Judgment :- 1. This appeal is filed by the State and arises out of a Land Acquisition Reference. The acquisition in question was of 26.866 cents in S. No. 961/4 A and B in Thellakam Kara in Ettumanoor Pakuthy belonging to the respondent Kora Eapen, retired District Judge, and for the purpose of the Quilon-Ernakulam railway. The whole survey number covered about 8 acres and the acquisition split up the property into two portions, 7 acres 31 cents on one side and the rest on the other. The Special Deputy Collector fixed the compensation due on basis of the Revenue Supervisor's estimate of land value at Rs. 23 per cent and so passed his award on 27.4.1953. The respondent had filed claim on receipt of notice under S.9 for compensation at the rate of Rs. 60 per cent in view to the nature and quality of the plot acquired and also to the impairment of proper enjoyment of the balance area. But this claim was rejected for want of evidence when the award was made as abovesaid. The respondent thereafter applied for and obtained reference to Court under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act on the question of the adequacy of the compensation. In the statement he filed before the court the respondent reiterated his claim for compensation on the same original basis. During the course of the trial, however, he applied to amend his statement of claim so as to include damages due to severance under two heads, (i) on account of loss of access to the road suffered by the 7 acres 31 cents block at the rate of Rs. 10 per cent totalling Rs. 7310 and (ii) cost of enclosing the two separated blocks on either side of the proposed acquisition Rs. 300. The amendment was opposed by the State on the ground that it was a new claim altogether and could not be entertained. 2. The court below by its judgment under appeal allowed enhancement of market value for the acquired portion up to Rs. 35 per cent. But while it disallowed damages for severance on basis of the amendment sought on ground of want of jurisdiction, it granted further enhancement of market value up to Rs. 60 per cent as claimed by the party in consideration of the injury sustained by the balance area. 35 per cent. But while it disallowed damages for severance on basis of the amendment sought on ground of want of jurisdiction, it granted further enhancement of market value up to Rs. 60 per cent as claimed by the party in consideration of the injury sustained by the balance area. Hence this appeal by the State raising two questions firstly about the compensation granted on the ground of injury to the remaining land at the rate of Rs. 25 per cent of the acquired plot and secondly about the disallowance of advocate's fee as regards the excess claim made by way of amendment before court. Memorandum of cross objections has been filed by the plaintiff in connection with the refusal by the court of damages for severance of the balance 7 acres 31 cents but the claim is now limited to Rs. 1.8 annas per cent. 3. The questions that arise for determination therefore are (1) Is the respondent entitled in the circumstances to compensation for the severance and the injury accrued to the remaining land? (2) If so what should be the basis of compensation? and (3) Whether any Advocate's fee was wrongly disallowed to the State? 4. On the first question as to the award of compensation for severance learned Government Pleader brought to our notice (i) the omission of the respondent in his statement before the Deputy Collector under S.9, to claim specific amount of compensation under this head and (ii) similar defect in the reference application and urged under S.25(3) of the Act that the Reference Court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances to consider this matter at all. Now Ext. I statement under S.9 filed by the respondent before the Deputy Collector claims land compensation at the rate of Rs. 60 per cent for the acquired property to begin with and winds up by saying that the depreciation sustained by the remaining property by reason of the severance should also be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation. The reference application simply said that the compensation allowed in the case was not adequate. When it came to the written statement in the Reference Case the respondent merely restated his claim as in Ext. The reference application simply said that the compensation allowed in the case was not adequate. When it came to the written statement in the Reference Case the respondent merely restated his claim as in Ext. I. From these the court below thought, relying on Secretary of State v. Subramonia,1930 Madras 576 for the purpose, that the claimant had not stated his case as fully as he should have done either before the Deputy Collector or in the Reference Petition and that therefore he was debarred from filing any supplemental claim to compensation before the District Court. But rather inconsistently the court took into consideration the injurious affection to the remaining property for purpose of awarding an extra market value of Rs. 25 per cent. 5. The decision in Secretary of State v. Subramonia AIR 1930 Madras 576 relied on by the court below no doubt held that the proceedings before the court are in the nature of the objection to the Collector's award and not a judicial enquiry independently undertaken as regards such questions as the claimant may raise and it would not be open to a claimant to make out a fresh claim whether by supplementary claims to compensation or otherwise. But in the later case of Rev. Divisional Officer v. Gajapathiraju,1937 Madras 902 Wadsworth, J., delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed as follows: "When a reference is made to Court under S.18, Land Acquisition Act, the Court can consider in framing the issues not only the pleadings, i.e., the statement of claim, the award and the objections thereto, but also the allegations of the pleaders where they are not inconsistent with the pleadings in view of S.53. The Court has therefore jurisdiction to frame an issue which does not directly arise from the objections taken, provided that it is not totally inconsistent with them. Though S.18(2) requires that the application for a reference to court shall state the grounds on which the objection is taken, there is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of this sub-section if the application states on which of the four