JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal by Defendants 1 & 2 against the appellate judgment of the First Additional Subordinate Judge of Cuttack, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties after adjustment of equities between the parties. 2. The parties have been litigating for clearly twenty years and even at interlocutory stages the litigation had been fought up to the High Court on innumerable occasions. For the decision of the present dispute however, It is unnecessary to narrate the full history of the litigation between the parties and I shall therefore content myself with referring only to the salient features. 3. The disputed properties amounting to 5.04 acres of land, consist of two Schedules, namely Schedule Ka having an area of 3.27 acres and Schedule Kha having an area of 177 acres. Both the schedules appertain to Khata No. 634 of Village Odd, covering a total area of 6.83 acres. The remaining portion of the Khata appears to have come into the possession of the Plaintiff (See Ext. 2) and is not the subject-matter of the present litigation. The Khata was recorded in the last Settlement in the names of the Plaintiff Krushna Sahu, his brother Naba Sahu, and Radian; the widow of his cousin Bahram. Naba died issueless. Radiani's daughter Sajani is Defendant No. 3. On the 8th April 1930 Radiani, Krushna and Naba executed a simple mortgage of the Ka Schedule properties in favour of Defendants 1 and 2 for Rs. 700/-. On the 27th July 1935 the mortgagees instituted a suit (O. S. No. 278 of 1935) in the Court of the Munsif of Jajpur to enforce their mortgage bond. That suit was compromised on the 24th February 1936 and a compromise decree (Ext. 12) (hereinafter referred to as the mortgage decree) was passed for Rs. 1200/-. One of the terms of the compromise was that the mortgagors should satisfy the rent decree obtained by the landlord of the holding, in Rent Suit No. 6001 of 1935-36 filed during the pendency of the mortgage suit, but there was a further stipulation that in case of default the mortgagees would pay up the same. Neither party satisfied the rent decree and consequently in Execution Case No. 3453 of 1936-37 brought by the landlord the entire holding was sold on the 20th November 1936, and purchased for Rs. Neither party satisfied the rent decree and consequently in Execution Case No. 3453 of 1936-37 brought by the landlord the entire holding was sold on the 20th November 1936, and purchased for Rs. 155/- by the mortgagees (Defendants 1 and 2) who subsequently obtained delivery of possession on the 2nd April 1937. On the 30th May 1938 Hadiani and Naba instituted a suit (O. S. No. 272 of 1938) for setting aside the rent sale and for reconveyance of the properties to them. The present Plaintiff Krushna Sahu was impleaded as pro forma Defendant No. 9 in that suit. That suit ended in a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs and Krushna Sahu on the 29th March 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the trust decree). It was held therein that Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act would apply in respect of the purchase at the rent sale by the mortgagee-decree-holders and that such purchase would ensure for the benefit of the mortgagors. The mortgagee- decree-holders were therefore directed to reconvey the properties to the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 9 (Krishna Sahu) in that suit and also to deliver possession of the same to them, after execution of the deed of reconveyance. But it was further directed that the sum of Rs. 155/- for which the mortgagees purchased the properties in the rent sale should be added to the mortgage decretal amount in O. S. No. 278 of 1935. On the 20th June 1940 the mortgagees filed a petition for execution of the mortgage decree without complying with the directions contained in the trust decree regarding reconveyance and delivery of possession of the properties to the mortgagors. But they took Care to add to the decretal amount the sum of Rs. 155 as directed in that decree. This execution case (No. 778 of 1940) ended in the sale of the Ka schedule properties in favour of the mortgagee-decree-holders for Rs. 500/-, on the 22nd January 1941 (Ext. L). During the pendency of that execution case the judgment-debtors filed several petitions (Ext. A series, praying for time to pay up their mortgage dues. They also filed a petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, but this was dismissed on the 16th December 1940. The mortgagee- decree-holders obtained delivery of possession of the Ka schedule properties on the 21st April 1941 (Ext. A series, praying for time to pay up their mortgage dues. They also filed a petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, but this was dismissed on the 16th December 1940. The mortgagee- decree-holders obtained delivery of possession of the Ka schedule properties on the 21st April 1941 (Ext. K) and thereafter obtained a personal decree for the balance of the decretal dues and put that decree into execution on the 30th September 1941 (Ext. G.) in Execution Case No. 1135 of 1941. The Kha schedule properties were purchased for Rs. 350/- in execution of that personal decree and delivery of possession was taken on the 7th June 1942. Inspite of that, however, a further balance of about Rs. 946/- remained unsatisfied and the mortgagee-decree-holders filed another Execution Case (Execution Case No. 845 of 1943) on the 24th August 1943. The judgment-debtors paid the entire outstanding balance in instalments ending on the 20th June 1945, and thus satisfied the mortgage decree completely. 