Judgment :- 1. Defendant 4 in O. S. No. 26 of 1125 on the file of the District Court of Alleppey has preferred this appeal against the order of the Additional District Judge, dated 4-4-1957., dismissing his application, C. M. P. No. 6191 of 1956, to permit him to pay the decree-debt in instalments as provided for by the T-C Indebted Agriculturists Relief Act,' 1956 (President's Act No. Ill of 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act). The decree is one passed on foot of-a chitty hypothecation bond and the appellant was impleaded in the suit as a party defendant as he had purchased the hypotheca. There was no dispute before the learned judge that the appellant or the person primarily liable for the decree debt was not an "agriculturist" within the meaning of the Act. The learned judge refused to extend the benefits of instalment payment to the appellant on the ground that the 'debt is not one to which the provisions of the Act apply. 2. S.2, clause (b) defines the term "debt" as follows: "(b) "debt" means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist on the commencement of this Act, whether payable under a contract or under a decree or order of a Court, Civil or revenue, or otherwise, but does not include (i) ….. (ii) …. (iii) …. (iv) …. (v) … (vi) any liability incurred or arising under any chitty or kuri registered or licensed under the Travancore Chitties Act, 1-120 (XXVI of 1120) or the Cochin Kuries Act, 1107 (VII of 1107). The concerned chitty was started long before the commencement of the Travancore Chitties Act, 1120. The Travancore Chitties Act III of 1094 was in force at the time it was started. The chitty was therefore registered under the provisions of that Act. Exemption clause (vi) appended to S.2 (b) of the Act does not refer to liabilities incurred or arising under a chitty registered under the Travancore Chitties Act, III of 1094. All the same the teamed judge below took the view that the exemption would apply to liabilities arising or incurred under a chitty registered under the said earlier Act as well. His reasoning can be seen from the following extracts from his order: "Construing the section strictly it might appear that Chitties registered under the Chitties Act 1120 are alone exempted. His reasoning can be seen from the following extracts from his order: "Construing the section strictly it might appear that Chitties registered under the Chitties Act 1120 are alone exempted. But I think the legislature could not have intended that the exemption should confine itself within such narrow limits. If that be the case the result will be anomalous and even absurd; because under the same section, so far as the Cochin area is concerned Kuries registered as early as in 1107 have been brought under the exception. The result will be, that so far as the Travancore area is concerned the exemption will apply only to Chitties registered after 1120 while in Cochin area the liability will date back to Chitties registered in 1107 and thereafter. It was contended on behalf of the debtor that the section being deaf this court has only to give effect to it plain meaning and not to put any construction upon it so as to change the meaning intended by the section. I am unable to accept the contention". The learned judge then refers to certain passages from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and concluded the discussion thus: "In the present case also the language of the statute is plain; but the literal and natural meaning of it, if followed would lead to inconsistency or if I may say so even absurdity. The legislature could not have intended that the exemption should apply so far as Cochin area is concerned to Kuries started under the Kuries Act of 1107 and in Travancore only to Chitties started under the Chitties Act of 1120. The difference in the nature of the liability contemplated, is certainly great and such an unreasonable discrimination the legislature could not have intended. The section itself starts with the words any liability incurred or arising under any chitty etc' but while mentioning the relevant Act the amended Act of 1120 alone happened to be referred to, that is all." 3. We can agree with the learned judge below that the omission is, perhaps, unintentional, but Courts could not reach it by any recognised canons of interpretation. We can agree with the learned judge below that the omission is, perhaps, unintentional, but Courts could not reach it by any recognised canons of interpretation. It is not only liabilities arising or incurred in respect of chitties registered in the Travancore area under Act III of 1094 that have not been brought within the purview of the exemption clause, but also liabilities incurred or arising in the Travancore area or the Cochin area, as the case may be, before statute intervened in either State to regulate the conduct of chitties (or Kuries as they are called in Cochin), Act III of 1094 was the first Travancore Act in relation to chitties and the Cochin Kuries Act, 1107 is the first and the only enactment made in Cochin with respect to kuries. The decree under execution is an instance where the liability incurred under a chitty registered in the Travancore area under Act III of 1094 still subsists and it will not be questioned that there will be very many such instances of liabilities under chitties registered under that Act still subsist. Not only that, there will still be cases in Travancore area where liabilities incurred or arising under chitties started before the commencement of Act III of 1094 happen to be still subsisting. Likewise there will be very many cases in Cochin area of liabilities arising under kuries started before the Cochin Kuries Act, 1107, still subsist. The exemption clause (vi) to S.2 (b) of the Act, quoted above, does not refer to any liability arising under the three categories now mentioned. For courts to bring them within the purview of the exemption by any process of interpretation would be arrogating to themselves powers which they do not possess, but which the Legislature alone have. The passages the learned judge quotes from Maxwell do not really support the course of action he adopted and Maxwell himself can usefully be quoted to show that the learned judge's action is wrong. Before referring to Maxwell's text book we will refer to certain decisions of the Supreme Court and of some Indian High Courts to show that under the guise of interpretation, Courts cannot assume the role of the, legislature. 4. In New Piece Goods Bazaar Co. v. I. T. Commr. Before referring to Maxwell's text book we will refer to certain decisions of the Supreme Court and of some Indian High Courts to show that under the guise of interpretation, Courts cannot assume the role of the, legislature. 4. In New Piece Goods Bazaar Co. v. I. T. Commr. A. I. R.1950 S. C. 165-Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed (at p. 168 of the report): "It is elementary that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find that intention." In Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan A. I. R.1955 S. C. 504 -Venkatarama Ayyar, J. pointed out (at p. 526 of the report) that recourse to rules of construction would be necessary only when a statute is capable of two interpretations and that where the language is clear and the meaning plain, effect must be given to it. In Ram Krishan v. Delhi State -A. I. R.1956 S.C. 476 Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. said (at p. 478 of the report) that Courts have primarily to look at the language employed in the section and give effect to it. 5. Similar observations are to be found in a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Ajit Kumari v. Surendra Natha A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 733. A few extracts from the head-notes to that case would serve our purpose here. Head-note (c) reads: "(c) Per Das Gupta J: The canons of construction of statutes do not permit the court to take the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the consequence of interpretation as a factor for deciding on the correct interpretation. Whether the result is reasonable or not is in substance a question of expedience and it is not for the court to dabble in it". Head-note (f) reads: "(f) Per Mukherji, J: If a statute contains a gap it is not for the court to fill in but for the legislature or else it will be mere speculation or guess work which the court should avoid". To cite only one more case on this aspect, we now refer to Srinivasacharyulu v. Hanumantha Rao A. I. R.1955 Andhra 10. To cite only one more case on this aspect, we now refer to Srinivasacharyulu v. Hanumantha Rao A. I. R.1955 Andhra 10. Subba Rao, C. J. observed there (at p.12 of the report) that arguments based on possible anomalies are not of relevance when the provisions of the section are clear and unambiguous. 6. To these cases may be added a few extracts from Maxwell (tenth edition). At pp. 12 and 13 it is seen stated: "It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and, in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do". "We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself". Words plainly should not be added by implication into a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context. A case not provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission appears consequently to have teen unintentional. Thus, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (c. 85), S.21, which provided that any order made for the protection of the earnings of a deserted married woman might be discharged by the magistrate who made it, was held not to empower his successor to discharge it, though the magistrate who had made it was dead, and this rule is of general application. An Act which authorised the removal of lunatics to a hospital when there was no lunatic asylum established in the county did not authorise such removal when a county asylum existed but was so full as-to be unable to receive another lunatic". An Act which authorised the removal of lunatics to a hospital when there was no lunatic asylum established in the county did not authorise such removal when a county asylum existed but was so full as-to be unable to receive another lunatic". Pages 14 and 15 give further instances of casus omissi which courts refused to fill up by any process of interpretation: "The Limitation Act, 1623 (c.16), having provided that the period of limitation should not run while the plaintiff was beyond the seas, and 4 and 5 Anne, c. 3, having made a similar provision where the defendant was abroad, S.7 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (c. 42), enacted that no part of the United Kingdom should be deemed "beyond the seas" within the meaning of the former Act, but made no mention of the latter Act, and it was held that the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (c. 42), could not be stretched to include the latter Act. There may have been no good reason for thus limiting the new enactment to the Act of 1623, but there was no sufficient ground, either in the context or in the nature of the consequences resulting from the omission, for concluding that the Act of Anne was intended to be included". When the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (c. 93), S.11 (repealed with certain savings by the Married Women's Property Act. 1882 (c. 75), S.2, empowered a married woman to sue, without making her liable to be sued, it was held that no action lay against her", In the light of these authorities it is fairly clear that the learned judge acted wrongly in holding that exemption clause (vi) to S.2 (b) of the Act brought within its scope liabilities arising under chitties registered under the Travancore Chitties Act, III of 1094. As law stands now a liability incurred or arising under such a chitty or under a chitty or a kuri, as the case may be, started before Act III of 1094 was enacted in Travancore or Act VII of 1107 was enacted in Cochin would not come within the ambit of exemption clause (vi) to S.2 (b) of the Act. The lower court's decision to the contra is wrong and we set it aside. 