Judgment :- 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the first defendant and arises out of an order in execution. The original decree-holder was one Kesava Panicker. The first execution petition was filed by him. After that he passed away. His legal representatives were impleaded as additional decree-holders 2 to 7. The rights of Nos. 3 to 7 were assigned to two persons. They filed the execution petitions seeking to execute the whole of the decree for the benefit of all the decree-holders impleading decree-holder No. 2 also as a party. Objections were raised by the first defendant. The objections pressed are (1) that the assignee decree-holders who seek to execute by themselves are not competent to execute the decree, and (2) that execution cannot be allowed without production of a succession certificate as regards personal reliefs. Both the lower courts rejected these objections. 2. We will first of all deal with the maintainability of an execution application by assignees of the rights in a portion of the decree. Here the assignees obtained only the rights of decree-holder Nos. 3 to 7. But what they sought was the execution of the decree as a whole for the benefit of themselves and decree-holder No. 2 who was also impleaded as a party. Now what is contended on behalf of the appellant is that when it is a question of the assignees representing only a part of the interest in the decree without the junction of the other decree-holders representing the other part they have no right to execute. It is pointed out that O. XXI, R.15 and 16 of the Civil Procedure Code do not recognise any such right. O. XXI, R.15 which deals with the application for execution by a joint decree-holder and R.16 which deals with the application for execution by transferee of a decree are as follows: "R. 15(1). When a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or, where any of them has died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the decree-holder. (2) Where the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to he executed on an application made under this rule, it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. R. 16. Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree-holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the applications were made by such decree holder: Provided that, where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution. Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others." Thus R.15 says that one of the joint decree-holders can apply for the execution of the whole decree though it must be for the benefit of all. If under an assignment the rights of a decree-holder passed to assignee the right to execute which one of the joint decree-holders had also would pass to the assignee of that joint decree-holder. If the contention of the appellant is accepted it would mean that the assignee from a joint decree-holder will obtain a lesser right than what the assignor himself had with regard to the execution of the decree. The question is whether there is any provision in the Civil Procedure Code which warrants such a conclusion. The wording in R.16 clearly indicates that the assignee of a joint decreeholder derives the same rights as his assignor with regard to the procedure to be adopted in executing the decree. The question is whether there is any provision in the Civil Procedure Code which warrants such a conclusion. The wording in R.16 clearly indicates that the assignee of a joint decreeholder derives the same rights as his assignor with regard to the procedure to be adopted in executing the decree. The words "where a decree or if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decreeholder in the decree is transferred" clearly contemplates not only the assignment of the rights in the entire decree by the sole decreeholder but also the assignment of the fractional right of a joint decreeholder. As pointed out by Chitaley in Note 7 of his commentaries to O. XXI R.16 the words'or if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons the interest of any decree-holder in the decree' were newly incorporated in the rule when the Civil Procedure Code was revised as per Act V of 1908. This amendment was obviously for the specific purpose of making it clear that the assignee of a fractional share in the decree had the same right as one of the joint decreeholders with regard to execution. Then again, the words 'the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the court which passed it and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the applications were made by such decreeholder' clearly cover the right of the transferee of the entire interest to the decree as well as of the transferee of the fractional interest. Assignees of both the categories are allowed to execute in the same way and in the same manner as their assignors could have executed. So when one of the joint decreeholders could take out execution for the whole of the decree for the benefit of all the decreeholders his assignee also could do so. No other interpretation can be placed on the provisions contained in the aforesaid rules in O. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. Coming to the decisions cited on the point, in Bhaggwant Balajiran v. Bajaram Sajnaji (AIR 1947 Bombay 157) the execution court held that an application filed by the assignee of the decree-holder's right was not maintainable as the assignment was only of a portion of the right under the decree. 3. Coming to the decisions cited on the point, in Bhaggwant Balajiran v. Bajaram Sajnaji (AIR 1947 Bombay 157) the execution court held that an application filed by the assignee of the decree-holder's right was not maintainable as the assignment was only of a portion of the right under the decree. The learned District Judge in appeal held that the nature of the assignment there was such as in effect transferred the entire interest in the decree-holder. When the matter was taken up to the High Court, Rajadhyakaha, J., disposed of the matter by accepting the interpretation placed on the assignment by the District Judge and did not discuss the question as to whether there was any disability placed upon the assignee of a portion of the right under the decree. Macklin, J., at page 159 observed as follows: "I am not aware of any provision of the Civil Procedure Code which prevents the holder of a decree from assigning it in part any more than I am aware of any provision of law which prevents an owner of any property disposing of it as a whole or in part. The only difficulty in the way of an assignee of a part rather than the whole of a decree is that in many cases decrees cannot be executed except as a whole. If therefore he is the assignee of only a part of the decree, he cannot in such a case execute only for a part of the decree and he is not entitled to execute for the whole of the decree because he is not the owner of the whole of the decree. So far as I am aware, there is nothing whatever illegal in his becoming the assignee of a part only of the decree. His rights, so far as they go, are exactly the same as the rights of his assignor; and if it would be open in any particular case for the assignor to execute for a part only of the decree, the rights of the assignee would be exactly the same, neither more nor less." These observations clearly go to show that if one of the joint decree-holders can execute the decree as a whole but for the benefit of all his assignee also can follow the same procedure. Muthiah Chettiar v. Krishna Doss Yarn (AIR 1921 Mad. Muthiah Chettiar v. Krishna Doss Yarn (AIR 1921 Mad. 599) is a decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court. It is a clear authority in support of the position that a fractional interest in a decree can be transferred and the transferee thereunder can execute just as one of the joint decree-holders. There, the questions arose whether under the Indian Civil Procedure Code of 1908 a decree can be transferred in part and if so whether the part transferee can be made a party in pending execution proceedings and allowed to execute. The following observations of Wallis, C.J., at page 600 may be pointed out; "It was well settled under the old Code that there could be part transfers of a decree, Kishore Chand Bhakal v. Gishorne & Co. (1890) 17 Calcutta 341 and Venkataramaniah v. Venkatacharulu ((1910) 33 Mad. 80) and it was also settled that, one of the several decree-holders could transfer his interest, Muthunarayana Reddi v. Balakrishna Reddi ((1896) 19 Mad. 306). I do not find any sufficient indication in the new Code that it was intended to alter the law in this respect. On the contrary the present Code contains a new general S.146 enacting that, save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken, an application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. This general provision is to take effect unless it is otherwise provided in the Code itself or by any law for the time being in force, and, even if it should be held that the part transfer of a decree is not provided for in the rules, though it is not prohibited, that would not prevent due effect being given to such part transfers under this section itself which is wider than the rules if it can be read as authorising such a part transfer. The section should I think have a beneficial interpretation, and be read as supplementing the rules, and, as a part transferee is a person claiming under a decree-holder, I think it sufficiently authorises applications in execution by such a part transferee." Again at page 603, Spencer, J. observes as follows: "I can see no objection to the assignee of a portion of a decree being allowed to come in and execute it on behalf of himself and his co-decree-holder under 0.21, R.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that the Court imposes under R.15 such terms for the conduct of the execution proceedings as may be necessary for the protection of the interest of others, such as a direction for payment into Court of sum realised under the decree." The aforesaid Full Bench decision was followed in Shanker Hari v. Damodar Vyankaji (AIR 1945 Bombay 380). There the contention was that the execution application filed by one of the assignees of the decree was not maintainable. Rejecting the said plea at page 381 it was observed as follows: "It is true that the definition of "decree-holder" in the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 included a transferee of a decree, and those words have now been omitted in S.2, sub-s. (3), of the Code of 1908. But that omission is made good by the newly added S.146 whereby the transferee of a decree, being a person claiming under the decree-holder, steps into his shoes and for all purposes he may be regarded as a decree-holder himself. If the assignment of the decree is jointly in favour of more than one, then such assignees may be deemed as joint decree-holders for the purpose of the application of the provisions of 0.21, R.15 of the Code." This was the view taken by the Full Bench at the Madras High Court in ILR 44 Madras 919 (AIR 1921 Madras 599). 4. 4. It may be pointed out that S.146 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 referred to is as follows: "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." The observations by the learned judges in Ram Sahai v. Madan Lal (AIR 1926 Allahabad 346) show that the position taken up in the aforesaid decisions was approved. Coming to the decisions relied upon on behalf of the appellant, Mazhar Husain v. Mt. Amtul Bibi (AIR 1922 Allahabad 101) says that unless the interests of the transferor in a decree are extinguished by the transfer there is not such a transfer as 0.21, R.16 contemplates. This decision is commented upon in Ram Sahai v. Madan Lal (AIR 1926 Allahabad 346) and the observations there show that it has not been approved. Narayandas v. Tajmal (AIR 1934 Bombay 59) is a single Bench decision where the Full Bench decision in AIR 1921 Madras 699 has been dissented from. A later case of the Bombay High Court itself has followed the Madras view. So we are clearly of opinion that the view taken by the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court is the correct one and we do not see any reason to diverge from it. The wording of the relevant provisions in the Civil Procedure Code already referred to can lead only to the conclusion, that the assignee of a fractional interest in the decree is fully entitled to execute the decree as one of the joint decree-holders, though it must be for the whole interest and for the benefit of all persons interested in the decree. So the position taken up by the lower court is correct and no question of interference arises. 5. The next point urged is that succession certificate ought to have been produced as the original decree-holder has passed away and the interest has devolved on his legal representatives. The execution being with regard to the personal relief against the judgment-debtor also. So the position taken up by the lower court is correct and no question of interference arises. 5. The next point urged is that succession certificate ought to have been produced as the original decree-holder has passed away and the interest has devolved on his legal representatives. The execution being with regard to the personal relief against the judgment-debtor also. The learned District Judge relies on Davu Settu v. Abdul Sattar Settu (31 TLJ 80) as authority to show that when execution has already been initiated by the decree-holder no succession certificate need be produced by his representatives-in-interest who continue the proceedings. There at page 84 it is observed as follows: "The next question is whether the additional plaintiffs are competent without a succession certificate, to execute the decree except as against the property. The answer to the above question will depend upon the interpretation of the term 'proceed' employed in S.3, Cl. (b) of the Succession Certificate Act. The expression suggests that the necessity to produce a succession certificate for carrying on execution exists only in cases where the original decree-holder has not initiated proceedings in execution. In instances where he dies after having commenced execution, his heirs who are brought on record in his place have the right to continue the proceedings in execution initiated by the original decree-holder without a succession certificate. The scheme of Cls. (a) and (b) of S.3 is clear on this matter. While Cl. (a) contemplates the stage when a decree is to be passed, Cl. (b) contemplates the stage when the execution is started." The learned judges there relied upon Venkatachalam Chetty v. Ramaswami Servai (55 Madras 352) and Mohamed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim (ILR 26 Cal. 839). The decisions cited on behalf of the appellant like those in Abdul Sattar v. Satya Bhushan Das (ILR 35 Calcutta 767), Nanchand v. Yenawa (ILR XXVIII Bombay 630), Ramaswamy Ayyar v. Subramanian (26 Cochin Law Reports 98), all only deal with the question of the necessity of a succession certificate before a decree giving personal relief is granted. The only decision cited which deals with the question of necessity for a succession certificate in execution is the Single Bench decision in Ramji Ladha v. Harisanji Varaslji (AIR 1955 Kutch 6). There the learned judge dissented from the decision in Muhammed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim (ILR 26 Cal. The only decision cited which deals with the question of necessity for a succession certificate in execution is the Single Bench decision in Ramji Ladha v. Harisanji Varaslji (AIR 1955 Kutch 6). There the learned judge dissented from the decision in Muhammed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim (ILR 26 Cal. 839), and Kshetra Mohan Paddar v. Azhizullah Mea (AIR 1920 Calcutta 580) and followed the view taken up by the Nagpur High Court in Tajraj Hajmal v. Hampyari (AIR 1938 Nagpur 528). In AIR 1938 Nagpur 528 the decree-holder passed away while the execution petition filed by him was pending and his legal representative, namely, his widow, sought to get herself substituted in the place of her husband and continue the execution. It was held that she was bound to produce a succession certificate. The following observations therein, may be pointed out: "Now it is said she was not proceeding on her application but on his application and therefore S.214(1)(b) does not apply; 26 Calcutta 839 and 57 Indian Cases 902 which simply follows 26 Cal. 839. 26 Calcutta 839 dissents from a Full Bench judgment reported in 16 Allahabad 259. The latter case however appears to us to be distinguishable, for it was concerned with a suit, not with execution proceedings. Since the new Rule, 0.22, R.12 was made the old question whether execution proceedings abate on death has been set at rest. Abatement does not apply to execution proceedings. The result of that is however that the heirs need not take steps for substitution under 0.22, R.3 but may apply to carry on the proceedings or may file a fresh application. In other words, execution proceedings do not abate but live on and, as some one must take the next step and death terminate all agencies, the person entitled, i.e., the personal representative or heir, can come before the Court. That person when he comes will be claiming for himself, at least where he, or she, is heir or beneficially interested. The proper application is for leave to carry on (or proceed with) the pending execution proceedings. Such an application would fall within the words 'upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled'. 