4. In the meantime the mortgagors did not remain idle. On the 10th November 1913 they filed a suit (O. S. No. 993 of 1943) for recovery of mesne profits from Defendants 1 and 2 (Appellants) in respect of the Ka schedule properties from the 2nd April 1937 till the end of 1940. This period approximately represented the period during which the mortgagees remained in possession of the properties, that is from the date of delivery of possession to them as auction-purchasers in the rent decree till the date on which they obtained delivery of possession as mortgagee-decree-holder auction-purchasers in Execution Case No. 778 of 1940. O. S. No. 993 of 1943 ended in a decree in their favour on the 7th November 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the mesne profits decree) for a sum of Rs. 508/-. 5. On the 11th December 1943 the Plaintiff Krushna Sahu filed an execution case (Execution Case No. 1145 of 1943) for executing the trust decree and getting a reconveyance from Defendants 1 and 2. An objection petition was filed u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, which was allowed by the lower court, but in Second Appeal No. 39 of 1944 (Ext. On the 11th December 1943 the Plaintiff Krushna Sahu filed an execution case (Execution Case No. 1145 of 1943) for executing the trust decree and getting a reconveyance from Defendants 1 and 2. An objection petition was filed u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, which was allowed by the lower court, but in Second Appeal No. 39 of 1944 (Ext. R) the Honourable High Court of Patna (Beevor) J, while directing that the judgment-debtors in the trust decree should execute a deed of conveyance, made the following observations: The Appellants themselves state through their Advocates that they have no objection to executing a conveyance in favour of Defendant No. 9 in respect of the properties covered by the decree in O. S. No. 272 of 1938 subject to the mortgage which formed the subject-matter of title mortgage suit No. 278 of 1935 in the Court of the Munsif of Jaipur and subject to any rights which have accrued under the said mortgage or under the decree passed in that suit. In these circumstances this appeal will be allowed to this extent that the conveyance which the Appellants are required to execute in favour of Defendant No. 9 of Original Suit No. 272 of 1938 will be restricted by inserting a clause in the conveyance that the rights conveyed wilt be subject to the mortgage and decree above mentioned, and subject to any rights which have accrued there under. As regards the claim for possession the learned Judge observed that It would be left to the parties to establish by suit their right to possession on the basis of the deed of conveyance. The deed of conveyance Was executed by the Munsif of Jajpur on the 30th October 1946 (Ext. 15) due to the default of the judgment-debtors. 6. In view of the above observations of the High Court the present suit Was brought by the Plaintiff Krushna Sahu on the 16th October 1947 for recovery of possession of Ka and Kha schedule properties, for mesne profits, and other reliefs. The Plaintiff stated therein that he was the sole surviving coparcener of the original joint family and that consequently he alone was entitled to bring the suit. Hadiani's daughter Sajani was however impleaded as Defendant 3 and she claimed some interest In the properties on the ground that the family was separate. The Plaintiff stated therein that he was the sole surviving coparcener of the original joint family and that consequently he alone was entitled to bring the suit. Hadiani's daughter Sajani was however impleaded as Defendant 3 and she claimed some interest In the properties on the ground that the family was separate. Both the courts have held that, Sajani has no interest in the properties at all and that the Plaintiff is the sole owner. This finding was rightly not challenged in this second appeal. Similarly, the finding of the lower appellate Court that the properties were all along in the possession of Defendants 1 and 2 (Appellants) notwithstanding the directions contained in the trust decree was also not challenged in second appeal. In giving a decree in favour of the Plaintiff the lower appellate court thought that at the time of the execution of the mortgage decree by the Appellants in Execution case No. 778 of 1940 the mortgagee-decree-holders were in the position of constructive trustees inasmuch as they had not obeyed the directions given in the trust, decree, and that the advantage gained by them by purchasing the properties In execution of the mortgage decree would therefore enure for the benefit of the mortgagors now represented by the Plaintiff. 7. Mr. G.K. Misra on behalf of the Appellants raised the following two contentions: (i) Any claim by the Plaintiff by way of equitable relief u/s 90 of the Trusts Act in the present suit will be barred by constructive res indicate in inasmuch as It ought to have been raised at the time of the execution of the mortgage decree in Execution Case No. 778 of 1940; and (ii) The Appellant-Defendants were not guilty of any lack of good faith or candid dealing, or of sharp practice in purchasing the properties themselves in execution of the mortgage decree and consequently the principles of Section 90 of the Trusts Act would not in any case apply. 8. In my opinion neither of these contentions can prevail. 9. The success of the present litigation entirely depends on whether the purchase of the properties by the Defendants in execution of the mortgage decree in Execution Case No. 778 of 1940 on the 22 and January 1941 and the subsequent delivery of possession of the same on the 21st April 1941 (Exts. 9. The success of the present litigation entirely depends on whether the purchase of the properties by the Defendants in execution of the mortgage decree in Execution Case No. 778 of 1940 on the 22 and January 1941 and the subsequent delivery of possession of the same on the 21st April 1941 (Exts. L. and K) could be successfully challenged by the Plaintiff in the present suit. It is true that the Plaintiff was one of the mortgagor-judgment-debtors in that execution case. During the course of the execution proceeding from the 20th-June 1940 to the 22nd January 1941 the mortgagor-judgment-debtors had filed several petitions (Exts. A series) asking for adjournments from time to time, to pay up the mortgage dues. They were also aware of the directions given in their favour in the trust decree dated the 29th March 1940. In Ext. A.1 there is some mention of the right to mesne profits as the properties remained in the possession of the mortgagee-decree-holders. In the execution petition also the mortgage-decree-holders had added a sum of Rs. 155/- granted to them in the trust decree. It also appears that during the pendency of, that execution petition an objection petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, was filed by the judgment-debtors and was rejected by the Executing Court on the 16th. December 1940. That petition and the order of the Court thereon were not exhibited in the lower court, and during the hearing of this second appeal Mr. Misra on behalf of the Appellants filed a petition under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, for admitting these as additional evidence for the ends of justice. Mr. Das Gupta appearing for the Respondents had no objection to the admission of these documents at the second appellate stage. I therefore decided to admit these documents and they shall be marked Exhibits U and V respectively. According to Mr. Misra during the course of that execution proceeding both parties were fully aware of their respective rights under the trust decree. I therefore decided to admit these documents and they shall be marked Exhibits U and V respectively. According to Mr. Misra during the course of that execution proceeding both parties were fully aware of their respective rights under the trust decree. The judgment-debtors were aware that the mortgagee-decree-holders had not only failed to comply with the directions given in the trust decree, that is, to deliver possession of the properties and to execute a deed of conveyance, but they were also aware that the mesne profits which had been appropriated by the mortgagee-decree-holders from 2nd April 1937 (the date on which they took possession in execution of the rent sale) till 20th June 1940 (the date of application for execution) had not been duly credited in favour of the judgment-debtors in the execution petition. On the other hand the execution petition was filed for a total sum of Rs. 1,664-10.0 which represented the decretal amount in the mortgage decree (Ext. 12) plus the interest up to date, plus the sum of Rs. 155- granted in the trust decree. Mr. Misra therefore urged, that it was the duty of the judgment-debtors to object to the execution of the mortgage decree for such a large sum and they ought to have pointed out to the executing court that mesne profits should be deducted out of the total sum and that execution should be levied only for the balance. He further urged that this was the point taken up in the objection petition u/s 47, CPC which was, however, rejected by the executing court on the 16th December 1940. The mortgagor-judgment-debtors should have taken up the matter on appeal, but they failed to do so, and it is not open to them to raise the same question by way of a separate suit. It is true that the objection as to the exact amount, out of the original decretal amount, that yet remained to be satisfied was an objection u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, which should have been taken by the mortgagors during the execution stage. In fact it was taken and the order of the Court was against the judgment-debtors. But in the present litigation, the question is entirely different. In fact it was taken and the order of the Court was against the judgment-debtors. But in the present litigation, the question is entirely different. The Plaintiff's claim is not based on any objection to the sale in execution of the mortgage decree, but it is based on what he considers to be an equitable right in his favour which accrued after the sale. According to him the mortgagee-decree-holders being in the position of constructive trustees, gained an advantage when the mortgaged properties Were purchased by them on the 22nd January 1941, and it was only from the date on which they so gained an advantage that a new equitable right accrued to the mortgagor-judgment debtors by the principle of Section 90 of the Trusts Act. Prior to the 22nd January 1941 the mortgagee-decree-holders had gained no advantage though they were attempting to gain such an advantage by vigorously pressing there execution petition and objecting to the petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the judgment-debtors. The crucial question is whether the claim of the Plaintiff to the disputed properties under the equitable principles of Section 90 of the Trusts Act ought to have been made during the pendency of the execution proceeding In Execution no, 778 of 1940. I think such a claim would have been premature and any petition based on that claim would have been summarily rejected. The executing court was not concerned at that stage with the question as to what would be the legal effect of the purchase of the mortgaged properties by the mortgagee-decree holders, Until an advantage was actually gained by the constructive trustee against the interests of the beneficiary, the right of the beneficiary to ask for equitable relief under the principles of either Section 88 or 90 of the Trusts Act would not arise. It is true, that when the mortgagor, judgment-debtors' objection petition u/s 47 of the CPC was rejected by the Executing Court on the 16th December 1940 the decree-holders gained some advantage by the principles of res judicata inasmuch as the judgment-debtors were precluded from re-agitating the matters which had been disposed of by the order of the Court dated the 16th December 1940. But that advantage arising out of the principles of res judicata during the progress of the execution case will not be the 'advantage' referred to either in Section 88 or Section 90 of the Trusts Act. That was merely a step in the whole process which culminated in the purchase of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee- decree-holders, and it was then that the advantage in derogation of the rights of the beneficiary accrued to the mortgagee-decree-holders. I must, therefore, reject Mr. Misra's contention to the effect that the present suit is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 10. Mr. Misra then relied on a decision of the Privy Council Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Macnaughten 16 I.A. 107. The facts of that case are (omitting immaterial portions, as follows. A lessee in possession of an estate consisting of several villages also became a mortgagee of the entire estate from the proprietors. As a lessee he was collecting rents from the tenants and accounting to the lessors, after deduction of costs and charges. In 1877, he brought a suit on the basis of his mortgage bond, but did not disclose therein the sums due from him to the mortgagors or past rents collected by him by virtue of his lease. The mortgagors, while defending that suit, did not put forward the plea that they were entitled to have a general account taken and that the mortgage decree should be limited to the balance, if any, found against them. They put forward some other plea which was rejected and need not be discussed here. The mortgage-suit was eventually decreed and in execution of the same the properties were purchased by the mortgagee-decree-holder. Subsequently, sometime in 1883 the mortgagors filed another suit for setting aside the sale in execution of the mortgage decree alleging that the rents due to them from the mortgagee were more than sufficient to extinguish the mortgage debt. In support of this contention it was urged that there was an equity in their favour arising out of the fact that during the period of the mortgage the mortgagee was in possession of the estate by virtue of the lease and appropriating the income therefrom. In support of this contention it was urged that there was an equity in their favour arising out of the fact that during the period of the mortgage the mortgagee was in possession of the estate by virtue of the lease and appropriating the income therefrom. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that such a plea ought to have been taken during the mortgage suit and as it was not taken then, it would be barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. In my opinion that case is distinguishable. There the mortgagors had the right to object to the passing of the decree in favour of the mortgagee without adjustment of the equities in their respective favour. He failed to raise such an objection and thus allowed the mortgagee decree to be passed against them for the entire sum. In the present case however at the time of the passing of the mortgage decree in 1935 there was no equity in favour of the mortgagors. It is true that at the time of the execution of that decree some equities arose due to the directions of the Court in the trust decree. But these could not in any way affect the validity of the mortgage decree, though they might have the effect of reducing the decretal amount if no objection had been taken at the proper stage. In the Privy Council case it was the mortgage decree that was primarily challenged in the subsequent suit and their Lordships pointed out that such challenge should have been made at the suit stage and that the principle of constructive res judicata would apply. I should further point out that the Indian Trusts Act came into force only in 1882 prior to the mortgage sale in the aforesaid Privy Council decision. Though the equitable principles of the English Law of Trusts appear to have been applied in some decisions prior to that date, Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act would not, In terms, apply and consequently that decision may not be of much help here, where, for the purpose of deciding whether constructive res judicata would apply, we have first to find out the precise stage at which the advantage referred to in Section 90 or Section 88 of that Act accrued to the beneficiary. 