JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - First appeal No. 95 of 1949 arises out of Title Suit No. 57 of 1946 and First Appeal No. 45 of 1949 arises out of mortgage suit (T.M.S.) No. 13 of 1947. Both the suits were tried together in the Courts below and they are covered by one judgment dated 4th January 1949 of Sri R.C. Misra, Subordinate Judge of Berhampur. This judgment of ours will cover both the appeals which were heard together. 2. From the genealogy it will appear that one Harakrishna (I) had five sons. The fifth son was Purusottam who died long since. His son Harakrishna (II), who was the last male holder in respect of the properties in dispute, died on 21st July 1919 leaving behind him his widow Maliani, who died on 30th September 1923, and his mother Gellamoni who died long after on 8th October 1946. The Plaintiff in the Title Suit, Nilamboro, is the only surviving male member of all the other four branches. It is the common ground that Harakrishna (II) was separate. 3. In both the suits the main question involved is whether the large number of alienations made by Gellamoni are binding upon the next reversioner Nilamoboro. 4. It is to be mentioned here that Defendants 5 and 35 in the Title Suit have brought First Appeal No. 95 of 1949. Dasarathi, who is the Plaintiff in the Mortgage Suit and Defendant No. 35 in the Title Suit, has brought First Appeal No. 45 of 1949. 5. Within two months after the death of Harakrishna, his widow Maliani executed a deed of surrender in favour of Gellamoni, the mother. To set aside this deed of surrender, a Title Suit was brought in the year 1919, which was ultimately compromised on 9th December 1922 (Ext. 15 (b). Under the terms of the compromise decree both Gellamoni and Maliani were entitled to equal shares in the property having absolute rights to alienate. As I have mentioned above, Mallani died in September 1923. Maliani during her life time, executed deeds of alienations in favour of Defendants 1 and 2 of the Title Suit. To set aside these alienations, Nilamboro's father Ramchandra (II) brought Original Suit No. 18 of 1924. As I have mentioned above, Mallani died in September 1923. Maliani during her life time, executed deeds of alienations in favour of Defendants 1 and 2 of the Title Suit. To set aside these alienations, Nilamboro's father Ramchandra (II) brought Original Suit No. 18 of 1924. This was ultimately decreed after keen contest, and the matter went up in first Appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Madras which confirmed the decree with the modification that Ramchandra (II) would not be entitled to immediate possession of the property during the time of Gellamoni. It is pertinent to refer to this suit as the alienations, to be tested before us, are alleged to have been made to meet the expenses of the suit (T.S. 1824) from its original stage till its finalisation in the High Court. It is the case of both parties that Ramchandra was set up by Gellamoni to bring the suit. Gellamoni having executed quite a large number of deeds during her life time, Nitamboro has brought the present Title Suit No. 57 of 1946 to set aside those alienations and for possession on the basis that they are not bona fide transactions for consideration and are not supported by legal necessity. He added as many as 39 Defendants. Our task has been much simplified in the appeal, because it is only the alienations in favour of Defendant No. 5 Narayan and Defendant No. 35 Dasarathi, (Defendant No. 5 being the father-in-law of Defendant No. 35) which are to be tested before us. 6. Ext. 24 is a sale-deed dated 4th May 1923 executed by Gellamoni in favour of Defendant No. 5. Ext. 24(a) is another sale deed dated 15th March 1927 executed by Gellamoni in favour of Defendant No. 5, and Ext. 2(b) is another sale-deed dated 25th November, 1924 executed by Gellamoni in favour of Defendant No. 5. But the most important document to be tested before us is Ext. A (II), the mortgage transaction executed by Gellamoni in favour of Defendant No. 35 (the son-in-law of Defendant No. 5) on 3rd March 1933. Dasarathi, being the Plaintiff in the Mortgage Suit, has come with the prayer for enforcing the mortgage transaction on the basis that the mortgage transaction is a bona fide transaction for consideration and for legal necessity, and, as such is binding against Nilamboro. Dasarathi, being the Plaintiff in the Mortgage Suit, has come with the prayer for enforcing the mortgage transaction on the basis that the mortgage transaction is a bona fide transaction for consideration and for legal necessity, and, as such is binding against Nilamboro. Defendant No. 5 and Defendant No. 35 had taken up a further plea that Nilamboro was not the next reversioner of deceased Harakrishna (11). It was further pleaded that the properties transferred in their favour were the Stridhan properties of Gellamoni, and, as such, she had absolute right to transfer. Both these pleas have been negatived by the Court below and Mr. Pal, appearing on behalf of the Appellants In the both the appeals, does not press the points. On a perusal of the judgment we find that there is nothing to interfere so far as these findings are concerned. 