Raichand Amichand v. Sanchalak Gramodhar — 1956 DIGILAW 98 (MP)

JUDGEMENT : SAMVATSAR, J. The petitioner was a, sitting member of the Gram Panchayat, Suhagpura and was a Sarpuncha both of the Gram Panchayat, Suhagpura and the Kendra Panchayat of Mahidpur. 2. The accounts of the Gram Panchayat and the Kendra Panchayat which were maintained during the period the petitioner was Sarpancha of the Gram Panchayat and the Kendra Panchayat, were audited by the audit party and it noticed that there were numerous irregularities therein. The audit report was considered by the Department of Rural Development and it found it necessary to inquire into the matter. On a further scrutiny, it appeared to the Director of Rural Uplift, Madhya Bharat, that a charge-sheet should be served upon the petitioners and that the matter should be investigated further. On 4-4-1956 the Director of Rural Uplift therefore served a charge-sheet on the petitioner and called upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of the Pancha. The petitioner gave a reply to the charges on 21-4-1956. On 1-5-1956 the Director of Rural Uplift gave a notice to the petitioner intimating to him that the hearing of his case was fixed on 8-5-1956 and that he should therefore appear in person on the said date along with such evidence as he wanted to adduce in connection with the charges framed against him. 3. On receipt of this notice, the petitioner engaged Mr. S. M. Kutumbale, Advocate, to appear for him during the inquiry before the Director of Rural Uplift. On 7-5-1956 the petitioner accompanied by his counsel went to the office of the Director and applied that his counsel be permitted to inspect the record pertaining to the inquiry. The prayer was however refused on the same day on the ground that the inquiry was a departmental inquiry and the relevant Government record could not be shown to the pleader. It is alleged by the petitioner that Mr. Kutumbale also asked for permission to appear on behalf of the petitioner during the inquiry but the request was turned down. 4. On 8-5-1956, which was the date fixed for personal hearing of the petitioner at the departmental inquiry the petitioner submitted three applications before the hearing commenced. It is alleged by the petitioner that Mr. Kutumbale also asked for permission to appear on behalf of the petitioner during the inquiry but the request was turned down. 4. On 8-5-1956, which was the date fixed for personal hearing of the petitioner at the departmental inquiry the petitioner submitted three applications before the hearing commenced. By the first application the petitioner requested that eight witnesses examined during his absence be recalled for being examined in his presence and for being cross-examined, and further requested that 9 witnesses mentioned in the application be summoned for being examined in defence. The second application contained a prayer for inspection of certain record and in the third application there was a request made to the Director to give a Dakhala that the permission to be represented by a pleader was refused to the petitioner. The petitioner has contended that no orders were passed on either of these applications ana the Director proceeded with the inquiry and examined the petitioner on the various charges levelled against him. 5. During the course of his statement, the petitioner informed the Director that he could not answer questions put to him unless he was given inspection of the necessary files. The prayer was granted and the hearing was adjourned to 14-5-1956 to enable the petitioner to look into the relevant papers before answering the questions put to him. On 14-5-1956 the petitioner was accordingly further examined and answered the questions put to him after looking into the relevant files. From the statement made by the petitioner, the Director was satisfied that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct and was not a fit person to hold the office of a Pancha. He therefore ordered the petitioner to be removed from the office of the Pancha. 6. During the interval, programme for fresh elections to the Panchayats was published by the Collector. The petitioner decided to contest the election and filed his nomination paper but it was rejected by the Nirwachan Adhikari as by that time the Director, Rural Uplift had ordered his removal from the office. 6. During the interval, programme for fresh elections to the Panchayats was published by the Collector. The petitioner decided to contest the election and filed his nomination paper but it was rejected by the Nirwachan Adhikari as by that time the Director, Rural Uplift had ordered his removal from the office. Aggrieved by this rejection of his nomination paper the petitioner has filed this petition for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writs order or direction to quash the order of the Director of Rural Uplift, removing the petitioner from the office of the Puncha and further to quash the order of the Nirwachan Adhikari by which the petitioners nomination paper was rejected. 