JUDGMENT J.K. Tandon, J. - This revision is directed against the order of the court below passed in an appeal before it setting aside the decree of the trial court and remanding back the case for disposal in the light of the observations made by it. 2. The Plaintiffs, who are the applicants before us, instituted a suit for possession of certain plots which according to them had been mortgaged with possession in favour of the Defendants, opposite-parties by a deed executed on 7-5-1926. Before instituting the suit the applicants made an application u/s 12 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act for redemption of the very same mortgage. This application, which was registered as a suit, was subsequently dismissed because in view of the Full Bench decision in Mahabal Singh v. Ram Raj AIR 1955 All. 604 the appropriate remedy of the applicants lay not in proceedings u/s 12. of the Agriculturists' Relief Act but in a regular suit for possession in the appropriate court. The suit thus commenced was resisted by the mortgagee Defendants on several grounds. The property in suit consisted of two sets of plots, one described in Sch. A and the other in Sch. B. With regard to the Plots mentioned in Sch. B the defence was that the Plaintiffs were not the tenants of those plots which, on the other hand, were the tenancy plots of Sheo Paltan, Palku, Lagan and Paltan. An issue as follows was also framed by the Munsif: Whether the Plaintiffs are the tenants as alleged of the plots in list 'B' at the foot of the plaint? 3. The suit was instituted in 1951 before the coming into force of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950. UP Tenancy Act was, therefore, in force at that time. When, therefore, the suit came up for hearing, it was contended on behalf of the Defendants that the issue aforesaid needed to be referred to the revenue court u/s 288 of the UP Tenancy Act for a finding on it. The learned Munsif by a previous order dated 2-5-1951 did not accept the Defendants' contention but subsequently upon a second application having been moved by the Defendants he found by his order dated 19-10-1951, that the issue did arise and needed to be referred to the revenue court for decision. The issue was accordingly so referred. The learned Munsif by a previous order dated 2-5-1951 did not accept the Defendants' contention but subsequently upon a second application having been moved by the Defendants he found by his order dated 19-10-1951, that the issue did arise and needed to be referred to the revenue court for decision. The issue was accordingly so referred. Before, however, the revenue court could hear and decide this issue the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 came into force. It was, it appeared, then contended that as a result of the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act by the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 the jurisdiction of the revenue court came to an end, Section 288 of the UP Tenancy Act itself having been repealed, and the issue should be decided by the civil court concerned. Though not very clear from the record, it nevertheless appeared it was considered that in view of the provisions of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 the civil court should decide questions relating to title and the question raised was one of title. The revenue court, therefore, returned the record to the civil court saying that in view of the coming into force of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 revenue court had no longer any jurisdiction. 4. Thereafter the case proceeded in the court of the Munsif. Evidence in this issue as well as on others was taken and the learned Munsif decided the suit including this issue in favour of the Plaintiffs applicants. The Defendants thereafter appealed against the judgment of the learned Munsif and in appeal the only question convassed was whether it was necessary for the learned Munsif to send the issue for a finding by the revenue court u/s 288 of the UP Tenancy Act. The learned appellate Judge found that: the Plaintiffs could get possession of the lands shown in list B, if, and only if they proved themselves to be the tenants of those lands. (Reference to 'those lands' was obviously to plots mentioned in Sch. B). The learned Judge also found that since the cause of action in respect of the suit had arisen before the commencement of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 the issue as plffs. tenant rights necessarily required to be referred to the revenue court for a finding. (Reference to 'those lands' was obviously to plots mentioned in Sch. B). The learned Judge also found that since the cause of action in respect of the suit had arisen before the commencement of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 the issue as plffs. tenant rights necessarily required to be referred to the revenue court for a finding. He also relied on the UP Land Tenures (Legal proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 made by the Government u/s 342 of the said Act. This Order provides that, Every suit, appeal or legal, proceeding in respect of any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under or in pursuance of the UP Tenancy Act of 1939 shall... (a) where pending on 30-6-1952, in any revenue or civil court be continued in such court, and (b) where not so pending, may be instituted or commenced in the court in which it would but for the enactment of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 have been instituted or commenced. 5. The Order further said that: Every such suit, appeal or proceeding shall be heard, enquired into and decided under and in accordance with the provisions of the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901, and UP Tenancy Act, 1939. The UP Tenancy Act was repealed by Section 339 of the UPZA and LR Act. The repeal came into force from l-7-1952, the date on which the notification u/s 4 of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 had been made. Section 339 in repealing the UP Tenancy Act made no reservations or imposed no condition apart from those contained in UP General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act says that: Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter (sic) be made UP Tenancy Act is an Act made before the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 then, unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or effect any remedy or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability ... as aforesaid and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued or concluded as if the repealing Act had not been passed. as aforesaid and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued or concluded as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The effect of this section is that despite the repeal of an enactment any proceedings or remedies commenced before its repeal continue to be governed by the provisions of that Act The UP Land Tenures (Legal, Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 similarly provided in the case of the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act by the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 that any proceeding commenced before the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act and every suit or appeal thus commenced shall be heard, enquired into, and decided in accordance with the provisions contained in the UP Tenancy Act, 1939. Both the UP General Clauses Act, 1904 and the UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 made similar provisions for the continued investigation, inquiry and decision of matters arising in any suit commenced before the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act, namely, that they shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The lower appellate court, however, has referred in its order to the UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 alone, and in view of it, has found that the Munsif was bound to refer issue No. 6 aforesaid to the revenue court for decision despite the coming into force of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950. In the view of the matter taken by it, it has remanded back the case to the Munsif with directions to refer the particular issue to the revenue court and, later, to decide the suit himself in the light of the findings received from that court. 