Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is from an appellate order confirming the order of the executing court whereby a sale in execution of a co-operative award was set aside on an application by the judgment-debtor under 0.21 R.87 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to 0.21 R.90 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The sale in execution took place on the basis of an execution application dated 9.6.1119 which prayed that the legal representatives of the 3rd defendant be impleaded as defendants 4 to 11 and that the scheduled property, which consisted of an equity of redemption belonging to the 3rd defendant be sold in execution after attachment and proclamation. Of these defendants 4 to 11, defendants 8 to 10 were minors and separate prayer was made for appointing the 6th defendant as their guardian ad litem. It was also prayed that notice under 0.21, R.20 CPC (Travancore) corresponding to 0.21, R.22 of the Indian CPC be issued to the parties before execution proceedings were taken. Even before notice was issued under 0.21, R.20, the plaintiff filed special application for levying immediate attachment over the property in view of the apprehension that the property might be alienated before notice was issued under 0.21 R.20. The court passed order for attachment on 13.6.1119 though without mentioning any reasons therefor. The 6th defendant was in due course appointed as guardian. Notice under 0.21 R.20 was also issued and served and the property was subsequently duly proclaimed and sold in execution for a sum of Rs. 300 in favour of the present special appellant, stranger to the decree but mortgagee thereof. The 7th defendant, on 15.11.1120, filed a petition complaining that the procedure adopted in execution was illegal and fraudulent and in any event vitiated by material irregularities as a result of which, the 3rd defendant's estate had sustained substantial loss and praying that the court-sale be set aside in consequences. 3. The plaintiff and the auction-purchaser both objected to this petition. Later on 18.1.1121 the plaintiff agreed to have the sale set aside on deposit of the sale amount and commission. The deposit was made by the judgment-debtors and the sale was set aside without reference to the auction-purchaser. This order was however set aside by the District Court on appeal by the auction-purchaser. Later on 18.1.1121 the plaintiff agreed to have the sale set aside on deposit of the sale amount and commission. The deposit was made by the judgment-debtors and the sale was set aside without reference to the auction-purchaser. This order was however set aside by the District Court on appeal by the auction-purchaser. Subsequently the matter was argued without evidence and the executing court set aside the sale on the basis of its findings (1) that the order of attachment of 9.6.1119 without a preliminary issue of notice under 0.21 R.20 was illegal and vitiated the whole proceedings, (2) that the execution application of 9.6.1119 was barred by limitation under Art.166 (Travancore) corresponding to Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act, (3) that the procedure adopted by the plaintiff to bring the properties of the 3rd defendant alone to sale was fraudulent, and (4) the property was sold for inadequate value. The matter was taken in appeal by the auction-purchaser before the District Court which upheld all the findings entered by the learned Munsiff and finally confirmed the order and hence this second appeal by the auction-purchaser. 4. The questions that arise for consideration are (i) whether execution was barred, (ii) whether the attachment of 13.6.1119 was illegal, (iii) whether the court sale was attended with any material irregularity or fraud and (iv) whether any substantial injury had been caused thereby to the judgment-debtors. 5. First point: The question of limitation arises this way. The previous execution application was filed on 10.1.1113 but further proceedings thereon were stayed by injunction order from O.S. No. 194 of 1113 on 21.5.1113 and the execution application was also struck off on 23.5.1113. It is argued that the plaintiff was a party to the suit O.S. No. 194 of 1113, that the suit itself was dismissed and therefore the injunction was dissolved on 3.10.1114, that it was open to the plaintiff to have come immediately thereafter and pursued the execution application and not waited indefinitely till 9.6.1119 when he filed the present execution petition. This argument is without any substance. The striking off of the execution petition was merely ministerial and therefore the execution application of 10.1.1113 must be deemed to be pending. The disposal of the suit O.S. No. 194 of 1113 on a particular date is totally irrelevant for considering when and how the pending execution application should be further pursued. This argument is without any substance. The striking off of the execution petition was merely ministerial and therefore the execution application of 10.1.1113 must be deemed to be pending. The disposal of the suit O.S. No. 194 of 1113 on a particular date is totally irrelevant for considering when and how the pending execution application should be further pursued. It has therefore to be held that the execution petition of 9.6.1119 was properly filed in revival of the execution petition of 10.1.1113. 