7. Mr. Pal, however, has argued in both the appeals on the sole question that the four alienations in question are bona fide for consideration and supported by legal necessity, and, as such Nilamboro is bound by them. 8. We will first of all take up the mortgage transaction dated 3rd March 1933 (Ext. A(II). It purport to be for consideration of Rs. 7000/-. The consideration is made up of three Hems as follows: (i) Rs. 57847/- being the amount due under a promissory note dated 18th January 1931 for Rs. 4144/7/- executed by mortgagor Gellamoni in favour of Dasarathi; (ii) Rs. 1000/- taken by the mortgagor Gellamoni on 27th February 1933 on a promissory note executed by her; and (iii) Rs. 2159/- taken in cash previous to the execution of the suit mortgage bond for household expenses of Gellamoni. There is no dispute over the position that in order that the mortgage transaction, executed by a limited owner, would be binding as against the reversioner of the last male owner, the alienee or the mortgagee has got to prove that the transaction is bona fide for consideration and supported by legal necessity. On scrutinising Ext. A (II) we find that there is no thumb impression of the executant Gellamoni on any of the front pages of the document to show that she had executed. It is mentioned there in the front page that she has put a mark and signed through the pen of somebody else. On scrutinising Ext. A (II) we find that there is no thumb impression of the executant Gellamoni on any of the front pages of the document to show that she had executed. It is mentioned there in the front page that she has put a mark and signed through the pen of somebody else. It is not even mentioned through whose pen she had signed the document. Indeed on the back side of one of the pages her thumb impression appears to show that she admitted execution. The scribe of this document has not been examined even though admittedly he is alive. The only attesting witness examined in the case is D. W. 5 Bonomali Padhi. It is manifestly clear that the executant Gellamoni is an Illiterate woman and the vast properties involved in these two litigations clearly show that she belonged to a very rich and respectable family, and, as such, a Purdanishin lady. In a transaction, which purports to have been executed by a lady of this description, it is incumbent upon the party, who wants to rely upon this document or to enforce it, to prove that the document was read over and explained to her and that she executed the document only after she understood the nature and contents of the transaction. It is curious to find, there is no evidence on record to show that in fact the document was read over and explained to the executant, The attesting witness D. W. 5 states that he was present all along when the document was being written out, but at the same time he says that the document was not read out to him. These are significant circumstances to throw a good deal of suspicion over the genuineness and bona fide character of the document. 9. We will take up the question regarding the consideration of this mortgage transaction. As I have indicated above, no cash consideration passed under the transaction in question. The mortgage bond was executed to pay up previous debts on two promissory bonds mainly. The second mortgage bond for Rs. 1000/- alleged to have been executed on 27-2-33, has not been produced in Court It is significant to note here that the only attesting witness D. W. 5, examined in the case, says that these two promissory notes were not to be seen at the time of execution of the document. The second mortgage bond for Rs. 1000/- alleged to have been executed on 27-2-33, has not been produced in Court It is significant to note here that the only attesting witness D. W. 5, examined in the case, says that these two promissory notes were not to be seen at the time of execution of the document. We shall have therefore to examine if the hand notes were really for consideration. The only hand note which has been placed on record is Ext. F(II) dated 18-11-31. Neither the scribe nor the attesting witness to the hand note has been examined to prove the actual passing of the consideration. The thumb impression alleged to be that of Gellamoni