Judgment :- 1. Defendant 1 in O.S. 98 of 1953, on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff of Irinjalakuda, has brought this revision against the decision of the Additional District Judge of Trichur, in C.M.A. 35 of 1954, by which the learned judge set aside the order made by the District Munsiff to return the plaint for presentation to the proper court. Under the compromise decree in O.S. 49 of 1121 on the file of the Anjikaimal District Court, the Illom of the plaintiff and the defendants had got divided itself into six branches, but that decree kept certain properties in common for the maintenance and upkeep of the family temples. The compromise decree further provided that the management of those properties and temples should go in rotation among the senior members of the six branches of the Illom. At the time of the institution of the present suit, the petitioner, that is, defendant 1, was in management and the plaintiff's suit is to remove him from management and to install in office the person next entitled to the management. The relief of removal alone is valued in the plaint and the plaintiff estimated the value of the said relief at Rs. 100 and paid ad valorem Court Fee thereon which came to Rs. 7-8-0. 2. Defendant 1, among others, contested the suit and joined issue with the plaintiff not only on the merits, but also on the question whether proper court-fee has been paid on the plaint and whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Issue 2 raised by the learned District Munsiff related to Court-Fee and issue 3 to the question of jurisdiction. 3. These issues were heard preliminarily and the court held that the proper court-fee leviable on the plaint was the fixed fee of Rs. 40 prescribed in Art. VIII-1(b) of Schedule II of Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act 1125 (Act II of 1125) and that as the plaint showed that the properties set apart for the maintenance of the temples yielded annual profits to the tune of 500 paras of paddy and Rs. 6-15-0, the suit cannot be entertained in the Munsiff's Court as the market value of the properties calculated at ten times the annual profits exceeded the Munsiff's pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 3,000. 6-15-0, the suit cannot be entertained in the Munsiff's Court as the market value of the properties calculated at ten times the annual profits exceeded the Munsiff's pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 3,000. The plaint was, therefore, ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper court with the direction that the Court-Fee paid in the Munsiff's Court will be given credit in case it is presented before the proper court within two weeks from the date of its return. 4. The learned District Munsiff's order was taken in appeal before the Trichur District Court in C.M.A. 35 of 1954. According to the learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal, the Court-Fee payable was the fixed fee of Rs. 10 prescribed by Art. VIII-8 of Schedule II of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125 and as for valuation for purposes of jurisdiction, he took the view that the plaintiff was entitled to put his own valuation. The plaintiff had put his own valuation both for Court-Fee purposes and for purposes of jurisdiction. Consistently with the view taken by the appellate Court on the question of the Court-Fee and on the question of jurisdictional valuation, the Munsiff's order was set aside in both respects. The learned judge held that the plaintiff should make good the difference (Rs. 2-8-0) between the fixed fee of Rs. 10 and the fee paid on the plaintiff's valuation of Rs. 100 namely Rs. 7-8-0 and that as the plaintiff was entitled to put his own valuation for purposes of jurisdiction he should be given an opportunity to make that valuation afresh. The present revision is against this appellate order. 5. The question of Court-Fee is really simple though both the courts below went wrong about it. It has long been held that a suit for the removal of a person from management is incapable of valuation for purposes of Court-Fee and the fee leviable in such a suit is the appropriate fixed fee prescribed in Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. See Govindan Nambair v. Krishnan Nambiar (1881) ILR IV Madras 146, Krishna v. Raman (1888) ILR XI Madras 266, Karuppanna Nadar v. Karuppa Nadar AIR 1939 Madras 776 and Raman Adithiripad v. Raman Namboodiri XXXVI Cochin Law Reports 689. Art. VIII-1(b) of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125 prescribes a fixed fee of Rs. See Govindan Nambair v. Krishnan Nambiar (1881) ILR IV Madras 146, Krishna v. Raman (1888) ILR XI Madras 266, Karuppanna Nadar v. Karuppa Nadar AIR 1939 Madras 776 and Raman Adithiripad v. Raman Namboodiri XXXVI Cochin Law Reports 689. Art. VIII-1(b) of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125 prescribes a fixed fee of Rs. 40/- for a plaint to remove a karnavan where the ad valorem fee on the value of the property exceeded that sum. The compromise