This revision has been filed against an order of the learned Addl. Commissioner, Jaipur dated 17.11.56 whereby he confirmed in appeal the order of the trial court about the appointment of a receiver pending disposal of the suit for recovery of possession over the land in dispute instituted by the opposite party against the applicants in the court of the Asst. Collector, Jaipur. 2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicants is that in ordering the appointment of a receiver on the land in dispute pendente lite both the trial court as well as the lower appellate court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction inasmuch as that they ignored the express provision of law contained in sec. 212 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It was urged that according to the provisions of this section it was incumbent on the courts below to satisfy them-selves before issuing an injunction and ordering the appointment of a receiver that the property in dispute was in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party thereto or that any party to the suit threatened or intended to remove or dispose of the said property in order to defeat the ends of justice. It was also urged that prior to the institution of the present suit the land in dispute was found in actual cultivatory possession of the applicants whose possession was duly declared by the S. D. M. in a proceeding between the parties under sec 145, Cr.P.C. and that so long as the said order of the criminal Court dated 3.9.56 was in force and the applicants were not evicted from the disputed land by due process of law, the courts below had no jurisdiction to disturb the possession of the applicant in these revenue proceeding*. Our attention was drawn to a copy of the order under sec. i 45, Cr.P.C. on the file passed by the S. D. M. in respect of this land. Our attention was drawn to a copy of the order under sec. i 45, Cr.P.C. on the file passed by the S. D. M. in respect of this land. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a decision of a single Judge of the Lahore High Court reported in A.I.R. 47 Lahore page 173 wherein it was held that the finding of a criminal court that "A" was in possession of a property X on the date on which breach of peace was likely to occur or within 2 months of the date, could not be questioned in a civil court and A must be held to be continuing in possession until he was evicted in due process of law: and as B was not on the date of suit in possession of the property X of which he was to recover possession, no injunction can be granted in his favour and against A as prayed for under O. 39r. 1 C. P. C. Reliance was also placed on R.R.D. 1956, pages 173 and 273 in which it was held that a revenue court was not authorised to grant an injunction and appoint a receiver wherever it appears to be just and convenient unless it was satisfied that either the property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated or that any party intends to remove or dispose it of in order to defeat the cause of justice As against this the learned counsel for the opposite party cited I. L. R. 22 All. 215 in which a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad held that the fact that there existed in respect of any immovable property an order of a magistrate passed under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. is no bar to the exercise by a civil court of the power conferred on it by sec. 505 (which now corresponds to O. 34, R. 1 C. P. C.) of appointing a receiver in respect of the same property. It was also urged that the opposite party had proved by affidavit that the property in question was being wasted and damaged by the applicants and that it was a fit case for issue of an injunction and the appointment of a receiver both under O.39 r. 1 C. P. C. read with sec. 212 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act as well as O. 40, r. 1. 212 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act as well as O. 40, r. 1. C. P. C. 3. In order to appreciate the arguments put in by the learned counsel for the applicants we examined the circumstances under which the impugned order was given by the courts below. 4. It is a common ground that there had been a long standing dispute between the parties in respect of this land. The opposite-party approached a criminal court to initiate proceeding under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C. against the applicants and on the basis of the record before the Magistrate he issued an order to the effect that the possession of the applicants be not disturbed unless they were evicted by due process of law. This order was passed on 3.9.56 and a week after i.e. on 11.9.56 the opposite party instituted a regular suit for restoration of possession in the court of the As«t. Collector, Jaipur. The applicants filed their written statement in which they denied all the allegations. On 27.9.56 the opposite-party filed an application for the issue of a temporary injunction and the appointment of receiver duly supported by an affidavit in which it was stated that the applicants were unlawfully cutting all the Pala and other spontaneous produce from the disputed land simply to cause an irreparable loss to the opposite-party. The prayer for a temporary injunction was allowed by the trial court and notice was given to the applicants to show cause why a receiver be not appointed. In their reply the opposite-party resisted this application. It appears that the court got the site inspected by appointing a Commissioner whose report dated 23.10.56 is to the effect that the applicants assisted by a large number of other persons were cutting down the Pala etc and removing the same by cartloads. The trial court on the basis of the record before it thought it fit to order the appointment of a receiver on the ground that the plaintiff opposite-party had established his bona fide claim and that unless a receiver was appointed it would not be possible to assess the damage which the applicants were causing to the land. In appeal the learned Addl. Commissioner also confirmed the same order which is now before us in revision. In appeal the learned Addl. Commissioner also confirmed the same order which is now before us in revision. The impugned concurrent order of the courts below is as stated above assailed on two grounds, viz, firstly that in the presence of an order of the magistrate under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. declaring the possession of the applicants on this land on the date when the order was given by him, could not be interfered with in a revenue suit and secondly the ingredients of sec. 212 Rajasthan Tenancy Act were not proved which would justify an order for the appointment of a receiver. We would take up both these contentions in seriatim. In so far as the first contention is concerned we are of the view that such an order of the magistrate in our opinion does not fetter the powers of a revenue or civil court to proceed under sec. 212 Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which corresponds in substance to Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. As held in I. L R. 22 p. 215 the magistrates order under sec. 145, Cr.P.C. is only intended "to control any period upto the time when the civil court takes seisin of the matter and passes such an order as may be necessary for the protection of the property. A final order under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. does not in any manner affect the rights of the parties, nor does it give rise to a presumption in a civil court in favour of the successful party, and it is open to the civil court on materials placed before it to come to a different conclusion from the one the magistrate has reached." The onus in such cases is on the unsuccessful party to show that he has a better title to the property than the person whose possession has been declared by the magistrate. The order of the magistrate under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. is admissible in evidence in the subsequent civil suit to prove the fact of the dispute, to show how it was settled but the findings of the magistrate on question of fact relating to possession are inadmissible. The rule of law laid down by a single judge of the Lahore High Court in 1947 of Lahore does not appear to be of a greater binding force than that of a D.B. decision in I.L.R. 22 All. 215. 5. The rule of law laid down by a single judge of the Lahore High Court in 1947 of Lahore does not appear to be of a greater binding force than that of a D.B. decision in I.L.R. 22 All. 215. 5. In the case before us, it is on the record that the opposite-party had given an affidavit to support his application for appointment of a receiver. It is also on the record that the court appointed a Commissioner to report about the crops etc. standing on the land and the conduct of the applicants who were alleged to have been using all means to remove the same and causing damage to the opposite-party. The Commissioner in his report stated that he visited the site in the presence of the parties and found that the applicants along with a fairly large number of other persons who had been collected to assist them were cutting Pala, etc. indiscriminately and removing the same from the site inspite of the protest of the opposite-party. On the basis of this as well as on grounds stated in the affidavit, the court was on duty bound to pass such orders as were deemed necessary for the protection of the property. As regards the other contention one of the essential ingredients of sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under which an injunction can be issued as well as a receiver can be appointed is to prove to the satisfaction of the trial court that the property was being damaged or wasted by one of the contesting parties. A removal of the natural produce by force is evidence of the fact that the applicants were causing damage to the property in dispute and that under such circumstances the only course open to the trial court was to issue an injunction and also to appoint a receiver in order to protect the property from further damage. There is nothing on the record before us to controvert the above facts and we are satisfied that the courts below did not contravene any provisions of law or acted without jurisdiction in ordering the appointment of a receiver. There is nothing on the record before us to controvert the above facts and we are satisfied that the courts below did not contravene any provisions of law or acted without jurisdiction in ordering the appointment of a receiver. As held in RLW 1953, 303 a court of appeal will be slow to interfere with the discretion of the lower courts in the appointment of a receiver and would interfere only if satisfied that the discretion has not been exercised in accordance with settled principles of law. This principle of law applies a fortiori in revision petitions, in which a court of revision would be almost reluctant to interfere in revision with the concurrent decision of the lower courts unless it is shown to its satisfaction that the lower courts acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction which do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached (1953 AIR, S.C. page 28). In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that this revision must fail. Accordingly we dismiss it and confirm the order concurrently passed by the lower courts.