11. Turning now to the second contention raised by Mr. 11. Turning now to the second contention raised by Mr. Misra I must observe that the conduct of the mortgagee-decree- holders during the course of the execution proceeding leading up to the sale of the entire mortgaged property Was any thing but fair and candid. Though they were ready to take advantage of the trust decree in their favour and to inflate the decretal amount by adding Rs. 155/- they were neither willing to give up possession of the properties, nor to execute a deed of conveyance. They also did not care to make any deduction out of the original decretal amount though they were in possession of the mortgagors' properties for more -than three years, i.e. from the 2nd April 1937 to the 20th June 1940. In the subsequent mesne profits decree this amount was estimated at about Rs. 508/-. By the trust decree they were held to be in the position of constructive trustees holding the properties on behalf of the mortgagors and if they wanted to act fairly and candidly, they ought to have given due credit for this sum and sought to execute the mortgage decree only for the balance. Moreover, if they wanted to sell the mortgagors' properties, they ought to have sought the permission of the District Judge u/s 93 of the Trusts Act. It is true that section, in terms, applies only to trustees. But it was held in Gokul Das v. Vahbm 19 I.C. 844 that the principles of Section 53 of the Trusts Act would apply to constructive trustees also. Having thus placed a very heavy burden on the mortgagors by inflating the decretal amount the decree-holders objected to their petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, and got it rejected and then purchased properties them selves for Rs. 500/-. 12. It was however urged on behalf of the Appellants that though the mortgagee-decree-holders might have been obstinate in ignoring the directions of the trust decree they did not conceal from the executing court the existence of the trust decree and acted openly in prosecuting the execution case and that consequently they were not guilty of any sharp practice or lack of good faith. It was further urged that at no time were the mortgagor-judgment debtors ever ready and willing to pay the sum of Rs. It was further urged that at no time were the mortgagor-judgment debtors ever ready and willing to pay the sum of Rs. 1200/- which would be the correct balance due under the mortgage decree, after deducting the mesne profits due to the mortgagor and that in the absence of any evidence pointing to such a infact it is not open to the mortgagors to contend that it was the failure of the mortgagees to give due credit to the mesne profits that eventually resulted in the sale. This argument, however, overlooks the fundamental principles underlying sections 88 and 90 of the Trusts Act. The present case would, perhaps, more appropriately come u/s 88 than u/s 90 of that Act, in as much as whatever might have been the position of the parties at the time of the rent sale, the mortgage-decree-holders were held to be constructive trustees by the judgement in the trust decree of March 1940. They were, in duty, bound to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, namely, the mortgagors, until they discharged the trust by giving up possession of the properties, and If they wanted to purchase the properties in execution of the mortgage decree, they ought to have applied to the District Judge u/s 53 of the Trusts Act. The latter part of Section 88 of that Act clearly says that where any person bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interests of another person enters into any dealings under circumstances in which his own interests are, or may be, adverse to those of such other person and thereby gains for himself a pecuniary advantage he must hold for the benefit of such other person the advantage so gained. As constructive trustees the Appellant- Defendants were bound to protect the interest of the beneficiaries, namely, their right of equity of redemption in the disputed properties, until the trust is discharged. Moreover, as mortgagee-decree-holders, they were entitled to sell the properties with a view to realise the decretal amount. The two interests are thus adverse to each other, and the constructive trustees cannot be permitted to retain the advantage gained in furtherance of his interest unless and until they obtained the permission of the District Judge or discharged the trust. Moreover, as mortgagee-decree-holders, they were entitled to sell the properties with a view to realise the decretal amount. The two interests are thus adverse to each other, and the constructive trustees cannot be permitted to retain the advantage gained in furtherance of his interest unless and until they obtained the permission of the District Judge or discharged the trust. For the application of the latter part of Section 88 of the Trusts Act the question whether they were guilty or any sharp practice or lack of good faith, is not material. It cannot also be said that even if the correct decretal amount had been shown