Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff is the Appellant. The suit is for setting aside a claim order and for consequential reliefs. The plaint property belonged to the father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff got a gift of the property from his father under a gift-deed dated 28.5.1107. According to the plaintiff he was in independent possession of the property from the date of the gift-deed. The defendant obtained a decree against the plaintiff's father in O.S. No. 61 of 1100 of the Trivandrum District Court and in execution of that decree, attached the property. The plaintiff preferred a claim to the attachment on 18.10.1112. The claim was disallowed by the execution court by its order dated 5.7.1113. Ext. D is the copy of the order. A Revision Petition filed by the plaintiff before the Travancore High Court was dismissed on 6.11.1114. Within one year the plaintiff instituted a suit as O.S. No. 101 of 1115 of the Trivandrum District Court for setting aside the claim order and for a declaration that the property attached belonged to him. The suit property is Kandukrishi land and under S.8 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure 1100 sanction of Government was necessary for instituting a suit relating to Kandukrishi lands. Since sanction of Government was not produced by the plaintiff, the suit was dismissed; but on the application of the plaintiff it was subsequently restored to file. Thereafter the plaintiff applied for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. The permission was granted by the order, Ext. E, dated 28.4.1119. During the pendency of the suit and subsequent to the withdrawal of the same the plaintiff tried to obtain the sanction of Government, but did not succeed. As no sanction of Government is necessary under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure to institute suits relating to Kandukrishi lands the plaintiff instituted the present suit without the sanction on 11.10.1951. 2. The defendant contended as follows:- The suit is barred by limitation having been brought more than a year after the final disposal of the claim petition by the High Court. The suit is barred by resjudicata by reason of the decision in O.S. No. 101 of 1115. The gift deed in favour of the plaintiff was a sham transaction executed fraudulently for the purpose of defeating the defendant. The plaintiff had no possession of the property at any time. The suit is barred by resjudicata by reason of the decision in O.S. No. 101 of 1115. The gift deed in favour of the plaintiff was a sham transaction executed fraudulently for the purpose of defeating the defendant. The plaintiff had no possession of the property at any time. The plaintiff's father continued to be in possession of the property and the suit was instituted at his instance. 3. The question of limitation was heard and disposed of as a preliminary issue. The court held that the suit was not barred by limitation since the claim petition had not been disposed of on the merits. The defendant filed a Revision Petition before the High Court from this order as C.R.P. No. 895 of 1952. The High Court disagreed with the view of the trial court and held that O. XXI R.63, C.P.C. would apply even to cases in which the order on the claim petition is not passed on the merits. It was argued before the High Court on behalf of the plaintiff that S.8 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, 1100 was amended by Act XXV of 1121, that under the amended section even execution proceedings relating to Kandukrishi lands could not be taken without the sanction of Government, that the attachment effected without such sanction ceased to be in force and that it was therefore not necessary to prefer a claim to the attached property. The High Court did not express any opinion on this question but directed the trial court to consider the question of limitation afresh in the light of this argument also. After the remand, the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint so as to convert the suit into one on title. The amendment was allowed. The defendant did not file any additional written statement in the case. The court below held that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed it with costs. 4. The only question for decision in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant raised three grounds in support of his contention that the suit is not barred by limitation. The first ground is this: After the amendment of S.8 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure by Act XXV of 1121 sanction of Government was necessary for executing a decree relating to Kandukrishi lands. Learned counsel for the appellant raised three grounds in support of his contention that the suit is not barred by limitation. The first ground is this: After the amendment of S.8 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure by Act XXV of 1121 sanction of Government was necessary for executing a decree relating to Kandukrishi lands. This provision being one relating to procedural law has retrospective effect and will apply even to attachments effected before the date of the Amendment Act. It has therefore to be taken that there was no attachment in the eye of law when the claim petition was presented. The claim petition itself was unnecessary and O. XXI R.63 will not apply to the case. We are unable to accept this argument. There is nothing in the Amendment Act XXV of 1121 to show that it was the intention of the Legislature to render inoperative attachments effected or execution proceedings taken without Government sanction before the date of the Act. In the absence of any such intention on the part of the Legislature the Amendment Act cannot affect the validity of an attachment effected before the date of the Act as provided in S.3 of the General Clauses Act. Learned counsel for the Appellant relied on the decision of this Court in Padmanabhan v. Kumaran, AIR 1952 T.C. 357. What was held in that case was that the Amendment Act, XXV of 1121, applied even to execution proceedings initiated prior to the date of the Act and which were pending on the date when the Act came into force. That was an appeal filed by the present defendant, namely the decree-holder in O.S. No. 61 of 1100, against an order allowing the objection of the judgment-debtor (the plaintiff's father) relating to the execution of the decree. It was not held in that case that the attachment and other execution proceedings taken in the case before the date of the Amendment Act without the sanction of Government were inoperative. What was held was that under the Amendment Act the decree-holder was bound to produce the sanction of Government for proceeding with the execution of the decree. Sankaran, J., observed as follows: "But a change in the procedure to be followed in the matter of executing the decree has been effected by S.8 as amended by Act XXV of 1121. What was held was that under the Amendment Act the decree-holder was bound to produce the sanction of Government for proceeding with the execution of the decree. Sankaran, J., observed as follows: "But a change in the procedure to be followed in the matter of executing the decree has been effected by S.8 as amended by Act XXV of 1121. It is a well recognised principle that such changes in the law of procedure are retrospective in effect. Consistent with this principle, it has to be held that the procedure prescribed by S.8 as amended is applicable not only to proceedings in execution started after the amended section came into force but also to execution proceedings which were initiated prior to the amendment of the section and which were pending on the date when the amendment came into force. The court could proceed with any application in furtherance of execution only if the required sanction was also produced along with the application. It has to be remembered that the new procedure insisting on the production of Government sanction along with the application to proceed in execution against Kandukrishy lands was brought into force during the pendency of the execution proceedings in this case started in accordance with the procedure that was till then in force. In such a situation the decree-holder should have been allowed a reasonable time to obtain and produce the Government sanction as required by S.8 and the case should have been adjourned for that purpose". It was also held in the case that since under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure no sanction of Government was necessary for executing a decree relating to Kandukrishi lands the decreeholder was entitled to proceed with the execution without the sanction of Government. This decision does not in any manner help the appellant. 5. The second ground urged is that O. XXI R.63 C.P.C. does not apply to orders on claim petitions passed not on merits but for default of appearance of parties. The preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that the rule applies to such orders also. The question was considered in C.R.P. No. 893 of 1952. Although the decision in that C.R.P. does not conclude the parties we find no reason to disagree with the view taken in that case. The preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that the rule applies to such orders also. The question was considered in C.R.P. No. 893 of 1952. Although the decision in that C.R.P. does not conclude the parties we find no reason to disagree with the view taken in that case. This court has held in Raman Nadar v. Bhoothalingom,1950 KLT 502 that O. XXI R.103 C.P.C. will not apply to an order passed under R.101 relating to obstruction without investigation into the merits of the obstruction petition. That is the view taken by other High Courts also. But there is difference between the wording of O. XXI R.103 and that of O. XXI R.63. 0. XXI R.103 reads as follows: "Any party not being a judgment-debtor against whom an order is made under R.98, R.99 or R.101 may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property, but, subject to the result of such suit (if any), the order shall be conclusive". Rr.98,99 and 101 contemplate orders passed after enquiry into the dispute between the parties. O. XXI R.63 reads; "Where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive". In S.283 of the old Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to O. XXI R.63 the wording was similar to that of O. XXI R.103. The effect of the change in the wording of O. XXI R.63 is, as held in various cases, to make the rule applicable even to orders passed without investigation into the merits of the claim. Vide Cannanore Bank v. Madhavi,1942 Mad. 41 F.B., Dwarika Sahu v. Anandi,1950 Pat. 25, Chet Singh v. Anjuman Inaided Bahmi Qunza,1949 East Punjab 318 and Chempakakutti Amma v. Parvathi Amma, 31 TLJ 248. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions of the Travancore High Court in Kathaperumal Pillay v. Subramonia Pillai, 22 TLJ 1314, Bhagavathi Pillay Kochamma v. Kunju 13 TLT 153 and Neelakantan v. Neelakantan, 33 TLJ 529.22 TLJ 1314 related to a claim preferred under the old Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions of the Travancore High Court in Kathaperumal Pillay v. Subramonia Pillai, 22 TLJ 1314, Bhagavathi Pillay Kochamma v. Kunju 13 TLT 153 and Neelakantan v. Neelakantan, 33 TLJ 529.22 TLJ 1314 related to a claim preferred under the old Code of Civil Procedure. As stated already, the wording of S.280 of the old Travancore Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to S.283 of the Indian Code (old) is different from that of O. XXI, R.61 (Travancore) corresponding to O. XXI R.63 of the Indian Code. 13 TLT 153 was a case in which the claim petition was rejected on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The learned judges followed 22 TLJ 1314. The difference between the wording of S.280 of the old Code and that of O. XXI R.61 of the Code of 1100 was not considered in the case. 33 TLJ 529 was a case in which the claim petition was dismissed for non-payment of process and registration fees. It was held that the claim petition could not be treated as having been before the court for adjudication either on the merits or for default. 7. The claim petition in this case was posted for evidence and was dismissed on the ground that the claimant's advocate stated that he had no instructions. The order is as follows: "This court ordered on 26.4.1113 that the claimant should take steps within a week for proving his claim. One step was taken but no witness was present on 9.6.1114 to which the case stood posted. No further step has been taken since that date. The petitioner is not present today. His Advocate states that he has no instructions. Even the gift-deed in favour of the petitioner is not produced. This relates to a decree of 1103 and the transaction is as old as 1097. There is no bonafides in this claim petition. The petition is dismissed with costs. Vakil fee Rs. 5". We have no doubt that an order of this nature will come within the purview of O.XXI, R.63 C.P.C. and that the party against whom the order is made is bound to institute a suit within the prescribed time to establish the right he claims to the property in dispute. 8. Vakil fee Rs. 5". We have no doubt that an order of this nature will come within the purview of O.XXI, R.63 C.P.C. and that the party against whom the order is made is bound to institute a suit within the prescribed time to establish the right he claims to the property in dispute. 8. The third ground urged is that the plaintiff was unable to institute the suit within one year from the date of the disposal of the Revision Petition as Government refused to grant him sanction to institute the suit without which the suit could not be instituted. It was argued that in such a case the rule of limitation will not apply. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Rup Chand v. Mukanda, AIR 1914 Bom.197. Heaton and Shah, JJ., observed as follows in that case: "It is clear that the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. Under the circumstances, we think, the proper rule to apply is that when the law creates a limitation, and the party is disabled to conform to that limitation without any default in him, and he has no remedy over, the law will ordinarily excuse him". This view was not followed by the Bombay High Court in later cases. In Sayaji Rao v. Madhava Rao, 1929 Bom.14, Fawcett, Ag. C.J., after referring to the passage cited above in the judgment in 1914 Bom.197 observed as follows: "This is merely an application of the ordinary maxim'lex non cogit ad impossibilia'. But with due deference, this general principle, in my opinion, cannot prevail against the express provisions of S.3, Limitation Act any more than principles of equity can prevail against the provisions of statutory law such as S.49 Registration Act and S.91 and 92, Evidence Act". To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Narayanan Jivaji v. Gurunath Gouda, 1939 Bom.1 in which case Rangnekar and Wadia, JJ., discussed the question elaborately with reference to decided cases. Reference may also be made to the decisions of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmed v. Onkar Pratap, AIR 1935 PC 85 and General A.F. & L Assurance Corporation v. Janniahomed, 1941 PC 6. In the later case Their Lordships cited with approval the following passage from Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures (Vol. Reference may also be made to the decisions of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmed v. Onkar Pratap, AIR 1935 PC 85 and General A.F. & L Assurance Corporation v. Janniahomed, 1941 PC 6. In the later case Their Lordships cited with approval the following passage from Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures (Vol. I page 256): "A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular cases, but where such a law has been adopted by the State, for reasons which justify the rule in the majority of cases, it must, if unambiguous, be applied with stringency; and no individual case to which these reasons are inapplicable can be expected from its operation. The general good of the community requires that even a hard case should not be allowed to disturb the law. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it". In the light of these decisions we are unable to agree with the view taken by Heaton and Shah, JJ., in 1914 Bom.197. 9. In the result we hold that the suit is barred by limitation. The judgment and decree of the court below are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.