6. Second point: The finding of the courts below that the attachment of 13.6.1119 was illegal is based upon the fact that the defendants 8 to 10 minors were properly represented before court only thereafter on 17.7.1119 with the appointment of the 6th defendant as their guardian ad litem and it was only still later that the essential preliminary of a notice under 0.21 R.20 to the legal representatives was at all ordered. But the courts below omitted in this connection to notice sub-cl. (2) of 0.21 R.20 which says: "Nothing in the foregoing sub-rule shall be deemed to preclude the Court from issuing any process in execution of a decree without issuing the notice thereby prescribed, if, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that the issue of such notice would cause unreasonable delay or would defeat the ends of justice." Under this sub-rule it was open to the court to entertain the application of the decree-holder to levy the attachment even before the notice under 0.21 R.20 was issued. The only defect in the matter was that the court had not entered reasons required by the sub-section. But the non-recording of reasons by itself was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the proceedings ipso facto. As observed in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure at page 795, 12th edition: "The effect of this sub-rule is not to make the issue of notice a matter which does not pertain to jurisdiction, but is by way of giving to the Court a special power to dispense with the issue of notice in the exceptional circumstances specified. It enables the Court to issue execution without issuing a notice as provided by sub-r. (1) in case where the issue of a notice may involve an unreasonable delay or defeat the ends of justice. Where the Court dispenses with notice under sub-r. (1) it should its reasons. It enables the Court to issue execution without issuing a notice as provided by sub-r. (1) in case where the issue of a notice may involve an unreasonable delay or defeat the ends of justice. Where the Court dispenses with notice under sub-r. (1) it should its reasons. But if the Court omits to record its reasons the omission is a mere irregularity" (referring to a number of cases in the footnote). Again there was the proviso to 0.21 R.20 (Travancore) introduced by way of amendment on 10.6.1115 before the date of the proceedings in this case to the following effect: "Provided that no order for execution of a decree shall be invalid by reason of the omission to issue a notice under this rule, unless the judgment-debtor has sustained substantial injury by reason of such omission." It was not pleaded nor is it argued that any special injury substantial or otherwise was caused by the levy of attachment before notice under O.21 R.20 was issued, or at all. It has to be held therefore that the attachment proceedings which led to the sale in execution in question was not open to question, on the ground of any want of jurisdiction. 7. Third and fourth points. The fraud in connection with the sale on execution is rested on the fact that even though the 2nd defendant's properties were available from 1114 by virtue of the dismissal of the suit and dissolution of the injunction in O.S. No. 194 of 1113 the decree-holder proceeded against the 3rd defendant's properties alone in 1119. It is assumed that the 3rd defendant's legal representatives would not be entitled to contribution as against the 2nd defendant if their properties were exclusively made liable in execution of the award. But all these are totally irrelevant circumstances let alone their correctness. It appears unnecessary however in the circumstances to go further into the matter particularly in the light of the Proviso to O.21, R.87 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure. But all these are totally irrelevant circumstances let alone their correctness. It appears unnecessary however in the circumstances to go further into the matter particularly in the light of the Proviso to O.21, R.87 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure. "(1) that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of such irregularity or fraud, unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud; and (2) that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of any defect in the proclamation of sale at the instance of any person who after notice did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or of any person in whose presence the proclamation was drawn up, unless objection was made by him at the time in respect of the defect relied upon." The decree-holder was entitled to proceed against any one of the defendants 1 to 3 and if he proceeded against the 2nd defendant on an earlier occasion it was perfectly open to him later on to proceed against the 3rd defendant or his properties. There is no material irregularity in the publishing or conduct of the sale either. 8. It follows therefore that absolutely no grounds have been made out for interfering with the sale in execution in the case. 9. The special appellant has filed a petition to convert the 2nd appeal into a Civil Revision Petition if it is found that the second appeal is not maintainable. I am prepared to hold that the appeal is maintainable in view of the question under 0.21, R.20 raised therein. I wish to add however that I would have allowed the petition and set aside the orders of the courts below in the exercise of my revisional jurisdiction if I found that the appeal was not maintainable. 10. In the result the second appeal is allowed and the application under O.21, R.87 CPC filed by the 7th defendant is dismissed with costs throughout.