7. The lower court's decision to the contra is wrong and we set it aside. 7. The earlier Travancore Act left chitties started before its enactment untouched (vide S.2) and the later Act did practically the same thing with chitties started before its commencement (vide S.2). No legal fiction has been introduced to the effect that chitties registered under the earlier Act will be deemed to have been registered under the later Act. The Cochin Act (VII of 1107) no doubt gave retrospective operation to some of its provisions, but no registration was necessary for a kuri of which the first drawing has been conducted before the commencement of that Act. The respondent's learned counsel sought to maintain the dismissal of the appellant's application by another argument. His contention was that as the appellant was not the person primarily liable for the debt he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Emphasis was sought to be laid on the words 'due from an agriculturist' occurring in the definition of the term 'debt' in the Act. The appellant purchased the hypotheca and it is in his capacity as such purchaser that he was made a party defendant. He is not personally liable for the debt and the contention was that the benefits of the Act are open only to persons who are primarily or personally responsible for the debt. To answer this argument we need only point out that'the definition of the term debt occurring in the Act and quoted above, is in all material particulars, word for word the same as that obtaining in the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 (Act IV of 1938) and that authorities are well settled that persons similarly situated as the present appellant are also entitled to the benefits of that Act. We see no reason why a different rule should be applied to the Act with which we are concerned. Before referring to the case-law on the point it may be pointed out that exemptions provided in the two Acts are different, but that does not affect the question before us. 8. In Nageswaraswami v. Viswasundara A. I. R.1953 S. C. 370 - Mukherjee J. (as he then was) stated (at p. 372 of the report) that for a person to obtain the benefits of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, it is not necessary that he himself should be liable for the debt. 8. In Nageswaraswami v. Viswasundara A. I. R.1953 S. C. 370 - Mukherjee J. (as he then was) stated (at p. 372 of the report) that for a person to obtain the benefits of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, it is not necessary that he himself should be liable for the debt. The learned judge observed: - "The right to claim relief as is well settled by decisions (vide 'Perianna Goundan v. Sellappa Goundan', A. I. R.1939 Mad 186) of the Madras High Court is not confined to the person who originally contracted the debt, but is available to his legal representatives and assigns as well; nor is it necessary that the applicant should be personally liable for the debt." The decision referred to in the above extract Perianna Goundan v. Sellappan Goundnn; A. I. R.1939 Mad. 186 is one rendered by Varadachariar and Abdur Rahman, JJ. the leading judgment having been delivered by the former. The following quotation from that decision may usefully be made here: "The only ground on which the petitioner's right to relief under the Act is challenged is that the liability of the petitioner is not a'debt' within the meaning of S.3 (3) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that this definition should be understood as limited to cases where a person is personally liable. We are unable to read the definition in this limited sense. There are no words in the definition clause justifying any such restriction; the clause speaks of 'any liability' and the word 'due' does not necessarily imply that it must be recoverable by imprisonment of the debtor It could not therefore have been the intention of the legislature to limit the relief under the Act to cases where a person was personally liable. Its avowed purpose was to enable agriculturists to retain their property and prevent such property passing into the hands of creditors or execution purchasers. Again according to the contention o the plaintiff's learned counsel, it will only be the person who actually contracts the debt that will be entitled to claim relief under the Act and not his heir-at law or legal representative because the latter will ordinarily be under no personal liability." The learned judges ultimately held that the debt must be scaled down under the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. As stated earlier, there is no reason why a different meaning should be attributed to the term'debt" as defined in the Act with which we are concerned here. The respondent's contention has therefore no force and we repel it. 9. The appeal succeeds in the result and we allow it with costs. The lower court's order is set aside and the application giving rise to the appeal is remitted back to that court to be disposed of afresh in the light of this decision. Order accordingly.