in the execution petition the sale could not have been averted. The execution was filed for Rs. 1670/- and the judgment-debtors were unable to pay the same and therefore the properties were sold for Rs. 500/-. If the mesne profits due to the mortgagors, namely Rs. 508/- had been deducted and the execution had been filed for about Rs. 1200/- only, it is very payabable that the mortgagors might have been able to pay that sum and averted the sale. This Inference seems reasonable in view of the fact that two years later, in 1948, the mortgagors were able to pay up the balance of Rs. 946/-. when that amount was executed against them as a personal decree. I am satisfied that it is the mortgagees' conduct in not obeying the terms contained in the trust decree,(2) in omitting to give due credit to the mesne profits due from them to the mortgagors, and (3) in objecting to the mortgagors' petition u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, that brought about the eventual sales of the properties. The amount due was unreasonably inflated and the mortgagors were handicapped from raising any loan out of their interest in the mortgaged property by the mortgagees' conduct in continuing to remain in possession and refusing to execute a deed of conveyance in favour of the mortgagors. Under these circumstances, I must hold that the mortgagees availed themselves of their position as constructive trustees and gained an "advantage" within the meaning of Section 88 or Section 90 of the Trusts Act. The mere fact that they did not conceal the existence of the trust decree in their execution petition would not show that they were not guilty of unfair practice. 13. The mere fact that they did not conceal the existence of the trust decree in their execution petition would not show that they were not guilty of unfair practice. 13. I may, in this connection, refer to a recent decision of the Madras High Court in Kombi Achan and Others Vs. K.C. Velayudhan and Others. In that case a puisne mortgagee Who was in possession of the mortgaged properties and who was bound by the contract to discharge a prior mortgage, deliberately omitted to do so and allowed the properties to be sold in execution of a decree obtained by the first mortgagee and purchased it benami in another's name. It was held that the" principles of Section 90 of the Trusts Act would apply and that the principles of res judicata would not apply merely because the mortgagors were impleaded as parties in the suit brought by the first mortgagee. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. (as he then was) pointed out (at page 147): It is difficult to see how the fact that the mortgagors were impleaded as parties to the action would detect from the obligations of Plaintiff 1 (puisne mortgagee) to pay the mortgagee amount to Kunhiraman Nayar (first mortgagee) as provided in Ext. A-2, or to alter the quality of his title founded on a sale which Was brought about by his own default. The only difference between the present case and that case is that there the puisne mortgagee who was in the position of a constructive trustee was bound to pay the entire sum due to the first mortgagee and he omitted to do so and thus brought about the sale of the mortgaged property. In the present case, however, the mortgagee-constructive trustees were bound to deduct nearly one third of the total decretal amount when they applied for the execution of the mortgage decree. But do not think this makes any difference in principle. It was the high inflation of the decretal amount by the mortgagee-decree- holders that crippled the mortgagors from averting the sale though they appear to have made desperate attempts to raise the necessary money by asking for time from the Executing court on several occasions, and the mortgagees cannot be permitted to take advantage of such a situation. 14. Before concluding my judgment I should refer to another point urged by Mr. Misra. 14. Before concluding my judgment I should refer to another point urged by Mr. Misra. According to him the mesne profits decree in O. S. No. 993 of 1943 cannot be adjusted in the present suit inasmuch as an independent right accrued to the mortgagors by virtue of that decree which they could have enforced by an execution petition. Though Mr. Misra fairly conceded that the mesne profits were appropriated by the Appellants when they were constructive trustees and they would be normally accountable for the same in suit of this type, he urged that these profits had crystallised into a decree of the court and had thus assumed a different character and the Plaintiff's remedy was only by way of enforcement of that decree by execution. It is true that the mesne profits decree would attract the principles of res judicata so far as the quantum of those profits and the period for which they were decreed are concerned, but I do not think the decree affects the essential nature of the rights between the parties. The constructive trustees have not yet given up possession of the properties of the beneficiaries, and they are bound to account for all the mesne profits during the period of their possession of the same, subject of course to the adjustment of the rights and liabilities between the parties. I would, therefore, maintain the judgment of the lower appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. Das, J. 15. I agree. 16. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed