Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the 1st defendant against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of South Kanara passed in O. S.141 of 1954. 2. The short point for consideration in this appeal is about the nature of the estate taken by the 2nd defendant under the Registered Settlement-deed, Ext. B 1, executed in her favour by her mother. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the 2nd defendant gets only a life estate under Ext. B1 and her sons the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 6 get a vested remainder. 4. The plaint A Schedule property originally belonged to one Sundari Bai, mother of the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff and defendants 3 to 6 are the sons of the 2nd defendant. Sundari Bai executed the settlement-deed, Ext. BI on 20-10-1929 in favour of her daughter the 2nd defendant. The exact scope and effect of the said document will be considered later. The said 2nd defendant along with her sons, defendants 3 to 5, and as guardian of her minor son the 6th defendant, executed a sale-deed, Ext. B 2 in favour of the 1st defendant on 18-4-52, conveying among other items the properties obtained by her from her mother under the settlement deed Ext. Bl. The plaintiff, who is another son of 2nd defendant was not a party to the sale-deed Ext. B 2 and he filed the present suit, O. S.141/52, for a declaration that the sale-deed Ext. B2 does not convey to the 1st defendant more than the life estate of the 2nd defendant. 5. The suit was resisted by the 1st defendant-appellant mainly on the ground that the 2nd defendant has been given an absolute estate under the settlement-deed Ext. B 1, and as such, under the conveyance Ext. B 2, he has got an absolute right in the A schedule properties. 6. The learned Subordinate Judge, as already mentioned, on a construction of the recitals in Ext BI, has held that the dominant intention of the settlor was only to confer a life estate to the 2nd defendant with a vested remainder to her sons. In this view, the learned judge has decreed the suit as prayed for. 7. In appeal, Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that under Ext. In this view, the learned judge has decreed the suit as prayed for. 7. In appeal, Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that under Ext. BI, the 2nd defendant has been given an absolute estate which she was competent to convey and did convey under Ext. B2 to the 1st defendant. Alternatively, he also contended that Sundari Bai, under Ext-Bl, settled the A scheduled property on the 2nd defendant and her sons collectively and as such, the sons (plaintiff and defendants 3 to 6) also obtained present interest along with their mother in the A schedule property. He contended that under Ex.-B2, the 2nd defendant & defendants 3 to 6 have conveyed their interest in the property to the 1st defendant and to that extent the sale should be held to be valid; and therefore, the lower court should have dismissed the suit excepting as to the plaintiff's share. 8. We are not inclined to accept either of these contentions. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the settlement-deed Ext-BI conveys only a life estate to the 2nd defendant with a vested remainder to the sons of the 2nd defendant namely, plaintiff and defendants 3 to 6. 9. Before referring to the recitals in Ex-BI, it is necessary to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Bajrang Bahadur v. Bakhtraj Kuer (A. I. R.1953 S.C. 7 at p 9) as to the principles governing the construction of such documents: "In all such cases the true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory" Their Lordships further observe at page 10 as follows: "In cases where the intention of the testator is to grant an absolute estate, an attempt to reduce the powers of the owner by imposing restraint on alienation would certainly be repelled on the ground of repugnancy; but where the restrictions are the primary things which the testator desires and they are consistent with the whole tenor of the will, it is a material circumstance to be relied upon for displacing the presumption of absolute ownership". 10. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the above decision of the Supreme Court and reading Ext. 10. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the above decision of the Supreme Court and reading Ext. BI as a whole, it is clear that the dominant intention of the Settlor, Sundari Bai, was to give only a life estate to the 2nd defendant for enjoyment of the income for her life and that on her death the properties should go to her sons. The object of the Settlor in executing the document was to enable her daughter to carry on her maintenance easily and independently. After the words of conveyance, the settlor places a restriction prohibiting her from subjecting the properties to any kind of debt or encumbrance and the devolution is also to be in the line of her male children. This idea of enjoyment in the male line is again repeated in the following words: "You shall enjoy the said property permanently and successively in the line of your male children with improvements made etc. etc". There is no dispute that the parties are governed by the Hindu Mithakshara Law and if an absolute estate had been given to the 2nd defendant, the further direction as to devolution in the line of male children would be creating a new line of succession and as such, will be opposed to principles of Hindu Law. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar contended that the words in the document: "That you should enjoy the said property permanently and hereditarily", and the further words: "You shall enjoy the said properties permanently and successively as you please". clearly indicate that the indention of the donor was to grant an absolute estate to the 2nd defendant He further contended that the provisions regarding the restrictions on alienation and devolution in the line of male children will be repugnant & as such, have to be ignored. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-1st respondent on the other hand, contends that the document taken as a whole cannot lend support to the contentions of Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar. Mr. Eradi further contended that the intention of the settlor was only to provide for maintenance of the 2nd defendant for her life & that her male children are to get the vested remainder. Krishnamurthy Ayyar. Mr. Eradi further contended that the intention of the settlor was only to provide for maintenance of the 2nd defendant for her life & that her male children are to get the vested remainder. In support of this contention, the learned counsel further relied upon the restriction placed upon the powers of alienation of the 2nd defendant and in any event, the necessity for associating the male children in any alienation that she may effect. He also relied very strongly upon the direction in the settlement-deed that the properties should be enjoyed in the line of the male children and not in the line of her daughters as would be the case, if the 2nd defendant got an absolute estate. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi in support of his contentions relied upon a decision of a Bench of the Madras High Court in Radhakrishnayya v. Sakuntala (1950-II M. L. J. p. 239) and also on certain observations of the Supreme Court in Bujrang Bahadur v. Bakhtraj Kuer (A. I R 1953 Supreme Court 7). Though each document has to be construed according to the words and expressions used therein, the decision in Radhakrishnayya v Sakuntala (1950-II M L J p. 239) gives some useful guidance in the matter of construction of a document more or less similar to the one that we have to interpret in this case. In that case a Hindu governed by Mithakshara Law, executed a settlement deed in favour of his three daughters with a direction that the properties so taken shall pass on hereditarily from sons to grandsons. The female children of the daughters were given a right to take a share only in the absence of sons of the daughters. There were also recitals to the effect that the settlees therein should enjoy the same happily and hereditarily from sons to grandsons with powers of gift, sale etc. Their Lordships, Mr. Justice Satyanarayana Rao and Mr. Justice Basheer Ahmad Sayeed, in construing the said document, came to the conclusion that it was the deliberate intention of the settlor to give only a limited estate to the daughters and not to confer an absolute estate on them. Their Lordships were very strongly influenced in coming to this conclusion by the provision made in the document about the devolution of the property given to a woman, not to her daughters, but to her male children. 11. Their Lordships were very strongly influenced in coming to this conclusion by the provision made in the document about the devolution of the property given to a woman, not to her daughters, but to her male children. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in Bajrang Bahadur v. Bakhtraj Kuer (A.I. R.1953 Supreme Court 7) affords also some useful guidance. In that case, though the word "Malik" which ordinarily connotes absolute ownership was used and subsequently, there were certain words of limitation such as imposing restraint on alienation, their Lordships, held that such restrictions clearly show that it was not the intention of the testator in that case to confer anything but a life estate on the donee therein. In fact their Lordships observe that the clause in that will imposing a restraint on alienation is a pointer in the direction that what was sought to be conferred was only a life estate. Following the decisions in Radhakrishnayya v. Sakuntala, (1950-II M. L. J. p. 239) and Bajrang Bahadur v. Bakhtraj Kuer (A. I. R.1953 Supreme Court 7), we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the intention of the settlor in this case was to benefit her daughter the 2nd defendant during her life-time and to give the properties as a vested remainder to her grandsons, sons of the second defendant. 12. In this view, we hold that under Ext. B1, the 2nd defendant has got only a life estate in the plaint A schedule properties, and the conveyance of those properties under Ext. B2 to the 1st defendant will amount only to a transfer of the A schedule properties for the life time of the 2nd defendant. 13. Regarding the alternative argument of Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar that it is a collective settlement in favour of the 2nd defendant and her sons, we are not able to agree. The document is quite clear. It is executed only in favour of the 2nd defendant. Even the operative words of transfer are only in favour of the 2nd defendant and it is the 2nd defendant that is given the power to enjoy the property. In view of these clear recitals in this document, the contention about collective gift to the 2nd defendant and her sons also fails. 14. But Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar has also taken another objection to the nature of the relief granted in the decree. In view of these clear recitals in this document, the contention about collective gift to the 2nd defendant and her sons also fails. 14. But Mr. Krishnamurthy Ayyar has also taken another objection to the nature of the relief granted in the decree. On the finding that the property has been given only to the 2nd defendant for her life and a vested remainder to her sons, it follows that the alienation under Ext. B2 will be valid for her life time. The sons of the 2nd defendant including the plaintiff, have no right to be maintained out of this property during the lifetime of the 2nd defendant. Therefore, the direction in the decree that the alienation in favour of the 1st defendant is subject to the right of the plaintiff to be maintained out of the income thereof during the life of the 2nd defendant will be deleted. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent.