Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal arises from an order in execution of a decree for recovery of possession of immovable property. When the decree-holder applied for possession, the defendant objected on the ground that he was a Kudikidappukaran and that he was not liable to be evicted. This objection was over-ruled by the courts below and the defendant has preferred this Second Appeal from the concurrent decisions against him. 2. The suit was instituted on 10.12.1953 when the Travancore Prevention of Eviction Act XXII of 1124 was in force. S.4 of the Act provided that no Kudikidappukaran was to be evicted from his Kudiyirippu except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. S.7 enumerated the grounds on which a decree for eviction could be passed against a Kudikidappukaran. Suits for eviction of Kudikidappukarans were barred under that section, except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The decree in this case was passed on 11.10.1954 when Act XXII of 1124 was in force. This Act was repealed by the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act XIII of 1955 which came into force on 7th June 1955. The objection raised in the execution court was that Act XXII of 1124 was repealed by the later Act and that a fresh suit and decree were necessary before eviction could be ordered, as the later Act conferred a right of permanent occupancy. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that Act XIII of 1955 was retrospective in operation and that notwithstanding the decree passed in the suit, the decree-holder was not entitled to recover possession, in view of S.3 and 8 of the Act. S.3 provides that no Kudikidappukaran shall be evicted from his Kudiyiruppu except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and S.8 bars a suit for eviction except in accordance with the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on principles of construction of statutes to show that the Act was retrospective in its operation. In my opinion there is nothing in Act XIII of 1955 to warrant the inference that decrees passed under the earlier Act ceased to have legal effect by the repeal of that Act. Ss.12 and 14 were also relied on for this purpose. In my opinion there is nothing in Act XIII of 1955 to warrant the inference that decrees passed under the earlier Act ceased to have legal effect by the repeal of that Act. Ss.12 and 14 were also relied on for this purpose. S.12 provides for maintenance of a register of Kudikidappukarans and further provides that every Kudikidappukaran who is in occupation of a Kudiyiruppu at the commencement of the Act should apply to the Village Officer for entering his name in such register. It was argued that notwithstanding the decree passed in the case, the judgment-debtor could apply for entering his name in the register and that he actually got his name so entered. This argument is fallacious because the term Kudikidappukaran has been defined as: "A person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by an owner of land to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given; and 'Kudiyirippu' means the site so given together with the house, but or shed thereon which is used as a place of residence by the Kudikidappukaran with the permission of the owner." 3. On the date of the new Act, the judgment-debtor was one who had been ordered to be evicted by a decree of the court and he could not come within the scope of the definition. S.14, if at all, is against the appellant's contention. The new Act which repealed Act XXII of 1124 (Travancore) and the Cochin Proclamation XVII of 1122, contained a provision that suits, appeals, reviews, revisions, decrees and applications for execution which were stayed under the Cochin Act should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. There is no corresponding provision regarding suits, decrees etc., passed under the Travancore Act. The new Act was not thus intended to re-open decrees passed under the old Act. There is no corresponding provision regarding suits, decrees etc., passed under the Travancore Act. The new Act was not thus intended to re-open decrees passed under the old Act. Apart from all these, this is a matter governed by S.6 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) which provides that when a new Act repeals an earlier Act, such repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment so repealed or affect any remedy in respect of such right. The respondent obtained the right to evict the appellant when the old Act was in force and such right cannot be affected by Act XIII of 1955. In the result, the concurrent orders are confirmed and the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.