Judgment Misra, J. 1. The petitioner, Satyanarain Sah, being aggrieved by the order of the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery, Parsa Bazar, convicting him for an offence under Sec.379, Indian Penal Code, and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month as also to pay a fine of Rs. 50/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one week, has come up to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The opposite party, Bishwanath Sah, who is also a resident of the same village as the petitioner, namely Parsa Bazar, lodged a complaint against him before the Sarpanch stating that on the 16th of May, 1954, at about 7 p.m., the petitioner entered his shop premises and ran away with a lantern worth Rs. 49/-. The petitioner was duly summoned to stand his trial. He pleaded that there were certain disputes between him and the complainant and, on that account, he was falsely implicated in the case. The Bench of the Gram Cutchery duly constituted after the nomination of the Punches by the petitioner and the Complainant acquitted him of the charge. Chhabi Sah, the Punch nominated by the complainant, however, refused to sign the order. The opposite party thereupon took an appeal to the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery consisting of ten Punches including the Sarpanch, Madan Misser. The Full Bench examined some witnesses and perused the record of the case. On a consideration of the evidence, the Full Bench held that the petitioner in fact had run away with a petromax light from the house of the complainant and, accordingly found him guilty. He was sentenced as stated above. It appears, however, that the petitioner put in an application before the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chapra, under Sections 70 and 73 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 , for withdrawal of the case from the Gram Cutchery on the allegation that the Sarpanch was hostile to him and most of the other Punches were also under his influence. Bishwa-nath Sah was a rich and influential businessman of the locality and he was in a position to enlist the support and sympathy of the Sarpanch and the other Punches. This application was not finally disposed of but an order granting stay of the hearing of the appeal by the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery was made. The hearing was, accordingly postponed. This application was not finally disposed of but an order granting stay of the hearing of the appeal by the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery was made. The hearing was, accordingly postponed. In the meantime, an application was filed by Bishwanath Sah in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 19th August, 1954, to the effect that the Criminal. Case filed by him before the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery, which was pending disposal before the Gram Cutchery, was stayed by the order of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. Since it was being inordinately delayed, it was necessary that proper orders should be passed in the case. Accordingly, on 14th March, 1955, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate vacated the order of stay and directed the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery, Parsa Bazar, to proceed to bear the appeal. He also ordered a copy of the order to be sent to the Sarpanch of the Gram Cutchery. The Full Bench, accordingly, took up the hearing and on the 18th March, 1955, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the original Bench of the Gram Cutchery and convicted the petitioner. The petitioner thereupon made a further application under Section 73 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act praying for setting aside the order of the Full Bench of the Gram Cutchery on the ground of miscarriage of justice. On the 1st June, 1955, however, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate rejected that application as well on the ground that the Full Bench, of the Gram Cutchery having disposed of the appeal pending before it under Sec. 67 of the Act, he was incompetent under Section 73 (3) of the Act to interfere any longer with the proceeding, inasmuch as the decision of the Full Bench was made final under Sec. 67 of the Act, which was also made clear under Section 73 (3) of the Act. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the view of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate refusing to decide his application on merits is erroneous and amounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction which the law has clearly vested in him. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the view of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate refusing to decide his application on merits is erroneous and amounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction which the law has clearly vested in him. If he had decided the application under Section 73 on merits, whatever bis decision might be adjudging the allegations of the petitioner, it might not be open to interference by this COurt so far as the allegations were concerned, but he refused to enter into the question altogether so that his order dated the 1st June, 1955, must be set aside by this Court in its jurisdiction of superintendence. He has further contended that even the Previous order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer on the application by the petitioner under Section 70, which was disposed of by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 14th March, 1955, was bad in law, inasmuch as the order was passed without hearing him. In support of his first contention, he has referred us to the relevant sections of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 , and to a decision of this Court. The relevant sections of the Act are Sections 59, 60 and 67 and Rule 59 of the Statutory Rules issued by the State Government under Section 80 of the Act. Learned counsel has also referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Mukhlal Gir V/s. The State, 1955 BLJR 416 at p. 419 (A), wherein also an identical question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Section 73 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act to interfere with a proceeding before the Gram Cutchery was raised and considered. In that case a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of my learned brother and myself, expressed the following opinion: "Moreover, I have already held that the proper course for them was to make an application under Section 73 of the Act which contemplates that if there is an apprehension of miscarriage of justice, then application may be made to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for cancellation of the jurisdiction of, the Bench with regard to a suit or case, or to quash any proceeding of the Bench at any stage. Section 73 to that extent is complementary to Section 70 which applies to the Bench of the Gram Cutchery, which evidently refers to the trial stage. Section 73 to that extent is complementary to Section 70 which applies to the Bench of the Gram Cutchery, which evidently refers to the trial stage. The language of Section 73, however, is more comprehensive inasmuch as it refers to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Sub-divisional Magistrate in any case or suit at any stage; and Sub-section (3) states that except for the exercise of jurisdiction as provided for in Sub-sections (1) and (2) and as provided for in Sec. 67, an order or decree passed by the Bench of the Gram Cutchery under this Act shall be final and shall not be open to appeal or revision in any Court. This also indicates that if a person has a grievance at any stage of a case, whether it is before the Grain Cutchery or a Full Bench, the Sub-divisional Magistrate can exercise his jurisdiction. In my opinion, the combined effect of Sections 70 and 73 is to provide for a situation like the present one which most frequently arises in litigations before the Gram Cutchery where all sorts of allegations are made against one or more of the Panches by the parties on the ground of bias". Learned Counsel for the opposite party, however, has contended that in that case although an opinion was expressed to that, effect but the point was not finally decided. It should accordingly be treated as a mere obiter dictum. He has accordingly invited us to examine the position afresh, Apart from the fact that the matter was considered at some length in the above case and an opinion was expressed on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, I see no reason to depart from that view, even on a fuller examination of the position which has been pressed before us by the learned counsel for the opposite party. He has laid stress on the wording of Sec. 67 of the Act which states, inter alia, that "an appeal against any order or decision of "any Bench of the Gram Cutchery shall be preferred. .... .The decision of the Full Bench on any such appeal shall be final". Section 73 of the Act which requires proper construction may be quoted in full. "73 (1). .... .The decision of the Full Bench on any such appeal shall be final". Section 73 of the Act which requires proper construction may be quoted in full. "73 (1). If there has been a miscarriage of justice, or if there is an apprehension of miscarriage of justice, in any case or suit, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, in respect of any case and the Munsif in respect of any suit may, on the application of any party or of his own motion, at any time during the pendency of the suit or case and within 60 days from the date of a decree or order, call for the record from a Bench of the Gram Cutchery and may for reasons to be recorded" in writing - "(a) cancel the jurisdiction of the Bench with regard to the suit or case; or (b) quash any proceedings of the Bench at any stage; or (c) cancel any order- or decree passed by the Bench. " (2) When an order has been passed by a Mun-sif or the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sub-section (1) in respect of any suit or case, as the case may be, the complainant or plaintiff, as the case may be, may institute the case or suit afresh in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent jurisdiction. (3) Except as aforesaid, and as provided in Sec. 67, an order or decree passed by a Bench of the Gram Cutchery in any case or suit under this Act shall be final and shall not be open to appeal or revision in any Court". Learned counsel for the opposite party has laid special stress on "Sub-section (3) of the above section and has contended that the very fact that this sub-section makes the decision of a Bench of the Gram Cutchery final, subject only to Sub-section (1) and Sec. 67, would indicate that the finality attaching to the decision of the Full Bench under Sec. 67 is to govern Sub-section (3) of Section 73. The effect of Sub-section (3), therefore, ig that the very wide terms in which Sub-section (1) of Section 73 is couched is narrowed down in its effect by the provisions of Sec. 67, so that the situation contemplated under Sub-section (1) of Section 73 should be confined only to the decision of the Bench of a Gram Cutchery as constituted under Section 57 of the Act; Sec. 57 runs thus:- - "57. Every suit or case instituted under this Act shall be instituted before the Sarpanch and shall be heard and determined by a Bench of the Gram Cutchery consisting of the Sarpanch and two Panches from the panel to be named by the respective parties to the suit or case : Provided that- (i) if any , party does not nominate a Panch within such time as may be prescribed, the Sarpanch shall nominate a Panch from the panel; (ii) if in any suit or case the Sarpanch is unable to take part in the proceeding by virtue of the provision of Sec. 56, the panel of Panches shall elect a Panch from amongst its own number and the Panch so elected shall discharge all the functions of the Sarpanch for the purpose of the said suit or case; (iii) if the services of the Sarpanch cease to be available at any time after the institution, but before the determination, of the suit or case, he may nominate a Panch in his place, or where no such nomination has been made, the seniormost Panch of the Gram Cutchery shall act for him; and (iv) if the services of a Panch cease to be available at any time after the institution, but before the determination, of the suit or case, the party which nominated that Panch shall be asked to nominate another Panch from the panel within the prescribed time". He has also referred to the rules framed under Section 80 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act in so far as the Gram Cutchery Rules are concerned. He