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1957 DIGILAW 161 (KER)

Devaki Sarada v. The Trivandrum Permanent Fund Ltd.

1957-07-15

T.K.JOSEPH, VARADARAJA IYENGAR

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Judgment :- 1. These two appeals arise from two separate suits instituted by two different Banking institutions to enforce their debts charged on same immovable property of their common debtor. As they involved similar question of construction of deed, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this single judgment. A.S. No.167 of 1955 (T) The plaintiff in the suit which led to this appeal is the Trivandrum Permanent Fund Ltd. They had extended certain overdraft accommodation up to a limit of Rs. 3000/- to Sankaran, a Government contractor and to secure the same had got Ext. A hypothecation bond dated 28-4-1119 corresponding to 14-12-1945 executed in their favour by Sankaran and his wife Devaki, deceased. Sankaran is the 1st defendant and the children of Devaki, all minors, are defendants 2 to 6 in the case. The property charged under Ext. A had been acquired by way of gift by Devaki from her father Govindan under Ext. D Udampadi dated 25-2-1119; and Devaki in Ext. A had claimed the same as belonging to her in absolute right. The main question in controversy between the parties was about the scope of this Udampadi. The contention raised on behalf of the minor children of Devaki was that on its proper construction, the Udampadi conferred the property not alone on Devaki but on her thavazhi as a whole and Devaki was in consequence incompetent, by herself and without more, to encumber the same under Ext. A. The court below found that Devaki obtained the property exclusively for herself under and by virtue of the Udampadi and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff-Bank accordingly. The defendants 2 to 6 through the guardian ad-litem seek to re-agitate the question by this appeal. 2. Now Ext.D Udampadi takes the form of a mutual agreement between Govindan an Ezhava father and Devaki, one of his ten children. Under the deed, Devaki gives up her future right to a share of the inheritance in all her father's estate in return for a present gift by the father in her favour of some of his properties. 2. Now Ext.D Udampadi takes the form of a mutual agreement between Govindan an Ezhava father and Devaki, one of his ten children. Under the deed, Devaki gives up her future right to a share of the inheritance in all her father's estate in return for a present gift by the father in her favour of some of his properties. Exhibit D in terms provide for Devaki to take the property, apply for mutation, obtain patta in her name and enjoy the property with all absolute rights, The document recites that the occasion for the gift was Devaki's own request in the matter made apparently with a view to help her husband to obtain bank facilities under Ext. A. And it would appear that the rest of the children got similar gifts though at various other points of time. There can be no doubt that on the wording of Ext. D Devaki can claim to be the exclusive owner of the property and entitled as such to execute the suit hypothecation bond. But it is contended on behalf of Devaki's children that the mere fact that the gift was given in the name of Devaki did not mean that she should alone get the benefit of it but the gift must enure to the sub-tarwad of Devaki and her children. The argument is that in conformity with the Marumakkathayam usage in the matter which must be deemed to have still governed him, the donor should be held to have intended to make the gift for the benefit of the group as distinguished from an individual component thereof and if so it did not matter in whose name the gift was made. When once the gift was made it partook of the nature of sub-tarwad property over which the donee acquired no special interest as against the unnamed or even unborn persons who constituted the tarwad. There is, in our judgment, no substance whatever in this submission. For one thing there was no rule even in the days when pristine Marumakkatha-yam law prevailed that under no circumstances could a gift be made by a Marumakkathayam father to his daughter so as to constitute her the sole and absolute owner of his bounty. And with the transfer of emphasis from group to individual ownership brought about by the statutory innovations, there is less scope than ever for gifts in favour of sub-tarwads. And with the transfer of emphasis from group to individual ownership brought about by the statutory innovations, there is less scope than ever for gifts in favour of sub-tarwads. For another, the best that the donor himself would say on behalf of the children, whom he was out to support as Dw.1, was that the gift was intended for their support also. But beyond all, there is the express language of Ext. D Udampadi and the surrounding circumstances which gives a quietus to a contention of this kind. The finding of the court below that Devaki was the absolute owner of the property under and by virtue of the terms of Ext. D Udampadi is therefore perfectly right and the decree in favour of the bank on foot of this construction must be held to be unassailable. 