decree in O.S. 49 of 1121 provided that the person in management of the properties set apart for the upkeep and maintenance of the temples shall have the powers of a karnavan. The Munsiff, therefore, took the present suit to be one to remove a karnavan and held that as the ad valorem fee on the market value of the property, as fixed by him, exceeded the limit fixed in sub-cl. (a) of Clause.1 of Art. VIII, namely, Rs. 40/- the plaint should bear stamp value for the fixed fee of Rs. 40/- prescribed by sub-cl. (b). Under the scheme of the compromise decree, the manager for the time being of the common properties is only a trustee and the Court Fee payable on a plaint to remove a trustee is specifically provided in Clause.2 of Art. VIII of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The fee prescribed is Rs. 15/-. The learned Additional District Judge overlooked this provision and he therefore went for the residuary clause of Art. VIII, namely, Clause.8 prescribing a fixed fee of Rs. 10. As stated at the outset both courts are wrong and before me counsel appearing for the contending parties and the learned Government Pleader, representing the State, agreed that the proper Court Fee leviable is Rs. 15 as prescribed in Clause.2 of Art. VIII, Schedule II. 6. The next question is whether the learned Additional District Judge's view that in a suit to remove a trustee or a manager, the plaintiff can put his own valuation for purposes of jurisdiction is right or whether the Munsiff 's view that the notional value of the property under the control of the manager or the trustee, fixed with reference to S.3(5) of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125, is the correct one. I feel constrained to observe that both views are wrong. I feel constrained to observe that both views are wrong. Both the Munsiff and the Additional District judge overlooked the fact that there are no statutory provisions as to how suits of the present nature should be valued for purposes of jurisdiction. S.3(4) of the Court Fees Act which entitles a plaintiff to put his own valuation for purposes of court fee does not cover a suit of the present nature, nor is there any provision that even in the case of suits falling thereunder, the value as determinable for the computation of Court Fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction, shall be the same. There is no Suits Valuation Act in force now, applicable to the Cochin area of the State. The Cochin Court Fees Act, II of 1080, into which by the amending Act X of 1115 provisions relating to the mode of valuing certain suits for purposes of jurisdiction of courts were introduced, has been repealed by the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125 (vide S.38). Though the Travancore-Cochin Legislature enacted a Suits Valuation Act (Act IV of 1125) to be applied to the whole State, it was agreed before me that that Act has yet not been brought into force. The provision to repeal the Travancore Suits Valuation Act (III of 1068) is contained in S.9 of Act IV of 1125 and as the latter Act is yet to come into force, the Travancore area of the State continues to be governed in the matter of valuation of suits for purposes of jurisdiction by Travancore Act III of 1068, whereas in Cochin area there is no law in that behalf. This is the anomalous position we are in now. Be that as it may, even the provisions contained in the Suits Valuation Act do not cover the valuation of a suit of the present kind. See Veeramma v. Butchiah AIR 1927 Madras 563 and Raman Adithiripad v. Raman Namboodiri 36 Cochin LIZ 689. This is the anomalous position we are in now. Be that as it may, even the provisions contained in the Suits Valuation Act do not cover the valuation of a suit of the present kind. See Veeramma v. Butchiah AIR 1927 Madras 563 and Raman Adithiripad v. Raman Namboodiri 36 Cochin LIZ 689. The discussion made in these cases shows that even with enactments like the Madras Suits Valuation Act (VIII of 1887) and the Cochin Court Fees Act (II of 1080) as amended by Act X of 1115, it was only by a construction of the meaning of the word 'value', occurring in S.12 of the Madras Civil Courts Act and S.10 of the Cochin Civil Courts Act, that it was possible to find a rational basis to determine the valuation of suits like the present for purposes of jurisdiction. In Veeramma v. Butchiah, as also in Karuppanna Nadar v. Karuppa Nadar, it has been held that the market value of the property under the charge of the manager or the trustee to be removed, should determine jurisdiction. In Krishna v. Raman, it was held that although for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, a suit to remove the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad is incapable of valuation and subject to the fixed fee prescribed by S. VI, Art.17 of Sch. II of that Act, yet, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction under S.12 of the Civil Courts Act, the right of management, which is the subject matter of the suit, must be valued. It is further held in