7. The grounds on which the validity of the order or removal of the petitioner from the office of the Puncha is challenged, are set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the petition and briefly stated they are as follows : "(i) that the order removing the petitioner is passed by the Director, Rural Uplift, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the amended Rule No. 38 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Rules; that this rule is in Hindi language and its English translation is not published under the authority of the Rajpramukh as provided in Art. 348(3) of the Constitution; that the rule was therefore ultra vires, void and of no effect that in the absence of this rule the Director, Rural Uplift had no power to remove the petitioner from the office of the Puncha and the order of removal was therefore illegal and without jurisdiction; (ii) without prejudice to the aforesaid contention it is submitted that the Director had not complied with the requirements of this Rule in conducting the departmental inquiry and the order of removal of the petitioner was bad on that account too. In this respect it is stated (a) that the witnesses were examined during the departmental inquiry in the petitioners absence and without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect it is stated (a) that the witnesses were examined during the departmental inquiry in the petitioners absence and without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine them. This, it was submitted, was contrary to the provisions of R. 38 and was in any event against the principles of natural justice; (b) that the petitioner was not given inspection of the files for which he had applied, nor was he allowed sufficient time to produce his witnesses; (c) that the petitioners request for permission to be represented by a pleader was refused; (d) that the three applications filed by the petitioner on 8-5-1956 before the inquiry commenced, were not disposed of and the inquiry was held without informing the petitioner whether they were allowed or rejected." 8. The petitioner has further contended that the order of his removal from the office of the Puncha being void and illegal, the rejection of his nomination paper by the Nirwachan Adhikari was also improper and unauthorised. 9. The petitioner has impleaded the Director of Rural Uplift and the Nirwachan Adhikari as opponents Nos. 1 and 2. The opponent No. 3 is the rival candidate at the election who is stated to be the petitioners own son. The State of Madhya Bharat has also been joined as opponent No. 4. 10. The opponents 1, 2 and 4 filed a joint return in which they denied that R. 38 of the Panchayat Rules was null and void or that the inquiry in regard to the charges levelled against the petitioner was not in compliance with the amended R. 38 or was against the principles of natural justice. 11. The opponent No. 1 the Director of Rural Uplift admitted that on 8-5-1956 the petitioner filed applications as mentioned in the petition and stated that they were disposed of and the orders passed thereon were communicated to the petitioner under a memorandum dated 10-5-1956. The petitioner was examined with a view to elicit the required information and when he expressed the need to look into the record, it was made available to him and the hearing itself was adjourned to enable him to give his replies after inspection of the record. 12. It is then contended that on 14-5-1956 the petitioner was further examined and answered the questions put to him after looking into the relevant papers. 12. It is then contended that on 14-5-1956 the petitioner was further examined and answered the questions put to him after looking into the relevant papers. In his statement, he made certain admissions which clinched the matter and proved his misconduct. It was under the circumstances of the case not necessary to proceed with the inquiry any further or to examine the witnesses. The opponent No. 1 was satisfied on these admissions that the petitioner was not a fit person to hold the office of the Puncha and was removed by him. The opponent has denied that the files required by the petitioner were not shown or that the petitioner was cross-examined by the Director and subjected to harrassment in any manner. 13. It is further contended that the petitioner never asked permission to be represented by a pleader and therefore the question of refusing this prayer never arose. It is also urged that there is no right enabling a person against whom departmental inquiry is directed to be represented by a counsel. 14. Finally it was urged that the proceedings before the Director of Rural Uplift were purely executive in character and the only conditions that apply and had to be complied with in conducting the inquiry were those that were imposed by the rules and no others. 15. At the stage of arguments, Mr. S. D. Sanghi learned counsel for the petitioner did not press for the second relief, namely, the relief in the form of a writ to quash the order of the Nirwachan Adhikari by which the petitioners nomination paper was rejected. It is therefore unnecessary to consider that aspect of the petitioners case. 16. Mr. Sanghi also did not press the contention that the inquiry was bad because the petitioner was not allowed to inspect the record or for the reason that the petitioner was not allowed to be represented by a counsel during the inquiry. 17. The main points which remain to be considered are : "(i) Whether the amended R. 38 framed by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the Panchayat Act, is void and of no effect because it is in Hindi and its English translation is not published in the Government Gazette under the authority of the Rajpramukh? 