is taken in a most unsatisfactory manner with writing ink. Nothing is decipherable from the thumb impression appearing in the hand note. It is strange that such a large amount of Rs. 4144/7/- was advanced on a scrap of paper like this without getting the hand note registered or demanding any security. There is a still more important circumstance which had rightly weighed with the learned trial Court to come to the finding that the hand note is a fictitious transaction without consideration. In the mortgage bond it appears that the previous debts were in favour of Dasarathi, the mortgagee, but the hand note Ext. F(II) shows otherwise. It stands in the name of the father-in-law Narayan Panigrahi. To bridge up the Appellants' inconsistencies at the trial stage a case was made out that in fact the money came from the son-in-law Dasarathi and the transaction was being looked after by the father-in-law. There is no document executed between the father-in-law and the son-in-law even though they live in distant villages. It will be pertinent here to refer to the evidence of Dasarathi, the son-in-law, who is said to be the real creditor. In his examination-in-chief, which consists of four lines only, he does not speak anything about the consideration either of the mortgage transaction or of the hand note. He simply says, "I am Defendant No. 35 and the Plaintiff in the mortgage Suit No. 13. Gellamoni was known to me. She never sent any registered notice to me. I never refused any such letter. I never received or refused Ext. 5. He simply says, "I am Defendant No. 35 and the Plaintiff in the mortgage Suit No. 13. Gellamoni was known to me. She never sent any registered notice to me. I never refused any such letter. I never received or refused Ext. 5. "In cross-examination he has exposed himself very clearly when he says "Two years back, I saw the suit mortgage bond when the suit was filed. I never perused it before. My Father-in-law was in charge of it. I can't say how or what promotes were executed. I have no documents with me to prove that I gave the amount to my father-in-law who never wrote any letter to me stating that he had taken such a mortgage bond in my favour." He even goes to the extent of saying "I cannot identify the signature of my father-in-law". If this be the statement of the actual creditor, in our opinion, no Court of Justice will find that the transaction is a bona fide transaction for valuable consideration. Dasarathi admits that there was a partition deed executed between himself, his brother and father. Presumably this mortgage transaction must have found mentioned in the partition deed itself. The partition deed, even though called for from Dasarathi, has not been produced. Mr. Pal has placed before us the correspondence between the lawyer who was in charge of the First, Appeal in Madras arising out of O.S. No. 18 of 1924 and the clerk of Mr. V. Subba Rao at Berhampur. The correspondence, referred to by Mr. Pal, can at best relate to the promissory note for Rs. 1000/- which has not been produced. It appears from the correspondence that in fact a sum of Rs. 5501- was sent to engage Mr. Venkata Ramasastry, a leading counsel of Madras, at the stage of first appeal., as it appears from Ext. C(II). But It is significant to note this exhibit does not indicate who had paid the money. On the above consideration, therefore, we have no hesitation to agree with the learned trial Court and to find that the mortgage bond is not for consideration. The slender evidence regarding the passing of consideration on the hand note Ext. F (II) is that of the only witness D. W. 8 who happens to be the son of D. W. 4. Narayan (Defendant No. 5). The slender evidence regarding the passing of consideration on the hand note Ext. F (II) is that of the only witness D. W. 8 who happens to be the son of D. W. 4. Narayan (Defendant No. 5). The learned trial Court gave good reasons to disbelieve both D. W. 4 and D. W. 8. 10. We will now take up the question of legal necessity. Indeed in the recital of the mortgage bond it is stated that for litigation expenses of Title Suit No. 18124 Gellamoni had borrowed the aforesaid sums on hand note. But that recital alone cannot give the benefit of the finding in favour of Dasarathi on the question of legal necessity. It is very strange to find that while the hand-note for Rs. 1000/- is not forthcoming, the other hand note does not even recite that the sum of Rs. 41447/- was advanced to Gellamoni for meeting the litigation expenses. The hand note is absolutely silent about the purpose. It is still more extraordinary and curious to find that none of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Defendants states about the purpose for which the advance was mad to Gellamoni. Even Defendant No. 5, who was in charge of the transaction on behalf of his son-in-law Dasarathi, the mortgagee, does not speak a word that the original loans on the basis of two hand notes were for the purpose of meeting the litigation expenses. The other witness D.W. 8, the son of Defendant No. 5, is also silent about the purpose. In our opinion, the Appellants stand on a worse position on the question of legal necessity for the mortgage transaction. We would therefore find definitely that the mortgage transaction is not supported by legal necessity, and, as such, is not binding against Nilamboro. 