provision in the Stamp Act which forbids such interference. Sec. 56(1), in our opinion, gives revisory jurisdiction to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority over those powers which the Collector can exercise under chapters IV and V, and under clause(a) of the first proviso to sec. 26. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may interfere before the Collector exercises those powers, or may revise them after they have been exercised under the provisions of sec. 56(1), subject always to there being nothing in other parts of the Stamps Act which prohibits such interference. 6. We may here examine certain cases which have been cited by learned counsel for Bhagwan Singh in support of his contention that the reference is incompetent because the Collector has already exercised his power under sec. 37. 7. The first case to which reference may be made is referred as case No. 14 of 1901(1), stated under sec. 57 of Act II of 1899 (Stamp Act) by the Secretary to the commissioner of Salt, Abkari and Separate Revenue, Madras, in a letter Mis. No. G. R., 1334, dated 14th December. 1901. The case went before a Special Bench, and the facts were these. 57 of Act II of 1899 (Stamp Act) by the Secretary to the commissioner of Salt, Abkari and Separate Revenue, Madras, in a letter Mis. No. G. R., 1334, dated 14th December. 1901. The case went before a Special Bench, and the facts were these. A Sub-Registrar impounded two documents which had been produced before him for registration, and forwarded them to the Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector certified under sec. 40(1)(a) that they were exempt from stamp duty. The Inspector General of Registration disagreed with this opinion, and reported the matter to the Board of Revenue for orders. The Board of Revenue thereupon made a reference under sec. 57. It was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question. Each of the three judges delivered a separate judgment. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the High Court had jurisdiction to decide the» matter. The other two judges, however, took the view that because of the provision contained in sec. 40, sub-sec. (2), the decision of the Collector could not be interfered with because sub-sec.(2) makes every certificate under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 40 conclusive evidence of the matters stated therein. Further Bhashyam Ayyanagar J. was of the opinion that the word exercisable used in sec. 56(1) showed that the Board of Revenue could only intervene before the Collector exercised the powers, and not afterwards. Moore J., however, was of the view that the Board could interfere with the orders of the Collector, which come within the ambit of sec. 56(1) subject to the other provisions of the Act. He was further of the view that if other provisions of the Act made the order of the Collector conclusive, the Board could not interfere. The three judges thus took three different views in this case, and with all respect we are of opinion that the view taken by Moore J. is the correct view. 8. The next case, to which reference may be made, is in the matter of Khub Chand (1). That was also a Special Bench decision, and the Madras case cited above was relied upon. That case, however, was not a case under sec, 40(l)(a). It was a case under sec. 40(1) (b); but the learned Judges somehow say in their judgment that under sec. 40, sub-sec. That was also a Special Bench decision, and the Madras case cited above was relied upon. That case, however, was not a case under sec, 40(l)(a). It was a case under sec. 40(1) (b); but the learned Judges somehow say in their judgment that under sec. 40, sub-sec. (2) this certificate is, for purposes of the Stamp Act, conclusive evidence of the matter stated therein. A perusal of sec. 40, sub-sec. (2) would show that it does not refer to cases covered by sec. 40(l)(b). How the learned Judges made the mistake is difficult to say ; but, in view of this mistake the value of this case is, if we may say so with respect, very little. 9. The next case is Usuf Dadabhai vs. Chand Mahomed(3). That was a case under sec. 37 of the Stamp Act, and the Collector had allowed stamps of the proper description to be affixed. Thereafter, the Board of Revenue made a reference; but the documents had been admitted in evidence, and a decree had been passed on them. In those circumstances, the learned Judges held that an abstract question could not be referred when there was no pending case before the Chief Revenue Authority. The view taken in this case has no relevance to the interpretation of sec. 56(1) with which we are really concerned in the present case. 10. The next case, to which reference may be made, is In re Cook & Kelvey (4). In that case a certain instrument was presented before the Collector under sec. 31, and the Collector determined the duty with which it was chargeable. The Collector, however, did not impound the document. It may be mentioned that sec. 31 is in Chapter III, and sec. 56(1) does not apply to it. What the Board of Revenue did in that case was to make a reference before the Collector impounded the document. It was then held that the Board could not make a reference. This case also is not helpful to us for interpreting sec. 56(1). 11. The next case is Thakurdas vs. The Crown (5) In that case, it was held that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56 confers very wide powers on the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, and it has the power to interfere with the order of the Collector in exercise of his powers under sec. 56(1). 11. The next case is Thakurdas vs. The Crown (5) In that case, it was held that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56 confers very wide powers on the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, and it has the power to interfere with the order of the Collector in exercise of his powers under sec. 56, and also to make a reference under sec. 57. The Madras case (1) cited above was distinguished, and it was pointed out that that case should only be confined to cases covered by sec. 40, sub-sec. (2). This was a case which came under sec. 40(1)(b), and was thus not covered by sec. 40, sub-sec. (2). 12. The last case, to which reference may be made, is Kedarmal Raghunath vs. Rati-ram (6). In that case, it was pointed out that the certificate of a Collector under sec. 40(1) (a) was final. It was also said that probably an order under sec. 40(1)(b) is also final. That case, however, did not deal specifically with the powers of the Board of Revenue under sec. 56(1). 13. On a review of these authorities, we are of opinion that sec. 56(1) gives powers to the Board to interfere with the orders of the Collector passed under Chapters IV and V, and under clause (a) of the first proviso to sec. 26, whether the Col lector is about to exercise those powers or has exercised those powers, subject however to such provisions in the Stamp Act, which declare the orders of the Collector conclusive as for example sec. 40, sub-sec. (2). We may also remark that what we have said in this case should not be taken to decide a case coming under secs. 40 (1) (b) and 42, as this case is not of that type. But so far as other orders of the Collector are concerned which are within the ambit of sec. 56(1), the Board has the right to revise them if no provision of the Stamp Act makes them conclusive, and to make a reference in that connection if the matter comes to its knowledge otherwise. The matter that is pending in this case is the application before the Board requesting it to set aside the order of the Collecto|r under sec. The matter that is pending in this case is the application before the Board requesting it to set aside the order of the Collecto|r under sec. 37, and the Board, after it receives a copy of our judgment, would be entitled to deal with the application pending before it according to our judgment. 14. Now we come to sec. 37 itself. That section provides that the collecting Government may make rules providing that where an instrument bears a stamp of sufficient amount, but of improper description, it may on payment of the duty, with which the stamp is chargeable, be certified to be duly stamped, and any instrument so certified shall then be deemed to have been duly stamped as from the date of its execution. 15. It is clear from the words of this section that the certificate under it can only be given when there are rules framed to that effect by the State Government The Collector has refused a certificate in this case on the ground that there are no rules framed by the State Government. He has also held that the rules framed under the Jaipur Stamp Act are no longer in force. The Board of Revenue is of opinion that the rules framed under the Jaipur Stamp Law remain in force till new rules are, framed by the State of Rajasthan, and as Jaipur Stamp rules allow the Collector the certify such cases, the Collector should have proceeded accordingly. 16. We are of opinion that the view taken by the Board is correct, and does not require much authority in support of it. The first proviso to sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Act clearly saves the rules framed under the Jaipur Stamp Law till the Rajasthan State frames its own rules. The proviso is as follows — "Provided that anything done or any action taken under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act, and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by any thing done or any action taken under the Indian Act as hereby adapted to Rajasthan." Now the Jaipur Rules were framed under the Jaipur Stamp Act. That was an action taken under the Jaipur Stamp Law. That was an action taken under the Jaipur Stamp Law. That action would now be deemed to have been taken under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act adapted to Rajasthan namely sec. 75 of the Stamp Act which gives power to the Government to make rules to carry out generally the purposes of the Act. Therefore, the rules framed under the Jaipur Stamp Act continue to be in force under the first proviso to sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Act as having been framed under sec. 75 of the Indian Act as adapted to Rajasthan. The Collector, therefore, was not right in holding that the Jaipur rules were not in force, and he should have disposed of application made to him under sec. 37 according to Jaipur Rules. The Board of Revenue, where the matter is now pending, is entitled to revise the order of the Collector, and to pass an order in conformity with the Jaipur Stamp Rules, and dispose of the application before it under its powers under sec. 56(1) of the Stamp Act. 17. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Board of Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs.