JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. This petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against a decision of the District Judge Bhind affirming in appeal an order made by the Tehsildar of Gohad as Rent Controller allotting and giving possession of a house belonging to the petitioner to the opponent. 2. The circumstances in which this petition arises are thus. On 23-9-1953 the non-applicant Rameshwar Dayal presented an application before the Rent Controller stating that accommodation was needed for a boarding house for the students of the High School, and that a house belonging to Makhnobai was vacant, it be allotted to him for use as boarding house. Immediately on the presentation of the application, the Tehsildar directed his Nazir to put a lock on the premises and then issued a notice of the application to one Ramgopal said to be the Mukhtar-Am of Mahila Makhnobai. As the notice could not be served on Ramgopal, the Tehsildar made an order on 25-9-1953 for affixing the notice on the premises. On 28-9-1953, one Kalika Prasad, a brother of Ramgopal appeared before the Tehsildar and urged that Ramgopal was not the Mukhtar-Am of Makhnobai and that the notice of the petitioner be issued to Makhnobai herself and that Makhnobai herself was living in the house. The Tehsildar, however, took no notice of what Kalika Prasad had said. On 29-9-1953, Makhnobai herself appeared and made an application saying that she herself was living in the house and that the Nazir be directed to remove the lock so as to enable her to enter the house. The Tehsildar made no order with regard to the removal of the lock. He, however, proceeded to record the statement of Makhnobai and fixed 30-9-1953 as the date for taking down the statement of the parties. On 30-9-1953 Makhnobai made a prayer that sufficient time be granted to summon her witnesses and to engage a counsel from other place as none of the local lawyers was willing to appear on her behalf because the opponents father was an influential pleader in Gohad. The Tehsildar rejected this prayer and on the statement recorded by him of Makhnobai came to the conclusion that she was not living in the house, and made an order allotting the house to the opponent on the monthly rent of Rs. The Tehsildar rejected this prayer and on the statement recorded by him of Makhnobai came to the conclusion that she was not living in the house, and made an order allotting the house to the opponent on the monthly rent of Rs. 18/- per month and further saying that if Makhnobai desired, a kotha in the house would be made available to her for her residence. Makhnobai then appealed against the order of the Rent Controller to the District Judge under S. 9, Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Samvat 2008. The learned District Judge of Bhind agreeing with the decision of the Rent Controller, dismissed the appeal. Makhnobai has now filed this application under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Mr. Motilal Gupta learned counsel for the opponent took the preliminary objection that the order made by the Rent Controller under S. 13 of the Act allotting the house to the opponent was one made by him as an administrative authority and not in the exercise of any Judicial or quasi-judicial powers, and that, therefore, this petition under Art. 227 could not be entertained. There is no substance in this contention. The present petition is directed against the decision of the District Judge given in appeal. It cannot be maintained with any degree of force that the District Judge when he hears and adjudicates an appeal under S. 9, he acts in an administrative capacity. The District Judge has to decide the appeal judicially. In hearing and deciding an appeal under S. 9, the District Judge, if not a Court, is certainly a judicial tribunal. Even if it is taken that this petition is primarily against the decision of the Rent Controller, it can be entertained under Art. 227. The decision of the Rent Controller as to whether a particular house should be allotted to a particular person is no doubt an administrative decision. But in arriving at that decision he has to act judicially and in accordance with the provisions of S. 13. He would, therefore, be a tribunal within the purview of Art. 227. The decision of the Supreme Court in - Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees, Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi. But in arriving at that decision he has to act judicially and in accordance with the provisions of S. 13. He would, therefore, be a tribunal within the purview of Art. 227. The decision of the Supreme Court in - Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees, Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi. AIR 1950 SC 188 (A) - Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 (B), make it perfectly clear that the real question that has got to be considered in order to determine whether an authority is a tribunal within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227, is whether the statute which creates the authority, imposes upon it the duty to act judicially. If that duty is cast upon the authority, then it would be a tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227. On this test, there can be no doubt that we can entertain this petition. 4. Coming now to the merits of the petition I think the order made by the Rent Controller is in utter violation of the provisions of S. 13. Under that section the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to make any order with regard to allotment without first passing a general or special order under S. 13 (1) requiring the landlord to give intimation that any accommodation of which he is the landlord is or has fallen vacant and to let or not to let such an accommodation to any person. In this case admittedly no such order was passed. From what has been stated earlier, it is clear that in this case the Rent Controller acted arbitrarily and in a high-handed manner and in utter disregard to the provisions of S. 13 and of the elementary rules of procedure to be followed in the investigation of facts under S. 13. The finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner was not living in the house is vitiated also by his inconsistent direction allowing the petitioner a portion of the house for her residence. The learned District Judge also failed to comprehend the conditions which had to be satisfied under S. 13 before an order of allotment could be made by the Rent Controller under that provision. The learned District Judge also failed to comprehend the conditions which had to be satisfied under S. 13 before an order of allotment could be made by the Rent Controller under that provision. The decisions of the District Judge of Bind and of the Rent Controller must, therefore, be set aside and the opponent must be directed to restore possession of the house to the petitioner on or before 31-5-1956. I would, therefore, make order accordingly, and further direct the opponent to pay to the petitioner costs of this application fixing counsels fee at Rs. 75. 5. A. H. KHAN, J. :- I agree. Petition allowed.