6. The learned advocate for the applicants has challenged the above order of the court, below on several grounds. He once again repeated that the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to take into consideration the provisions of UP Tenancy Act, as that Act had been repealed. He also disputed the effect of the UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 contending at the same time that the issue about tenancy should have been decided by the Munsif and not referred to the revenue court. Another ground raised by him was that no question of tenant right arose in the case. 7. He also disputed the effect of the UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 contending at the same time that the issue about tenancy should have been decided by the Munsif and not referred to the revenue court. Another ground raised by him was that no question of tenant right arose in the case. 7. So far as the last mentioned point is concerned, both the Munsif and the lower appellate court found after hearing, the parties that the question of tenant right did arise in the case. The learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that the finding of the two courts, namely, the finding that the question of tenant right did arise, was incorrect. While silting in revision we will not, unless there be some very strong reasons to the contrary, interfere with the findings of the court below where the court below was competent to record a finding on that point and it has not acted with any material irregularity or illegality. In this case it has not been disputed that the Munsif as well as the Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, had jurisdiction to decide whether the question of tenant right actually arose or not in the case. As a matter of fact, Section 288 of the UP Tenancy Act requires the court, in which the question is raised, to find whether such a question does arise in the case and when it so arises, to refer it to the revenue court concerned for a finding upon it. This section gave jurisdiction to the two courts to record a finding on this particular question and they after hearing the parties found that the question did arise. I do not think it will materially alter the position that the Munsif had once found that the question of tenant right did not arise. Firstly it is not the order of the Munsif with which we are concerned at this stage. The order attacked is the order passed by the first appellate court which at no earlier stage found that the issue did not arise. Secondly, the Munsif was competent to decide whether the question did off did not arise and there was no bar to his reviewing the earlier order wherein he found that the issue did not arise. The order attacked is the order passed by the first appellate court which at no earlier stage found that the issue did not arise. Secondly, the Munsif was competent to decide whether the question did off did not arise and there was no bar to his reviewing the earlier order wherein he found that the issue did not arise. It was in the nature of an interlocutory order and could be revised by the court I do not think it can be said in this case that the court below acted illegally or with material irregularity or exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding that the question of tenant right arose in the case. 8. The next contention by the learned advocate for the applicant was that once the UP Tenancy Act had been repealed and the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 had come into force, the appropriate court to decide the issue was the civil court. He invited my attention to Section 332 of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950. It says that: Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 331 if in any suit or proceeding mentioned in column 3 of Sch. II a question is raised regarding the title of any party to the land which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings ... the court shall ... frame an issue on the question of title and submit the record to the competent civil court for the decision of that issue only. I do not know this section at all helped his contention. In the first place this section is applicable to those suits only which are described or are contained or are mentioned in Sch. II of the Act. The present was obviously not a suit falling under any of the categories mentioned in Sch. II. It was commenced before the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 came into force. Section 332 relates to those cases only which fall under the provisions of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950. Secondly the question raised in the suit was not a question regarding title. As the law stood before the commencement of the UP. ZA and LR Act 1950 this was a question of tenant right and not a question of title Section 332 has absolutely no relevancy. 9. Secondly the question raised in the suit was not a question regarding title. As the law stood before the commencement of the UP. ZA and LR Act 1950 this was a question of tenant right and not a question of title Section 332 has absolutely no relevancy. 9. With regard to his contention that the UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1952 was not applicable, it has been, difficult to follow his reasoning. In this order it has been very clearly stated that any suit or proceedings in respect of a right, liability, obligation or privilege acquired under the UP Tenancy Act previous to its repeal by the UPZA and LR Act, 1950, shall be commenced and continued under the UP Tenancy Act as if it had not been repealed. The Plaintiffs were claiming that they were tenants of the plot in question. They were thus claiming a right, which according to then had accrued in their favour under that Act. The suit itself in which this question arose, was commenced before the repeal of that Act. The conditions necessary for the application of the Order, therefore existed. 10. Earlier I referred to Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act of 1904 also. Apart from what had been stated in the above order of 1952, Section 6 itself authorised the continuance of the suit in accordance with the provisions of the UP Tenancy Act of 1939. The UP Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order of 1952 has only reaffirmed what otherwise was the consequence of the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act by the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 having regard to Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act, 1904. 11. It cannot, therefore be said that the finding reached by the lower appellate court that the issue should have been referred to the revenue court was wrong. In my view it will not make any difference that the revenue court had at any stage returned back the papers to the civil court saying that after the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act the jurisdiction vested in the civil court. In my view it will not make any difference that the revenue court had at any stage returned back the papers to the civil court saying that after the repeal of the UP Tenancy Act the jurisdiction vested in the civil court. Once the provisions of Section 288 of the UP Tenancy Act are held to be applicable, it is the duty of the revenue court, to which the issue is referred, to return the record with its finding So long as it has not recorded a finding the papers can again be referred back to it for compliance of the provisions of Section 288 of the UP Tenancy Act., The court below was justified in the order made by it and it could not be interfered with by us in these proceedings. 12. In view of what I have said above, there is no force in this revision which accordingly is dismissed. But having regard to all the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. 13. This case has a prolonged history and the sooner the rights of the parties are determined the better. The case may be expedited in the courts below.