17. The main points which remain to be considered are : "(i) Whether the amended R. 38 framed by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the Panchayat Act, is void and of no effect because it is in Hindi and its English translation is not published in the Government Gazette under the authority of the Rajpramukh? (ii) Whether the order of the opponent No. 1 removing the petitioner from the office of the Puncha is vitiated because (a) the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to meet the charges levelled against him and to examine his evidence; (b) the inquiry was conducted in violation of the rules of natural justice?" 18. I shall examine these contentions seriatim. 19. The petitioners first contention is that the R. 38 of the Panchayat Rules is null and void because it is in Hindi and its English translation is not published under the authority of the Rajpramukh. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the absence of an authoritative English translation, there was a failure to comply with the provisions of Art. 348(3) of the Constitution and the rule was therefore null and void and of no effect. 20. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to examine the various provisions of the Indian Constitution which deal with the official language and the language in which the business is transacted in Parliament and in the State Legislatures. For this purpose, we have to look to Arts. 120, 210 and the whole of Part XVII which deals with the official language and includes Arts. 343 to 351 of the Constitution. 21. By Article 343(1) the Constitution has declared that Hindi shall be the official language of the Union. By Cl. (2) of this Article, it is however provided that English language is allowed to be used for a period of 15 years beginning from the commencement of the Constitution for all official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before such commencement. There is a proviso to this clause under which the President is authorised even during the aforesaid period of 15 years to authorise the use of Hindi in addition to the English language. 22. There is a proviso to this clause under which the President is authorised even during the aforesaid period of 15 years to authorise the use of Hindi in addition to the English language. 22. Article 345 empowers the Legislature of a State by-law to adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the purposes of that State. There is a proviso to this Article which enacts that until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides, the English language shall continue to be used for purposes of the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. 23. Article 348, which is the most material Article is then as follows : "348(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament bylaw otherwise provides (a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court, (b) The authoritative text (i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendment thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State, (ii) of all Acts, passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, and (iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, shall be in the English language. (2) ................... (3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of Cl. (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for the use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinance promulgated by the Governor or Rajpramukh of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor or Rajpramukh of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article." 24. The provisions of Art. 348 regarding the use of the English language for purposes specified in sub-cl. The provisions of Art. 348 regarding the use of the English language for purposes specified in sub-cl. (1) are subject to the law to be made by the Parliament. But by Art. 348 of the Constitution this power is limited into two respects : (i) that during the period of 15 years from the commencement of the Constitution no bill or amendment making provision for the language to be used for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. 348(1) shall be introduced or moved without the previous sanction of the President; and (ii) that the President shall not give his sanction to the introduction of the bill or amendment of the Constitution in the matters specified in Cl. (1) of Art. 348 without taking into consideration the recommendations of the Commission constituted under cl. (1) of Art. 344 and the report of the Committee constituted under Cl. (4) of Art. 344. 25. Articles 350 and 351 are in the nature of directions. Article 350 is intended to enable every person to submit a representation for redress of his grievance to any officer or authority of the Union or the State in any of the language used in the Union or in the State. Article 351 casts a duty on the Union to promote the spread and development of the Hindi language. 