has also referred to the rules framed under Section 80 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act in so far as the Gram Cutchery Rules are concerned. Rule 2 (b) of the Bihar Gram Cutchery Rules, 1949, de fines the word Bench as follows : " Bench means a Bench of the Gram Cutchery constituted under Sec. 57 to hear any suit or try any case instituted under the Act;" The combined effect of Sections 67, 73 and Rule 2 (b) is that the Sub-divisional Magistrate is empowered to interfere even in the case of an apprehension of miscarriage of justice or miscarriage of justice-only so long as the Full Bench has not delivered its decision aS soon as that is done, the Subdivisional Magistrate is not competent to interfere with the proceedings before the Gram Cutchery. In my opinion, the argument is without force. Reference to Rule 2 (b) of the Gram Outchery Rules is of no assistance in the matter. Rule 2 opens with the qualification that the meaning given to the words in Clauses (a), (b) (c) and (d) of the Rule will apply as set out therein, only in respect of the Rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or the context. The exact words are "In these rules unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context." In the first place, therefore, the meaning of the word "Bench" given in Rule 2 (b) is confined to the use of the word "in the context" of the rules: it hast got no application to the Act as such. The reason why it is so can be clearly understood on an examination of the rules which lay down the procedure for the constitution of the Bench of the Gram Cutchery on the original side and a few rules, beginning from Rule 55 to Rule 61, which deal with the procedure before the Full Bench of the Gram Cutcherry. Moreover the rule itself makes it clear that that is the general meaning which may be applied with reference to the subject or the context. The meaning, therefore, indicated therein is only for the purpose of compendiqus indication and it is not a definition of the word "Bench" as such. When We turn to the definitions under Sec.2 of the Act, we come across the definition of the expression "Gram Cutcherry". The meaning, therefore, indicated therein is only for the purpose of compendiqus indication and it is not a definition of the word "Bench" as such. When We turn to the definitions under Sec.2 of the Act, we come across the definition of the expression "Gram Cutcherry". Sec.2 (f) says that "Gram Cutcherry" means, a Gram Cutcherry established under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 49. Sec. 49 refers to the constitution of the Gram Cutcherry consisting of a panel of 15 persons of the prescribed qualifications to be elected by the Gram Panchayat in the prescribed manner. It is clear, therefore, that the Gram Cutcherry consists of the total number of Punches which may be a panel of 15 persons. There is no definition of a "Bench of the Gram Cutcherry" given in the Act, nor there is a definition of "a Bench, of the Gram Cutcherry" given in the Rules. What, however, the learned counsel for the opposite party is contending for is that the expression "a Bench of the Gram Cut-cherry" should be construed in a technical manner so as to exclude the ordinary judicial meaning of the word "Bench" which is the office of the Judges of a Court & which is thus a collective expression for the Judges constituting a particular Court. I see no warrant for narrowing down this meaning in regard to the use of this expression in Section 73 (3) of the present. Act. A Bench of the Gram Cutcherry consisting of three Panches as well as a Full Bench of the Gram Cutcherry consisting of the entire number or the minimum, number of eight constituting the quorum are intended, by the Legislature to be a Bench or a Full Bench of the same Court, namely, the Gram Cutcherry. The contention, therefore, that the Bench of the Gram Cutcherry is intended by the legislature to stand for any narrow meaning with reference to the Act appears unwarranted even oh a construction of the Act itself. Rule 59 of the Gram Cutcherry also gives an indication to the fact by describing a Bench of three holding original trial as the original Bench as opposed to Full Bench. Rule 59 of the Gram Cutcherry also gives an indication to the fact by describing a Bench of three holding original trial as the original Bench as opposed to Full Bench. Thus the Legislature did net make any distinction between the two wings of the Bench whose functions were defined, only for giving more than one forum and more than hearing in the same proceeding before the two wings of the Gram Cutcherry differently constituted. Moreover, when we try to gather the object and intention of the Legislature in enacting the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and Section 73 of the Act, it is clear that the Legislature intended to confer some kind of judicial autonomy in petty cases enumerated in Sec. 62 of the Act on the members of the Gram Panchayat with a view to develop some sense of responsibility among the residents of a certain locality constituting a Bench. The Legislature, however, must be taken to be clearly aware of the fact that the persons constituting the Panchayat Court are laymen who may in many cases do things in a manner which may go against the limits of their jurisdiction or may do things against natural justice. Section 73, evidently, has been incorporated, therefore, in the Act to provide a remedy for a contingency where gross miscarriage of justice has resulted as consequence of the proceeding in the Gram Cutcherry. To accept the view that miscarriage of justice may take place while the matter is pending on the original side of the Gram Cutcherry, but the Full Bench of the Gram Cutcherry is immune, such miscarriage would , be palpably unacceptable. If regular Courts of law also in cases have been found erring in this matter, and the Privy Council, without looking upon itself as a Court of Criminal Appeal, interfered in cases of gross miscarriage of justice even with the decisions of the High Courts in India, there is no reason to suppose that the Bihar Legislature intended to confer such wide powers upon the Full Bench of the Gram Cut-cherry that their judgment should be completely beyond interference by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who is a functionary more conversant with the legal procedure