3. Before closing we must notice an ingenious argument addressed to us by Mr. T K. Narayana Pillai (Parur), appearing for the children, in the connected appeal based upon the definition of 'Makkathayam property' in S.4 clause (11) and the rule as to divisibility of Makkathayam property contained in S.32 of the Ezhava Act, III of 1100. S.4 (11) says. "Makkathayam property is property obtained from the husband or father by the wife or child or both of them by gift, inheritance or bequest." S. 32 says: Except where a contrary intention is expressed in the instrument of gift or bequest, if any, Makkathayam property acquired after the date of the passing of the Regulation shall be liable to be divided among the wife and each of the children in equal shares: Provided that, in the partition of Makkathayam property, the issue how-low-so-ever of a deceased child shall be entitled to only such share as the child itself, if alive, would have taken." The argument was that the property herein was Makkathayam property Within the meaning of the definition having been obtained from a father by a child in 1119 after the Act came force. The argument then proceeded to say that by virtue of S.32, the property became divisible, among the wife and children of the donor, inasmuch as there was no contrary intention against such divisibility, within the meaning of the Exception in the section. The argument then proceeded to say that by virtue of S.32, the property became divisible, among the wife and children of the donor, inasmuch as there was no contrary intention against such divisibility, within the meaning of the Exception in the section. But it is forgotten that Makkathayam property within the meaning of the S.4 (11) and 32 paucits a group of beneficiaries consisting of a wife and children, though the acquirer on behalf of the group is the wife or a child. And the source of acquisition is the same only you give his relationship of husband or father from the point of view of acquirer. If therefore under particular gift an individual donee is alone predicated the idea of Makkathayam gift or property cannot arise and neither of the Sections will apply. The contrary intention referred to in S.32 refers to an intention to benefit only some one or other of the group who will according to the section otherwise take an equal share and not alone to the question of divisibility as assumed by the argument. It is unnecessary to add that the argument does not arise on the pleadings and is also of doubtful utility. 4. The appeal fails and is therefore dismissed with costs. 5. The plaintiff has taken up a cross-appeal in regard to the rate of interest at 4 per cent alone awarded after suit. The complaint is that the contract rate was 9 percent and there was no reason to depart from that rate. It is also mentioned that in the ex-parte decree which had been originally passed interest at 6 per cent had been provided. But the rate of interest from the date of suit to the date of the decree is in the discretion of the court and we have not been shown anything in the case to exclude the discretion. The cross-appeal is therefore dismissed but without costs. A.S. No.269 of 1955 (T) 6. The plaintiff in this appeal is the Central Banking Corporation. They had extended overdraft accommodation in favour of Sankaran on basis of a pro-note and an open loan agreement. As large amounts had accrued due under the account and remained unpaid the bank called for additional security and that led to the execution of Ext. E hypothecation bond dated 31-11-1123 corresponding to 30-6-1948 for a sum of Rs. They had extended overdraft accommodation in favour of Sankaran on basis of a pro-note and an open loan agreement. As large amounts had accrued due under the account and remained unpaid the bank called for additional security and that led to the execution of Ext. E hypothecation bond dated 31-11-1123 corresponding to 30-6-1948 for a sum of Rs. 17275/- by Devaki in favour of the Bank with Sankaran as an attestor and charging the property covered by the Udampadi between her father and herself, dated 25-2-1119. The Udampadi is filed in this case as Exhibit F. This suit was filed for recovery of the amounts due under Ext. E hypothecation bond. The same contention based on the scope of the Udampadi as was raised in the other case was taken here also by the children of Devaki as defendants 2 to 6 and similarly overruled. For the reasons mentioned in the judgment in the connected appeal we dismiss this appeal also with costs.