11. One other point also was argued before the trial Court that the mortgage bond having been materially altered, it has become void and not enforceable in law. In the face of our definite finding indicated above, the point need not be decided. But as the point was argued before us, we thought it fit to notice it in our judgment. It appears from Ext. A(II) that there are four attesting witnesses appearing in the body of the document. In the face of our definite finding indicated above, the point need not be decided. But as the point was argued before us, we thought it fit to notice it in our judgment. It appears from Ext. A(II) that there are four attesting witnesses appearing in the body of the document. D. W. 1, Bonomali, another man Kandha Pal, who has not been examined, Defendant No. 5 Narayan Panigrahi and another Narasingha Pal appear to have signed as attesting witnesses. But on a comparison of the certified copy of the document Ext. 81 and the more legible copy obtained from the registration office (Ext. 31a), with Ext. A(II), the learned trial Court has found that the names of Narayan Panigrahi and Narasingh Pal which do not appear in Exts. 31 and 31 (a) do appear In Ext. A (II). As such, he has rightly found that they are subsequent additions on the document which is sought to be enforced in the Court. The trial Court has found that it is a material alteration, and, as such, has rendered it void. On a perusal of the relevant evidence on record on the point, Narayan Panigrahi, who poses not to have attested the document, could not explain in his deposition as to how his signature as one of the attestors appears in the document, Dasarathi, who was examined as D. W. 7, also fails to explain. The document was in possession of Narayan Panigrahi on behalf of his son-in-law Dasarathi. None of them was able to explain the attestation which is clearly as subsequent alteration. We are of the view that the mortgagee is responsible for this alteration without the consent of the mortgagor. Mr. Pal argues that this cannot be taken to be a case of material alterations as the legal requisite for the document being attested by two witnesses is already there and the additions of two other names does not affect the rights and liabilities arising from the terms of the document between the parties. To us it appears that it is a material alteration as it was likely to prejudice the mortgagor under certain circumstances. 1? To us it appears that it is a material alteration as it was likely to prejudice the mortgagor under certain circumstances. 1? the original attestors do not want to depose to the effect as desired by the mortgagee, he will be in a position, on the face of this material alteration, to avail of the deposition of the two other persons named as attest of subsequently to his advantage. It is to be noted here that one of the subsequent additions in the name of no other person than the father-in-law (Defendant No. 5) who was examined as D. W. 4. The position of law on the point has been clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1940 160 (Privy Council) . In the deed before their Lordships there were alterations of the date of execution and of certain other words by making holes in the document without the consent of the oblige by the party in whose favour it was executed. Their Lordships held the case not to be one of material alterations as the terms which had been disfigured or dropped out by the holes did appear clearly in other parts of the document and therefore the alterations had not changed the legal rights and liabilities of the parties and did not prejudice the party bound by the document in any event. But the position of law has been very well discussed and it has been laid down as a guidance for the Indian Courts as what would constitute a material alteration. Their Lordships observed that the rule of Law on the point prevailing In England does apply to Indian cases also. Their Lordships further observed that material alteration does not render the document void as initio and does not put the parties in the position