Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the 2nd defendant in a suit to cancel a sale and recover property which has been allowed by the court below. 2. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and defendants 3 to 31 are members of an undivided Nair tarwad with their family house in Ayyanthol Village in Trichur Taluk. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 who are respectively the karnavan and senior anandiravan of the tarwad are employed in a workshop at Bombay. In the partition which took place in the main tarwad under Ext. A dated 20-7-1114 the plaintiff's group figured as the fourth thavazhi and got allotted to it among other properties the plaint schedule wet land 57% cents in extent and also four items of common debts amounting to Rs. 712-7-1. Portion of these debts was paid off by execution by the tarwad members inclusive of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 of Ext. B sale deed on 15-4-1115. Subsequently on 12-6-1116 the defendants 3 to 31 by themselves executed Ext. II sale deed of the plaint property in favour of the 1st defendant for a price of Rs. 300/- making provisions for payment of Rs, 199/- towards the balance of common debts, viz, Rs. 115-15-10 to the Manakulam Swaroopam under the decree in 0. S.452 of 1113 of the Trichur Munsiff's Court and Rs. 83-0-2 to the Manpilli Illom. Ext. II sale took in another item belonging to the third thavazhi of the main tarwad and for this purpose the members of that thavazhi were also joined as co-executants in Ext. II and were paid Rs. 50-8-0 as their share of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 101. The remaining sum of Rs. 50-8-0 was reserved with the vendee 1st defendant for payment with 6 per cent interest on the receipt of the plaintiffs 1 to 3. The plaint averred that Ext. II sale deed was incompetent on account, inter alia, of the nonjunction of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the want of consideration and necessity therefor. According to the plaintiffs the balance debt had already been paid off with moneys advanced by the plaintiffs and raised otherwise, and the execution of Ext. II had been brought about rather fraudulently. The plaintiffs therefore claimed that Exts. According to the plaintiffs the balance debt had already been paid off with moneys advanced by the plaintiffs and raised otherwise, and the execution of Ext. II had been brought about rather fraudulently. The plaintiffs therefore claimed that Exts. II sale was void and not binding on the tarwad and should be cancelled and they laid this suit accordingly on 24-3-1125 for recovery of the property with mesne profits past and future. The 2nd defendant was impleaded as the subsequent purchaser from the 1st defendant. The suit was resisted by the 2nd defendant on the footing that the debts provided for under Ext. II sale were still outstanding undischarged at its date and that the payment thereof, at any rate of the decree among the debts, by the execution of Ext. II in part avoided the compulsory sale of other valuable property of the tarwad as well. The 2nd defendant pleaded accordingly that the execution of Ext. II even without joining the plaintiffs 1 and 2 therein was in the circumstances properly justifiable. Even so, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 had actually been consulted previous to the sale and they had written letters approving of the transaction and accepting it and Ext. II was therefore not liable to be cancelled. The 2nd defendant expressed his readiness to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 50-8-0 left with him. The court below found against the plaintiffs on the question of the prior discharge of the debt and found that Ext. II was supported by consideration except to the extent of Rs. 50-8-0 and also necessity though the circumstances were not really so emergent as the defence wanted to have it. However, Ext. II had to be held invalid under S.53 of the Nayar Act of 1113 because plaintiffs 1 and 2, who constituted two of the adult members of the tarwad had not consented to it in writing. The court below found in this connection that the defence case of consent and ratification was not made out. In the result Ext. II was set aside and the plaintiffs were allowed to recover the plaint item on payment of Rs. 199 with mesne profits at lower rate till such payment and higher rate thereafter. The parties were directed to suffer their respective costs. 3. In the result Ext. II was set aside and the plaintiffs were allowed to recover the plaint item on payment of Rs. 199 with mesne profits at lower rate till such payment and higher rate thereafter. The parties were directed to suffer their respective costs. 3. Learned counsel for the 2nd defendant-appellant strongly urged before us firstly that the court below was wrong in finding that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 had not consented to the execution of Ext. II and also ratified it in letter written by them, particularly in view of the fact, as the court below itself found that the debts provided for in Ext. II were subsisting at its date and this suit was filed very late after an interval of 9 years. Secondly Ext. II sale should have been upheld by the court below in the light of its findings that there was consideration and also necessity to support it. The nonjunction of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 should in the circumstances not have been considered to be any fatal defect. On the question of fact, we find that no member of the tarwad had been examined in the case to prove the receipt of any letter of either consent or ratification as alleged. Indeed if there were any such letters the 1st defendant would certainly have been careful to get at them and pass on to the 2nd defendant. Above all there was the wording of Ext. II which proceeded as if there was no precedent consent of the plaintiffs 1 and 2. We have therefore perforce to agree with the court below that Ext. II had to be adjudged on its own merits apart from participation therein of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 either expressly or by implication. 4. Taking up then the question of law we notice, to begin with, that the court below took its stand on S.53 of the Nayar Act of 1113, which forbids by its terms the execution by a karnavan of any sale deed of tarwad property except with the written consent of all the major members of the tarwad whenever possible, to hold against the validity of Ext. II. For, the possibility was very clear in this case that the written consent of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 could be got if the executants of Ext. II were only minded to do so. II. For, the possibility was very clear in this case that the written consent of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 could be got if the executants of Ext. II were only minded to do so. It is doubtful whether S.53 of the Nayar Act can apply to this case where the karnavan is not a party at all to the sale transaction. The section contemplates his junction in any event and provides for the restrictions of his power if all by insisting on the written consent of all major members wherever possible. It is impossible therefore to have a sale of tarwad property in any circumstances without the karnavan joining it, unless, apart from the statute, resort could be had to the doctrine of urgent necessity. But this was discouraged in an old case in the Travancore High Court, Kesavan Govindan v. Chandi Geevargheee, 4 T.L.J. 380, which held that the power of junior members to raise a mortgage or a hypothecation of tarwad property in order to meet an urgent necessity of the tarwad could not be extended to a case of sale of tarwad property. For such extension "would probably be to sap the Marumakkathayam system altogether and to destroy the authority of the karnavan or manager. If the junior members were armed on the slightest pretext with authority to sell tarwad property it would lead to an impasse in justification of the sale so executed by him or them." Ext. II sale deed without the first plaintiff joining it cannot therefore be supported. S.53 will apply at any rate so far as the 2nd plaintiff junior member is concerned seeing that no circumstances, e.g. ignorance as to his whereabouts or his indifference to or enmity against the tarwad interests was attempted to be made out. Ext. II cannot therefore stand and the decision of the court below cancelling it has only to be confirmed. Learned counsel for the appellant said that Ext. II must be upheld because it has been found to be supported by necessity and that is enough under S.54. But S.54 deals only with one indispensable element for the validity of alienation, viz., necessity and does not dispense with the competency of its executants. The express provision in S.54 is not that competency of the executants is not essential to justify sale, & c., but that tarwad necessity is essential to validate them. 5. But S.54 deals only with one indispensable element for the validity of alienation, viz., necessity and does not dispense with the competency of its executants. The express provision in S.54 is not that competency of the executants is not essential to justify sale, & c., but that tarwad necessity is essential to validate them. 5. It follows therefore that the decision of the court below is correct and does not call for any interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.