26. The net result of these various provisions is that Hindi is declared to be the State language and is allowed to be used for all purposes of the Union subject to the provisions contained in Article 348. So far as the States are concerned Article 343 has no application. For the States the material provision is to be found in Article 345, which empowers the Legislature of a State by-law to adopt any one or more of the languages used in the State or Hindi as the language to be used for all or any of the purposes of the State and permits the use of English language (i) in the absence of such a law and (ii) only for the purposes for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. In a State like Madhya Bharat where immediately before the commencement of the Constitution laws were passed in Hindi, question of using English language by reason of Art. 345, for passing Acts and Ordinances, does not arise. In a State like Madhya Bharat where immediately before the commencement of the Constitution laws were passed in Hindi, question of using English language by reason of Art. 345, for passing Acts and Ordinances, does not arise. If prior to 26-1-1950 laws were passed in Hindi, they could as well be passed in that language even in the post-Constitution period. 27. In this connection reference may also be made to Article 120 and 210 which deal with the language in which the business of the Parliament and the State Legislature has to be transacted. Article 210(1) which deals with the language to be used in the Legislature of a State is to the following effect : "210(1). Notwithstanding anything in Part XVII, but subject to the provisions of Article 348, business in the Legislature of a State shall be transacted in the official language or languages of the State or in Hindi or in English;........". 28. It cannot be disputed that framing of laws is an important business that a State Legislature has to transact and when the State Legislature is allowed to use Hindi language in transacting its business, it must be assumed that it can pass laws also in that language. 29. I shall now consider the impact of Article 348 on the provisions of Art. 210 and Article 345. This Article contains an over-riding provision in that it provides that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of Part XVII, (a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and every High Court shall be in English and (b) the authoritative texts - (i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State, (ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, and (iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State, shall be in the English language. Article 348 (1) (a) is per-emptory and enacts that all proceedings in every High Court shall be in English notwithstanding that in the pre-constitution days the proceedings in the High Court were allowed to be carried on in Hindi or other regional language. Article 348 (1) (a) is per-emptory and enacts that all proceedings in every High Court shall be in English notwithstanding that in the pre-constitution days the proceedings in the High Court were allowed to be carried on in Hindi or other regional language. Article 348 (1)(b) does not lay down that all proceedings in the Parliament and the State Legislatures shall be in English. The mandatory provisions in Cl. (b) of Art. 348(1) providing for the use of English language is intended only for the limited purposes of having the authoritative text. It does not forbid laws being passed in languages other than English. It only requires that the authoritative text of the law shall be in English. This also has been relaxed in respect of the State laws by authorising the State Legislatures by Clause (3) to Article 348 of the Constitution to prescribe any other language in use in the State for the purposes of Cl. (1) (b) of the said Article. By Cl. (3) it is provided that if an English translation of the laws made by the Legislature or of the rules framed by the Government is published under the authority of the Rajpramukh, it shall also be recognised as an authoritative English text for the purposes of Article 348 (1)(b). 30. It is not the petitioners case that the Madhya Bharat Legislature has not prescribed Hindi for the purposes of introducing bills, passing acts, promulgating Ordinances or making rules, regulations or bye-laws. No such contention can also be advanced in view of the Madhya Bharat Official Language Act S. 2007 by which Hindi is adopted as the official language of the State. Section 3 of the Madhya Bharat Official Language Act is as follows : "3. All Bills to be introduced and amendments thereto to be moved in the Legislature and all acts passed by it and all Ordinances issued by the Rajpramukh; and all orders rules regulation and bye-laws issued under the Constitution of India or under any law made by the Legislature of Madhya Bharat shall be in Hindi written in the Devanagari script : Provided that an authoritative text of the same, in the English language, shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Article 348(3) of the Constitution of India." 31. In view of this provision it is futile to argue that laws passed or rules made in Hindi are devoid of force or of no effect. 32. Having held that R. 38 of the Punchayat Rules is not ultra vires or of no effect, the next question to be considered is, whether the inquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner and his removal from office was effected without complying with this rule or against the principles of natural justice. 33. The power that is vested in the Government to remove a Puncha from his office is derived by them under the amended S. 18(4) of the Punchayat Act and R. 38 of the Punchayat Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 116 of that Act. The amended S. 18(4) is as follows : "The Government may, after such inquiry as it deems fit and in accordance with the rules made under the Act at any time remove a Puncha. (a) If he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duty; or (b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public. Provided that .... nor the Government or shall remove him, unless he has been given opportunity to show cause ....... why he should not be removed from his office." 34. Section 18(4) which empowers the Government to remove any person from the office of a Puncha has also prescribed circumstances in which the order of removal can be passed and the conditions which must be complied with before doing so. Under this section a Puncha can only be removed (i) if he is found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or (ii) if his continuance in office of a Puncha is deemed undesirable in the interest of the Public. 35. There is also a proviso attached to the amended S. 18(4) of the Punchayat Vidhan. It provides that no order removing a Puncha from his office shall be passed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. 36. It is not disputed that in the present case a notice as contemplated by the proviso to S. 18 (4) of the Punchayat Vidhan was given to the petitioner and there was a due compliance with its requirements. 37. 36. It is not disputed that in the present case a notice as contemplated by the proviso to S. 18 (4) of the Punchayat Vidhan was given to the petitioner and there was a due compliance with its requirements. 37. By S. 115, Madhya Bharat Punchayat Vidhan, the Government are empowered to delegate any of the powers conferred upon them under the provisions of the Act to any particular officer or officers. For the purpose of S. 18(4), Punchayat Act the Government have delegated their power to the Director of Rural Uplift and the inquiry was held in exercise of this delegated authority by the Opponent No. 1. 38. On an inquiry into the charges, the Director of Rural Uplift came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct and that his continuance in office was undesirable in the interest of the public. 39. It is however argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the removal of the petitioner had to be in accordance with the rules made under the Punchayat Act and the order of removal of the petitioner was bad as the Director of Rural Uplift had passed it without complying with the relevant rule. 40. The amendment to S. 18 was effected by Act No. 16 of 1955 which came into force on 24-6-1955. It was to give effect to this amendment that R. 38 of the Punchayat Rules was amended and put up in its present from on 17-11-1955. This rule is as follows : 41. This rule requires that before an order of removal of a Puncha is passed, the Director of Rural Uplift should give in writing the charges on the basis of which the action is proposed to be taken and sufficient opportunity should be given to the Puncha to give a reply in writing. The Puncha should be given a fixed date which should not exceed more than fifteen days to produce his evidence and he also should be asked whether he wants a personal hearing. If he so desires, and if the inquiring officer deems it fit, he will inquire into such charges as are not admitted by the Puncha. During the inquiry into these charges evidence can be examined. A memorandum of the evidence shall be made during these proceedings and use of this evidence shall be made in basing the conclusions. 42. If he so desires, and if the inquiring officer deems it fit, he will inquire into such charges as are not admitted by the Puncha. During the inquiry into these charges evidence can be examined. A memorandum of the evidence shall be made during these proceedings and use of this evidence shall be made in basing the conclusions. 42. The inquiry is to be held either by the Director Rural Uplift himself or by any of the officers duly authorised by him though the final decision has to be taken on the basis of the material produced by the Director of Rural Uplift. 43. Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present case was one in which there was a failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 38 inasmuch as no sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to produce his evidence and the decision arrived at without it was manifestly unjust. 44. The stand taken by the opponent No. 1 in his return is that from the facts admitted he was satisfied that the continuance of the petitioner in the office of the Puncha was undesirable in the interest of the public. He therefore did not think it necessary to inquire into this matter any further. 45. It is urged that the opponent had not considered any evidence recorded in the absence of the petitioner and there was therefore no violation of the principles of natural justice. 46. It is well settled that in proceedings under Art. 226, Constitution the High Court cannot exercise the powers of an appellate Court and it is therefore not within the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine whether the findings of the Director of Rural Uplift are correct or erroneous. By Art. 226, the High Court is invested with jurisdiction to interfere in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals, bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or there is any error apparent on the face of the record and such an omission error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. See Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 (A). 