Judgment :- 1. Both these appeals arise out of a suit for redemption. The suit properties which belonged to Alappatt Illom were demised on kanam to the families of the plaintiff and defendants 8 onwards. The kanamdars mortgaged these properties to the ancestor of defendants 1 to 4 on 30-3-1043 for a consideration of Rs. 140/-. Even though plaint items 1 and 2 were charged under the mortgage deed, item 1 alone was put in possession of the mortgagee. After his death, his heirs continued to be in possession of the property. While so, the jenmi of the property instituted the suit O.S. No.1719 of 1073 for recovery of arrears of michavaram due under the kanom deed and also to compel the kanom tenants to take a renewal providing for payment of michavarom and other dues at enhanced rates. Defendants 1 to 5 in that suit were the kanamdars, while the 6th defendant was impleaded as a mortgagee under them. The 6th defendant was Variathu Poulo, the eldest son of the original mortgagee. This Poulo was the maternal uncle of the present defendants 1 to 3 and was also the grandfather of the 4th defendant. Variath Poulo also contested that suit. Ext. B is copy of the written statement filed by him. O.S.1719 of 1073 was decreed and the kanamdars were directed to take a renewal of the kanam. Ext. A is copy of the judgment in that case. It was also provided in the decree that the mortgagee-6th defendant may execute the renewal deed in case the kanamdars failed to do so. The kanamdars were also agreeable to the renewal deed being executed by the mortgagee, and accordingly they surrendered possession of item 2 also to him about the year 1079 to enable him to pay the dues at the higher rate as provided for in the decree for renewal. 2. On 26-3-1080 the 6th defendant Variath Poulo executed the deed of renewal. Ext. C is the copy of that renewal deed. Subsequently, on 30-5-1093, these properties and other properties in the possession of the members of Poulo's family were partitioned by them. Ext. D is copy of that partition deed. According to the plaintiffs, the liability under the plaint mortgage has been acknowledged in Exts. Ext. C is the copy of that renewal deed. Subsequently, on 30-5-1093, these properties and other properties in the possession of the members of Poulo's family were partitioned by them. Ext. D is copy of that partition deed. According to the plaintiffs, the liability under the plaint mortgage has been acknowledged in Exts. B, O and D, and in view of such acknowledgments there is no bar of limitation for the present suit to redeem the mortgage. The 3rd defendant resisted the suit and contended that his possession of plaint item 2 and a portion of plaint item 1, is not under the plaint mortgage, but is under a kanom demise obtained from Alappatt Illom. He further contended that even if his possession is found to be under the plaint mortgage, the suit for redemption has only to be dismissed as being out of time, because there has been no proper or valid acknowledgment of that mortgage, and that Variath Poulo was incompetent to make any such acknowledgment binding on all the members of his family. Accepting this latter contention, the trial court held that the suit for redemption was out of time and accordingly dismissed it. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against that decree. The lower appellate court found that in Ext. B Variath Poulo, who was one of the three sons of the original mortgagee, had clearly acknowledged the plaint mortgage and that even though such an acknowledgment could not keep alive the mortgage against all the heirs of the original mortgagee, it was sufficient to keep alive the mortgage to the extent of Variath Poulo's 1/3 share in it. Consistent with these findings, the lower appellate court allowed the suit in part and passed a decree for redemption of 1/3 share of the plaint items 1 and 2 on payment of the mortgage amount and the other amounts paid by Variath Poulo towards jenmi dues. It is against this decree that the 3rd defendant has preferred Second Appeal No. 445 of 1953. The other second appeal, 472/1953, is by the plaintiffs who maintain that the suit should have been decreed in terms of the plaint. 3. The decision in both these appeals depends upon the answer to the question whether there has been a proper and valid acknowledgment of the plaint mortgage so as to keep it alive even on the date of the suit. 3. The decision in both these appeals depends upon the answer to the question whether there has been a proper and valid acknowledgment of the plaint mortgage so as to keep it alive even on the date of the suit. The mortgage was in favour of the ancestor of defendants 1 to 4 and it is common ground that the mortgage came into existence on 30 31043. The present suit was instituted at a time when the parties were governed by the Travancore Limitation Act (Act VI of 11001. Under Art.126 of that Act the period of limitation prescribed for a suit to redeem a mortgage and to recover possession of immovable properly mortgaged was 50 years from the date when the right to redeem accrued. Admittedly, no period was fixed under the mortgage deed in question. It follows therefore that the period of 50 years under Art.136 has to be computed from the date of the mortgage itself. The present suit was instituted long after the expiry of this period. It has therefore to be seen whether the mortgage was kept alive by any valid acknowledgment before the expiry of the said period of 50 years and within a period of 50 years prior to the date of the suit. 4. Exts. B, C and D are the documents relied on by the plaintiffs for the purpose of saving the suit from the bar of limitation. All these documents came into existence within 50 years prior to the date of the suit. But it is seen that Ext. D, the partition deed executed by the heirs of the original mortgagee, is a document dated 30-5-1093 i.e., after the expiry of the period of 50 years from the date of the mortgage. Hence any statement contained in Ext. D which might amount to an acknowledgment