heads of objection detailed in sub-s. (1) the applicant proposes to rely. When an objection to the amount of compensation has been taken, the Court has jurisdiction to work out the amount of compensation in a manner different from that which has been adopted in the statement of objections". When an objection to the amount of compensation has been taken, the Court has jurisdiction to work out the amount of compensation in a manner different from that which has been adopted in the statement of objections". That was a case of acquisition of a large plot of land for purpose of the Vizagapatanam Harbour. In the original statement of claim or in his objection to the award by the Land Acquisition Officer the land owner had not claimed compensation for the value of the special adaptability of the land acquired for supplying drinking water otherwise than to his unacquired land. The question arose whether the reference court had jurisdiction to award compensation for that value in the absence of a specific plea. It was urged on behalf of the Secretary of State on the support of the ruling in Secretary of State v. Subramonia, AIR 1930 Madras 576 above referred to, that the raising of new grounds of compensation not taken in the statement of objections could only be allowed before the court by virtue of some section of the Land Acquisition Act and there was no section which gave power to the court to entertain such fresh grounds. But the court held that the court had jurisdiction to award compensation on the basis of the value of the land for water supply apart from its value to the plaintiff's own lands though no express objection was taken on this basis and no specific claim for compensation was urged before the Land Acquisition Officer. 6. We may also refer to the decision in Province of Bengal v. P.L. Nun, 1945 Cal. 212 where it was similarly held that even though the jurisdiction acquired by the court extends over the matter referred to it by the Collector under S.18 and to no other matters and within this sphere of its jurisdiction the court must follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court hearing reference under S.18, has the power to allow the reference petition to be amended subject only to the limitation that it cannot allow an amendment which will have the effect of introducing a new matter which had not been referred to it by the Collector under S.18. The court hearing reference under S.18, has the power to allow the reference petition to be amended subject only to the limitation that it cannot allow an amendment which will have the effect of introducing a new matter which had not been referred to it by the Collector under S.18. Accordingly where a reference under S.18 was with reference to the amount of compensation the court could allow amendment of the petition for reference by increasing the amount asked for by the claimant and incidentally they held that a reference petition under S.18 objecting to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector would be quite in order even if the claimant did not value his claim in the reference petition at any amount. It follows therefore that it was perfectly open to the respondent to raise the question of compensation on account of severance by way of specific pleading before the court. Indeed the plaintiff had at all relevant times mentioned that as one of the factors to be taken into consideration in estimating the compensation. 7. It has to be observed however that the court could not grant anything more than what had been asked for in the statement under S.9 in view to S.25(1) of the Act. This section is concerned with the maximum and minimum amounts which the court may award in each of the three cases, (i) where the applicant has made a claim before the Collector (ii) where without sufficient reason he has failed to make a claim, and (iii) where with sufficient reason he has so failed. In the last of these cases the minimum is not to fall below the amount of the Collector's award, but no maximum has to be observed. The maximum here is Rs. 60 per cent of the land acquired. Subject to this maximum amount there can be no objection for the grant of compensation on the head of severance of property. 8. This leads us on the consideration whether the grant of Rs. 25 per cent of the land acquired as damages for injurious affection was proper. The maximum here is Rs. 60 per cent of the land acquired. Subject to this maximum amount there can be no objection for the grant of compensation on the head of severance of property. 8. This leads us on the consideration whether the grant of Rs. 25 per cent of the land acquired as damages for injurious affection was proper. The injurious affection is said to consist of the deprivation to 7 acres 31 cents of land lying on the northern side of the rail road of any means of access to the public road on the southern side and it cannot be said that the amount as awarded for this injury is any way exaggerated. The learned Government pleader says that the accident of a large block of land left like that should not be an occasion for large damages but there is no point in this criticism for as a matter of fact the acquisition has had the effect of making such large block difficult of access from the road. Even though therefore there may be technically some fault in accepting a basis as so much per cent of the land acquired there cannot really be any objection to the amount as granted. The objection if at all is technical and we overrule it. We have to say at the same time that the total amount sanctioned by the court, in connection with the land value and also the damages for injurious affection together make up the basis asked for by the claimant before the Land Acquisition Officer under S.9. The plaintiff cannot therefore seek to get any amount in excess and this is sufficient answer to the cross appeal filed by the plaintiff. 9. The third and last point which has to be considered is whether the court below was correct in disallowing to the Government Advocate's fee arising out of the claim made by the plaintiff for an additional compensation by way of amendment. But this amendment was rejected even during the course of the suit. There can therefore be no question of that amount having been disallowed by virtue of the decision. In our opinion it was properly rejected. 10. In the result we dismiss both the appeal and the cross objection with costs.