and the proper meaning of the various sections of the Indian Penal Code which have been enumerated in Sec. 62 of the Act. Let us take for instance the case where the original Bench of the Gram Cutcherry has imposed the sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment, when its power to impose the sentence of rigorous imprisonment is limited to one month only, and the Full Bench has upheld it. Will the Sub-divisional Magistrate be helpless in the matter ? Can it be imagined that the Legislature intended that the liberty of the subject should be thus jeopardised and he should be left completely helpless, just because the Full Bench has affirmed, modified or set aside an order ? It is patently beyond the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. Let us take also another instance where without hearing the parties, either the accused or the complainant, the Full Bench has recorded a judgment. Can it be said that Sections 67 and 73 were intended to make such an order sacrosanct ? Learned counsel for the opposite party has urged, in reply, that the High Court can interfere in such a case under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, to be noted that when the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act was passed in 1947 the Constitution of India was not then in existence. How then could it be contended with any reason that the Legislature intended remedy in such a case by the High Court under Article 227 ? As a matter of fact, if the extreme contention advanced on behalf of the opposite party in regard to the limitation upon the power of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in criminal cases and the power of the Munsif in civil cases were to be accepted, it would lead us to the absurd conclusion, that the Legislature in fact left the body of 15 as keeping in its hand the liberty of a subject at its sweet will which could pass any order without the danger of any interference by a superior tribunal. It is also to be noted that the constitution of the Full Bench in terms is such that the same Sarpanch and the two other Panches, who may in a particular case form the original Bench of the Gram Cutcherry, may have occasion to sit on the Full Bench and yet the decision given by the members of the Full Bench along with the Punches forming the original Bench would not be open to interference by the Sub-divisional Magistrate even if gross miscarriage of justice were to result. Learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that if the Legislature intended such a result to follow, it is not for a law Court to rectify the position, however unreasonable it may appear. In my opinion, the Legislature has not intended such a result and, therefore, the question of accepting the position, how-ever unreasonable it may be, does not, really, speaking, arise. Even if it be a case of narrow Interpretation as pressed by the learned counsel for the opposite party, and a wide interpretation as contended for by the petitioner, and if we had to make a choice between the two interpretations, I would be inclined to follow the exposition of the law in the case of Nokes V/s. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, 1940 AC 1014 at P. 1022 (B), referred to by Maxwell in his book the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th edition, page 6, to the effect that if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we. should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effecive result. 3. In the result, it must be held that the view expressed by the Court in Mukhlal Girs case (A) referred to above laid down the law correctly and that view must be re-affirmed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended, in the next place, that the order passed on his first application under Section 70 was passed without hearing the petitioner. He has contended that that order was passed in a new case started at the instance of the opposite party Bishwanath Sah, the complainant, and the petitioner had no notice of the various dates fixed in that case. He has contended that that order was passed in a new case started at the instance of the opposite party Bishwanath Sah, the complainant, and the petitioner had no notice of the various dates fixed in that case. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, has urged that it was not an Independent application, it was merely an application in the case started at the instance of the petitioner for the withdrawal of the case under Section 70 of the Act on various allegation that he made against the Sarpanch and some other Punches. The petitioner had full knowledge of the dates to which the case stood adjourned as a result of the various orders passed by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate and there is no reason to suppose that, he was not aware of the order passed on the 14th March, 1955. It has also been urged that no grievance was made of this fact even in the subsequent petition under Section 73 which was filed by the petitioner after the decision of the Full Bench, nor was any specific grievance made to this effect in the application to this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made this point only in course of the argument. In my opinion, the contention raised by learned counsel for the opposite party appears to be correct. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that he was not aware of the date of hearing when the order was passed by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate on his application on the 14th March, 1955, and the effect of the order of that date was that his application under Section 70 stood dismissed. 5. In the result, although the order of the learned Subordinate Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1955, refusing to consider the merits of the application of the petitioner under Section 73 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act must be held to be erroneous, nevertheless the present petition must fail PS the other ground which alone would have constituted a valid reason for interference by us, that is, that the application under Section 79 was disposed of without giving the petitioner notice of the date of hearing, has failed. No other point has been made to justify our setting aside the order of the Full Bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Banerji, J. 6 I agree.