that decision that if the value is estimated bona fide by the plaintiff, the court should adopt it. In the later cases cited above, it has been clarified how the right of management which forms the subject-matter in suits like the present should be valued. What applies to a suit for removal of a karnavan must apply equally to a suit for removal of a manager or a trustee. S. 12(4) of the Travancore-Cochin Civil Courts Act, 1951 (XXII of 1951) reads:- "The jurisdiction of a District Munsiff extends, to all like (civil) suits and proceedings not otherwise exempted from his cognizance of which the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 3000". S. 12(4) of the Travancore-Cochin Civil Courts Act, 1951 (XXII of 1951) reads:- "The jurisdiction of a District Munsiff extends, to all like (civil) suits and proceedings not otherwise exempted from his cognizance of which the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 3000". The corresponding section in the Cochin Civil Courts Act (III of 1076) was S.10 and that contained a proviso which is absent in the present S.12. The said proviso read: "Provided that in the case of suits and proceedings that are incapable of being estimated at a money value such value shall be taken to be the value of the relief sought as stated in the plaint". 7. In Raman Adithiripad v. Raman Namboodiri, Krishnaswami Iyengar, C.J., who delivered the leading judgment in that case stated that this proviso enabled the plaintiff to put his own value upon the relief, that value and that value alone, however arbitrary, it may be, provided the basis for the determination of the court in the Cochin State. It was further pointed out there that as the Madras Civil Courts Act did not contain any similar provision, it may be that in the Madras Courts the valuation has to be made on principles different from those applicable to Cochin. It is however worthy of notice that the learned Chief justice also said that the expressions 'the amount or value' and 'money value' occurring in S.10 obviously meant the market value where the property in the suit is capable of a definite valuation in terms of money. In the absence of the proviso which occurred in the Cochin Act, I have to adopt the market value of the property as the standard by which jurisdiction of the Court should be determined. Properties which fetch profits to the extent of 500 paras of paddy and Rs. 6-15-0 a year must beyond doubt, the worth more than Rs. 3,000. The learned Munsiff found that even the notional value assessed in terms of the Court Fees Act exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction. The Munsiff was therefore right in directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court. That decision of his has to be restored. There is no legal basis for the learned Additional District Judge's view that it was open to the plaintiff to put his own valuation for purposes of jurisdiction. 8. The Munsiff was therefore right in directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court. That decision of his has to be restored. There is no legal basis for the learned Additional District Judge's view that it was open to the plaintiff to put his own valuation for purposes of jurisdiction. 8. It has now to be pointed out that there is no legal basis either for the Munsiff's view of ascertaining jurisdiction by resort to S.3(5) of the Court Fees Act. Just as S.3(4) does not cover suits like the present even for Court Fee purposes, S.3(5) does not either. Nor is there any provision that even in respect of suits falling under S.3(5), valuation for purposes of Court Fees and jurisdiction will be the same. As stated earlier, the valuation for jurisdiction has to be determined with reference to the language of S.12 of the Civil Courts Act and the Privy Council had occasion to point out that except in cases where it is specifically provided that the valuation for jurisdiction and valuation for Court fee are to be the same, the general principle is that the valuation as per market value must govern jurisdiction - see Rachappa Subrao Jadav v. Sidappa Venkatarao Jadhav - XLVI Indian Appeals 24. The Madras and the Cochin High Courts took the same view in the cases noted above. There is therefore no warrant for adopting any notional value of the property as the basis to determine jurisdiction. However, in this case, it is immaterial whether the market value is made the basis, or a notional value as adopted by the Munsiff, as either value would be in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of a District Munsiff. 9. In the result, the revision is allowed and the appellate Court's decision is set aside. The Munsiff's order to return the plaint for presentation to the proper court is restored and the plaintiff will make good the deficit court fee when the plaint is presented to the proper court. There will also state the figure at which the plaint is valued for purposes of jurisdiction and that conformably to this order. In the circumstances of the case I make no order for costs. Order accordingly.