of the plaint mortgage, could not by itself revive and keep alive the mortgage which was already dead by having become barred by limitation. It may also be stated that Ext. D does not contain any statement acknowledging the liability under the plaint mortgage. Then there are Exts. B and C. Ext. B is copy of the written statement filed by the 6th defendant in O.S. No.1719 of 1073 'on the file of the Parur Munsiff's Court. It may also be stated that Ext. D does not contain any statement acknowledging the liability under the plaint mortgage. Then there are Exts. B and C. Ext. B is copy of the written statement filed by the 6th defendant in O.S. No.1719 of 1073 'on the file of the Parur Munsiff's Court. That was a suit instituted by the original Jenmi of the plaint items against the kanamdars, for recovery of the arrears of jenmi dues and for compelling the kanamdars to renew the kanam providing for payment of such dues at enhanced rates. The 6th defendant in that suit was impleaded as the person in possession of the properties. This 6th defendant was Variath Poulo, the eldest of the three sons of the original mortgagee. In Ext. B Variath Poulo has referred to the plaint mortgage and has clearly admitted that under that mortgage possession of item 1 was given to his father to enable him to appropriate its income towards the interest op the mortgage amount and that after his father's death Variath Poulo was himself in possession of the properties under the mortgage. It was further stated in Ext. B that in case of the kanamdar's default to take a renewal, Variath Poulo was himself prepared to take a renewal of the kanam. These statements clearly amount to an acknowledgment of the subsisting rights and liabilities under the plaint mortgage by one of the sons of the original mortgagee. The finding of the lower courts to that effect has therefore to be upheld. 5. Ext. A is copy of the judgment in O. S.1719/1073 and it shows that the kanamdars were directed to execute a renewal deed in favour of the plaintiff jenmi. The 6th defendant who was in possession of one item of the properties, was also given the liberty to execute a renewal deed, in case the kanamdars defaulted to do so.'lhe kanamdars did not execute the renewal deed, but put the 6th defendant in possession of the 2nd item of property also covered by the plaint mortgage to as to enable him to pay enhanced dues to the jenmi. The 6th defendant accordingly executed the renewal deed in favour of the jenmi and Ext. C is copy of that renewal deed. This document also contains a clear statement that he was in possession of the two items of property under the plaint mortgage. The 6th defendant accordingly executed the renewal deed in favour of the jenmi and Ext. C is copy of that renewal deed. This document also contains a clear statement that he was in possession of the two items of property under the plaint mortgage. It was not a casual statement explaining how Variath Poulo happened to be in possession of the property, as the lower appellate court has taken it to be. On the other hand, Variath Poulo was clearly admitting that his possession was under the plaint mortgage, thereby conceding the rights and liabilities under that mortgage. Thus, so far as he is concerned, it has to be taken that in Ext. 0 also he has made an acknowledgment of the plaint mortgage. The acknowledgment in Exts. B and C were made within 50 years from the date of the mortgage and also within 50 years prior to the date of the suit. 6. The next and the more important point to be considered is whether the acknowledgments made by Variath Poulo in Exts. B and C are by themselves sufficient to keep alive the plaint mortgage in its entirety or at least in respect of Variath Poulo's interest or share in that mortgage. For giving the mortgagor a fresh starting point of limitation other than the normal starting point for a suit for redeeming the mortgage, there must have been a valid acknowledgment as contemplated by S.19 or S, 20 of the Limitation Act. S.20 is not invoked in the present suit for the obvious reason that the plaintiffs have no case that there has been any payment on account of the debt and evidence in writing of such payment signed by the party making the payment, as contemplated by S.20. The plaintiffs are only invoking S.19 on the strength of the acknowledgments contained in Exts. B and C. It has to be remembered in this connection that these acknowledgments were made only by one of the three sons of the original mortgagee on whom the mortgage right had devolved after his death. In order to attract S.19 there must be an acknowledgment of liability made in writing and signed by the party against whom the claim is sought to be enforced or by some person through whom he derives title or liability. In order to attract S.19 there must be an acknowledgment of liability made in writing and signed by the party against whom the claim is sought to be enforced or by some person through whom he derives title or liability. Such an acknowledgment signed "by a duly authorised agent will also come under S.19 by virtue of Explanation II to the section. After the plaint mortgage had devolved on the three sons of the original mortgagee, the liability to surrender possession of the properties on receipt of the redemption price was common to all the three of them and naturally, therefore the party competent to make an acknowledgment of such a liability consisted of these three persons or an agent duly authorised by them. Variath Poulo who signed Exts. B and C did not purport to act on behalf of all these three persons, nor was he competent to do so. The documents show that he was acting in his individual capacity. Himself and his brothers took the mortgage right as tenants-in-common and as such his position could not be akin to that of the manager of a joint Hindu family. There is also nothing on record to show that he had been duly authorised by his brothers to act as their agent in making the acknowledgments in Exts. B and C. Thus the acknowledgments made by him