Bhagwati Prasad v. Babulal Bathwal — 1956 DIGILAW 83 (PAT)

Judgment Sahai, J. 1. This is an appeal by Bhagwati Prasad against whom an order of eviction passed by the House Controller is being executed under Sec.17, Bihar Buildings (Lease, Kent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. The Courts below have given ail the facts of the case in detail, and I need not repeat him. Shortly stated, respondent Babulal Bathwal is the owner of a house in mahalla Bara Bazar in Katihar Town. There are three blocks in that house. The eastern block is, and has been, in the possession of the landlord, Babulal Bathwal, himself. The middle, block was in the possession of Ghugli Sah and others as tenants. The western block was in the possession of appellant Bhagwati Prasad as a tenant. The respondent filed two applications for eviction of his tenants, one against Ghugli Sah and others, which was numbered as Case No. 38 of 1948, and another against the appellant, which was numbered as Case No. 37 of 1948. The ground on which he prayed for eviction of the tenants was that he needed the two blocks because his sons had grown up, and it way proposed that they should open shops in those blocks. I am not concerned in this appeal with the case against Ghugli Shah and others. 2. So far as the appellant is concerned, it appears that he is in possession of one room, which is used as a shop, another from which is used as stock room and a verandah. It appears that, originally, only one room was let out to the appellant on a rental of Rs. 11/- per month. Subsequently, the other room and verandah were added, and the rent was enhanced by agreement of the parties to Rs. 35/- per month. 3. The House Controller passed an order for eviction of the appellant. When the matter went up to the Commissioner, he set aside that order and remanded the case for proper enquiry. Thereafter, the House Controller again passed an order for eviction of the appellant. That order has been confirmed by the Collector and the Commissioner. It is that order which the respondent has put in execution under Sec.17 of the Act, referred to above. 4. The appellant filed an objection to the execution. Thereafter, the House Controller again passed an order for eviction of the appellant. That order has been confirmed by the Collector and the Commissioner. It is that order which the respondent has put in execution under Sec.17 of the Act, referred to above. 4. The appellant filed an objection to the execution. The objection was that he could not be evicted from the entire block in his occupation be cause the respondent had prayed for his eviction from only one room, and the House Controller had also directed his eviction from only one room. Both the Courts below have held that the order of the House Controller directs the appellants eviction from the entire block in his occupation, and they have thus decided against the appellant. Hence, he has filed this appeal. 5. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Hareshwar Prasad Sinha has raised two points. The first point is that the Courts below could look into the House Controllers judgment and the petition of the respondent for eviction as well as the written statement filed by the appellant, but they have erroneously referred to various other pieces of evidence in order to come to the conclusion at which they have arrived. The second point is that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act has no application to this case because it was not a building but a piece of parti land which was let out to the appellant. I propose to consider these points in the order in which I have mentioned them. 6. So far as the first point is concerned, it is true that the Courts below have referred to a number of materials in order to interpret the House Controllers judgment which takes the place of the decree in the execution case. Mr. Sinha has referred to the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in -- Nuddyar Chand Shaha V/s. Gobind Chunder Guha, 10 Cal 1092 (A). In that case, the terms of the decree were uncertain. The executing Court took oral and documentary evidence in order to ascertain the exact meaning of the terms of the decree. Their Lordships held that the executing Court could not take such evidence in order to ascertain what the decree meant. In that case, the terms of the decree were uncertain. The executing Court took oral and documentary evidence in order to ascertain the exact meaning of the terms of the decree. Their Lordships held that the executing Court could not take such evidence in order to ascertain what the decree meant. Even if it was not permissible for the executing Court in the present case to refer to other evidence in order to understand the judgment of the House Controller Mr. Sinha had himself conceded that the executing Court could certainly refer to the House Controllers judgment and to the pleadings of the parties in order to find out the premises from which the appellant was ordered to be evicted. There are also many decisions of this Court and other Courts to this effect. I may refer only to some of those cases. In -- Baij Nath Sahay V/s. Gajadhar Prasad, 58 Ind Cas 276: (AIR 1920 Pat 118) (B), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that, in construing a decree, the executing Court is competent to take the assistance of the pleadings and the judgment. This was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in - Bibi Wakilan V/s. Bibi Kasiman, AIR 1930 Pat 536 (C). In -- Moti-Ur-Rahman Khan V/s. Sonu Lal, 175 Ind Cas 47: (AIR 1938 Pat 195) (D), Fazl Ali J. (as he then was), Agarwala J. agreeing, held that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree or in any way add to or amend the terms thereof but it is the duty of a Court to ascertain the property which is the subject of the decree, and, for this purpose, it is entitled to look at the paramount description of the property. 