47. See Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 (A). 47. The Rule under which the inquiry was held, itself requires that a definite date not longer than fifteen days should be given to the Puncha to produce his evidence and such a date was admittedly fixed. The criticism is that the time given was not sufficient to collect the necessary evidence in view of the fact that the petitioner and the witnesses did not belong to Indore. 48. Whether the opportunity given in a particular case is sufficient or not, is a question of fact and can ordinarily be no ground for interference of the High Court under Art. 226. Apart from it, the Director of Rural Uplift has stated that in the statement of the petitioner himself there was sufficient material to decide the matter. 49. It was then contended that the opponent No. 1 has stated in his return that his conclusions against the petitioner were based on admitted facts. The petitioners learned counsel argued that there were no such admissions and the decision of the opponent No. 1 was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. 50. This is however not one of the grounds raised in the petition. 51. The petitioner has produced at Annexure A a copy of the charge-sheet given to him and at Annexure B there is the written reply given by him to the charges. Annexures J and K are copies of the oral statement made by the petitioner in the presence of the Director, Rural Uplift. The opponent No. 1 has also produced copies of the oral statement of the petitioner with particular portions on which he relied on in support of his findings underlined in red. 52. The learned Advocate General and the petitioners learned counsel read extensively from the charge-sheet, and the oral statement of the petitioner. Whereas the learned Advocate General has contended that there was sufficient material to support the conclusions of the opponent No. 1, Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if the defence evidence had been allowed to be produced the circumstances appearing against the petitioner would have been explained. Whereas the learned Advocate General has contended that there was sufficient material to support the conclusions of the opponent No. 1, Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if the defence evidence had been allowed to be produced the circumstances appearing against the petitioner would have been explained. He also submitted that by examining the witnesses mentioned in the application dated 8-5-1956 the petitioner could have proved that the irregularities imputed to him were committed by almost all the Punchayats and that this might have persuaded the Director of Rural Uplift to take a lenient view in this case. 53. Assuming there is some force in this contention of the petitioners learned counsel, it cannot be itself be held to be an error apparent on the face of the record and can furnish no ground for interference under Art. 226. As observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1952 SC 192 (A). "However extensive this jurisdiction may be it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and to decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." 54. In the present case the error, if any, is not one which can be described as error apparent on the face of the record and this Court not being a Court of appeal, cannot examine the merits of the case and determine whether conclusions different from those drawn by the opponent No. 1 can be reached on carefully reading the whole statement or whether on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner, a lenient view deserved to be taken. 55. I have discussed the various contentions raised on the assumption that a detailed inquiry is contemplated by Rule 38 of the Punchayat Rules and that it is obligatory to hold it. In the first place the rule is sufficiently elastic and leaves to the discretion of the Director of Rural Uplift whether there should be a detailed inquiry. Secondly, the order of removal of the petitioner from the office of the Puncha is in the nature of an administrative order which cannot be easily assailed and quashed by a mandamus. In the first place the rule is sufficiently elastic and leaves to the discretion of the Director of Rural Uplift whether there should be a detailed inquiry. Secondly, the order of removal of the petitioner from the office of the Puncha is in the nature of an administrative order which cannot be easily assailed and quashed by a mandamus. However in the view I have taken on the main contentions, it is unnecessary to discuss whether R. 38 is in the nature of administrative instructions for breach of which a writ may not be available. 56. It was finally urged that the proceedings taken by the opponent No. 1 were against the principles of natural justice. It is contended on behalf of the opponent No. 1 that he had made no use of any material that was not obtained fairly and in the presence of the petitioner himself. There is under the circumstances no question of violation of any principle of natural justice. 57. On the whole I am of opinion that no proper grounds are made out to quash the impugned order and the petition must therefore fail. 58. The petition is dismissed with costs. The costs shall be taxed at Rs. 100/-. 59. NEVASKAR, J. :- I agree.