could not in any way bind his brothers or their rights under the plaint mortgage. This position is made clear by sub-section (2) of S.21 of the Limitation Act. Subsection (2) states that nothing contained in S.19 and 20 renders one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed or of a payment made by, or by the agent of, any other or others of them. By implication it would appear from this sub-section that one or more of such joint contractors, partners executors or mortgagees would become chargeable by reason of the written acknowledgment signed by them or by their agent. But this implication can hold good only in cases where such persons have distinct and separate liabilaties capable of being acknowledged and kept alive. By implication it would appear from this sub-section that one or more of such joint contractors, partners executors or mortgagees would become chargeable by reason of the written acknowledgment signed by them or by their agent. But this implication can hold good only in cases where such persons have distinct and separate liabilaties capable of being acknowledged and kept alive. So long as the integrity of the mortgage is maintained, no one of the joint mortgagees could be said to have a separate right or liability under the mortgage so that he, could by himself put an end to such a separate right or keep alive his separate liability by acknowledging the same. The position may be different after the mortgage has been split up by the agreement or conduct of the parties themselves or by operation of law. 7. So far as the plaint mortgage is concerned its integrity was never split up. The mortgage properties were partitioned by the heirs of the original mortgagee only when they executed the partition deed Ext. D dated 30-5-1093 by which time the right of redemption had become barred by limitation and full ownership of the properties had become vested in them. On the dates of Exts. B and C the mortgage remained joint and undivided and as such Variath Poulo alone could not acknowledge the liability under it. His acknowledgment could not also operate in respect of any portion of that mortgage because the integrity of the mortgage had not been broken and he had acquired no separate, distinct or exclusive right or liability in respect of that mortgage. Thus the acknowledgments made by Variath Poulo in Exts. B and C were totally in effective in saving the mortgage from getting barred by lapse of time. This view gains support from the decisions in Bhogilal v. Amritlal ( (1893) I.L.R.17 Bombay 173), Jawala Prasad v. Achehey Lal ((1912) I. L. R.34 Allahabad 371), Nadar Shah v. Ishar Das (A. I. R.1920 Lahore 516) Ahamad Shah v. Kartar Singh (A. I. R.1934 Lahore 293 (1) and in Mulch Narain v. Ramalochan (A. I. R.1941 Patna 147) where also the effect of an acknowledgment made by one only of several joint mortgagees had come up for consideration. After a review of these and other cases dealing with the same question, the principle that so long as the integrity of the mortgage remains unbroken an acknowledgment by one of the several joint mortgagees will not keep alive the mortgagor's right of redemption even in respect of the share of the person acknowledging the mortgage, was again affirmed in Ramavarama Thampuran v. Kunju, Pennamma (1951 K.L.T. 683, at pp. 693 to 695). As against these decisions learned counsel for the plaintiffs cited the decision in Motilal Jadav v. Samal Bechar (I.L.R. 54 Bombay 625) where on the strength of an acknowledgment made by one of the mortgagees, a decree for redemption of his share of the mortgaged properties on payment of the entire mortgage amount was passed in' favour of the mortgagor plaintiff. The decision in that case does not really go against the principle upheld in the other cases already referred to. On the other hand, that principle-was accepted, but was only distinguished in view of the vital difference in the situation under which the acknowledgment happened to be made in Motilal Jadav v. Samal Bechar. In that case the acknowledgment was not at a time when the integrity of the mortgage remained unbroken but only after it had been split up by a partition as between the mortgagees. Since there was such an effective division of the mortgage debt and also of the mortgaged properties, it was held that the mortgagee who made the acknowledgment after such a division could bind himself by making an acknowledgment of the mortgage and thus keep alive the right of the mortgagor to redeem that portion of the mortgage holding which fell to the separate share of that particular mortgagee. That decision can be of no help to the plaintiffs in the present suit where the position is entirely different. Here the acknowledgment in Exts. B and 0 was made by Variath Poulo when himself and his brothers remained joint owners of the mortgage right as an integral whole, there having been no partition among them. Such an acknowledgment having been ineffectual even as against him, plaintiffs are not entitled to get a decree for redemption even in respect of that portion of the mortgage holding which fell to his share under the partition deed Ext, D which came into existence long after the entire mortgage had become barred by limitation. Such an acknowledgment having been ineffectual even as against him, plaintiffs are not entitled to get a decree for redemption even in respect of that portion of the mortgage holding which fell to his share under the partition deed Ext, D which came into existence long after the entire mortgage had become barred by limitation. It follows therefore that the decree passed by the lower appellate court in respect of Variath Poulo's 1/3 share in the mortgaged properties cannot be sustained and the suit has to be dismissed in toto. 8. In the result, S. A. 445 of 1953 preferred by the 3rd defendant is allowed and S. A. 472/1953 preferred by the plaintiffs is dismissed, and in reversal of the decree of the lower appellate court, plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout to the contesting 3rd defendant.