'To be so entitled' means, as is plain from S.214(1) (a) 'to be entitled to any part of the deceased's estate'. The proper application is for leave to carry on (or proceed with) the pending execution proceedings. Such an application would fall within the words 'upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled'. 'To be so entitled' means, as is plain from S.214(1) (a) 'to be entitled to any part of the deceased's estate'. This widow claims to be so entitled and she makes an application, which is necessary before the Court can proceed with a pending execution. The Court cannot on that application proceed with execution unless a succession certificate is produced." So in this case even when the prayer was to carry on the execution application filed by the original decreeholder after substitution of the legal representatives it was held that a succession certificate was necessary. So it fully supports the appellant's position here. In Mohamed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Bepari (26 Cal. 839) what was laid down was only that an application filed by a decreeholder can be continued by his successor-in-interest without the production of a succession certificate for at page 841 it is observed as follows: "But there is another reason why we think that the contention of the appellant in this case should fail and that is this, that S.4, sub-s. (1) Cl. (b) which is the only provision of the Succession Act under which the case could possibly come can have no application to the present case. For, that clause provides that no Court shall 'proceed upon the application of a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased person' to execute against a debtor of such deceased person a decree or order for the payment of his debt. Now, in the present case the Court was not proceeding upon the application of a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased person but was proceeding originally upon the application of the creditor himself and it was only during the pendency of the execution proceedings that the original mortgagee decree-holder died and his legal representatives, the present respondents, were brought on record." In Kshetra Mohan v. Azhizullah Mea (AIR 1920 Calcutta 580) also it was the same principle that was laid down. S.4 referred to in 26 Calcutta 839 is of the Indian Succession Act of 1889 which corresponds to S.214 of the Succession Act, XXXIX of 1925, which is the same as S.3 of the Travancore Act referred to in 31 TLJ 80. So it cannot be said that even the Calcutta cases are authorities to support the position that the legal representatives and their assignees-in-interest can file a fresh execution application and seek reliefs without the production of a succession certificate on the ground that a prior application had been filed by the original decreeholder. We are not called upon here to consider whether that position itself is correct as in the present case what we have to consider is whether the legal representatives of a decreeholder and their assignees can file a fresh execution application and seek to enforce personal relief without the production of a succession certificate. In 55 Madras 352 the only question considered was whether the legal representatives of a decreeholder can proceed with the execution application filed by the original decree-holder. So these decisions did not support the principle laid down in 31 TLJ 80. S.214(b) of the present Succession Act is as follows: "No Court shall (b) proceed upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for payment of his debt, except on the production by the person so claiming of etc." So the wording clearly indicates that when a fresh execution application is filed by the successors-in¬interest a succession certificate is essential whatever be the position when it is a question of a continuation of an execution application filed by the original decree-holder. So in the present case it is clear that the production of a succession certificate is necessary in order to enforce the personal reliefs granted under the decree. Of course, with regard to execution against the property charged no certificate is necessary. The lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that with regard to the personal reliefs also no succession certificate need be produced. 6. Of course, with regard to execution against the property charged no certificate is necessary. The lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that with regard to the personal reliefs also no succession certificate need be produced. 6. In the result, it is held that the present execution petitioners, namely, the assignees of the rights of some of the legal representatives are entitled to execute for the benefit of all interested in the decree but if they want to enforce the personal reliefs granted under the decree they are to produce a succession certificate authorising the legal representatives of the original decree-holder to do so. The second appeal is allowed to the said extent. It is considered that it is only proper that the respondents are given an opportunity to produce a succession certificate. The execution court is directed to give reasonable time for the same. The parties are directed to suffer their own costs.