exactly they were prior to the execution of the document but only operates from the time of such alteration and prevents enforcement of any of the rights arising out of the document in any Court. Their Lordships further observed that material alteration does not render the document void as initio and does not put the parties in the position exactly they were prior to the execution of the document but only operates from the time of such alteration and prevents enforcement of any of the rights arising out of the document in any Court. It will be very pertinent to quote their Lordships' observations as to what the material alteration is: A material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. We do follow the view with great respect that the document is not rendered void (sic) Initio. But in the particular case when the mortgagee is coming to enforce the transaction as a mortgage transaction, he is forbidden to do so by this rule of law. It is needless to say that attestation of a mortgage transaction is one of the material parts of it. We therefore, find that the mortgage transaction is not enforceable in law for this material alteration. 12. We will now take up the alienates In favour of Defendant No. 5, that is Exts. 24(a) and 24(b). Ext. 24 is in respect of 1. 48 acres and for Rs. 200/-. Ext. 24(a) is in respect of 1. 46 acres and for Rs. 300/- and Ext. 24(b) is in respect of 2. 42 acres and for Rs. 700/-. The recital in Ext. 24 is that a sum of Rs. 200/- had been borrowed by Gellamoni from Defendant No. 5 previously under a promissory note. The recital indicates that it was only a personal loan of Gellamoni and it cannot therefore be binding upon the estate or the reversioner. Further the date of the promissory note has not been mentioned. Nor is there any evidence to that effect. The promissory note also has not been produced. The only evidence on record as to the necessity of the loan is that f Defendant No. 5 himself and, as we have discussed his evidence earlier, it is not reliable, there being no other corroboration. Ext. Nor is there any evidence to that effect. The promissory note also has not been produced. The only evidence on record as to the necessity of the loan is that f Defendant No. 5 himself and, as we have discussed his evidence earlier, it is not reliable, there being no other corroboration. Ext. 24(b) does not give a word as to the existence of the necessity or the alienation thereunder. Defendant No. 5 however explains in his evidence that all these alienations were or conducting the civil litigations in which Gellamoni had been involved. The learned Court below has given sufficient reasons not to accept the subsequent explanation of Defendant No. 5, particularly when the recital in It he document is silent about the purpose. There remains the other document Ext. 24(a) where indeed the recital is to the effect that a sum of Rs. 300/- was necessary to pay up the debts in connection with the civil suits. The recital does not indicate who the creditors were, whether it was Defendant No. 5 or Dasarathi (Defendant No. 35) or anyone else. The original transaction of loan of Rs. 300/- was not also produced before the Court, nor has it been referred to in the document itself. It is further important to note that so far as Ext. 24 is concerned the alienee has produced only a certified copy of the document and not the original. There is no explanation as to why the original is not forthcoming from the custody of the alienee. The document having been exhibited without objection, the non-production of the original may not affect the admissibility of the document, but it does affect the bona fide nature of it, that is, whether any consideration passed under the transaction or whether it was meant to be acted upon at all. In the above circumstances, the learned Court below was perfectly justified in finding that Defendant No. 5 has not been able to prove the alienations on the basis of Exts. 24, 24(a) and 24(b) as binding against the reversioner Nilamboro. 13. In conclusion, we confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismiss both First Appeal 45 of 1949 and First Appeal 95 of 1949. The Respondents will be entitled to the costs of First Appeal No. 45 of 1949 but not in First. 24, 24(a) and 24(b) as binding against the reversioner Nilamboro. 13. In conclusion, we confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismiss both First Appeal 45 of 1949 and First Appeal 95 of 1949. The Respondents will be entitled to the costs of First Appeal No. 45 of 1949 but not in First. Appeal No. 95 of 1949 where there is no appearance or the Respondent. Das, J. 14. I agree. 15. Appeals dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed