Judgement JUDGMENT :- This appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga in A.S. No. 85 of 1851 reversing the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif of Sivaganga in E.P. No. 282 of 1950 in I.A. No. 940 of 1944 in O.S. No. 238 of 1942. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of the present appeal are :- O.S. No. 238 of 1942 was a partition suit in which final decree had been passed. The first plaintiff died and the second plaintiff who is the legal representative of the first plaintiff through his guardian and mother Perianayagathammal in E.P. No. 383 of 1948 sought delivery of possession of portion No. 2 of the commissioners plea and also attachment and sale of moveables of defendants 2 and 3. That portion was delivered to the second plaintiff on 14-4-1949 but E.P. in respect of the sale of moveables was dismissed. On 17-2-1950 keeping alive the attachment for six months. Then the second defendant filed E.P. No. 282 of 1950 on 3-7-1950 for attachment and sale of the moveables of the second plaintiff. It was contended on behalf of the second plaintiff that this execution petition was not in time because the date of the final decree governs limitation and if that is taken as the starting point of limitation then the execution petition would clearly be out of time. What was contended on behalf of the second defendant was that the execution petition was filed within three years of E.P. No. 383 of 1948 and as such it was within time. 3. Before the learned District Munsif the second defendant relied on the decision in Sarju Prasad v. Baldeo Prasad, 1946 Pat 371 (AIR V 33) (A) and also on the decision in Muhammad Ishak v. Karunamoy Choudhury, 1946 Cal 266 (AIR V 33) (B) and he considered that these decisions did not support the execution petitioner and dismissed his execution petition. 4. 4. Then there was an appeal and the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga held that by reason of the fact that in a partition suit though the parties are arrayed on opposite sides still as the decree is one for the benefit of all the persons entitled to share the properties the decree-holderss execution petition can be a step in aid to save limitation in regard to an application filed by the judgment-debtor. 5. The position taken by the learned subordinate Judge is fully supported by authority. In 1946 Pat 371 (AIR V 33) (A) the facts were :- A partition decree allotted certain properties in severality to each of the parties, reversing certain properties as joint between the parties. One of the parties filed an application for execution and got delivery of his property. Another party presented an application after three years of the date of the final decree for execution and relied on the earlier application filed by the other party to save limitation. The learned Judges referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mon Mohan Gope v. Madhusudan Gope, 1932 Cal 869 (AIR V 19) (C) which also related to a partition decree and in the present case also a strip of land was kept in common for the use of the parties. The learned Judges in construing Explanation 1 to Art. 182(5), Limitation Act held that the fact that certain properties were kept in common indicated that the decree should be regarded as a joint decree within the meaning of the second part of the Explanation and that an application for execution by any one party within time enures for the benefit and that subsequent applications within three years of the order of the earlier petition will save limitation. In the case of 1946 Cal 266 (AIR V 33) (B) the facts were :- Joint and separate reliefs were decreed against the defendants. The plaintiffs applied for execution and asked for possession of lands against all the defendants, and realisation of a particular sum from some of the defendants. The execution petition was disposed of on 19-5-1939. In the case of 1946 Cal 266 (AIR V 33) (B) the facts were :- Joint and separate reliefs were decreed against the defendants. The plaintiffs applied for execution and asked for possession of lands against all the defendants, and realisation of a particular sum from some of the defendants. The execution petition was disposed of on 19-5-1939. Another execution petition was filed by the plaintiffs on 15-1-1942 more than three years from the date of the decree but within three years from the date of the disposal of the prior execution petition to realise the money claim from the other defendants against whom he had not asked for reliefs in the first execution petition. The defendants in the second execution petition who were sought to be made liable contended that the order on the prior application will not furnish a fresh starting point of limitation. But the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the decree being a joint decree if any one of the reliefs given in the decree is against the defendants jointly, even though some other reliefs may be given against the defendants separately, then if an application for execution is made in respect of the joint relief against one or some of the defendants it will save limitation in regard to the other defendants for all the other reliefs. In Mahomed Sahoob Levvai v. Mayammad Ammal 1933 Mad 789 (AIR V 20) (D) the final decree in paragraph 2 gave a declaration that the properties described in schedule 1 thereto were the properties available for partition and paragraph 3 of the decree declared the several properties which fell to each one of the sharers. Following the decision in 1932 Cal 869 (AIR V 19) (C) it was held that the declaration of the joint character of the property mentioned in schedule 1 of paragraph 2 of the final decree was undoubtedly one made for the benefit of all the sharers and that therefore an application by one of the parties, though filed more than three years after the date of the final decree, can save limitation if there had been a previous execution petition by any shareholder in regard to his relief. In 1940 Pat 147 (AIR V 27) (E) the cases in 1933 Mad 789 (AIR V 20) (D) and 1932 Cal 869 (AIR V 19) (C) were relied upon. In 1940 Pat 147 (AIR V 27) (E) the cases in 1933 Mad 789 (AIR V 20) (D) and 1932 Cal 869 (AIR V 19) (C) were relied upon. In this case certain properties were kept as joint and the learned Judges held that the decree was a joint decree and that execution of the decree by any one of the parties would afford a fresh starting point of limitation for others. In Theyyunni Menon v. Kamalam, 1954-2 Mad LJ 657 (F) the facts were after the partition among members of a tarward and the passing of the final decree in partition the legal representatives of one of the members of the tarwad applied for execution and when they were faced with the objection that the execution application itself was filed later than three years from the date of final decree in partition they relied on an earlier application for execution filed by an assignee of the share of another member of the tarwad and the order thereon. On the question whether that order in execution would avail the legal representatives of the defendant to get over the plea of limitation, Satyanarayana Rao, J. following the reasoning in 1933 Mad 739 (AIR V 20) (D) held that as the decree in effect was passed jointly against more persons than, one within the meaning of the second part of Explanation of Art. 182, Limitation Act the earlier application made on behalf of the assignee of property from the other members share the order passed therein would save the bar of limitation of the later application in execution. 6. The net result of this analysis is that the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct and merits no interference, in dismissing the appeal without costs I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. K.S. Desikan, learned counsel for the appellant who, as the respondent had not appeared in person or by counsel, very properly referred to all the cases against his client as well as the decisions and the points which he considered supported his position. No leave. Appeal dismissed.