JUDGMENT : The only question involved in this second appeal is whether the appeal in the Court below against the decision of the trial Court dated 9-5-1950 was filed within the period allowed by Law. 2. The trial Court dismissed substantial part of the plaintiffs claim and decreed the claim to the extent practically admitted by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on 9-5-1950. The decree was prepared on the basis of trial Courts decision by it on 15-5-1950. On 16-6-1950 he applied for copies of judgment and decree. On the same date he submitted a memorandum of appeal unaccompanied by copies of the judgment and decree appealed against. On 19-6-1950 the copies applied for by the plaintiff-appellant were prepared. The same were taken by the appellant on 20-6-1950. He filed the same in Court on 21-7-1950. According to Article 73 of Kanun Myad Samaat Gwalior, period of limitation for such an appeal is sixty days. If to that is added the time requisite for obtaining the copies, which is of five days, the total period allowable becomes sixty-five days. The total time which elapsed from the date of the decision up to the filing of the copies in Court is seventy-three days. 3. Thus strictly speaking in the absence of any explanation the appeal is barred by eight days. 4. Plaintiff-appellant, however, alleged that he was ill before 16-5-1950. There was, according to him, a boil in his arm-pit. This prevented him from obtaining information about the decision. It was also stated that no decree was prepared up to 15-5-1950 and that the Court had closed for summer vacation from 16-5-1950 to 15-6-1950 and it re-opened on 16-6-1950. He was therefore entitled to the deduction of that period. 5. The lower appellate Court held on facts that the appellant had not established that he was so ill as to be unable to obtain information about the decision of his case. As regards his other contention he held in the first place that inasmuch as he submitted a petition for copies on 16-6-1950 i.e., after vacation, no question of allowing him the period of vacation as time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree arose. He held that even otherwise the appeal was barred by one day as the copies were ready on 19-6-50 and they were to be delivered to the appellant on 19-6-1950. He held that even otherwise the appeal was barred by one day as the copies were ready on 19-6-50 and they were to be delivered to the appellant on 19-6-1950. The appellant was duly informed of this date as was plain according to him from the duplicate of receipt in respect of copying charges paid by the appellant on 16-6-1950. The appellant appeared one day late. This delay at any rate remained unexplained. 6. He therefore held the appeal as barred by time. 7. This is a second appeal against that decision and the aforesaid question arises for consideration. 8. The first question which will be involved in considering the question of limitation is whether the term "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" of the decree, judgment etc., in S. 12 of the Limitation Act includes time which elapses between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree is actually drawn up or whether an application for copy has to precede before any such allowance can be made. There is a divergence of judicial opinion on this point. The latest pronouncement of the Full Bench of Bombay High Court, in Jayashankar v. Mayabhai, AIR 1952 Bom 122 (A), is in favour of allowing that period to a party whether he has actually applied for it or not. Chagla, C.J. while dealing with that question at page 123 of the report held that "it is rather futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be given to him." He drew a distinction between cases where a decree could be drawn up without any act or step on the part of a party to the litigation and those where it could not be so drawn up. In the former case according to him an appellant should as a matter of course be entitled to the deduction of time between date of the judgment and date when the decree is drawn up whether he applies for a copy of the decree before its preparation or not. In the latter case whether he should be allowed that time should, according to him depend upon whether he is guilty of delay or default in taking steps for the preparation of the decree. In the latter case whether he should be allowed that time should, according to him depend upon whether he is guilty of delay or default in taking steps for the preparation of the decree. The learned Judge recognised the contrary view taken in Full Bench, Keshar Sugar Works v. H.C. Sharma, AIR 1951 All 122 (B), as the possible view and that if that view is accepted it is incumbent for a party to apply for a copy of the decree whether it is drawn up or not. But the learned Judge felt bound by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, in Murlidhar Shrinivas v. Motilal Ramcoomar, AIR 1937 Bom 162 (C), which overruled a similar view formerly held by that Court in New Piece Goods Bazar Co. v. Jivabhai Vadilal, 15 Bom LR 681 (D). 9. The learned Judge construed the Privy Council decision, in Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arthur Lee, 49 Ind App 307 : ( AIR 1922 PC 352 (E), as indicating that their Lordships of Privy Council did not consider the application for copy as the conclusive test. According to the learned Judge the aforesaid Privy Council case assumed that the period between the making of the order and the signing of it should ordinarily be excluded and that for that reason, according to him, their Lordships of the Privy Council were at pains to consider whether the whole of that period was properly required or whether part of it was taken up by reason of default on the part of the application. 10. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court, in AIR 1951 All 122 (FB) (B), as referred to above is in favour of stricter interpretation. According to that Court the period during which a decree remains unsigned and which is not covered by the period during which a copy of the decree remains pending is not a period requisite for obtaining copy of the decree under S. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. It was held in that case that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, in 49 Ind App 307 : ( AIR 1922 PC 352 ) (E), did not overrule the decision of Allahabad High Court, in Bechi v. Ahsan Ullah Khan, ILR 12 All 461 (FB) (F). It was held in that case that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, in 49 Ind App 307 : ( AIR 1922 PC 352 ) (E), did not overrule the decision of Allahabad High Court, in Bechi v. Ahsan Ullah Khan, ILR 12 All 461 (FB) (F). The decision of the aforesaid Privy Council case should, according to their view, be held applicable to the facts of that case. 11. The aforesaid was the view of the majority. Agarwal, J., however, who was a member of that Bench interpreted the Privy Council decision referred to above as suggesting that "the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree" does not depend upon the making of an application for such a copy. 12. The view of the Patna High Court, in Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan Missir, AIR 1936 Pat 45 (FB) (G), is in line with the view of the Bombay High Court. Calcutta High Court has been taking the same view since decision in Bani Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi, ILR 13 Cal 104 (FB) (H). 13. Lahore High Court, in Abdul Salam v. Abdul Khaliq, AIR 1945 Lah 233 (I), took the view in line with majority view in the Allahabad High Court Full Bench case in AIR 1951 All 122 (B). 14. In my opinion the reading of the decision of their Lordships of Privy Council in 49 Ind App Ind 307 : ( AIR 1922 PC 352 ) (E), by Chagla, C.J., in AIR 1952 Born 122 (A), and the reasons upon which the latter decision is based are preferable and I chose to follow that decision. It is significant that this view is the one taken by the majority of High Courts and is calculated to relieve undue hardships. It is not contrary to any explicit provisions of law. 15. It therefore follows that the period between 9th and 15th of May, 1950 has to be included within the period requisite for obtaining copy. From 16th the Court closed for vacation and reopened on 15th. The appellant applied for copy on 16th and obtained it on 20th. He filed his appeal on 21st. It cannot, in that case, be said with any reason that there was unreasonable delay on his part. After the decree was prepared after a reasonable time, he hardly be said to have lost more than a day. The appellant applied for copy on 16th and obtained it on 20th. He filed his appeal on 21st. It cannot, in that case, be said with any reason that there was unreasonable delay on his part. After the decree was prepared after a reasonable time, he hardly be said to have lost more than a day. For these reasons the dismissal of the appeal as having been barred by time is not proper. 16. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court who shall hear the appeal on merits and dispose of the same according to law. The appellant will be entitled to costs of this appeal. Costs of the Courts below will abide the final result of the case.