Judgment 1. This application is made on behalf of the plaintiffs for leave to appeal to Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution against the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in p. A. 358 of 1947 decided on 19-4-1955. 2. On the question of valuation counsel for the petitioners submitted that the valuation placed on the plaint and on memorandum of appeal to the High Court was about Rs. 6414, the dispute between the parties involves property at more than Rs. 10000.00 and so the requirements as to valuation under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution is satisfied. On this point counsel referred to the circumstances that the question at issue in the suit and in the first appeal was whether the order of the Revenue Officer acting under the provisions of the Bihar Restoration of Bakasht Lands and Reduction of Arrears of Rent Act (Bihar Act 9 of 1938) passed on 1-11-1939, was legally valid order and was within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the order of the Revenue Officer involved not merely the four holdings, which are the subject matter of the present suit, but there were five other holdings, namely, 252, 253, 266 and 267 which are involved in the decision of the Revenue Officer. In T. S. No. 27 of 1945 the petitioners challenged the order of the Revenue Officer with regard to khatas 252, 253, 266 and 267 and in T. S. No. 25 of 1945 the petitioners challenged the validity of the order of the Revenue Officer with regard to khata 97. In para 22 of the application the petitioners have stated on affidavit that the value of the subject-matter of dispute in T. S. No. 27 of 1945 is Rs. 3098/8/-. In T.S. no. 25 of 1945 the valuation was Rs 2363/6/1. Adding up, therefore, the valuation of all the three suits the total would come Up to Rs. 11,876 and odd and, therefore, the submission of the counsel for the petitioners was that the case falls within the purview of Article 133(1) (b) of the Constitution, and the judgment of the High Court in appeal indirectly involved a claim or question respecting property of the value of about Rs. 11876 and odd.
11,876 and odd and, therefore, the submission of the counsel for the petitioners was that the case falls within the purview of Article 133(1) (b) of the Constitution, and the judgment of the High Court in appeal indirectly involved a claim or question respecting property of the value of about Rs. 11876 and odd. In support of this counsel referred to several authorities: Srinath Pal V/s. Girindra Chandra, 14 Cal WN 651 (A); Ananda Chandra Bose V/s. Broughton, 9 Beng LR 423 (B) and Sri Kishan Lal V/s. Kashmiro, ILR 35 All 445 (O). We think that there Is some substance in the argument of the learned counsel, but we do not propose in this case to decide whether the case really falls within the purview of Article 133 (1Kb) of the Constitution. We shall assume in favour of the petitioners that the case satisfies the requirement of valuation under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. 3. But the difficulty in the way of the petitioners is that the judgment of the High Court is a judgment of affirmance, and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled as a matter of right to a certificate for leave to appeal unless we are satisfied also that there is involved in this case a ubstantial question of law. On behalf of the petitioners the submissions were made that the Judgment of the High Court is not a judgment of affirmance. In support of this argument counsel referred to the circumstance that the High Court modified the decree of the trial Court to the effect that the plaintiffs would be entitled to bhaoli rent payable for both the holdings and not merely for one holding. It appears from the judgment that the trial Court gave a decree to the plaintiffs with regard to bhaoli rent for both the holdings, but by a clerical error the decree prepared by the trial Court contained a mistake and a decree was prepared with regard to bhaoli rent payable for only one holding. This error was corrected by the High Court and it was directed that a decree should be prepared in accordance with the judgment of the trial Court and the plaintiffs should be granted bhaoli rent payable for both the holdings.
This error was corrected by the High Court and it was directed that a decree should be prepared in accordance with the judgment of the trial Court and the plaintiffs should be granted bhaoli rent payable for both the holdings. The relevant passage of the High Court judgment is as follows: "It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the decree of the Court below bhaoli rent in respect of only one holding had been calculated. . This appears to be so. The decree of the Court below requires modification to that extent. In fact the learned counsel for the principal defendant-respondents has conceded that an error has crept in the preparation of the decree regarding the bhaoli rent payable for both the holdings. The result is that, for the modification of the decree as indicated above, in other respects the appeal fails and is dismissed. The defendants first party respondents are entitled to the costs of this appeal." 4. It is obvious, therefore, that the decree of the trial Court was not in accordance with the judgment of that Court and the High Court corrected the clerical mistake by ordering that the plaintiffs should be entitled to a decree With gard to bhaoli rent payable for both the holdings. There is no modification whatsoever of the judgment by the High Court, and it is impossible to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there has been a variation made by the High Court in appeal. 5. It is, therefore, necessary for the petitioners to show that there is a substantial question of law involved in this case before we grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the High Court has fallen into an error in holding that the mistake of the Revenue Officer in construing Sec. 6(1) (a) of Bihar Act 9 of 1938 was a mere mistake of law and did not affect the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer to restore the possession of the holdings to the original tenants. We are unable to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioners.
We are unable to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioners. We think that the High Court was correct in taking the view that the plaintiffs were landlords within the meaning of Sec.3(1) of the Statute, and if that is the correct legal position it cannot be argued that there was no jurisdiction in the Revenue Officer acting under Bihar Act 9 of 1938 to restore the holdings to the original tenants. The mistake committed by the Revenue Officer in construing 6 (1) of tne Act is merely a mistake of law and it cannot affect the Jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer to pass the order which is impugned. We are unable, therefore, to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that any substantial question of law is involved in this case. 6. In the result, We think that there is no case made out for the grant of certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art, 133(1) (b) of the Constitution, and the application is accordingly dismissed with costs: hearing fee Rs. 75/-.