7. The House Controllers order which is under execution has been marked as Ex. I-8. It appears from this order that the respondent filed his application for eviction of Ghugla Sah and others and the appellant from two rooms of holding No. 78 in ward No. IV of Kathihar Municipality. The rental of each of these, as mentioned in the order itself, was Rs. 35/- per month. Admittedly, the rental of Rs. 35 is payable by the appellant to the respondent not for one room but for the entire block in his possession. The rental of each of these, as mentioned in the order itself, was Rs. 35/- per month. Admittedly, the rental of Rs. 35 is payable by the appellant to the respondent not for one room but for the entire block in his possession. It is perhaps from this point of view that the House Controller has stated in his order (Ex. I-8) that the landlord requires the "houses" occupied by the two tenants for opening shops for his two sons. The operative part of his order is as follows: "I hereby direct that these houses (referring to the block in occupation of Ghugli Sah and others and to the block in occupation of the appellant) in question would be vacated and made available to the landlord within three months of the date of this order." This clearly shows that he directed the appellants eviction not only from one room but from the entire block in his occupation as a tenant of the respondent. 8 Exhibit 2(a) is a certified copy of the petition filed by the respondent for eviction of the appellant. Paragraph 2 of this petition is as follows: "That there are three blocks of room is ground floor of the said house and the western room of the ground floor is occupied by the opposite party as monthly tenant on a rent of Rs. 35/- per month." The prayer in the petition is that the opposite party (that is, the appellant) be evicted from the room occupied by him in which he holds a shop. Mr. Sinha has laid great stress upon the word "room as used in para 2 and in the prayer portion of the petition. It is obvious, however, that the word room has been loosely used. This is clear from two circumstances. The first circumstance is that the existence of three blocks has been clearly mentioned in para 2 itself, and what the respondent meant by mentioning the western room" was apparently the western block. The second circumstance is not the rent of Rs. 35/- per month, which is mentioned in para 2 of the petition ys being payable for the room, is, admittedly, payable for the entire block occupied by the appellant. The second circumstance is not the rent of Rs. 35/- per month, which is mentioned in para 2 of the petition ys being payable for the room, is, admittedly, payable for the entire block occupied by the appellant. In this connection, I may also refer to the definition of the word "building" in Sec.2(aa) of the Act, referred to above, which is as follows: " building means any building or hut or part of building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes- (i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtentant to such building or hut or part of such building or hut; and, (ii) any furniture, supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut." It is obvious that the room used for keeping stock and the verandah were merely appurtenances of the shop. Both the rooms and the verandah, therefore, formed the building which was under the appellants tenancy. 9. Exhibit C is a certified copy of the written statement filed by the appellant before the House Controller. Paragraph 2 of this petition is as follows: "That the petitioner is in occupation of this room for long, about 25 years, and it is about a year ago that he invested near about Rs. 425/- to extend the room by enlarging the size of the room and by attaching a pucca verandah to it as without these constructions the petitioner and the others who were occupying the remaining two rooms in the block were highly in discomfort and this investment that the petitioner made was on the definite understanding that the petitioner would never be asked to vacate the room which is being used by him since then." It is thus obvious that the appellant has also referred to the block in his occupation as a room, and has referred to the other two blocks as two rooms. The reason clearly is that the main part of the tenancy was the shop room. The room used for keeping stock and the verandah were merely adjuncts to that room. 10. On a consideration of the respondents petition and the appellants written statement, therefore, it is clear that the respondent wanted the appellants eviction from the entire block in his occupation. The room used for keeping stock and the verandah were merely adjuncts to that room. 10. On a consideration of the respondents petition and the appellants written statement, therefore, it is clear that the respondent wanted the appellants eviction from the entire block in his occupation. The order of the House Controller also shows that he directed the appellants eviction from the entire block. His objection, therefore, that he was directed to be evicted from only one room in his occupation was clearly untenable. 11. In the circumstances mentioned above, the conclusions of the Courts below are clearly justified on a consideration of the order which is under execution and the pleadings of the parties. Both the Courts have considered these materials. I am unable to hold that their conclusion are vitiated simply because they have considered some other materials also. Hence, the first point raised by Mr. Sinha fails. 12. So far as the second point is concerned, Mr. Sinha has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in -- Maheshwari Prasad Narain Sahi V/s. The Rupak Ltd., (Civil Revn. No. 600 of 1955, D/- 18-10-1955) (Pat) (E). It has been held in that case that the word "building" as defined in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act docs not include a piece of parti land when there is no building or hut standing on it has, therefore, been further held that the Act has no application to a tenant in respect of such a piece of parti land. , Mr. Sinha has sought to apply this decision to the facts of this case on the basis of the allegation made in the written statement filed by the appellant that he "enlarged the size of the room" and attached a pucca verandah to it. Even if the allegation is assumed, for the sake of argument, to be correct, I do not think that the mere fact that a tenant remodels or makes some alterations in a building let out to him can prevent the application of the Act. When it is clear that it was a building which was originally let out to him, it is impossible to hold that the Act docs not apply. When it is clear that it was a building which was originally let out to him, it is impossible to hold that the Act docs not apply. As the decision which I have just referred to is in respect of a piece of parti land in which no kind of structure was standing at the time of creation of the tenancy, it is clearly distinguishable. The second point raised by Mr. Sinha also, therefore, fails. 13. The result is that the appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs.